People v. Lee

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 18, 2026
• Docket: 5-25-0083
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250083-U NOTICE Decision filed 06/18/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0083 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Champaign County. ) v. ) No. 21-CF-1221 ) AMAHRION J. LEE, ) Honorable ) Randall B. Rosenbaum, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Sholar and Bollinger concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court’s conviction and sentence are affirmed where sufficient evidence existed to support defendant’s conviction, improper factors were not considered in determining the sentence, the sentence was not excessive in light of the crime and defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were either deficient or premature.

¶2 Defendant, Amahrion J. Lee, appeals the trial court’s judgment and sentence. He argues

that insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that he was the shooter. He further

argues that his 50-year sentence was excessive, improper factors were considered during

sentencing, and his counsel provided ineffective assistance. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On October 12, 2021, defendant was charged, by information, with four counts of murder

in violation of sections 9-1(a)(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), 1 (2) (West 2020)) following the shooting death of Adrian Watson on October 10, 2021. In addition

to the statutory sentencing range for first degree murder, the information also included the statutory

25-year firearm sentence enhancement, pursuant to section 5-8-1(a)(1)(D)(iii) of the Unified Code

of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(D)(iii) (West 2020)). Defendant was arraigned, counsel

was appointed, and a preliminary hearing was requested. The preliminary hearing was held on

November 2, 2021, and following the hearing, the court made a finding of probable cause.

Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and requested a jury trial.

¶5 On September 6, 2022, defendant obtained private counsel to represent him, and the court’s

appointment of a public defender was vacated. A Rule 402(d) conference (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 402(d)

(eff. July 1, 2012)) was held on June 17, 2024, but no agreement was reached. On October 7, 2024,

defendant advised the court that he wished to waive his right to a jury trial. Following admonitions

and review of the written executed waiver, the trial court granted the request.

¶6 Defendant’s bench trial began on November 6, 2024. The court first addressed the prior

settlement negotiations. The parties confirmed that a “flat 25-year” offer was made. Defendant

confirmed his rejection of that offer and when he was advised that it was “still on the table,” again

rejected the offer.

¶7 The following evidence was presented at the trial. A shooting occurred at Asia Dixon’s

apartment in the Rainbow View complex in Urbana, Illinois, around 7:00 a.m. on October 10,

2021. Asia testified that she and defendant were in a relationship that began in 2018 and ended in

September 2021. On October 9, 2021, Asia, along with her friends, Dan’y and Lupe, went to a bar

for Dan’y’s birthday. The group later returned to Asia’s apartment with Adrian (who was called

“A.J.”), Rel, Demariae (“Mar-Mar”), Von, and Pooh. Asia did not know the full legal names of

any of the men. They left the club around 2:00 a.m. and returned to her apartment around 3:00 a.m.

2 ¶8 Video, obtained from a Ring doorbell on a neighboring apartment, revealed the arrival and

departure of individuals at Asia’s apartment early that morning. Three people walked toward

Asia’s apartment at 4:36 a.m. At 4:46 a.m., two people walked toward the apartment parking lot.

The same two people walked toward Asia’s apartment around 5:53 a.m. At 7:05 a.m., a man

wearing black pants with white marks on them, red underwear, white shoes, and a black hooded

sweatshirt walked toward Asia’s apartment. At 7:07 a.m., Asia and Lupe walked toward the

parking lot and Asia is heard stating, “You’re weird” and that she intended to “call the police” as

they walked. As the girls were walking, eight gunshots were heard, and shortly thereafter, the man

who initially appeared in the 7:05 a.m. video moved quickly toward the parking lot. Around 7:11

a.m., two men walked toward the parking lot with one stopping to knock on the door with the Ring

doorbell. At 7:12 a.m. the two men returned with Lupe. At 7:13 a.m., three men quickly headed to

the parking lot, and Asia returned and walked toward her apartment. At 7:14 a.m., a fourth man

walked toward the parking lot, looked around and then headed back toward Asia’s apartment. The

police arrived at 7:15 a.m.

¶9 Asia testified that eventually everyone fell asleep in her apartment. Adrian was sleeping in

the first bedroom on the left and everyone else was in Asia’s room. Around 7:00 a.m., Asia heard

a knock on her window and thought it was Dan’y because Dan’y had left the apartment after they

returned from the club. Asia woke up Lupe to tell her about the knock on the window. Asia then

heard a knock at the front door. She and Lupe went to the door. When they opened the door, no

one was there. Asia began closing the door and an individual jammed his foot between the door

and the door frame so the door would not close and eventually pushed his way into Asia’s

apartment. At trial, Asia identified defendant as the individual who pushed into her apartment,

stating that she did not see him but recognized his voice because she had known him for years.

3 ¶ 10 Asia stated that defendant wanted to know what was going on in the apartment. Asia told

him there were people there and he needed to leave. Defendant continued to push into the

apartment. Asia and Lupe left the building. After they left, Asia heard several gunshots and saw

defendant running out of her apartment. She then saw defendant enter a gold car that she

recognized as belonging to defendant’s mother. Asia and Lupe went upstairs to a neighbor’s

apartment, and Asia called her mother and the police. Asia spoke with police who advised her of,

and eventually showed her, the Ring doorbell video that was obtained from Asia’s neighbor. Asia

identified the people shown in the videos at the various times. When she reviewed the 7:05 a.m.

video at trial, Asia identified the individual arriving at 7:05 a.m. and leaving at 7:07 a.m. as

defendant. Asia advised the police of defendant’s identity and address.

¶ 11 At trial, Asia was questioned about her conversations with the officers. She did not recall

saying anything to the officer about seeing defendant with a weapon. However, she agreed at trial

that she saw the gun and explained that was why she and Lupe left the apartment and why she said

defendant was weird and that she was going to call the police. Thereafter, she heard the gunshots.

She stated that, to her knowledge, there were no guns in the apartment before defendant arrived.

She also stated that none of the people in the apartment shot Adrian; defendant did the shooting.

¶ 12 On cross-examination, Asia stated that she and defendant broke up in September 2021

because he hit her in the face. She could not recall what she told the police officer who arrived and

disputed telling the officer that defendant punched her face. She stated that she told the officer that

defendant slapped her face. As to the October 10, 2021, event, Asia agreed telling the officers that

when defendant put his foot in the doorway, defendant told her that if there was a guy in the

apartment, he was going to kill him. She disputed any fights in the apartment around midnight,

stating they were at the bar at that time and opined that the source of the argument may have come

4 from a different residence. As to the neighbor’s claim of an argument around 5:00 a.m., Asia stated

that she was asleep, but that Lupe later told her that she and Adrian left the apartment around 5:00

a.m. The only argument Asia recalled was one with Mar-Mar after the shooting when he accused

her of “setting them up.” She explained that Mar-Mar made the statement because neither she nor

Lupe were in the apartment after the shooting occurred. Asia confirmed that she saw defendant in

the car when he drove off because he “hung out the window.” She told the officers that defendant

was wearing a black sweater with a hood, which she explained was the same thing as a jacket.

¶ 13 On redirect, Asia explained that prior to the slapping incident in September 2021 defendant

accused her of being at a party with Mar-Mar. She confirmed that Mar-Mar was at her apartment

on the morning of the shooting. She also clarified that in addition to knowing defendant’s height,

voice, shoes, and clothing, she knew it was him by his hand tattoo which she saw when he was at

the door. She recognized his car because she rode in it multiple times. She could not remember the

exact quote from defendant at the door but said it was similar to, “Whoever in here is about to die.”

Asia further explained that her classification of the black sweater with a hood was similar to a

“hoodie” or a sweatshirt.

¶ 14 Video, from three different angles, taken from the Tuscany Cove Apartments in

Champaign, Illinois, where defendant and his mother lived, was shown. The video revealed a man

leaving the 2404 Highview apartment building around 6:45 a.m. and walking to the parking lot.

