2026 IL App (1st) 240509-U No. 1-24-0509 Order filed June 30, 2026 Second Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 20 CR 6043 ) TERRANCE LAMBERT, ) Honorable ) James Bryan Novy, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE D.B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction for first degree murder where the evidence was sufficient to show he knew his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Terrance Lambert was found guilty of the first degree
murder of Joseph Smith and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends
that his conviction should be reduced to manslaughter because the evidence showed he acted
recklessly. Alternatively, he argues his conviction should be reduced to second degree murder No. 1-24-0509
because he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he unreasonably acted in self-defense.
We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendant was charged by indictment with two counts of first degree murder following an
incident in Chicago on May 29, 2020, when he punched Smith while on a Chicago Transit
Authority (CTA) train station platform, causing Smith to fall onto the tracks and be struck by a
train. Count I alleged that defendant intentionally or knowingly killed Smith (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1)
(West Supp. 2019)), while count II alleged that defendant punched Smith knowing that the act
created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West Supp.
2019)).
¶5 Prior to trial, defendant received behavioral clinical examinations from three psychiatrists,
as he had a history of diagnosed schizophrenia. All three psychiatrists concluded that defendant
was legally sane because, at the time of the offense, he did not lack a substantial capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Also prior to trial, defendant informed the court he
intended to pursue the affirmative defense of self-defense.
¶6 At trial, CTA train operator Kevin Taylor testified that, on May 29, 2020, at about 12:05
a.m., he was operating a northbound CTA train on the Red Line. As the train entered the 87th
Street Station, Taylor had an unobstructed view of the train platform to his left, where he saw
defendant and Smith walking toward the train. Defendant, whom Taylor identified in court,
approached Smith from behind and punched him on the right side of his face. Smith stumbled, lost
his balance, and fell onto the train track. Taylor stopped the train and asked defendant why he
punched Smith, but defendant did not respond.
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¶7 On cross-examination, Taylor elaborated that defendant punched Smith; then, defendant
continued with his “whole body,” “nudg[ing]” Smith. Taylor described the nudge as a “little push”
with “the force that [defendant] would use to get [Smith] off his balance.”
¶8 The State entered photographs and a video from a surveillance camera at the train station.
The video, which does not feature audio, is included in the record on appeal and this court has
reviewed it.
¶9 In the video, a man whom Taylor identified as Smith paces on the station platform. About
two minutes later, another man, whom Taylor identified as defendant, walks onto the platform and
also paces. At one point, Smith stops pacing and faces south, in the direction from which the train
would arrive. Defendant stops in the center of the platform behind Smith.
¶ 10 Smith turns, faces defendant, and appears to say something while making quick gestures
with his hands at waist level. Smith then turns from defendant and walks down the platform,
outside the blue safety edge. In the direction in which Smith is walking, headlights from an
oncoming train approach on the northbound track. Defendant, who is standing behind Smith, looks
south toward Smith and the approaching train.
¶ 11 As the train is about to pass Smith, defendant runs toward Smith, facing Smith and the
oncoming train. Defendant maneuvers to the center of the platform so that Smith is between him
and the train tracks. Defendant then draws back his right arm and punches Smith in the right side
of the face. Defendant’s body also appears to bump into Smith. As Smith stumbles to the left
toward the train track, defendant extends his left arm towards Smith and back; it is not clear if
defendant’s left arm contacts Smith. Defendant quickly lowers his left foot and jumps back from
the direction of the train tracks. Smith falls onto the tracks and is struck by the train. Defendant
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runs down the platform for a few steps while looking back. He then stops running, turns, and walks
toward the camera, glancing toward Smith’s body. The train’s conductor opens his window and
says something to defendant, who walks out of frame.
¶ 12 James Hayes testified that on May 29, 2020, he was working at a gas station when
defendant entered the gas station store wearing a denim jacket. Defendant, identified by Hayes in
court, approached the register counter looking toward the store’s surveillance monitors. He then
walked around the store looking agitated and returned to the counter no longer wearing his jacket.
Defendant bought a bottle of Sprite and exited the store after Hayes asked him to leave. Outside
the storefront, defendant poured out some of the Sprite and placed a few pills in the bottle. He then
shook the bottle and drank from it. Afterwards, Hayes found defendant’s jacket in an aisle of the
store.
