People v. Landers

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250478-U NOTICE Decision filed 07/22/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0478 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Vermilion County. ) v. ) No. 23-CF-9 ) JESSE LANDERS, ) Honorable ) Mark S. Goodwin, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE SHOLAR delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Vaughan and Hackett concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s 45-year sentence for first degree murder is affirmed where the sentence was neither excessive nor an abuse of discretion.

¶2 A Vermilion County jury found defendant, Jesse Landers, guilty of first degree murder.

The trial court sentenced him to 45 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), with

3 years of mandatory supervised release. On appeal, defendant contends that his sentence is

excessive in light of his mental and physical health ailments and his rehabilitative potential. For

the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 We recite only the facts necessary to address the specific argument of the parties on appeal.

The State charged defendant with three counts of first degree murder following the stabbing death

1 of John Carmean. The State proceeded to trial on count I, which alleged that defendant intended

to kill or do great bodily harm to John Carmean, when defendant stabbed Carmean to death without

lawful justification. Defendant raised the affirmative defense of self-defense. A jury ultimately

found defendant guilty of first degree murder.

¶5 On May 8, 2025, the matter proceeded to sentencing. The State did not tender any evidence

in aggravation outside of the presentence investigation report. For evidence in mitigation, defense

counsel submitted a letter from defendant’s daughter, Madison Kochvar. Defendant did not make

a statement in allocution.

¶6 The State argued that no mitigating factors applied to defendant. The State stated that the

“closest that any applies here I suppose is the voluntary intoxication.” However, the State argued

that defendant “chose to get himself as drunk and high as he was that night just shouldn’t be

considered as an actual factor in mitigation in this case.” In aggravation, the State argued that

defendant’s conduct caused or threatened serious harm, outside of the actual stabbing of the victim.

The State argued that defendant was at someone’s home, trying to kick down a door, and made

threats to people.

¶7 The State also argued that defendant had a history of “prior delinquency and criminal

activity.” Additionally, the State argued that “any sentence” was “necessary to deter others from

committing the same crime.” Finally, in aggravation, the State argued that defendant was on

mandatory supervised release for aggravated battery at the time he committed the instant offense.

For these reasons, the State requested “a sentence in the upper range,” suggesting a sentence of 60

years or “closer to the top.”

¶8 In response, defense counsel noted that there were “approximately 400 pages of medical

records” in defendant’s presentence investigation report and that the trial court was “aware of some

2 of [defendant’s] mental health issues from his previous participation in mental health court.”.

Counsel argued that this was “somewhat mitigating” where it demonstrated that defendant “had a

history of physical and mental health issues.” Defense counsel further stated that it appeared that

defendant had “struggled with mental health issues his entire life” along with alcohol and drug

addiction. For these reasons, defense counsel asked for a sentence of 20 years.

¶9 Steve Carmean, the victim’s father, offered a victim impact statement. Carmean testified

that he used to visit with his son daily. He spoke about the victim, stating that “he would have

given you the shirt off of his back so you would stay warm” and defendant “took away a life that

had a lot to live for; a young man that I loved with all my heart, a young man that has a daughter.”

Carmean asked for defendant to receive a sentence of 60 years.

¶ 10 Following argument of the parties and the victim impact testimony, the trial court rendered

its sentence. The court “considered the trial evidence, the presentence investigation report and all

of its attachments, the history, character and attitude of this Defendant, the evidence and arguments

presented in this hearing and the statement by Mr. Carmean here at the end.” The court also stated

that it considered the “relevant statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation.”

¶ 11 Specifically, in aggravation, the trial court noted that defendant’s conduct caused harm to

the victim. The court noted that the evidence demonstrated that defendant’s actions included

stabbing Carmean then leaving “without any attempt to remedy the difficulties that that delivered

to Mr. Carmean.” The court also observed that the evidence demonstrated that defendant was “on

a tear” on the date of the crime, wherein defendant spent the day “wreaking havoc in the lives of

other people, whether that’s the homeowner on Harmon Street, or the tenant in that property, the

other individuals that he encountered.” Thus, not only did defendant cause harm to Carmean, “but

also caused harm to others.”

