People v. Leon

2025 IL App (2d) 250444-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 23, 2025
• Docket: 2-25-0444
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (2d) 250444-U No. 2-25-0444 Order filed December 23, 2025

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 25-CF-2207 ) EDUARDO A. LEON, ) Honorable ) Salvatore LoPiccolo & John A. Barsanti, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judges, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Schostok concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: There was no error in the circuit court’s pretrial detention determination based on defendant’s dangerousness; defendant is a repeat felon, he was charged with a detainable offense, and he admitted to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a prohibited person.

¶2 Defendant, Eduardo A. Leon, appeals from an order detaining him prior to trial for non-

probationable weapons offenses, including unlawful possession of a firearm by a repeat felony

offender, (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West Supp. 2025) (formerly known as “armed habitual

criminal”)), possession of a weapon by a person previously convicted of a forcible felony (720

ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2024)), and possession of a firearm by a street gang member (720 ILCS 2025 IL App (2d) 250444-U

5/24-1.8(a)(2) (West 2024)). The appellate defender has declined to file argument on defendant’s

behalf and, after examining the record and defendant’s motion for relief, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Although the evidence is only preliminary at this stage, the parties did not dispute the facts

of record. For context, we note that defendant, now age 25, was previously convicted of aggravated

unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). Five days into his probation sentence, defendant committed

the felony offense of aggravated fleeing and eluding a peace officer. The following month,

defendant committed a strongarm robbery. Defendant was convicted of each charge and received

two separate three-year prison sentences for those felonies, and his initial probation for AUUW

was unsatisfactorily terminated. Defendant has also had multiple contacts with the Elgin police

department and is a known member of the “Maniac Latin Disciples” street gang, which, again, the

defense has not disputed.

¶5 After defendant’s arraignment, a detention hearing was held before the circuit court (Judge

LoPiccolo) pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2024). There, the State’s primary allegation was

that defendant had committed several detainable offenses, was a real and present threat to the

community, and that less restrictive means would not mitigate . Id. §§ 110-6.1(a)(1), (a)(6)(D),

(a)(6)(O)(i). The parties proceeded by way of proffer and no live testimony was introduced.

¶6 The State’s evidence showed that on September 12, 2025, Elgin police were alerted that

three men were in possession of a silver gun near an event at Elgin High School. Police responded

and attempted to stop the men, but they fled on foot. Defendant was observed entering the front

passenger seat of a black Chevy Tahoe, which sped off. Later, police located the vehicle, and found

the driver, defendant’s girlfriend, Diana Hernandez. Defendant was no longer in the car. Officers

observed open alcoholic beverages in the vehicle and arrested Hernandez. An inventory search of

-2- 2025 IL App (2d) 250444-U

the vehicle recovered a .40-caliber Smith & Wesson semi-automatic handgun, with a black frame

and silver stainless-steel slide, on the front passenger seat floorboard, hidden under a box of

alcoholic beverages. The police interviewed Hernandez, who identified defendant as her boyfriend

of three months. According to Hernandez, defendant had been sitting in the front passenger seat

“throughout the night.”

¶7 Four days later, defendant voluntarily went to the Elgin police department to speak with

detectives. Defendant stated that Hernandez had picked him up from a football game at Elgin High

School on the day of the incident. Defendant stated that he and the two other males—Alexander

Vargas and Roger Ibarra—had all been in Hernandez’s vehicle and had “pass[ed] the pistol around

[to each other] in the car.” Defendant identified a picture of the recovered Smith & Wesson pistol

and told police that his DNA would be on it. After they fled from the police, defendant then left

the handgun on the passenger seat floorboard because he “was the last one to hold it.” According

to defendant, the handgun belonged to Vargas. The police report also identified Ibarra as a member

of the “Maniac Latin Disciples” in Carpentersville.

¶8 The State noted that defendant is a thrice-convicted felon who cannot lawfully possess any

firearm under any circumstances. The State also pointed out defendant’s history of non-compliance

with court orders by, for example, having previously committed a forcible felony while on

probation for a prior weapons offense. In response, defense counsel represented that defendant

provides care for his four-month-old son, is employed, and resides with his mother and his sisters.

Defense counsel asserted that defendant would comply with any pretrial conditions and

emphasized that defendant voluntarily spoke with the police, as opposed to the police having to

seek an arrest warrant.