¶ 13 The State entered footage from inside the gas station store, filmed by two cameras at
different angles. The videos, which do not feature audio, are included in the record on appeal and
this court has reviewed them. In the videos, defendant enters the store wearing the blue denim
jacket. He fidgets and looks around before partially removing his jacket and leaving it hanging on
one arm. He then leaves something with the cashier and walks out of frame. When defendant
reenters the frame, he is no longer wearing the jacket but is holding a bottle of Sprite. He purchases
the Sprite and leaves the store.
¶ 14 Chicago police officer Pilch testified that on May 29, 2020, at about 12:16 a.m., he
responded to the CTA Red Line’s 87th Street Station. 1 There, defendant approached him and said,
“I did that.” Pilch placed defendant in custody and escorted him to Pilch’s vehicle, where defendant
1 Officer Pilch’s first name does not appear in the transcript of the trial proceedings.
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told Pilch “what he did.” The State published a video from Pilch’s bodyworn camera. We have
also reviewed this video, which is in the record on appeal.
¶ 15 In the video, Pilch guides people out of the 87th Street Station. Defendant, whom Pilch
identified in court, enters the station carrying a Sprite bottle. He approaches Pilch and says he has
something to say. Defendant then tells Pilch, “I’m the one who did that. Did that to the guy.” Pilch
retrieves his handcuffs, and defendant turns around with his arms behind his back. Pilch handcuffs
defendant and escorts him out of the station. Pilch asks defendant if he knew the victim. Defendant
responds that he did not. Defendant tells Pilch that Smith said “something” to him and “walked
off.” Defendant says he then “had to punch” Smith, who “fell.” Defendant then seems to say that
“it was an accident.” Pilch asks defendant what Smith had said that made defendant punch Smith.
Defendant begins to answer but stops and says he was diagnosed with schizophrenia.
¶ 16 On cross-examination, Pilch stated that defendant was cooperative. Pilch confirmed that,
once outside the station, defendant told Pilch that “it was an accident.”
¶ 17 The parties stipulated that, if called, a Cook County assistant medical examiner would
testify that she conducted Smith’s autopsy and observed multiple injuries, including spinal
fractures, broken ribs, and lacerations and hemorrhaging in his internal organs. The examiner
would opine that Smith’s cause of death was multiple injuries after being pushed from a platform
and struck by a train, and the manner of death was homicide.
¶ 18 Defendant testified that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia around October 2018. His
schizophrenia caused him to hear voices. He was prescribed Zyprexa, which relieved that symptom
and calmed him. On May 28, 2020, the day before the incident, defendant had been off Zyprexa
for one or two months, and the voices were “louder.” He was depressed and planned to commit
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suicide. He went to his sister’s residence and bought 30 pills of Xanax from a friend nearby. His
sister then dropped him off at the 87th Street Station so he could take the Red Line back home.
¶ 19 While waiting for the train on the station platform, defendant paced and felt “excited”
because he was about to commit suicide. Smith, whom defendant had never seen before,
approached “very aggressively.” Smith said something “very aggressive.” Defendant could not
recall Smith’s exact words but testified that Smith said “he was going to hit [defendant] or
something like that.” While Smith did not make any movements toward defendant, Smith’s “body
language [was] very aggressive” and he was moving his hands in front of his body. Defendant did
not see a weapon on Smith. Defendant felt a need to defend himself because he “didn’t know what
[Smith] was going to do” and thought Smith would “attack” or “do something to” him.
¶ 20 Smith turned and walked away from defendant, who then “blanked out.” Using his right
hand in a closed fist, defendant punched Smith once on the right side of his face. Defendant first
noticed the approaching train after he punched Smith, who fell toward the train track. Defendant
reached with his left hand to grab Smith and “[s]ave his life,” but failed. Smith fell onto the train
track and was struck by the train.
¶ 21 Defendant testified that he was shocked because it was an “accident.” He denied intending
to kill Smith or to have him hit by a train. Defendant ran to a gas station, left his jacket in an aisle
there, and purchased a Sprite. Outside the gas station, he placed the Xanax in his Sprite, but the
bottle overflowed and he did not drink it. Defendant then returned to the train station, where he
told an officer what happened.
