2026 IL App (1st) 230538 No. 1-23-0538 May 1, 2026 FIFTH DIVISION
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) 18 CR 12771 ) KEVIN LANIGAN, ) The Honorable ) Michael J. Hood, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Mikva & Wilson concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant Kevin Lanigan was convicted after a bench trial of aggravated driving under
the influence of alcohol. The bench trial had only one witness, who was the arresting officer.
Defendant was sentenced to two years of probation and ordered to comply with treatment
recommendations after a drug and alcohol evaluation. On appeal, defendant claims (1) that the
State relied on body-worn camera footage that was allegedly not admitted into evidence and No. 1-23-0538
(2) that the evidence at trial was insufficient. For the following reasons, we find (1) that the
trial court did admit the officer’s body-worn camera footage into evidence during the bench
trial and (2) that the testimony and the body-worn camera footage were more than sufficient
evidence of the charged offense.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Defendant was charged in a two-count information. The first count charged that on
August 10, 2018, he was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol and that this occurred during a period in which his driving privileges were suspended.
On appeal, defendant does not dispute the fact that his license was suspended. The second
count charged that on August 10, 2018, he was in actual physical control of a vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol and while not in possession of a driver’s license. In the trial
court, defendant was represented by private counsel.
¶4 After various delays and substitutions of counsel, on September 8, 2022, defendant
waived his right to a jury trial, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. Officer Trysha Solis
testified that she had been a Chicago police officer for 8½ years. In the early morning hours of
August 10, 2018, she was on routine patrol with her partner, Office Monic Reveles, in a marked
Chicago police vehicle. At 1:40 a.m., they were waved down by a citizen who told them that
there was a car stopped near an intersection with a man sleeping in the car. After the officers
drove to the location, Officer Solis observed a stopped vehicle with the engine running and a
person asleep in the driver’s seat. The car was stopped a little bit north of Oak Street, on
Orleans Street, with the driver’s side window down. Officer Solis testified that there was no
reason to be stopped at that time since the lights for Orleans Street were blinking yellow and
there was no traffic.
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¶5 Officer Solis testified that she approached the open driver’s side window, where she
observed that the driver’s eyes were closed and his head was tilted forward with his chin on
his chest. After she knocked on the rear window to get his attention, defendant released his
foot off the brake, and the car started to move forward. The officers became alarmed and told
defendant to stop the car and put it in park, which he did. Defendant seemed surprised to see
them, and they identified themselves as officers, although they were also in uniform. Officer
Solis asked for his license and insurance, and defendant started “fumbling around.” In the end,
he handed them his whole wallet. Defendant started trying to exit the car, and he was “finally”
able to open the door. Officer Solis noted the smell of alcohol emanating from the inside of the
car. When she asked him if he had had any drinks, he responded that he had consumed four
drinks. Then she conducted standard field sobriety tests.
¶6 Officer Solis testified that she had received training at the Chicago Police Academy
regarding how to perform field sobriety tests, which involved both written and practice tests,
and she was certified to administer them. At that time on August 10, 2018, it was dark, and the
weather was clear with no rain. First, she performed the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN)
test, where she held a pen four to six inches from his face and moved it from side to side and
also up and down, while she looked for an involuntary jerking of the eyes, among other signs.
Officer Solis testified that 4 signs are sufficient to indicate alcohol consumption, and defendant
indicated 10.
¶7 Officer Solis offered defendant the walk-and-turn test, which he declined to perform.
Defendant did do the one-leg stand test, and she observed that, when he placed his foot down,
“[h]e was swaying.” As part of the test, the subject is supposed to count “one thousand one,
one thousand two,” and so on, until told to stop. In the case at bar, defendant skipped a number
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and then stopped counting before Officer Solis told him to stop. Then he restarted and started
counting again. During the stop, defendant never indicated that he was unable to perform the
tests due to a medical condition or a leg or knee impairment or that he wore glasses or contact
lenses. Based upon the tests and her other observations, Officer Solis placed defendant in
custody and took him to the police station for processing.
¶8 Officer Solis testified that, as part of the processing at the police station, a breathalyzer
test was attempted. As part of the test, the subject has to blow into the machine. Officer Solis
testified that, in the case at bar, defendant “just blew lightly, [and] didn’t listen to the directions
that were given.” Officer Solis attempted to perform the test three times. She testified that,
after three attempts, it is considered a refusal. Officer Solis testified that she had had the
opportunity in both her personal life and her professional life to observe individuals who were
under the influence of alcohol and that it was her opinion that defendant was driving under the
influence of alcohol. Officer Solis explained that her opinion was based on: (1) defendant’s
“inability to follow simple directions,” (2) the tests, and (3) and “hi[s] being in the car with his
foot on the pedal at a yellow yield light with it is one o’clock in the morning and no stopped
traffic.”