The same individual is seen returning to the parking lot, parking in the same spot, at 7:19 a.m. The

individual was wearing white shoes, black pants with white paint marks. Upon his return, he was

seen carrying a black item in his hand. Additional video later showed the same male wearing black

pants with white marks walking down a sidewalk. Shortly thereafter, footage revealed a single line

5 of people that initially showed defendant’s mother, defendant, and then the mother’s roommate

walking past the pool and away from the apartment complex.

¶ 15 Guadalupe “Lupe” Rios Trujillo testified that she was previously best friends with Asia

and had known her since elementary school. She knew defendant through Asia and also previously

worked with him at Walmart. Lupe stated that she was no longer friends with Asia. On October 9,

2021, she met Asia at Asia’s apartment to drink. Other people were partying there, and the group

went to a bar. She and Asia later returned to Asia’s apartment with four men called Dee, Pooh,

Mar-Mar, and Adrian. She knew the men but only vaguely. At some point, Lupe and Adrian went

to a gas station to get drinks and snacks and returned around 5:53 a.m. The group ate snacks and

fell asleep. Lupe was awoken by Asia after Asia heard a knock on the window. Lupe believed it

was Dan’y returning to Asia’s apartment. Lupe and Asia then heard a knock at the door, and they

went to open the door. No one was there, but when they tried to close the door, somebody put their

foot in the door. Lupe could hear Asia arguing with the person pushing in the door. Lupe testified

that she never saw the person because she was behind the door but heard a male voice ask who

was in the apartment while Asia tried to keep the man out. Asia was unsuccessful. The man came

into the apartment and Lupe and Asia walked out. Shortly thereafter, they heard gunshots. Lupe

assumed the person who entered the apartment was defendant due to the on/off nature of his and

Asia’s relationship. She did not see the man run out of the apartment after the shooting because

she was upstairs with Asia at a neighbor’s house.

¶ 16 Lupe testified that she remembered having conversations with police officers after the

incident. She agreed that she told the officer that the person who “busted into the apartment” was

defendant and that she knew it was defendant because she had been friends with Asia for a long

time. She could not recall if she told the officer that she saw defendant’s face, recognized him from

6 his face, or whether defendant was holding a gun when he entered the apartment. She said he was

wearing a black “hoodie” with the hood up and did not see his hair. Lupe stated she was no longer

100% certain of who entered the apartment.

¶ 17 A stipulation was entered regarding Adrian’s cause of death. The stipulation stated that

Adrian had two gunshot wounds which were the cause of his death.

¶ 18 Urbana Police Officer Oliver Marquez, testified that he was dispatched to Asia’s apartment

on October 10, 2021. He was later dispatched to Champaign, Illinois, where defendant and his

mother were stopped by the Champaign police. Officer Marquez drove defendant to the police

station and seized defendant’s clothing. He identified the clothing as including red underwear and

black jeans with white marks.

¶ 19 Officer Osric Hays, previously with the Urbana Police Department, testified that he

canvassed the crime scene and located a motion-activated Ring camera from which he recovered

numerous audio and video recordings. Officer Hays identified the video of Asia and Lupe leaving

the apartment shortly before the gunshots were heard with a man running away at the end. Officer

Hays was wearing a body camera and identified the footage. The footage included Officer Hays

showing the Ring video to Asia and Asia stating that defendant was the individual running away

after the gunshots. Officer Hays advised the police department of Asia’s identification and was

later dispatched to Tuscany Cove Apartments, where he secured the scene at defendant’s apartment

until a search warrant could be obtained. On cross-examination, Officer Hays described the clothes

seen on the video as jeans with white lines and a black shirt. He agreed that he saw no design was

shown on the front of the shirt in the video.

¶ 20 A stipulation regarding Champaign Police Officer Jherion Broadnax’s testimony was

presented. The stipulation stated that Officer Broadnax would testify that he was the first law

7 enforcement officer to see defendant and the gold vehicle after the shooting. Officer Broadnax was

present when defendant’s vehicle was stopped, contacted the Urbana police, and maintained

custody of the scene until Urbana officers arrived.

¶ 21 Urbana Police Officer Andrew Hewkin testified that he was involved with searching the

gold vehicle after the vehicle was impounded. He seized two cell phones from the vehicle. The

phone from the passenger seat, where defendant was located when the car was stopped, was

provided to a specialist trained in analyzing cell phones at the police department. The officer did

not recall seeing any clothing or blood in the car. Nor did he smell any gunpowder.

¶ 22 Additional stipulations that were presented to the court involved firearm toolmarks, DNA

testing and gunshot residue (GSR). The parties stipulated that the firearm testing revealed that all

the casings found were fired from the same firearm. They also stipulated that DNA testing found

only defendant’s DNA on the white Crocs taken during the search executed at the Tuscany Cove

apartment. Finally, the parties agreed that the GSR testing concluded that it could “neither confirm

nor disprove [defendant] had either recently fired or been in the presence of a firearm discharge.”

¶ 23 Urbana Police Detective Kenneth Sprague testified that he was dispatched to the Tuscany

Cove apartment and photographed the apartment where defendant was residing. He also obtained

the video surveillance footage from that apartment complex. He took photographs outside the

building that included photographs of a black jacket found hanging in a tree near defendant’s

residence. The article of clothing was collected for evidence. He did not know if the jacket was

tested for DNA because he was not the lead detective on the case. Detective Sprague also obtained

search warrants for defendant’s residence, Asia’s residence, and the impounded vehicle, which

was owned by defendant’s mother and contained a piece of mail addressed to defendant in the

8 glove compartment. He did not recall any clothing being in the vehicle. He looked for a gun but

did not find one.

¶ 24 Alexandria Grady, previously of the Urbana Police Department, testified that she was

dispatched to Asia’s apartment following the shooting. She spoke to Asia and Lupe outside Asia’s

apartment. Video footage from Officer Grady’s body camera was shown in which Asia told the

officer that she saw defendant with a gun when he pushed into her apartment. She stated it was a

brown clip on a black gun. Additional video revealed Asia telling Officer Grady that defendant

said he was going to kill whoever was in the apartment and then she heard seven or eight gunshots.

The body camera video also showed Asia telling Officer Grady that Lupe also saw defendant and

that defendant was driving his mother’s car.

¶ 25 Illinois State Police Trooper Robert Telford testified that he worked as a crime scene

investigator at the scene of Adrian’s murder. He took numerous photographs of the eight cartridge

casings ejected from the gun after it was fired, as well as the bullet holes in an air mattress and the

walls. He agreed that based on the casings found, GSR would be created. He stated that typically

the residue was found on the back of the hand. He performed a GSR test and collected DNA from

defendant in the interview room at the police station. He stated that GSR was very time sensitive

because it could be wiped or washed away. He further stated that defendant’s GSR test was given

after the police interview approximately three and a half hours after the murder. Trooper Telford

did not know the results of the GSR test.

¶ 26 Urbana Police Officer Adam Marcotte testified that he was the lead detective in the case.

He interviewed Asia and Lupe after driving them to the station to obtain their statements. Asia told

him that the individual who pushed his way into her apartment was defendant and he had a gun at

the time. Lupe also told the officer that she identified defendant by his voice and that he was

9 holding a black gun. Following the interviews with Asia and Lupe, Officer Marcotte interviewed

defendant with Officer McCartney. The interview was recorded with sound and picture. He

confirmed defendant was read his Miranda rights prior to the interview and then waived them.