¶ 22 On cross-examination, defendant confirmed that he voluntarily stopped taking Zyprexa
without telling his doctor because he did not like the side effects. Defendant denied knowing how
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close Smith was to the train track when defendant punched Smith, because defendant had “blanked
out” and “wasn’t paying attention to it.” Defendant also denied that Smith ever walked faster
toward him, moved his body closer to him, or raised his arm or hand toward him. Defendant’s
interaction with Smith lasted less than 10 seconds. Smith was walking away from defendant and
not talking to him anymore when defendant thought he had to defend himself. Defendant
confirmed knowing that a person generally could fall after being punched, but denied knowing
Smith could have fallen. He confirmed that, based on the Red Line surveillance footage, the train
was close to him and Smith when he punched Smith.
¶ 23 Over the State’s objection, the trial court allowed defendant’s motion to introduce certified
copies of Smith’s convictions for robbery and misdemeanor battery.
¶ 24 In rebuttal, the State entered a stipulation that, if called, licensed clinical psychologist Dr.
Erick Neu would opine that defendant was legally sane at the time of the offense. Dr. Neu would
further opine that, while defendant’s mental illness may have impaired his judgment, there was no
indication his symptoms were so severe that he lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct.
¶ 25 During closing arguments, the State asserted that defendant was “[t]he only aggressor”
when he ran after Smith and punched him in the head from behind. Defense counsel argued that
defendant acted in self-defense, as Smith approached defendant acting aggressively, and defendant
“believed in his mind he needed to defend himself.” Counsel noted that defendant was “not in a
great state of mind” and suffering from schizophrenia. Counsel maintained that the evidence, “if
anything,” showed that defendant acted recklessly and thus committed involuntary manslaughter.
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¶ 26 The trial court found defendant guilty of count II for first degree murder, predicated on
knowing his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. The court acquitted
defendant of murder on count I.
¶ 27 In ruling, the court rejected defendant’s self-defense theory, explaining no evidence
showed “what specific, aggressive language” or “aggressive movements” Smith allegedly used
toward defendant. Further, Smith was walking away from defendant when defendant struck him.
The court found defendant knew his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm
to Smith, explaining that defendant ran toward Smith in a “looping manner” from right to left so
that his momentum and force increased as he struck Smith in the head. The force at that point was
great enough to knock Smith onto the train track. The court also rejected that defendant
unreasonably believed he was defending himself, finding his testimony to that effect “self-serving”
and incredible.
¶ 28 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider or for a new trial, alleging that the State failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had knowingly or intentionally caused Smith’s death. He
alleged that, if his actions amounted to “anything criminal,” it would be involuntary manslaughter.
Further, defendant claimed that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
was not justified in punching Smith to defend himself.
¶ 29 The trial court denied defendant’s posttrial motion. After a hearing, it sentenced defendant
to 20 years’ imprisonment.
¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 31 On appeal, defendant first contends that he should have been convicted of manslaughter
because the evidence showed he acted recklessly, without the requisite mental state of knowledge
to commit first degree murder.
¶ 32 When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, we must determine
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.
Johnson, 2026 IL 131337, ¶ 59 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The trier
of fact resolves conflicts in testimony, weighs evidence, and draws reasonable inferences from the
facts. People v. Sauls, 2022 IL 127732, ¶ 52. Therefore, we will not substitute our judgment for
that of the trier of fact on issues regarding the weight of the evidence and credibility, nor will we
retry the defendant. Johnson, 2026 IL 131337, ¶ 59. The Jackson standard applies to both direct
and circumstantial evidence, and circumstantial evidence that meets this standard is sufficient to
sustain a conviction. People v. Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037, ¶ 66. We will set aside a conviction only
where the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the
defendant’s guilt. People v. Bush, 2023 IL 128747, ¶ 33.
¶ 33 Defendant does not dispute that he punched Smith, causing him to fall on the tracks and be
struck by an oncoming train. Rather, defendant only argues that the State failed to prove he had
the requisite mental state of knowledge, i.e., that he knew punching Smith would create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to Smith. He maintains that his actions were reckless and
therefore requests that his first degree murder conviction be reduced to involuntary manslaughter.
¶ 34 The difference between first degree murder and involuntary manslaughter lies in the
defendant’s mental state. People v. McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 51. In order to sustain
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defendant’s conviction for first degree murder, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant killed Smith without lawful justification and, in performing the acts that caused
Smith’s death, knew that such acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to
Smith. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West Supp. 2019).