¶9 Officer Solis testified that both her and her partner were equipped with body-worm
cameras and that she had the opportunity to review the footage from both cameras. Since on
appeal defendant contends that this exhibit was not admitted, we quote below the remarks
surrounding its admission:
“MR. NEWTON [(ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY (ASA))]: Judge, if I can
have a brief moment. I’m going to mark for identification People’s Exhibit No. 2, and
this is a file labeled Axon underscore Body Reveles, R-e-v-e-l-e-s.
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(People’s Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.)
[ASA]: And Judge, I would ask to strike the words ‘for identification’ for People’s
Exhibit No. 2 and leave to publish.
THE COURT: Any objection, [defense counsel]?
MR. WALLIN [(DEFENSE COUNSEL)]: No objection.
THE COURT: There being no objection, the words ‘for identification’ are stricken.
People’s Exhibit No. 2, the Reveles body cam, is in. You can publish whatever you
want.
[ASA]: Thank you, Judge.”
¶ 10 The trial court then described for the record what was initially being shown and stated
again the court’s approval to publish:
“THE COURT: For the record what I’m seeing is the inside of a CPD vehicle with
a computer screen lit up in the middle and the steering wheel to the left.
Is that what you see, [ASA]?
[ASA]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And [defense counsel]?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.
THE COURT: [Defendant], you can see the video okay?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: Good to go. Okay. You can publish.”
The ASA then played the video, stopping at certain parts to ask Officer Solis to identify the
individuals.
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¶ 11 On cross examination, Officer Solis testified that she asked defendant where he was
coming from, and he replied that he was coming from home and provided a street address.
When she first approached defendant’s vehicle, the vehicle had its headlights on. At the time,
she had no concerns about a medical issue, and she did not call an ambulance. When defendant
stated that he had consumed four drinks, she did not ask what type of drinks or when he had
consumed them. When defendant exited the vehicle, she detected an odor of alcohol; however,
he did not need to hold on to the vehicle to support himself as he exited. During the HGN test,
defendant “slightly swayed” but not enough to affect her ability to perform the test. Officer
Solis did not ask defendant if he normally wore glasses and acknowledged that an eye condition
“may” affect the results of an HGN test. While the test was being performed, three squad cars
were in the vicinity with flashing lights. Officer Solis acknowledged that flashing lights could
distract a person’s eye movement.
¶ 12 Officer Solis testified that, by the time she offered defendant the walk-and-turn test,
which he refused, there were at least four officers present in the vicinity, in addition to herself
and her partner. Defendant did not follow her directions for the one-leg stand test, although he
appeared to be listening. Officer Solis acknowledged that the ability to perform the one-leg
stand test can be affected by a person’s weight. The first time that defendant attempted to do
the test, he had his foot up for about 10 seconds; the second time, for about 9 seconds. Officer
Solis did a “plain view” search of the vehicle and did not observe any open alcohol in the
vehicle. Officer Solis acknowledged that there was a section on her report for the one-leg stand
test, there was a box to check if the person swayed, and the box was not checked.
¶ 13 After the conclusion of Officer Solis’s testimony, the State introduced an abstract from
the Secretary of State for defendant. The abstract showed that defendant was issued a driver’s
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license on August 14, 2018, which was after the date of this incident. The State rested, and the
defense made a motion for a directed verdict which was denied, and the defense rested.
¶ 14 During the parties’ closing arguments to the court, both sides made arguments about
what the video showed. For example, defense counsel argued that defendant was dazed when
he was woken up, but that “you see as time goes by, he is understanding what’s going on.”
Defense counsel argued: “I didn’t see the officer lift her leg up when she was explaining that
one-legged test.” Again, apparently relying on the tape, counsel argued that his client was
“understandable” and that his speech was “not slurred.”
¶ 15 The trial court began its ruling by describing the evidence in the case and finding the
sole witness credible:
“THE COURT: In this case I listened closely to the evidence, and I watched the
video closely, listened to the testimony of Officer Solis, the sole witness in this case.
She testified credibly.”
After finding the sole witness credible, the court observed that “[a]ctual physical control was
not an issue,” and neither was the fact that defendant’s driving privileges were suspended.
