NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2025 IL App (3d) 240381-U
Order filed August 14, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit, ) Du Page County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-24-0381 v. ) Circuit No. 21-CF-2155 ) ANTHONY L. LANE, ) Honorable ) Ann Celine O’Hallaren Walsh Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. __________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Holdridge and Hettel concurred in the judgment. ___________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The prosecutor’s statements in closing argument did not constitute plain error.
¶2 Defendant, Anthony L. Lane, appeals from his conviction for aggravated criminal sexual
assault. Defendant argues the prosecutor’s improper comments during rebuttal closing argument
deprived him of his right to a fair trial. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 Defendant was charged with, inter alia, aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS
5/11-1.30(a)(5) (West 2020)). The charge alleged that on November 22, 2021, defendant entered
J.L.B.’s dwelling without authority and committed sexual assault by the use or threat of force
against J.L.B., who was 60 years of age or older.
¶5 A jury trial began on January 8, 2024. The evidence established that J.L.B. was 92 years
old. On November 22, 2021, J.L.B. drove herself home from her dialysis appointment arriving at
approximately 6 p.m. While in her kitchen, she saw a man at the door. She tried to close the door,
but the man pushed it open, causing J.L.B. to fall. She asked the man what he wanted. He said he
wanted money. J.L.B. gave him $30. The man grabbed J.L.B and pushed her to the ground.
¶6 The man carried J.L.B. to her upstairs bedroom and taped her hands in front of her. The
man removed J.L.B.’s clothing and touched J.L.B.’s vagina and anus. J.L.B. was unsure if the man
used his tongue or penis. J.L.B. did not feel any penetration, but felt something “wet and loose,”
and rubbing “back and forth.” J.L.B. kept her eyes closed throughout the assault. The man then
left. After the assault, J.L.B. walked downstairs and called 911. The recording was played for the
jury.
¶7 A neighbor of J.L.B. told the police he saw a suspicious vehicle earlier that day with
damage to the front bumper and the license plate inside the vehicle. He had surveillance footage
of the vehicle, which he showed police. The police located a vehicle matching the neighbor’s
description and surveillance footage. The vehicle was registered to defendant’s wife.
¶8 During a police interview, defendant initially denied being at J.L.B.’s home. When
confronted with evidence that defendant used J.L.B.’s credit or debit card at a gas station,
defendant admitted he followed J.L.B. home from the dialysis clinic, taped her hands, and
demanded money. Defendant denied sexually assaulting her.
2 ¶9 A sexual assault examiner treated J.L.B. following the assault. J.L.B. had bruising on her
hands, arms, chin, and neck. There was redness in her vaginal area and blood in the “vaginal vault.”
Use of a blacklight indicated there may have been “something foreign,” in J.L.B.’s vaginal area.
The examiner collected swabs from J.L.B.’s external genitalia, vagina, and legs. The swabs were
a match for defendant’s DNA.
¶ 10 Before closing arguments, the court informed the jury that closing arguments are not
evidence. Defense counsel highlighted discrepancies and other issues in J.L.B.’s testimony. During
rebuttal closing, the prosecutor stated,
“You don’t think a sexual assault occurred to her? We’re going to ask the lady
who’s being ravaged in her bedroom why his stuff might not be working? We’re
going to ask her about penetration? She told you exactly what she could tell you
that happened; the rubbing, the wetness, the injuries that are there. You guys can
put together the facts. You guys can use all the other witnesses that backed up
everything that [J.L.B.] said.”
The prosecutor argued the DNA evidence supported the finding of guilt. Later, the prosecutor
stated, “Look, the only one in this entire room that thinks this defendant is not guilty is the
defendant. Everything backs it up. His own statement backs it up.” The prosecutor continued to
argue that defendant was lying about the sexual assault during the police interview and “admitted
what he had to.”
¶ 11 After the completion of the parties’ arguments, the court again instructed the jury,
“[n]either opening statements or closing arguments are evidence.” The jury was also instructed
“[o]nly you are the judges of the believability of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the
3 testimony of each of them.” The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault.
Defendant was sentenced to 58 years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argues improper statements made by the prosecutor during rebuttal
closing argument deprived him of a fair trial. Specifically, defendant argues the prosecutor
improperly expressed his personal opinion and invoked the integrity of the state’s attorney’s office
by stating, (1) “You don’t think a sexual assault occurred to her? We’re going to ask the lady who’s
being ravaged in her bedroom why his stuff might not be working? We’re going to ask her about
penetration?” and (2) “Look, the only one in this entire room that thinks this defendant is not guilty
is the defendant.” Defendant forfeited this issue by failing to preserve it at the trial level. See
People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). However, defendant urges us to review the matter
under the second prong of the plain error doctrine. “[T]he plain-error doctrine bypasses normal
forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when either (1) the
evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is serious, regardless
of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005). The first step
in applying the plain error doctrine is determining whether a clear or obvious error occurred.
People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007).
¶ 14 “It is a basic principle of our criminal justice system that prosecutors owe defendants a
duty of fairness.” People v. Derr, 316 Ill. App. 3d 272, 275 (2000). “This duty extends throughout
the trial and includes closing statements.” Id. Prosecutors “must refrain from making improper,
prejudicial comments and arguments.” People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 441 (1993).