¶ 27 Officer Marcotte testified that he was familiar with the videos taken at the Tuscany Cove

apartments that showed defendant leaving the apartment complex around 6:45 a.m. and then

returning around 7:20 a.m. He stated defendant was wearing the same clothing he had on at the

scene of the shooting. After the shooting, defendant returned and entered the apartment building

where he lived. Defendant was seen on video with a different shirt and shoes. A search warrant for

defendant’s residence was obtained, and a pair of white Crocs were seized. He stated the shoes

were found in one of the bedrooms and were similar to the ones seen on defendant when he was

at Asia’s apartment before and after the shooting. Officer Marcotte also testified that still frames

from the Ring video revealed defendant holding something black in his right hand in a manner the

officer stated was consistent with holding a gun. He stated that two cell phones were obtained from

the search of the vehicle. One belonged to defendant’s mother and the other belonged to defendant.

¶ 28 Officer Marcotte admitted that he did not request forensic or fingerprint testing on the black

jacket found in the tree. He believed he reviewed a police report involving Asia and defendant

from a month prior to the shooting but did not recall what was in the report and did not ask Asia

or Lupe about the September report when they discussed the events of October 10, 2021. Officer

Marcotte attempted to contact the remaining men in the apartment but did not have their full names

and only spoke to Mar-Mar on the telephone. Mar-Mar would not provide his real name and

refused to identify the other men. The officer utilized additional methods to try to obtain the names

of the men, but all proved fruitless. The officer did not know the brand of defendant’s jeans,

whether they were distributed, or whether the size eight Crocs were sized for male or female shoe

10 sizes. He confirmed a conversation with Asia’s neighbor who indicated there were two arguments

the previous night. One around midnight and the other at 5:00 a.m. He did not know if defendant

still had a key for Asia’s apartment and stated that no forensic testing was done on the window

where the initial knock was heard. He agreed that aside from the blurry picture of a possible firearm

in defendant’s hand when he left the apartment, there was no other evidence that defendant had a

gun when he was at Asia’s apartment. He further agreed that the murder weapon was never

recovered, that DNA was recovered on the Crocs, and that Mar-Mar initially believed that Asia

and Lupe were setting him up for the murder.

¶ 29 Officer Darrin McCartney, a detective with the Urbana Police Department, testified that he

was present for defendant’s interview and that defendant was read, and waived, his Miranda rights.

At the beginning of the tape, defendant is alone in the room. He is seen rubbing the backs of his

hands on his clothes after taking a drink of water. In the police interview, defendant told the

officers that the cracked-screen phone found in the vehicle was his. He disputed being at Asia’s

apartment and stated it must have been someone with a similar build. He further stated that other

people had cars similar to his mother’s car. He stated that he did not do any shooting because he

did not have a gun. Defendant told the officers that there was no gun in the car when he was

stopped with his mother. When defendant was told that there was Ring doorbell video, he stated

that he knew about the cameras and if he had gone over there, he would have worn a mask but

continued to state that he did not go to Asia’s apartment. Toward the end of the interview,

defendant again stated that he did not have a gun and was not at Asia’s apartment that morning.

¶ 30 A stipulation regarding the cell phone data was provided to the court. The stipulation

revealed that two short videos depicting the defendant holding a 9 mm handgun on September 17,

2021, were found on defendant’s cell phone.

11 ¶ 31 Doug Pipkins, an officer with the Urbana Police Department, testified that he held expertise

as to digital forensics for data extraction and cell phone analysis. Officer Pipkins identified the

defendant’s phone as well as the videos from September 17, 2021, found on the cell phone. Officer

Pipkins also extracted geolocation data from the phone for the period from 6:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.

on October 10, 2021. The geolocation data revealed that defendant’s cell phone traveled from

defendant’s residence at the Tuscany Cove apartments in Champaign, Illinois, across to Urbana,

Illinois where Asia’s apartment was located from 6:48 a.m. to 7:05 a.m. Thereafter, the data

indicated the phone moved from Asia’s apartment around 7:09 a.m. and returned to the starting

location in Champaign, Illinois at 7:18 a.m. The officer stated that the certainty of the location was

dependent on proximity of cell towers to the location of the phone, but the locations listed were

within 60 meters.

¶ 32 Following Officer Pipkins’s testimony, the State rested. Defense counsel moved for a

directed verdict. Counsel argued that the case depended entirely upon the credibility of Asia and

Lupe and neither were credible enough to be believed beyond a reasonable doubt. The court denied

the motion after considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the State.

¶ 33 After confirming that defendant would not testify, defense counsel requested the court take

judicial notice of the weather in Champaign, Illinois on October 10, 2021. The temperature was

66 degrees at 7 a.m. and rose to 70 degrees by 9 a.m.

¶ 34 Defense counsel called Kimberlee Gruenstein, the forensic scientist working for the Illinois

State Police who evaluated defendant’s GSR testing. Gruenstein explained how gunshot residue

occurred and stated that the results of the testing revealed that defendant may not have discharged

a firearm with either hand. Alternatively, she stated that the results indicated that if defendant

discharged the firearm, then the particles were not deposited, were removed by activity, or were

12 not detected by the procedure. Gruenstein found two particles in the testing but not the tri-

component particles with lead, barium, and antimony. Gruenstein agreed that the GSR sample

neither proved, nor disproved, that defendant fired a gun.

¶ 35 Officer Josh Jeffers, an officer with the Urbana Police Department, testified about the

September 12, 2021, police report he authored following his interview with Asia. He stated that

Asia told him she was in a verbal altercation with defendant and defendant punched her twice in

the face. He stated that Asia said punched, not slapped. The officer did not see any marks on Asia’s

face but noted there was a mark on the inside of her lip. He did not think the injury was consistent

with being punched in the face. However, he agreed that if the punch was more of a graze, or was

made without a hard swing, it would not cause much of an injury. He agreed that bruises develop

later in time and may not be visible immediately after the contact. He stated that the injury to the

inside of Asia’s lip was consistent with a recent hit.

¶ 36 Defense counsel entered the final stipulation to statements provided by Asia’s neighbor,

Destiny Lewis. Destiny reported hearing an argument coming from Asia’s apartment between 11

p.m. and midnight on October 9, 2021, and around 5 a.m. on October 10, 2021. The voices included

both a male and a female.

¶ 37 Following the presentation of the stipulation, the defense rested. Defense counsel renewed

his motion for a directed verdict, which was again denied. Closing arguments were presented and

the matter was taken under advisement. The following morning, the court issued its ruling. It found

both Asia and Lupe credible, noting there was not much time for them to fabricate a story. The

court further noted, that despite the September breakup, Asia and defendant continued to

communicate and were considering reconciliation. The court analyzed Asia’s comment of “You’re

weird” and found it would be an odd statement to make toward a stranger. The court stated that

13 the man seen leaving after the shots were fired was running away, which it found “indicative of

consciousness of guilt.” The court also addressed the blurry photograph and said it was not

definitive but “it certainly has the clear shape of a firearm in his hand as he’s running out.”

¶ 38 The court stated the real issue was the identity of the man in the black jacket, black pants,

white shoes, and red underwear. The court considered Lupe’s testimony, which used the word

“assumed.” It further considered Asia’s testimony that “unequivocally said it was the defendant,”

noting the tattoo on his hand, his height, his weight, and his speech and the length of their

relationship. The court noted that Asia further testified at trial that she saw defendant with a gun.

The court agreed there were “some inconsistencies” between the testimonies provided after the

incident and at trial, but noted how quickly the officers arrived, the similarity of Asia and Lupe’s

version of events, their emotions immediately following the shooting, and that three years passed

between the shooting and the trial.