The court noted that defendant’s car was parked almost in the middle of the street in front of
a yellow blinking light at 1:30 a.m., that he was asleep at the wheel of a car that was still
running, that he admitted to consuming four drinks, and that there was “some sway” as
defendant walked to the front of the car. With respect to the sway, the court stated, “it is like
the famous Supreme Court case, you know it when you see it.” The court found there was
“some issue with his gait.”
¶ 16 However, the trial court discounted the HGN test, finding that it was “much adieu
about nothing.” The court did find that defendant did not follow instructions very well. With
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the one-leg stand test, the court noted that the video showed that he put his foot down after
five seconds, then picked it back up, and continued to count but skipped a number. The court
found that defendant stopped the test himself and restarted the test himself and decided to
start counting over. Based on all the evidence, the court found that defendant was proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of both counts.
¶ 17 After the trial on September 8, 2022, defendant filed a motion on October 5, 2022, for
a new trial. The parties returned to court on October 21, 2022, when defendant filed a motion
to substitute counsel, which was granted. Also, on October 21, 2022, the presentence
investigation report was filed, and it reflected that defendant had two prior misdemeanor
convictions, both related to driving: (1) negligent driving on August 6, 2015, and (2) driving
under the influence of alcohol “Bac. O8” on January 27, 2017. The instant offense occurred
on August 10, 2018.
¶ 18 On November 7, 2022, new counsel filed a supplemental motion for a new trial,
which argued, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate
defendant’s postarrest diagnosis of a medical condition, namely hypothyroidism. Defendant
contended that the medical condition could explain the observations made by the arresting
officer that were instead attributed to alcohol. On February 6, 2023, the trial court stated that
it was reopening the case because the court did not previously ask defendant whether he
wanted to testify. The court asked, and defendant stated on the record that he understood his
rights and did not want to testify. The parties then proceeded to consideration of defendant’s
motion for a new trial, which the defense declined to argue. With respect to the motion, the
trial court found that defendant was “guilty of the offense and I don’t think it was a close
call” and denied the motion.
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¶ 19 At sentencing, defendant submitted a letter of remorse for the court’s consideration,
in which he explained that his “past coping mechanisms were to turn inward and begin self-
medicating.” However, “[t]hrough the assistance of regular counseling and the creation of a
strong support network,” he had learned to manage his struggles. Now that he was in a
position to aid his sister with her health issues, he had “found renewed purposed in [his]
sobriety.” The trial court then sentenced defendant for the instant felony offense to two years
of probation with treatment. On appeal, defendant raises no challenge to his sentence. On
March 7, 2023, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.
¶ 20 ANALYSIS
¶ 21 Defendant’s first claim on appeal is that “the State relied on Body Worn Camera
footage that was published and relied on by the Court [but] never introduced or moved into
evidence, and counsel’s failure to object to this improper consideration of unadmitted
evidence was ineffective.”
¶ 22 As defendant notes in his appellate brief, when a trial court is the trier of fact, a
reviewing court presumes that the trial court considered only admissible evidence and
disregarded inadmissible evidence in reaching its conclusion. People v. Smart, 2025 IL
130127, ¶ 94. This presumption may be rebutted only where the record affirmatively shows
the contrary. Smart, 2025 IL 130127, ¶ 94. We can find no such affirmative showing here,
because our examination of the record reveals that defendant’s argument relies on an
erroneous factual premise.
¶ 23 Contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal, the body-worn camera footage was
admitted into evidence, with no objection by counsel, who then utilized this evidence in his
closing argument. Further evidence that the footage was admitted is as follows: (1) where the
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ASA moved for permission to strike the words “for identification from the exhibit and to
publish”; (2) where the trial court asked defense counsel if he had any objection and counsel
indicated that he had none; (3) where the trial court then ruled that “[t]here being no
objection, the words ‘for identification’ are stricken”; and (4) where the trial court expressly
stated that the exhibit was “in” and could now be published. See People v. Aquisto, 2022 IL
App (4th) 200081, ¶ 73 (although the trial court did not use the word “admitted,” admission
of the exhibit was implied when the trial court asked defense counsel if he had any objection
to its admission and he replied that he had none).
¶ 24 Defendant’s second claim on appeal is that “[t]he evidence against [defendant] was
insufficient and did not rise to the level of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” When reviewing
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must determine, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, whether any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People
v. Cline, 2022 IL 126383, ¶ 25. “All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn
in favor of the prosecution.” Cline, 2022 IL 126383, ¶ 25. A reviewing court will not reverse
the fact finder’s judgment unless the finding was so unreasonable, improbable, or
unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Cline, 2022 IL
126383, ¶ 25.