3 ¶ 12 In aggravation, the trial court also noted that defendant had a history of prior criminal

activity, including violent criminal activity. The court noted that defendant “went through the

mental health court program and completed it, and then resumed his criminal lifestyle, again.” The

court noted that “throughout the length of his contacts with the Court, [defendant] experienced

each and every available remedy or sentence that the Court can impose, from court supervision, to

probation, to jail, to prison, and yet he found himself, once again, in the circumstances of January

3 of 2023.” The court noted that was a “significant factor in aggravation.”

¶ 13 The trial court observed that “when you take someone’s life, a significant sentence is

necessary, if not required, to deter others from committing those same acts.” The court also noted

that defendant was on mandatory supervised release when he committed this offense.

¶ 14 Turning to the factors in mitigation, the court noted that it did not find any mitigating

factors. The court observed that “[v]oluntary intoxication is neither a defense in a case, nor is it a

factor in mitigation.” Rather, the court determined that defendant made “choices” and “he knows

perhaps more than others who have addiction difficulties or mental health difficulties, he knows

more than others that there is a path to recovery. He has gone down that path before, and this Court

was involved in knowing how he did that.” The court noted that defendant “chose to abandon that

path and not get back to it.” As such, the court had “trouble” “mitigating the seriousness of his

actions in this regard for him choosing not to stay on the path or choosing not to take the path that

served him once before.” For these reasons, the trial court sentenced defendant to 45 years with 3

years of mandatory supervised release.

¶ 15 On May 8, 2025, defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence. Defendant argued that

his sentence was excessive, where the sentence was “not in keeping” with his “past history or

4 criminality, mental history, family situation, economic status, education, occupational or personal

habits.”

¶ 16 On June 9, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to reconsider. Defense

counsel stood on its motion, and the State made no argument. The trial court noted that it heard

the case through to a jury verdict and heard all the evidence. The court noted that it “considered

presentence reports that had been submitted, considered all factors in aggravation and mitigation

as required as well, and believes that the sentence imposed while within statutory range was

justified by all of those factors.” For those reasons, the court denied the motion to reconsider

sentence.

¶ 17 This timely appeal followed.

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19 On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him

to 45 years in prison. Specifically, he argues that the sentence is excessive in light of his mental

and physical health ailments and his rehabilitative potential. The State responds, noting that

defendant received a below-maximum sentence of 45 years. For the reasons that follow, we affirm

defendant’s sentence.

¶ 20 Initially, we note that defendant’s 45 year sentence was well within the statutory range,

where the sentencing range for first degree murder was 20 to 60 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a)

(West 2020). The Illinois Constitution of 1970, article I, section 11, requires that “[a]ll penalties

shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of

restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. “A sentencing court must

not only consider rehabilitative factors in imposing a sentence, it must also make rehabilitation an

objective of the sentence.” People v. Wendt, 163 Ill. 2d 346, 352-53 (1994). In fashioning an

5 appropriate sentence, the trial court must consider the defendant’s “credibility, demeanor, general

moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age” and impose a sentence based on

the circumstances of each case. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Pina, 2019 IL App

(4th) 170614, ¶ 19. The court must also carefully consider the statutory factors in mitigation and

aggravation. People v. Center, 198 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 1033 (1990). The court is not, however,

required to recite and assign a value to each factor considered. Pina, 2019 IL App (4th) 170614,

¶ 19. There is a presumption that a circuit court considers all mitigating evidence presented. People

v. Abrams, 2015 IL App (1st) 133746, ¶ 33.

¶ 21 A trial court’s sentencing decision is entitled to great deference. People v. Stacey, 193 Ill.

2d 203, 209 (2000). Such deference is granted “because the trial court is generally in a better

position than the reviewing court to determine the appropriate sentence.” Id. “If a sentence falls

within the statutory limits, it will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.”

People v. Bunning, 2018 IL App (5th) 150114, ¶ 16. “An abuse of discretion occurs only if a

sentence greatly varies from the spirit and purpose of the law or where it is manifestly

disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” Id.

¶ 22 First, defendant argues that the sentence is excessive in light of his mental and physical

ailments. Specifically, defendant argues that he struggled with mental illness and addiction. He

argues that he was “in crisis” at the time of the event, that he “sought help for these issues, while

struggling with homelessness.” Defendant also argues that he uses a pacemaker due to his heart

condition, hypertrophic obstructive cardiomyopathy.