¶ 39 The court said there was no question that defendant entered into a gold car and defendant

was arrested wearing the black pants and red underwear that matched the description of the person

seen on video. The court further noted that defendant’s DNA was found on the white Crocs

indicating that he had worn them before. The court found the GPS data even more compelling than

the black pants, red underwear, and white shoes. It noted that defendant told the investigators that

he was never at Asia’s apartment that morning, but the GPS data showed otherwise, and the GPS

data was corroborated by the video surveillance at defendant’s residence. The court found that

defendant “lied to the police” about his location and the fact that he did not have a gun, which was

contradicted by the September video found on his phone.

¶ 40 The court found the State proved “defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first

degree murder in all four counts.” The court further found that the State proved beyond a

14 reasonable doubt that defendant “personally discharged the firearm that caused the death of the

victim.” The court ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI).

¶ 41 On December 3, 2024, defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial. Therein, counsel

argued that neither Asia nor Lupe were credible, claiming their initial stories did not match the

video recordings and their testimony at trial was changed to match the videos. The motion claimed

that several different versions of events were presented by both witnesses who had “powerful

motivating factors driving them strongly emotionally in opposition to [defendant].” The motion

claimed the witnesses committed “multiple acts of obstruction of justice” because they told

witnesses to leave before the police arrived, “changed their stories multiple times”, and “pretended

to not know the actual names” of the other witnesses at the apartment despite spending the night

with them. In addition to addressing the lack of credibility, the motion further contended that

defendant’s face was not seen in any video, no weapon was found, a jacket was found but there

was no evidence linking the jacket to the crime or to defendant, defendant was not seen on video

with a firearm, GSR testing was negative despite defendant having dirt on his hands, motions

in limine “were denied in significant part,” and evidence was improperly admitted.

¶ 42 The PSI was filed on December 17, 2024. The PSI revealed one prior juvenile

misdemeanor for criminal damage to property in 2017 and no prior adult convictions. Defendant

graduated from high school after being referred to the Regional Education Alternative for

Developing Youth (READY) school after 10th grade due to behavioral issues stemming from

anger management and fighting. His prior employment included Circle K, Walmart, and Burger

King. He described his mental health as “fair,” stating he never obtained evaluations but that he

struggled with depression and anxiety his whole life, was emotionally closed off, and craved

attention. He claimed two suicide attempts in 2020 when he stepped out in front of a car and again

15 in 2021 when he took pills. He had never been physically, emotionally, or sexually abused.

Defendant had four siblings. His father was in and out of prison and was now deceased. He had a

close relationship with his mother although they tended to “butt heads.” He had a history of

drinking and drug use with the latter including cannabis, Percocet, and Ecstasy, all of which began

when he was 15 years old.

¶ 43 Defendant’s motion for a new trial was heard on December 20, 2024, prior to the

sentencing hearing. No argument was presented by defense counsel, and the State only disputed

the language used regarding the GSR testimony. The court noted that the issues raised were

addressed when it issued its initial ruling and denied the motion for a new trial.

¶ 44 As to the sentencing hearing, no changes or additions were necessary for the PSI. The State

asked the court to consider the photographs of defendant with the gun in September 2021 in

aggravation. Adrian’s mother read a victim impact statement. As evidence in mitigation, a

photograph of defendant’s mother, Letika Graham, was submitted in which Letika held a gun.

Letika testified that the gun in the photograph was a toy gun that held pellets and was not a real

gun. She stated that neither a gun nor bullets were found in her house. On cross examination,

Letika could not state with certainty that the gun in her photograph was the same gun seen in

defendant’s video. On redirect, Letika said she believed it was the same toy gun shown in the

pictures at defendant’s trial. The State recommended 50 years’ incarceration. Defense counsel

requested the minimum sentence of 45 years’ incarceration. Defendant provided a statement in

allocution, stating that he did not commit the crime, but he understood both families’ pain.

¶ 45 Thereafter, the court issued its ruling, and stated the following:

“The Court is considering statutory and nonstatutory factors in aggravation

and mitigation whether specifically mentioned or not. I’m considering the history

16 and character of the Defendant with the objective of restoring him to useful

citizenship. I’m also concerned about the seriousness of the offense.

***

There is mitigation in this case. Mr. Lee was 18 years old at the time of the

offense. He’s now 22. He has no children to support. He was able to get a high

school diploma. Although, he had some issues with behavioral things. He was

expelled for fighting and the like and put in anger management classes. He has been

able to work periodically before he was incarcerated.

I would note that there’s also mental health issues. I did read in the report

that he’s in good physical health, but he struggles with depression and anxiety and

the new phrase in the world is unaliving yourself. They indicate that he attempted

to take his own life twice in ’20 and ’21 so clearly has mental health issues.

He had been involved in the criminal justice system. He had been involved in the

school system. A lot of opportunities to get help for free, but I agree with [defense

counsel] that if you have to go and pay or you have insurance to get mental health

treatment it’s sometimes hard. I get that, but there was some opportunity for him to

get it while he was in the system, so to speak.

He has used some alcohol. He was using cannabis daily from 18. When he

was 18[,] he was smoking the equivalent of—and I—I had to double-check, but it

said 18 blunts a day which is significant. There was really never any evaluations or

treatment which having a substance abuse problem can cut both way for mitigation

and aggravation, but when you have a problem and you’re not getting help it

oftentimes falls more on the aggravation side than the mitigation side.

17 The Supreme Court has said many, many times that perhaps one of the most

compelling factors, if not the most compelling factor, is the nature and

circumstances of the offense. ***.

If a firearm is used and it’s proven beyond a reasonable doubt, which I found,

our General Assembly in its infinite wisdom—whether I agree with it or not I’m

required to follow the law and the minimum is 45 years, but there has to be sort of

a spectrum of conduct for murder because there’s so many different facts and

circumstances.

In this particular case many of the facts and circumstances are more

aggravating than mitigating, and, in fact, there are several aggravating factors such

as deterrence to deter him from committing crimes and others who might be in the

same situation. He has that one juvenile case for criminal damage to property, but

he completed everything so really that’s more mitigating, but the facts of the case

are such that even though he’s a young man and even though he doesn’t really have

a criminal record he has anger control issues which he’s had since he was a kid. He

obviously had anger or jealousy issues at this time of the shooting.

Whether he usually played with toy guns with his siblings or not[,] it’s clear

on this particular day he had an actual firearm. He got the firearm. He drove to the

location. He went into the apartment, went straight to the front bedroom and shot

eight times, shooting the victim twice. He then ran away, got rid of the gun, got rid

of one of the jackets he was wearing. There were other people around who

potentially could have been hurt by this.

18 It was clearly planned. It was motivated out of anger or jealousy. He shot

multiple times. This was not just shoot somebody in the leg or even shooting, you

know, in the heart one time. I mean, this was multiple shots. I find the facts and

circumstances of the case more aggravating than mitigating.

Now, there are a couple statutes I want to talk about very briefly. One is in

the sentencing code 4.5-115. I believe if someone’s under age 21 potentially they

can be paroled after 20 years which is going to apply. There’s no guarantee whether

I give him 45 or 50 or a hundred years, you know, or *** life or whatever within

the range that he’s going to get out in 20, but the statute does permit him to apply

for release after 20 years.

The other one is Section 5-4.5-105 which doesn’t really apply here, but I do

want to discuss it because this is the statute that says if you commit a crime,

including murder, when you’re under 18 the Court should consider other factors.

Now, he was not 17, but he was barely 18. And some of these factors I think are

important, but I’m supposed to consider them in mitigation but when I look at them

they’re really actually more in aggravation. Although he wasn’t a member of a gang

I don’t think he was influenced by other people. He was the only person involved

in the shooting. I would also note that there’s nothing that shows that this was

impetuous. It was planned. I would also note that there was no abuse within his

family. He had good relations generally with his family such as his siblings and his

mother. He had the ability to understand that the consequences—what the

consequences of his actions were, so I’m not really gonna give a lot of weight in

aggravation to that because the statute technically doesn’t apply. But—but it’s nice

19 to look at those factors as well because I think they are important to somebody who

is just barely 18, so I don’t find those factors in particular are mitigating even if I

were to consider them.