¶ 25 For a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, the State must prove that the
defendant was “in actual physical control of any vehicle” while “under the influence of
alcohol.” 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2024). For the aggravated portion of the charge, the
State had to prove that defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol while his driving
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privileges were revoked or suspended or while he did not possess a driver’s license. 625
ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(G), (H) (West 2024).
¶ 26 In the case at bar, what strikes this reviewing court is how few issues are disputed on
appeal. Defendant did not dispute at trial and does not dispute on appeal (1) the lack of a valid
driver’s license; (2) the consumption of alcohol, having readily admitted the consumption of
four drinks to the arresting officer; and (3) his physical control of the vehicle.
¶ 27 Therefore, we will focus on the “under the influence of alcohol” element of the
statute. A person is under the influence of alcohol when, as a result of drinking any amount
of alcohol, his mental or physical faculties are so impaired as to reduce his ability to think or
act with ordinary care. People v. Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130152, ¶ 20. Being under the
influence is a question for the trier of fact to resolve after assessing the credibility of the
witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence. Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130152, ¶ 20. The
State must prove that defendant was under the influence to a degree that he could not drive
safely. Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130152, ¶ 20. Circumstantial evidence alone may be
sufficient to prove a person under the influence. Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130152, ¶ 20.
When the arresting officer provides credible testimony—as the trial court found in this
case—scientific proof is unnecessary. Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130152, ¶ 20. Further, a
defendant’s refusal to submit to chemical testing may be considered circumstantial evidence
of a defendant’s consciousness of guilt. Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130152, ¶ 20.
¶ 28 Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence of his being under the influence
of alcohol and that the officers and the trial court failed to rule out other possible causes for
defendant’s impairment. First, we find that this record provides overwhelming evidence that
defendant was under the influence. The evidence included (1) Officer Solis’s testimony of
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defendant being slumped in the driver’s seat of a car stopped almost in the middle of the
street, “with his foot on the pedal at a yellow yield light when it is one o’clock in the morning
and no stopped traffic,” the smell of alcohol emanating from inside his car, his inability to
follow directions, and the “sway” in his gait as he walked to the front of the car; (2) the
video; (3) his admission to having consumed four drinks; and (4) his performance on the
field sobriety tests. See People v. Eagletail, 2014 IL App (1st) 130252, ¶ 38 (the defendant’s
admitted consumption of alcohol, the odor of alcohol, and the failure of all three field
sobriety tests were sufficient evidence of being under the influence).
¶ 29 While defendant argues that there was only a small amount of sway, the court found
that there was definitely “some sway” as defendant walked to the front of the car and that
there was “some issue with his gait.” The court noted that “it is like the famous Supreme
Court case, you know it when you see it.” The trial court appears to be referring here to a
famous comment by Justice Stewart who said, regarding obscenity, “I know it when I see it.”
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). However, as we noted
in the paragraph above, defendant’s gait was just one of the factors indicating that defendant
was under the influence of alcohol in this case.
¶ 30 As to the cause of his apparent impairment, defendant cites no authority for the
proposition that, once (1) the driver admits alcohol consumption and (2) impairment is
shown, the State must sua sponte disprove other potential causes of impairment that are not
named or alleged. On appeal, defendant argues that the impairment could have been caused
by any number of medical conditions, including defendant’s subsequently diagnosed thyroid
condition. However, on appeal, when we consider a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence at trial, we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
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State. Cline, 2022 IL 126383, ¶ 25. The question we ask now is whether any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Cline,
2022 IL 126383, ¶ 25. To answer this question, we draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence in favor of the prosecution. Cline, 2022 IL 126383, ¶ 25. In the case at bar, with the
overwhelming evidence of impairment (supra ¶ 28), defendant’s admitted consumption of
four drinks, the smell of alcohol emanating from the vehicle, and the conceded lack of a
medical defense alleged at trial, we cannot find that the trial court was irrational in finding
that the defendant was in fact under the influence of alcohol.
¶ 31 CONCLUSION
¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, we do not find persuasive defendant’s arguments that an
exhibit was not admitted into evidence or that there was insufficient evidence to convict. Our
review of the record establishes that the exhibit at issue was, in fact, admitted and that the
evidence of guilt was overwhelming.
¶ 33 Affirmed.
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People v. Lanigan, 2026 IL App (1st) 230538
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 18-CR- 12771; the Hon. Michael J. Hood, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Anthony W. Hill, of Law Offices of Anthony W. Hill, of for Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Eileen O’Neill Burke, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (John E. for Nowak, Matthew Connors, and Beth Pfeiffer Burns, Assistant Appellee: State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.