People v. Leonard

2024 IL App (4th) 230413-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 3, 2024
• Docket: 4-23-0413
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 230413-U This Order was filed under FILED NO. 4-23-0413 April 3, 2024 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender not precedent except in the IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Winnebago County SHAWN M. LEONARD, ) No. 20CF563 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Debra D. Schafer, ) Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Harris and Knecht concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: By incurring a felony conviction, even a nonviolent felony conviction, a citizen forever loses the constitutional right to have a firearm for the defense of his person and his house.

¶2 In a stipulated bench trial, the circuit court of Winnebago County found defendant,

Shawn M. Leonard, guilty of count V of an indictment, a count that charged him with being an

armed habitual criminal. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7 (West 2020). The court sentenced him to

imprisonment. He appeals, contending that, under the second amendment (U.S. Const., amend. II),

the armed habitual criminal statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him. In our

de novo review, we adhere to our previous decisions that the statute does not violate the second

amendment. Therefore, we affirm the court’s judgment.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 In counts I and II of the indictment, defendant was charged with aggravated battery

of a child under 13. Specifically, count I alleged the infliction of great bodily harm upon a child,

H.S.L. (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(b)(1) (West 2020)), whereas count II alleged the infliction of bodily

harm upon her, not great bodily harm (id. § 12-3.05(b)(2)). Count III charged defendant with

unlawful use of weapons by a felon (id. § 24-1.1(a)). Count IV charged him with domestic battery

of S.L. (id. § 12-3.2(a)).

¶5 The State elected to try counts I, II, and IV first. Defendant waived a jury trial. The

circuit court found him guilty of counts II and IV but not guilty of count I.

¶6 Immediately before the bench trial on count III, which had been severed, a grand

jury returned a fifth count against defendant. Count V charged him with being an armed habitual

criminal (id. § 24-1.7). On March 16, 2020, according to count V, he possessed a 9-millimeter

pistol after having been convicted of burglary in Winnebago County case No. 09-CF-738 and

unlawful use of a weapon by a felon in Winnebago County case No. 11-CF-2657.

¶7 The parties agreed to a stipulated bench trial on count V and to the dismissal of

count III. The stipulation on count V was essentially as follows. In response to a report of suspected

child abuse, police officers went to a residence to perform a welfare check. The occupants of the

residence were defendant, H.S.L., and S.L. H.S.L. was taken into protective custody, and the police

interviewed S.L. and defendant. S.L. would testify that as the police interviewed her, she gave

them permission to search the residence. In the ensuing search, the police found a loaded

9-millimeter pistol on the backrest of a couch. S.L. would further testify that the pistol belonged

to defendant, he had possessed the pistol for a month, and he was accustomed to keeping the pistol

where the police had found it, on the backrest of the couch. According to laboratory testing,

defendant could not be excluded as one of the contributors of DNA that was found on the pistol.

-2- He previously was convicted of burglary in case No. 09-CF-738 and unlawful use of a weapon by

a felon in case No. 11-CF-2657.

¶8 In response to the stipulation, the circuit court found defendant guilty of count V.

The court imposed the following agreed-upon sentences: 10 years’ imprisonment for count II, 6

years’ imprisonment for count IV, and 10 years’ imprisonment for count V. The court ordered that

these sentences would run concurrently.

¶9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 A. The Armed Habitual Criminal Statute

¶ 11 Section 24-1.7(a)(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (id.

§ 24-1.7(a)(1), (2)) provides as follows:

“(a) A person commits the offense of being an armed habitual criminal if he

*** possesses *** any firearm after having been convicted a total of 2 or more

times of any combination of the following offenses:

(1) a forcible felony as defined in Section 2-8 of this Code [(id.

§ 2-8)]; [or]

(2) unlawful use of a weapon by a felon ***.”

Section 2-8 in turn defines a “ ‘[f]orcible felony’ ” as including “burglary.” Id. § 2-8.

¶ 12 According to the stipulation, which the prosecutor, defense counsel, and defendant

signed, defendant had two prior qualifying convictions when, on March 16, 2020, the police found

the pistol on the backrest of the couch. The prior convictions were (to quote the stipulation)

“Burglary in 09-CF-738 (a forcible felony) and Unlawful Use of a Weapon by a Felon in 11-CF-

2657.” Given those prior convictions, defendant’s subsequent possession of the pistol on the couch

was an offense of “being an armed habitual criminal” (id. § 24-1.7(a)(1), (2))—a Class X felony

-3- (id. § 24-1.7(b)), punishable by imprisonment for not less than 6 years and not more than 30 years

(see 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2020)).

¶ 13 B. Defendant’s Constitutional Challenge to the Armed Habitual Criminal Statute

¶ 14 Defendant contends that, facially and as applied to him, the armed habitual criminal

statute violates the second amendment (U.S. Const., amend. II) (applicable to the states through

the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) (see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.

742, 750 (2010)) because “there is no founding-era evidence of permanent status-based revocation

of the right to keep and bear arms.” In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1,

17, 24 (2022), the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an

individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct” and the government

“must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that [the regulation] is consistent with the

Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” The government must make this demonstration

by identifying a historical analogue to the challenged gun regulation: “historical precedent from

before, during, and even after the founding [that] evinces a comparable tradition of regulation.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 27. Defendant maintains that (1) the second amendment’s

plain language protected his right to possess a firearm and (2) the State is unable to identify a

historical analogue to the armed habitual criminal statute. Therefore, on the authority of Bruen,

597 U.S. at 71, he concludes that the armed habitual criminal statute “violates the Fourteenth

Amendment in that it prevents law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from

exercising their right to keep and bear arms” (to quote his brief).

¶ 15 However, under our decisions in People v. Boyce, 2023 IL App (4th) 221113-U,

¶ 14, and People v. Langston, 2023 IL App (4th) 230162-U, ¶ 19, defendant’s previous felony

convictions make him not a law-abiding citizen and, therefore, not protected by the second

-4- amendment. By incurring a felony conviction, even a nonviolent felony conviction, a citizen

forever loses the constitutional right to have a firearm for the defense of his person and his house.

¶ 16 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 18 Affirmed.

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