There is mitigation here. He’s young. He has no record. He has mental health

issues. All the other factors I’ve considered.

There’s the aggravation that he was angry. He’s used drugs and alcohol. He’s

enjoyed being around the gun culture. Whether it’s a real gun or fake guns he likes

the gun culture. The facts and circumstances of the case such as its planning and its

deliberate nature, the fact that he shot it multiple times.

Imprisonment is required. It’s also necessary to protect the public. I don’t

think the minimum under the circumstances are appropriate because of the nature

and circumstances of the—of the case as I’ve described, but I don’t think there is

significant mitigation, so I don’t think a lot over the minimum is really required.”

The court found the State’s recommendation appropriate and sentenced defendant to 50 years’

imprisonment to be served at 100%.

¶ 46 Following the sentence, defense counsel orally requested a motion for reduction of

sentence to be filed instanter. The court granted defense counsel’s request. The motion requested

the court reduce defendant’s “sentence to the 45 year box without parole minimum” and claimed

the minimum sentence was “nonetheless extreme and inappropriate.” No argument was presented.

The court found “the sentence was appropriate” and denied the motion. Defense counsel orally

requested appeal and appointment of counsel on appeal on behalf of defendant.

20 ¶ 47 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 48 On appeal, defendant argues that insufficient evidence was presented to prove his guilt for

first degree murder, and trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek suppression

of defendant’s statements during the police interview and during trial counsel’s cross-examination

of a witness. He further argues that his 50-year sentence was excessive and was based on improper

factors, and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 25-year firearm

enhancement under the proportionate penalties clause. The State disagrees with each argument.

¶ 49 A. Sufficiency of the evidence.

¶ 50 Defendant contends that insufficient evidence of his guilt for first degree murder was

presented because the State failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the identity of the shooter.

He claims that four other people were in the apartment when the shots were fired, and no one

testified that one of those people did not fire the fatal shots.

¶ 51 Sufficiency of evidence claims require this court to consider whether, when viewing all the

evidence adduced at trial in a light most favorable to the State, “any rational trier of fact could

have found [proof of] the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis

omitted.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008). Such

review requires this court to accept reasonable inferences by the trial court (see People v.

Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004)) and leaves credibility rulings of the witnesses to the trial

court. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d at 272. Only where a conviction is “so unreasonable, improbable, or

unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt” will the conviction

be reversed. Id. “[W]here the finding of guilt depends on eyewitness testimony, a reviewing court

must decide whether, in light of the record, a fact finder could reasonably accept the testimony as

true beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 279. “Testimony may be found

21 insufficient under the Jackson [v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)] standard, but only where

the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280 (citing People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 545

(1999); People v. Schott, 145 Ill. 2d 188, 206-07 (1991)). While the fact finder’s decision to accept

testimony is entitled to great deference, it is not conclusive and does not bind the reviewing court.

Id. (citing Smith, 185 Ill. 2d at 542).

¶ 52 Here, the trial court found both Asia and Lupe were credible and defendant was not

credible. Our review of the evidence fails to establish a conclusion that no reasonable person would

accept Asia and Lupe’s testimony as credible. While defendant relies on inconsistent testimony

between Asia and Lupe’s initial police interviews and testimony at trial, as the court noted, over

three years passed between the murder and the trial, both women were reluctant witnesses, and

there was no evidence that either witness reviewed their previous statements prior to the trial.

Despite the lack of alacrity by both witnesses to prepare for trial, Asia’s testimony continued to

state that defendant pushed into her apartment on the morning of the shooting, he had a gun with

him at that time, and there were no firearms in the apartment prior to defendant’s unexpected

appearance at her door. Testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to

uphold a conviction. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d at 541.

¶ 53 Here, Asia’s testimony at trial, while admittedly inconsistent on a few points with the

statements provided to police immediately following the shooting, continued to state that

defendant was the shooter. Her identification of defendant as the shooter was based on her

knowledge of his voice and body. Further, Asia’s testimony was corroborated by the videos from

the Ring doorbell, the videos from the apartment complex where defendant lived, and the GPS

data from his cell phone, which all placed him at the apartment. As such, defendant’s claim that

22 the evidence “hinged on the testimony of two women” seems implausible given the evidence that

showed defendant was at the apartment at the time of the shooting and ran out of the apartment

immediately after the eight shots were fired with what appeared to be a firearm in his right hand.

While there were other men who left the apartment after the shooting, none were shown on video

holding a weapon, and one of the men actually knocked on the neighbor’s door where the Ring

video was located. Finally, contrary to defendant’s claim, Asia did testify that none of the men in

the apartment shot Adrian.

¶ 54 Defendant also argues that the murder weapon was not found and his GSR testing was

negative. There is no dispute that the murder weapon was not found. However, Asia placed

defendant with a gun and no one other than defendant appears to be holding a firearm in their

hands when they are seen arriving and leaving the apartment.

¶ 55 Further, defendant’s claim that the GSR testing was negative is a misrepresentation of the

evidence. The stipulated conclusion of the GSR testing evidence stated that the State of Illinois

forensic expert concluded that “the analysis can neither confirm nor disprove [defendant] had

either recently fired or been in the presence of a firearm discharge.” The expert’s testimony at trial

also revealed that defendant’s testing revealed two of the three required chemicals for a positive

GSR test result. Additional testimony clarified that time itself could destroy residue just as easily

as washing or wiping the hands. Here, the video evidence revealed defendant returned to his own

apartment after Adrian was shot, which would have allowed defendant sufficient time to wash his

hands, before he was arrested. Additionally, police officers testified that GSR is typically found

on the back of a shooter’s hand and the GSR can be removed over time, or with washing or wiping

of the hands. Here, additional video evidence showed defendant being placed in the police

interview room with his hands cuffed behind him. An officer then removes defendant’s handcuffs

23 and places them on defendant so that defendant’s handcuffs are now in front of his body. Defendant

is provided a chair and a bottle of water before the officers leave the room. Thereafter, defendant

looks directly at the video camera. He then takes a drink of water, bends over at the waist and rubs

the backs of both hands repeatedly on the front of his sweatshirt and jeans for 20 seconds, all of

which occurred less than three minutes after defendant was placed in the police interview room.

As noted above, a sufficiency of the evidence claim requires this court to view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution. Given the evidence submitted, we hold that sufficient

evidence was submitted to find that each element of first degree murder was established, including

the identity of the shooter.

¶ 56 B. Failure to suppress police interview statements.

¶ 57 Defendant next contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to

suppress defendant’s police interview statements. In support, defendant contends that he did not

knowingly and willingly waive his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

He further claims that even if he knowingly and willingly waived those rights, trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to suppress the statements made after defendant invoked his right to remain

silent. Miranda warnings are necessary after “an individual is taken into custody or otherwise

deprived of his freedom *** and is subjected to questioning.” Id. at 478-79.

¶ 58 Typically, whether to file a motion to suppress evidence is a decision made by trial counsel

that is generally entitled to great deference because the decision is a matter of trial strategy. People

v. Gayden, 2020 IL 123505, ¶ 28. We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the

two-pronged Strickland (see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)) standard. People

v. Torres, 2024 IL 129289, ¶ 26. The test requires a defendant to show that (1) counsel’s

performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that a reasonable

24 probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id. ¶ 27 (citing People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 79). More specific to the

allegations here, a contention of ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure to file a motion to

suppress requires the defendant to show the unargued motion “was meritorious and that a

reasonable probability exists that the trial outcome would have been different had the evidence

been suppressed.” Gayden, 2020 IL 123505, ¶ 28.