“[P]rosecutors have wide latitude in the content of their closing arguments.” People v. Evans, 209
Ill. 2d 194, 225 (2004). “Closing arguments must be viewed in their entirety, and allegedly
4 erroneous arguments must be viewed in context.” People v. Ammons, 2021 IL App (3d) 150743,
¶ 43.
¶ 15 “ ‘It is prejudicial error for the prosecutor to express personal beliefs or opinions, or invoke
the integrity of the State’s Attorney’s office ***.’ ” People v. Boling, 2014 IL App (4th) 120634,
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NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2025 IL App (3d) 240381-U
Order filed August 14, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit, ) Du Page County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-24-0381 v. ) Circuit No. 21-CF-2155 ) ANTHONY L. LANE, ) Honorable ) Ann Celine O’Hallaren Walsh Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. __________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Holdridge and Hettel concurred in the judgment. ___________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The prosecutor’s statements in closing argument did not constitute plain error.
¶2 Defendant, Anthony L. Lane, appeals from his conviction for aggravated criminal sexual
assault. Defendant argues the prosecutor’s improper comments during rebuttal closing argument
deprived him of his right to a fair trial. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 Defendant was charged with, inter alia, aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS
5/11-1.30(a)(5) (West 2020)). The charge alleged that on November 22, 2021, defendant entered
J.L.B.’s dwelling without authority and committed sexual assault by the use or threat of force
against J.L.B., who was 60 years of age or older.
¶5 A jury trial began on January 8, 2024. The evidence established that J.L.B. was 92 years
old. On November 22, 2021, J.L.B. drove herself home from her dialysis appointment arriving at
approximately 6 p.m. While in her kitchen, she saw a man at the door. She tried to close the door,
but the man pushed it open, causing J.L.B. to fall. She asked the man what he wanted. He said he
wanted money. J.L.B. gave him $30. The man grabbed J.L.B and pushed her to the ground.
¶6 The man carried J.L.B. to her upstairs bedroom and taped her hands in front of her. The
man removed J.L.B.’s clothing and touched J.L.B.’s vagina and anus. J.L.B. was unsure if the man
used his tongue or penis. J.L.B. did not feel any penetration, but felt something “wet and loose,”
and rubbing “back and forth.” J.L.B. kept her eyes closed throughout the assault. The man then
left. After the assault, J.L.B. walked downstairs and called 911. The recording was played for the
jury.
¶7 A neighbor of J.L.B. told the police he saw a suspicious vehicle earlier that day with
damage to the front bumper and the license plate inside the vehicle. He had surveillance footage
of the vehicle, which he showed police. The police located a vehicle matching the neighbor’s
description and surveillance footage. The vehicle was registered to defendant’s wife.
¶8 During a police interview, defendant initially denied being at J.L.B.’s home. When
confronted with evidence that defendant used J.L.B.’s credit or debit card at a gas station,
defendant admitted he followed J.L.B. home from the dialysis clinic, taped her hands, and
demanded money. Defendant denied sexually assaulting her.
2 ¶9 A sexual assault examiner treated J.L.B. following the assault. J.L.B. had bruising on her
hands, arms, chin, and neck. There was redness in her vaginal area and blood in the “vaginal vault.”
Use of a blacklight indicated there may have been “something foreign,” in J.L.B.’s vaginal area.
The examiner collected swabs from J.L.B.’s external genitalia, vagina, and legs. The swabs were
a match for defendant’s DNA.
¶ 10 Before closing arguments, the court informed the jury that closing arguments are not
evidence. Defense counsel highlighted discrepancies and other issues in J.L.B.’s testimony. During
rebuttal closing, the prosecutor stated,
“You don’t think a sexual assault occurred to her? We’re going to ask the lady
who’s being ravaged in her bedroom why his stuff might not be working? We’re
going to ask her about penetration? She told you exactly what she could tell you
that happened; the rubbing, the wetness, the injuries that are there. You guys can
put together the facts. You guys can use all the other witnesses that backed up
everything that [J.L.B.] said.”
The prosecutor argued the DNA evidence supported the finding of guilt. Later, the prosecutor
stated, “Look, the only one in this entire room that thinks this defendant is not guilty is the
defendant. Everything backs it up. His own statement backs it up.” The prosecutor continued to
argue that defendant was lying about the sexual assault during the police interview and “admitted
what he had to.”
¶ 11 After the completion of the parties’ arguments, the court again instructed the jury,
“[n]either opening statements or closing arguments are evidence.” The jury was also instructed
“[o]nly you are the judges of the believability of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the
3 testimony of each of them.” The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault.
