People v. Lawson

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Lawson

75 A.D.2d 607, 426 N.Y.S.2d 791, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11058

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 14, 1980

StatusPublished

This text of 75 A.D.2d 607 (People v. Lawson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Lawson, 75 A.D.2d 607, 426 N.Y.S.2d 791, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11058 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1980).

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Opinion

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County, rendered May 3, 1977, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment reversed, as a matter of discretion in the interest of [608]*608justice, and new trial ordered. Defendant’s conviction was the result of a sale of narcotics made to an undercover police officer. At trial, the defendant raised the defense of entrapment. Although guilt was established by legally sufficient evidence, we are constrained to reverse the judgment of conviction because the defendant was denied a fair trial. During the charge on entrapment the trial court improperly instructed the jury to first consider the merits of that defense and then, if it was rejected, consider the guilt or innocence of the defendant (see People v Quitsch, 64 AD2d 917; People v Johnston, 47 AD2d 897). The court also erred when, in response to a jury request for clarification of the law with respect to entrapment it merely reiterated the language of the main charge (see People v Miller, 6 NY2d 152; People v Lopez, 73 AD2d 676). The court further prejudiced the defendant by thrice instructing the jury that his criminal record could be used to assess his credibility when the only prior brush with the law revealed at trial involved a traffic infraction. Defendant was also prejudiced by the prosecutor’s comments on summation. The prosecutor implied that the defendant was guilty of uncharged crimes by describing him as . a drug dealer operating out of New York City and by submitting to the jury that the defendant had created his record company as a front and to avoid paying taxes. Although the defense failed to make objection to either the charge to the jury or the prosecutor’s summation, we find their total effect to be so prejudicial as to require a new trial in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15, subd 6, par [a]). Hopkins, J. P., Lazer, Gibbons and Rabin, JJ., concur.

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Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County, rendered May 3, 1977, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment reversed, as a matter of discretion in the interest of [608]*608justice, and new trial ordered. Defendant’s conviction was the result of a sale of narcotics made to an undercover police officer. At trial, the defendant raised the defense of entrapment. Although guilt was established by legally sufficient evidence, we are constrained to reverse the judgment of conviction because the defendant was denied a fair trial. During the charge on entrapment the trial court improperly instructed the jury to first consider the merits of that defense and then, if it was rejected, consider the guilt or innocence of the defendant (see People v Quitsch, 64 AD2d 917; People v Johnston, 47 AD2d 897). The court also erred when, in response to a jury request for clarification of the law with respect to entrapment it merely reiterated the language of the main charge (see People v Miller, 6 NY2d 152; People v Lopez, 73 AD2d 676). The court further prejudiced the defendant by thrice instructing the jury that his criminal record could be used to assess his credibility when the only prior brush with the law revealed at trial involved a traffic infraction. Defendant was also prejudiced by the prosecutor’s comments on summation. The prosecutor implied that the defendant was guilty of uncharged crimes by describing him as . a drug dealer operating out of New York City and by submitting to the jury that the defendant had created his record company as a front and to avoid paying taxes. Although the defense failed to make objection to either the charge to the jury or the prosecutor’s summation, we find their total effect to be so prejudicial as to require a new trial in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15, subd 6, par [a]). Hopkins, J. P., Lazer, Gibbons and Rabin, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

75 A.D.2d 607, 426 N.Y.S.2d 791, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11058, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-lawson-nyappdiv-1980.

Opinion

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