¶ 59 Defendant first claims that he did not knowingly or willingly waive his Miranda rights. In

support, defendant claims he was too young to understand the significance of the rights. To

determine whether a defendant’s waiver is knowing and intelligent, courts consider factors

including the defendant’s age, education, intelligence, experience with the criminal justice system,

length of detention and interrogations, whether he was advised of his constitutional rights, and

whether he was mistreated or abused. People v. Williams, 230 Ill. App. 3d 761, 776 (1992) (citing

People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 376 (1990); People v. Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d 178, 198 (1989)).

¶ 60 Here, defendant was one month shy of being 19 years old at the time he was taken into

custody. As such, his reliance on section 103-2.1(a-5) of the Code of Criminal Procedures of 1963

(725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(a-5) (West 2022)), which addresses statements by minors, has no merit. See

id. (limiting the statutory requirements to subjects “under 18 years of age”). He was a high school

graduate with a history of employment. He had one juvenile conviction. The length of defendant’s

detention was less than 3 ½ hours, and the interrogation was less than an hour. Further, the entire

detention was recorded, and the video revealed no sign of abuse or threat. Defendant was provided

water and offered restroom breaks during the detention. Finally, any contention that defendant

failed to understand his Miranda rights was controverted by defendant’s invocation of the right to

25 remain silent later in the interview. Under these facts, we hold that defendant knowingly and

voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.

¶ 61 Defendant also contends that the detectives minimized the significance of defendant’s

Miranda rights and failed to determine whether he understood and wished to waive the right. As

to the former argument, defendant contends this situation is similar to that in People v. Alfaro, 386

Ill. App. 3d 271, 306 (2008). However, in Alfaro, the police officers “deliberately engaged in the

‘question first, warn later’ interrogation strategy.” Id. at 304, 305. More specifically, defendant

provided two unwarned, inculpatory statements prior to being read his Miranda rights three hours

into the interview. Id. at 305-06. Further, when defendant was finally read his rights, the officer

stated that they were “just a formality.” Id. at 306.

¶ 62 While defendant claims that the officer introduced his constitutional rights as something

they had to do to “tell [him] what’s going on,” our review of the video finds the claim wholly

without merit and misrepresents the video. Further, defendant’s argument fails to acknowledge the

fact that defendant repeatedly looked up to the officer while the Miranda rights were being read

and decisively nodded his head after the officer completed the reading and said “okay.” We find

none of the violations in Alfaro apparent here and that Alfaro is easily distinguishable. Given

defendant’s acknowledgment of the rights and the factors addressed above, we cannot find that a

meritorious motion to suppress defendant’s statements after the Miranda rights were provided was

viable. As such, we cannot find that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to

suppress defendant’s post-Miranda statements.

¶ 63 Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to

suppress the statements made after defendant invoked his right to silence. Failure to “scrupulously

honor” a request to remain silent after the right has been invoked renders any subsequent

26 statements inadmissible. People v. R.C., 108 Ill. 2d 349, 354 (1985). “ ‘The mere fact that

[defendant] may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does

not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries.’ ” People v. Turner,

56 Ill. 2d 201, 206-07 (1973) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445). To determine whether

defendant’s request to stop speaking was scrupulously honored, courts “consider whether (1) the

police immediately halted the initial interrogation after the defendant involved his right to remain

silent; (2) a significant amount of time elapsed between the interrogations;” (3) a new set of

Miranda warnings was issued prior to the second interrogation; and (4) the second interrogation

involved a crime that was not the subject of the first interrogation. People v. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d

271, 287 (1999).

¶ 64 Here, the interrogation was immediately stopped after defendant invoked his rights, and

we find defendant’s interpretation of the video following invocation of his rights misleading. The

police returned, three minutes later, so an officer could take DNA swabs and photographs. We do

not dispute that no new Miranda warnings were issued when the officer returned. However, the

second interrogation stemmed from defendant asking the detectives numerous questions and

becoming extremely upset with the responses, all of which were the subject of the same crime.

¶ 65 As noted above, a contention of ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure to file a

motion to suppress requires the defendant to show the unargued motion was meritorious and a

reasonable probability exists that the trial outcome would have been different had the evidence

been suppressed. Gayden, 2020 IL 123505, ¶ 28. Here, even if an unargued motion had merit, there

is no reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different. The State did not

present or rely on any portion of defendant’s interview after he invoked his right to silence. A

defendant’s failure to establish both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice stemming

27 from counsel’s deficient performance precludes any finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.

People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 11 (citing People v. Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 438

(2005)). As the evidence that defendant claims should be suppressed was never presented to the

trial court, no prejudice can be found because no different outcome is possible. As such,

defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to suppress the statements

defendant made after he invoked his right to remain silent has no merit.

¶ 66 C. Ineffective assistance of counsel during cross-examination

¶ 67 Defendant next argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because during

Asia’s cross examination counsel introduced Asia’s statement to police that said, “[I]f there’s a

guy in here, I’m going to kill him.” He further asked Officer McCartney to confirm whether Asia

spoke to defendant when he was leaving Asia’s apartment. Officer McCartney confirmed the

exchange and stated that Asia told him that her words to defendant were “You are weird. Why

would you come here and do that.” Generally, which witness to call for testimony and the manner

and extent of cross examination are matters of trial strategy that will not support ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. People v. Leeper, 317 Ill. App. 3d 475, 482 (2000) (citing People v.

Reid, 179 Ill. 2d 297, 310 (1997)). There is a presumption that defense counsel will pursue “sound

trial strategies.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A showing that trial counsel’s strategy was unsound

requires more than a lack of success at trial; the strategy must be “irrational and unreasonable in

light of the circumstances that defense counsel confronted at the time” of trial. People v. Faulkner,

292 Ill. App. 3d 391, 394 (1997). Rebuttal of the presumption that trial counsel’s trial strategy was

sound is shown when the chosen strategy is “so unsound that counsel completely fails to conduct

any meaningful adversarial testing” (People v. Leeper, 317 Ill. App. 3d 475, 482 (2000)) or “when

28 no reasonably effective criminal defense attorney, facing similar circumstances, would pursue such

strategies.” Faulkner, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 394.

¶ 68 Here, while defendant calls the statements “damning,” claiming they provided elements of

“intent to cause harm” and further showed that defendant shot Adrian, he fails to address why

defense counsel may have asked Asia and Officer McCartney about the statements. Here, review

of the cross examination reveals that defense counsel was trying to impeach Asia with the

statements by showing that she fabricated the statement because it was not heard on the Ring

doorbell video. The entire defense strategy was based on the credibility of Asia and Lupe, which

was addressed in both the opening and closing statements, as well as both motions for a directed

verdict. Generally, impeachment of a witness is a matter of trial strategy and immune from claims

of ineffective assistance (People v. Phillips, 2017 IL App (4th) 160557, ¶ 58) unless “ ‘counsel

entirely fails to conduct meaningful adversarial testing.’ ” People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 432-33

(1999) (quoting People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 394 (1995)). While defense counsel was

ultimately unsuccessful in persuading the court of Asia and Lupe’s lack of credibility, the attempt

to discredit Asia was reasonable strategy and undermines defendant’s claim that counsel failed to

conduct meaningful adversarial testing. Further evidence revealed that the reason the statement

was not on the video was because the Ring doorbell was activated by motion, not sound. When

defendant left Asia’s apartment, she was already in the parking lot. Once defendant passed the

Ring doorbell, no activity occurred that would have triggered the conversation in the parking lot.