Defendant was sentenced to 58 years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argues improper statements made by the prosecutor during rebuttal
closing argument deprived him of a fair trial. Specifically, defendant argues the prosecutor
improperly expressed his personal opinion and invoked the integrity of the state’s attorney’s office
by stating, (1) “You don’t think a sexual assault occurred to her? We’re going to ask the lady who’s
being ravaged in her bedroom why his stuff might not be working? We’re going to ask her about
penetration?” and (2) “Look, the only one in this entire room that thinks this defendant is not guilty
is the defendant.” Defendant forfeited this issue by failing to preserve it at the trial level. See
People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). However, defendant urges us to review the matter
under the second prong of the plain error doctrine. “[T]he plain-error doctrine bypasses normal
forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when either (1) the
evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is serious, regardless
of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005). The first step
in applying the plain error doctrine is determining whether a clear or obvious error occurred.
People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007).
¶ 14 “It is a basic principle of our criminal justice system that prosecutors owe defendants a
duty of fairness.” People v. Derr, 316 Ill. App. 3d 272, 275 (2000). “This duty extends throughout
the trial and includes closing statements.” Id. Prosecutors “must refrain from making improper,
prejudicial comments and arguments.” People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 441 (1993).
“[P]rosecutors have wide latitude in the content of their closing arguments.” People v. Evans, 209
Ill. 2d 194, 225 (2004). “Closing arguments must be viewed in their entirety, and allegedly
4 erroneous arguments must be viewed in context.” People v. Ammons, 2021 IL App (3d) 150743,
¶ 43.
¶ 15 “ ‘It is prejudicial error for the prosecutor to express personal beliefs or opinions, or invoke
the integrity of the State’s Attorney’s office ***.’ ” People v. Boling, 2014 IL App (4th) 120634,
¶ 126 (quoting People v. Lee, 229 Ill. App. 3d 254, 260 (1992)). For a closing argument to
constitute improper personal opinion, the prosecutor “must explicitly state that he is asserting his
personal views, stating for example, ‘this is my personal view.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People
v. Pope, 284 Ill. App. 3d 695, 707 (1996); see People v. Emerson, 122 Ill. 2d 411, 434-35 (1987)
(use of “ ‘we know’ ” and “ ‘we heard’ ” was not improper when it commented on the evidence at
trial and discussed the credibility of witnesses). Additionally, prosecutors cannot invoke the
authority or integrity of the state’s attorney’s office for fear jurors will defer their judgment
concerning defendant’s guilt to the integrity and authority of the prosecutor. People v. Wilson, 199
Ill. App. 3d 792, 796 (1990); see People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 122745, ¶ 18 (the
prosecutor improperly invoked the integrity of his office when “[t]he prosecutor told the jury that
it could, in fact, believe [codefendant] because of some independent investigation into the veracity
of [codefendant’s] story that was not based on record evidence”).
¶ 16 Here, when reviewed in context, the comments at issue were not personal opinion or an
improper invocation of the integrity of the prosecutor’s office. As stated above, the prosecutor’s
comments must be explicit, and does not amount to an improper argument “if the jury has to infer
[what] the prosecutor is doing.” (Emphasis in original.) Pope, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 707. Both of
defendant’s arguments rely on the implication of the argument to the jury, not the explicit language
used. Moreover, with the first statement, the prosecutor was responding to defense counsel’s
argument that J.L.B.’s testimony was not credible and could not support a finding of guilt. The
5 prosecutor properly argued that even though J.L.B. could provide only limited information
regarding the assault and assailant, the jury was provided overwhelming evidence of defendant’s
guilt, particularly the DNA evidence, and could “put together the facts.”
¶ 17 With the second statement, the prosecutor was arguing that defendant believed he could
escape culpability for the sexual assault by admitting only to robbing J.L.B. It was not meant to be
taken literally and did not “convey[ ] to the jury that the trial judge and defense counsel also
thought that defendant was guilty,” as defendant argues. It was an isolated comment on defendant’s
lack of credibility and the strength of the evidence, which employed some “dramatic rhetorical
flourish[ ].” People v. Daniel, 2014 IL App (1st) 121171, ¶ 36. There was no risk the jury would
defer their judgment regarding defendant’s guilt to the integrity of the prosecutor’s office.
Therefore, we cannot say that a clear or obvious error occurred.
¶ 18 Regardless, even if we assume error, defendant would not be entitled to relief. Defendant
solely argues under the second prong of the plain error doctrine. The second prong of the plain
error doctrine has been equated with structural error. People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 28.
Structural errors are those which “erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermine the
fairness of the defendant’s trial.” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186. “An error is typically designated as
structural only if it necessarily renders a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable means
of determining guilt or innocence.” People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 609 (2010). As our
supreme court has noted, “comments in prosecutorial closing arguments will rarely constitute
second-prong plain error because the vast majority of such comments generally do not undermine
basic protections afforded to criminal defendants.” People v. Williams, 2022 IL 126918, ¶ 56.
¶ 19 Here, the comments at issue were nowhere near so egregious that they threatened the
integrity of the judicial process. See People v. Bliefnick, 2024 IL App (4th) 230707, ¶ 315. That is
6 particularly true given the jury instructions that arguments of the parties were not evidence and
that the jury was the ultimate judge of the credibility of the witnesses. These instructions
“ameliorated any possible prejudice” resulting from the comments. People v. Gonzalez, 388 Ill.
App. 3d 566, 598 (2008).
¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 21 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.
¶ 22 Affirmed.