-3- 2025 IL App (2d) 250444-U

¶9 The circuit court agreed with the State and entered a detailed handwritten order setting

forth its findings. Specifically, the court found clear and convincing evidence that defendant had

committed a detainable offense, that he presents a danger to the community, and that no pretrial

release conditions would mitigate the threat he poses. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a). In particular,

the court noted that GPS tracking and electronic home monitoring would only be useful in locating

defendant, but could do nothing to keep a gun out of his hands. The court found that defendant had

serially demonstrated “an inability to follow court orders.” A few days later, the defense filed a

motion for relief, which was heard and denied by the circuit court (Judge Barsanti). This timely

appeal followed.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 Our review is confined to the claims raised in defendant’s motion for relief (see Ill. S. Ct.

R. 604(h)(2), (h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024)), which merits little discussion. Where parties to a pretrial

detention hearing proceed solely by proffer, our review is de novo. People v. Morgan, 2020 IL

130626, ¶ 51; People v. French, 2025 IL App (2d) 250035-U, ¶¶ 22-27.

¶ 12 Pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2024), the State may seek pretrial detention based

on the defendant’s dangerousness or risk of willful flight. Under the dangerousness standard, the

State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) “the proof is evident or the presumption

great” that the defendant has committed a detainable offense, (2) “the defendant poses a real and

present threat to the safety of any person or persons or to the community;” and (3) “no condition

or combination of conditions” can mitigate that threat. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1)-(3) (West 2024).

“Evidence is clear and convincing if it leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact

as to the truth of the proposition in question.” Chaudhary v. Department of Human Services, 2023

IL 127712, ¶ 74; see also People v. Morales, 2024 IL App (2d) 230597 ¶ 15.

-4- 2025 IL App (2d) 250444-U

¶ 13 Defendant’s motion for relief was largely comprised of block quotations of the State’s

motion to detain, restating the evidence from the detention hearing, followed by the general

assertion that the evidence was, somehow, not clear and convincing. Like the circuit court, we

determine that such a motion is unpersuasive.

¶ 14 First, without any citation to authority, the motion asserts that “[d]efendant’s prior offenses

and possession of a firearm are elements of the offense and cannot be used as a basis to detain.”

(Emphasis added.) The failure to cite authority for that proposition is unremarkable as that sentence

verges on absurdity. The nature of the charged offense, its elements, and the State’s preliminary

evidence supporting the charge, are inexorably part of a detention hearing based on allegations of

the defendant’s dangerousness. The operative statute repeatedly instructs circuit courts to make

such an assessment “based on the specific articulable facts of the case” (see 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(a)(1) through (a)(7) (West 2024))—and logically it could not be otherwise. Moreover, the

statutory authority is clear that the presence of a weapon in the commission of an offense, and a

defendant’s prior criminal history must be considered in assessing his dangerousness. 725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(g)(1), (g)(2)(A) (West 2024). We think it more likely that the motion meant to say that

the fact a defendant has been charged cannot be used as the sole basis for his detention, which is

true. But to suggest that the facts and elements of the offense cannot be considered at all is

nonsensical.

¶ 15 Next, defendant’s motion for relief also emphasized that “[he] went voluntarily to the

police department” and “[t]here was no warrant for his arrest” before concluding that “he was not

a threat to flee.” Even if it were conceded that defendant is not a flight risk, that observation would

only have value under the willful-flight standard. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8) (West 2024). Here,

however, defendant was again detained under the dangerousness standard (id. §§ (a)(1), (a)(6)(D),

-5- 2025 IL App (2d) 250444-U

(a)(6)(O)(i)), and his apparent willingness to speak to police after committing a felony weapons

offense offers little insight into how to protect the public from the crime itself.

¶ 16 Finally, to the extent defendant asserted that the police synopsis and reports were

insufficient to demonstrate that the proof was evident or presumption great that he committed a

detainable weapons offense, we reject the assertion. It is well-settled that a police synopsis alone

is sufficient to sustain the State’s burden at a detention hearing. See, e.g., People v. Horne, 2023

IL App (2d) 230382, ¶¶ 22-24. That evidence demonstrated that defendant’s criminality is not

isolated to his youth but has persisted through his adulthood. Few things could be more dangerous

than an adult felon, who maintains a gang affiliation, illegally in possession of a pistol, near a high

school event. Like the circuit court, we determine that the same clear and convincing evidence

shows defendant committed a detainable offense, that he poses a real and present threat to the

community, and that no less restrictive conditions would be appropriate.

¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 18 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.

¶ 19 Affirmed.

-6-