¶ 69 Once again, in order for defendant to succeed with his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, defendant must show deficient performance by his trial counsel and prejudice stemming

from the deficient performance. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 11. Here, we further find that even

if defense counsel’s trial strategy was deficient, prejudice cannot be shown. The trial court found

29 intent to kill by the fact that defendant shot at Adrian eight times, despite Adrian being unarmed

and sleeping when defendant walked into the room. Further, the trial court relied on Asia’s

testimony regarding her identification of defendant holding a weapon when he pushed into her

apartment as the basis of finding defendant was the shooter. The trial court’s very detailed ruling

on defendant’s guilt was not premised on either of the statements which are the basis of defendant’s

issue. Accordingly, we find that in addition to failing to show trial counsel’s cross examinations

of Asia and Officer McCartney did not amount to adversarial testing, defendant fails to show

prejudice. Accordingly, we hold that defendant failed to show his trial counsel was ineffective

during his cross examinations of Asia and Officer McCartney.

¶ 70 D. Sentencing

¶ 71 Defendant argues that his sentence was excessive and unconstitutional. In support of

excessiveness, defendant argues that the court failed to properly consider his rehabilitative

potential despite his young age. As to the latter argument, defendant contends that the trial court

relied on improper factors in determining defendant’s sentence. Neither argument was sufficiently

preserved at the trial court level and therefore, defendant requests review under the first prong of

plain error.

¶ 72 “[I]t is well settled that, to preserve a claim of sentencing error, both a contemporaneous

objection and a written postsentencing motion raising the issue are required.” People v. Hillier,

237 Ill. 2d 539, 543 (2010). “Failure to do so forfeits any review of the error.” People v. Jackson,

2022 IL 127256, ¶ 15. The plain error doctrine is a limited exception to the forfeiture rule. People

v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 65 (2008). First prong plain error requires the defendant to show that

a clear or obvious error occurred, and the evidence was so closely balanced that the error threatened

to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error. People

30 v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005). The first step is to determine whether error occurred.

People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007).

¶ 73 “[A] reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely

because it would have balanced the appropriate sentencing factors differently.” People v. O’Neal,

125 Ill. 2d 291, 298 (1988). Great deference is afforded the trial court’s judgment of sentence

because the trial court “ ‘having observed the defendant and the proceedings, has a far better

opportunity to consider these factors than the reviewing court, which must rely on the “cold”

record.’ ” People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212-13 (2010) (quoting People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d

48, 53 (1999)). “[T]he imposition of sentence is a matter of judicial discretion and the standard of

review to determine whether a sentence is excessive is whether the trial court abused that

discretion.” O’Neal, 125 Ill. 2d at 297-98. “A sentence will be deemed an abuse of discretion where

the sentence is ‘greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly

disproportionate to the nature of the offense.’ ” Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212 (quoting People v.

Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210 (2000) citing Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 54). Accordingly, our consideration

of error is applied with these principles in mind.

¶ 74 The basis of defendant’s claim of an excessive sentence is his claim that his 50-year

sentence does not reflect adequate consideration of his rehabilitative potential, given his youth. He

then argues, citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471-72 (2012), that his youth is an excellent

basis for establishing his rehabilitative potential and the court failed to consider his youth.

¶ 75 Unfortunately for defendant’s claim, the trial court specifically stated it was considering

the “character of the Defendant with the objective of restoring him to useful citizenship.” The

language indubitably addresses defendant’s rehabilitation potential. The court further considered

defendant’s age mistakenly believing that defendant had just turned 18, at the time the crime

31 occurred, when defendant was actually one month shy of turning 19 when the murder occurred.

Notably, Miller does not apply once a defendant is 18 years of age. People v. Spencer, 2025 IL

130015, ¶ 32.

¶ 76 Even more problematic for defendant is the fact that the trial court considered factors under

section 5-4.5-105 of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5-4.5-105 (West 2022)) even though it

was well aware that defendant had already reached the age of majority. Despite defendant’s

majority status, the court believed the section 5-1.5-105 factors were “important” to consider. The

court noted that the factors should be considered mitigation but found that when the factors were

considered as to defendant, the factors were not mitigating. More specifically, the court found that

defendant acted alone and was not in a gang. It further noted that defendant’s act was not

impetuous, was planned, and that defendant had a good relationship with his family. The court

also specifically noted that section 5-4.5-115 of the Code of Corrections (id. § 5-4.5-115(b))—

which was applicable only for defendants under the age of 21 at the time of the offense—provided

defendant with an opportunity to be eligible for potential parole after serving 20 years or more of

his sentence. Under these facts, we can find no error because the court did consider both

rehabilitative potential and age when it sentenced defendant.

¶ 77 Defendant also argues that the court considered improper factors during sentencing. He

contends that the trial court considered his “mental health, substance abuse, and the characteristics

of youth” as “aggravating, rather than mitigating.” Defendant again requests first prong plain error

for our review of this issue because it was not properly preserved either. We review whether the

court applied improper factors de novo. People v. Williams, 2018 IL App (4th) 150759, ¶ 18.

¶ 78 Typically, the term “improper factors” during sentencing involves the trial court

improperly considering factors inherent in the crime itself as a factor in aggravation at sentencing

32 because this would result in improper double enhancement. See e.g. People v. Conover, 84 Ill. 2d

400, 404-05 (1981); see also, People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (2004). A sentence based upon an

improper aggravating factor unjustly affects a defendant’s “fundamental right to liberty” and

violates his right to be sentenced on proper factors. People v. James, 255 Ill. App. 3d 516, 531

(1993).

¶ 79 Here, defendant’s issue contends that the court’s consideration of his mental health and

substance abuse was for aggravating factors, instead of mitigating factors as required by section

5-4.5-105(a) of Code of Corrections. (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2022)). As noted above,

section 5-4.5-105(a) is not applicable to defendant as he was over the age of 18 at the time the

offense was committed. Id. The factors for aggravation and mitigation that were applicable for

defendant are found in sections 5-5-3.1 and 5-5-3.2 of the Unified Code of Corrections. See

id. §§ 5-5-3.1, 3.2. Notably, neither age nor substance abuse is listed as a mitigating factor under

section 5-5-3.1. Id. § 5-5-3.1. While mental health is a mitigating factor (see id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(16))

it must be a “serious mental illness” that afflicted the defendant “[a]t the time of the offense.” Id.

Here, there is neither evidence or allegation of a serious mental illness nor evidence or allegation

that said illness afflicted defendant at the time he murdered Adrian.

¶ 80 Despite the lack of substantiating evidence related to defendant’s statements regarding his

mental health when the PSI was prepared, the court still considered the issue. Further, despite the

lack of necessity, the court also considered defendant’s age. Contrary to claims by defendant, the

trial court considered defendant’s mental health and age as mitigating factors specifically stating,

“There is mitigation here. He’s young. He has no record. He has mental health issues.”

¶ 81 Regarding substance abuse, the trial court did find that that defendant’s use of drugs and

alcohol were mitigating factors. The court specifically stated, “There’s the aggravation that he was

33 angry. He’s used drugs and alcohol. He’s enjoyed being around the gun culture.” As noted above,

the court was not required to consider substance abuse as a mitigating factor. We further note that

consideration of substance abuse as an aggravating factor is well-established. See People v.

Montgomery, 192 Ill. 2d 642, 674 (2000) (alcohol and drug abuse testimony is not necessarily

mitigating and the court is “not required to share the defendant’s assessment of the information”);

People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 193-94 (1996) (a trial court is not constrained to find evidence

proffered as mitigating to be, in fact, mitigating); People v. Whealon, 185 Ill. App. 3d 570, 574

(1989) (drug addiction can be considered as either a mitigating or aggravating factor); People v.

Scott, 225 Ill. App. 3d 938, 941 (1992) (same). The burden of persuasion for plain error rests with

the defendant. People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613 (2010). Here, we cannot find that the trial

court’s decision not to view defendant’s substance abuse as a mitigating factor was error. As no

clear and obvious error can be found regarding the court’s sentence based on its consideration of

defendant’s age, mental health and history of substance abuse, we will honor the procedural

default. See Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545 (“If the defendant fails to meet his burden, the procedural

default will be honored.”).