¶ 23 In determining an appropriate sentence, the relevant factors that should be considered

include the nature of the crime, the protection of the public, deterrence, punishment, and the

defendant’s rehabilitative potential. People v. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421, ¶ 14. “The weight

6 to be attributed to each factor in aggravation and mitigation depends upon the particular

circumstances of the case.” People v. Garibay, 366 Ill. App. 3d 1103, 1109 (2006).

¶ 24 First, the trial court noted that it considered the arguments of counsel. Defense counsel

noted that there were “approximately 400 pages of medical records” in defendant’s presentence

investigation report. Counsel argued that this was “somewhat mitigating” where it demonstrated

that defendant “had a history of physical and mental health issues.” Defense counsel also stated

that defendant had apparently “struggled with mental health issues his entire life” and also

struggled with alcohol and drug addiction. The trial court expressly noted that it was “aware of

some of his mental health issues from his previous participation in mental health court.”

¶ 25 Moreover, the court expressly enumerated the aggravating factors at play in the case before

it, while acknowledging defendant’s struggles with his mental health. The court determined that

defendant caused significant harm not only to the victim, but to others involved with him on the

date of the incident, as well. The court also pointed to defendant’s criminal history, specifically

that defendant completed mental health court yet once again “resumed his criminal lifestyle.” The

court had a longstanding history with defendant, and it noted that “throughout the length of his

contacts with the Court, [defendant] experienced each and every available remedy or sentence that

the Court can impose, from court supervision, to probation, to jail, to prison, and yet he found

himself, once again, in the circumstances of January 3 of 2023.” Finally, the evidence

demonstrated that defendant was on mandatory supervised release when he committed this offense.

¶ 26 Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court’s imposition of a 45 years

sentence constituted an abuse of discretion, where the court was well aware of defendant’s

struggles with his mental and physical health, yet found the aggravating factors weighed in favor

of a higher-end sentence.

7 ¶ 27 Next, defendant argues that the sentence is excessive in light of his rehabilitative potential.

A defendant’s rehabilitative potential is not entitled to more weight than the seriousness of the

offense. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 214 (2010). Further, a sentencing “court has no

obligation to recite and assign value to each factor presented at a sentencing hearing.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) People v. Brazziel, 406 Ill. App. 3d 412, 434 (2010).

¶ 28 As noted above, the record demonstrates that this particular defendant had a longstanding

history with the trial court. The court expressly stated that defendant made “choices” and “he

knows perhaps more than others who have addiction difficulties or mental health difficulties, he

knows more than others that there is a path to recovery. He has gone down that path before, and

this Court was involved in knowing how he did that.” The court noted that defendant “chose to

abandon that path and not get back to it.” As such, the court had “trouble” “mitigating the

seriousness of his actions in this regard for him choosing not to stay on the path or choosing not

to take the path that served him once before.” Moreover, defendant was on mandatory supervised

release for aggravated battery when he committed the offense herein. As such, the record

sufficiently demonstrates that, at the time of sentencing, defendant had scarce rehabilitative

potential.

¶ 29 As a whole, defendant essentially asks this court to reweigh the sentencing factors,

claiming that his 45-year sentence is excessive. While it is true a trial court’s sentencing discretion

is “not unfettered” (People v. O’Neal, 125 Ill. 2d 291, 297 (1988)) and that the appellate court was

never meant to be a “rubber stamp” for the sentencing decisions of the trial court (People v.

Woodson, 2024 IL App (1st) 221172, ¶ 89), it is also axiomatic that this court “must not substitute

its judgment for that of the trial court merely because [we might] have weighed” the pertinent

sentencing factors differently. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209. A reviewing court’s role is not to reweigh

8 the sentencing factors or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. People v. Klein, 2022 IL

App (4th) 200599, ¶ 37.

¶ 30 Here, the record reflects that the court considered the evidence and arguments of the parties,

the PSI, the history, character, and attitude of defendant, and the relevant statutory factors in

aggravation and mitigation. Specifically, the court stated that it “considered the trial evidence, the

presentence investigation report and all of its attachments, the history, character and attitude of

this Defendant, the evidence and arguments presented in this hearing and the statement by Mr.

Carmean here at the end.” The factors considered by the sentencing court provide a sufficient basis

for the prison sentence imposed in this matter, and the court’s sentence was within the statutory

range of sentences permissible. For these reasons, under the facts and circumstances of this case,

we do not find that defendant’s sentence was excessive or that the court abused its discretion in

sentencing defendant.

¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the circuit court of

Vermilion County.

¶ 33 Affirmed.