¶ 82 In the alternative, defendant contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

for failing to include the above-stated arguments in a post-sentencing motion. While forfeited

errors may suffice as a basis for ineffective assistance of counsel claims (see People v. Lear, 175

Ill. 2d 262, 278 (1997)), such application here is unwarranted. As with the previous claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel, we follow the Strickland standard which requires defendant to

show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and defendant was prejudiced as a result of the

deficiencies. People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 527 (1984). Here, regardless of counsel’s alleged

deficiencies, no prejudice can be shown where asserting the issues would be futile. As noted above,

34 no error was shown by the trial court’s consideration and classification of the evidence at

sentencing. “[T]he failure of a defendant to show that error occurred at all defeats both an

ineffective assistance claim and a claim of error under either prong of the plain error doctrine.”

People v. Hensley, 2014 IL App (1st) 120802, ¶ 47 (citing People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22,

25 (2011)). Because no error was found, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for

failure to preserve the issue must also fail.

¶ 83 E. Counsel’s failure to raise a proportionate penalties clause claim

¶ 84 Defendant’s final argument contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

raise a proportionate penalty claim related to the 25-year mandatory enhancement to defendant’s

sentence based on the trial court’s finding that defendant “personally discharged a firearm that

proximately caused *** death to another person.” See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2022).

¶ 85 A sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause where either the penalty is harsher

than the penalty for a different offense containing identical elements or “the punishment for the

offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense

of the community.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 20.

A sentence of any length may be challenged under the proportionate penalties clause. Id. ¶ 29.

¶ 86 Defendant claims here that his attorney argued that the mandatory enhancements should

not be imposed but failed to support the argument. Our review of the record reveals that, at most,

defense counsel argued prior to sentencing that, “Your Honor, by contrast with the State I think

the minimum sentence which this Court’s gonna respect is way too much.” After the court rendered

its sentence, it allowed defense counsel to file, and orally argue, a motion to reduce sentence. The

written motion stated, “Reduce [defendant’s] sentence to the 45-year IDOC without parole

minimum” and “The minimum sentence is nonetheless extreme and inappropriate.” After the court

35 reviewed the motion, it asked defense counsel if there was anything else he wished to say. Defense

counsel responded, “Just this, your Honor, had the sentence been much greater than 50 I would

have made a more concentrated effort on this, but it’s so close that I fear it’s just simply appropriate

for me to file it and say nothing else.” Accordingly, we find nothing in the record to support

defendant’s conclusion that counsel provided a specific argument that the minimum sentence in

this case was inappropriate, which would certainly explain why trial counsel “gave the court no

legal reasoning as to why that was the case” as claimed in defendant’s brief.

¶ 87 Defendant claims, citing People v. Estrada, 2024 IL App (1st) 230029-U, ¶¶ 50-54 and

People v. Spann, 332 Ill. App. 3d 425, 436-37 (2002), that counsel’s failure to present evidence on

the argument was deficient. He further claims that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure

because the State and the court agreed that a 25-year sentence would have been appropriate at the

sentencing conference held before trial.

¶ 88 Defendant’s argument is presumed to be an “as applied” challenge since the statutory 25-

year firearm enhancement (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2022)) has been found to be

constitutional under claims of cruelty, degradation, or shocking the moral sense of the community.

People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 525 (2005). Defendant’s argument places strong reliance for his

claim on People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 330 (2002). While defendant and Leon Miller were both

sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment for their convictions (see id. at 332), we find that Miller is

distinguishable both on the ages of the defendants and their participation in the crimes.

¶ 89 Notably, Leon Miller was 15-years old, had “one minute to contemplate his decision to

participate in the incident and stood as a lookout during the shooting, but never handled a gun.”

Id. at 341. Here, defendant, who was 18 years old, and would turn 19 the following month, brought

36 the gun to Asia’s apartment, pushed himself into the apartment, and used the gun repeatedly on an

unarmed, sleeping man. Further, the shots were fired while other people were in the apartment.

¶ 90 We find the facts in defendant’s case are more similar to People v. Hilliard, 2021 IL App

(1st) 200112, than Miller. While the defendant in Hilliard received a 40-year sentence of

incarceration (see id. ¶ 1), compared with defendant’s 50-year sentence, Hilliard’s conviction was

for attempted murder following a shooting, not first degree murder. Both Hilliard and defendant

were 18 years old at the time the crimes were committed, and both of their sentences were

increased by the 25-year firearm enhancement. Id. ¶¶ 1, 12. Notably, in the first Hilliard appeal,

the appellate court found the claim “was ‘best suited’ for the trial court where the factual record

could be developed as necessary.” See Id. ¶ 13; see also People v. Hilliard, 2017 IL App (1st)

142951-U, ¶ 42.

¶ 91 In order to make a claim that defendant’s sentence was improper under the proportionate

penalties clause, counsel was required to show that, as applied to the defendant, the sentence was

cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the

community. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 338; People v. Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d 337, 348 (2009). By relying

on an immature brain defense, as seen here, defendant would have been required to “demonstrate,

through an adequate factual record, that his or her own specific characteristics were so like those

of a juvenile that imposition of a life sentence absent the safeguards established in Miller was

‘cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the

community.’ ” People v. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶ 25 (quoting Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d at

348)).

¶ 92 Here, while evidence of defendant’s alleged mental health and substance abuse issues are

found in the PSI, the statements are insufficient to support the claim being made on appeal and we

37 are being asked to address evidence submitted on appeal through citations to journal articles and

the PSI although the journal article was never addressed by the trial court. “[A] reviewing court

will not take judicial notice of critical evidentiary material not presented in the court below,

especially where the evidence may be significant in the proper determination of issues between

the parties.” Kennedy v. Edgar, 199 Ill. App. 3d 138, 143 (1990).

¶ 93 While defendant also relies heavily on Estrada, 2024 IL App (1st) 230029-U, in support

of his ineffective assistance claim, Estrada is also distinguishable from the case at bar. Notably,

trial counsel in Estrada presented a written proportionate penalties claim, evidence in support

thereof, as well as evidence and argument at the resentencing hearing. Id. ¶¶ 22-24, 27-28, 30-33.

In response, the Estrada trial court specifically stated that it could not sentence defendant below

the minimum statutory sentence and found that trial counsel failed to present sufficient evidence

in support of the claim. Id. ¶ 55. The appellate majority interpreted the trial court’s statement as a

reasonable probability that “the court would have imposed a lesser sentence” if trial counsel had

submitted additional evidence in support of the defendant’s proportionate penalties claim. Id. ¶ 56.

¶ 94 Here, the trial court specifically found that defendant’s actions required a sentence greater

than the 45-year minimum required by statute. It stated, “I don’t think the minimum under the

circumstances are appropriate” due to the nature and circumstances of the case. Further, unlike the

trial counsel in Estrada, no claim under the proportionate penalties clause was raised, no evidence

in support of the claim was submitted, and defense counsel requested the court issue defendant the

minimum statutory sentence, not something lower. As such we find Estrada distinguishable and

the factual basis for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim lacking.

¶ 95 It is well-established that “as-applied constitutional claims cannot ultimately succeed

absent a sufficiently developed evidentiary record.” People v. Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 45

38 (citing People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48; People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 44). Given

the lack of any previously filed proportionate penalty claim, the lack of evidence presented in

support of the claim, and the precedential authority of Spencer, we find that the issue of whether

defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective is premature. We therefore hold that the issue would be

more appropriately presented in a postconviction proceeding under the Post-Conviction Hearing

Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)).

¶ 96 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 97 For the above-stated reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.

¶ 98 Affirmed.