¶ 35 A person acts with knowledge of the result of his or her conduct when “he or she is
consciously aware that that result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct.” 720 ILCS
5/4-5(b) (West 2020). Knowledge is often proven by circumstantial evidence because it is the
mental element of an offense and, as such, rarely proven by direct evidence. People v. Leib, 2022
IL 126645, ¶ 37. An admission is not required for the trier of fact to conclude the defendant had
knowledge of something. Id. “A defendant is presumed to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his or her acts.” People v. Mulosmani, 2022 IL App (1st) 200635, ¶ 65.
¶ 36 A defendant commits involuntary manslaughter, on the other hand, when he recklessly
performs acts likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another. 720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2020).
Recklessness occurs when a person “consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by statute defining the offense, and that
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
exercise in the situation.” 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2020).
¶ 37 After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as we must, we
find the evidence sufficient to support the court’s conclusion that defendant knew his act of
punching Smith, who was standing near the edge of a train platform as a train approached, created
a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. Taylor, the train operator, testified that he saw
defendant approach Smith from behind and punch Smith, with defendant’s “whole body” nudging
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Smith with enough force to knock Smith off balance so that he fell off the platform. See People v.
Givens, 364 Ill. App. 3d 37, 44-45 (2005) (evidence sufficient to show the defendant intentionally
killed the victim by pushing the victim down five stairs onto a concrete landing in a train station).
¶ 38 Taylor’s testimony was corroborated by video of the incident. The video shows Smith had
briefly interacted with defendant before turning and walking away. Defendant, who was looking
toward Smith and the approaching train, ran toward Smith. As the train was about to pass Smith,
defendant maneuvered to the center of the platform, placing Smith between him and the
approaching train. Defendant drew back his right arm and punched Smith, knocking Smith back
in the direction of the train. The video shows defendant stomping down and jumping away, as if
to break his own momentum toward the tracks. Smith, however, immediately fell off the platform
and onto the tracks. Given the precise timing of the punch as the train arrived and the fact that
defendant was facing the train throughout the incident, a reasonable trier of fact could have found
defendant knew his actions created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm as opposed
to being reckless behavior. See Bush, 2023 IL 128747, ¶ 33 (the trier of fact is not required to
disregard inferences which flow normally from the evidence before it); see also People v. Williams,
2016 IL App (1st) 133459, ¶ 40 (evidence sufficient to support murder conviction, on
accountability theory, where a codefendant pushed the victim onto a train track, which electrified
the victim). Therefore, we cannot say that the evidence presented is so improbable or unsatisfactory
that it creates a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.
¶ 39 Defendant nevertheless argues he did not know that punching Smith would cause his death,
as evidenced by defendant’s own testimony that he did not know a train was approaching, did not
realize how close Smith was to the tracks, did not mean for Smith to fall onto the tracks, and was
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shocked after the incident. However, the trial court was not required to accept defendant’s own
explanations for his conduct. See Bush, 2023 IL 128747, ¶ 36. Rather, as the trier of fact, the court
was tasked with making credibility determinations, weighing evidence, and drawing reasonable
inferences therefrom. See Sauls, 2022 IL 127732, ¶ 52. The trial court found defendant’s testimony
incredible, and it is not this court’s role to substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. See
Johnson, 2026 IL 131337, ¶ 59.
¶ 40 Defendant also argues that, because of his mental health condition, he lacked the “capacity”
to form the mental state of knowledge and was unable to “consider any consequences” of his
actions. The State responds that defendant is essentially raising the affirmative defense of
“diminished capacity,” under which a “ ‘legally sane defendant [presents] evidence of mental
illness to negate the specific intent required to commit a particular crime.’ ” People v. Johnson,
2018 IL App (1st) 140725, ¶ 63 (quoting Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351, 351 (2013)).
However, Illinois has rejected diminished capacity as an affirmative defense. See People v. Hulitt,
361 Ill. App. 3d 634, 641 (2005).
¶ 41 Defendant argues in reply that this court has more recently held that “[t]he fact that
evidence of a defendant’s mental illness, short of insanity, cannot serve as an affirmative defense
should not mean, necessarily and automatically, that such evidence could never be relevant and
otherwise admissible in a particular case to rebut evidence of mens rea.” People v. Valdez, 2022
IL App (1st) 181463, ¶ 131 (plurality opinion). The court in Valdez further held that Illinois courts
“should determine the admissibility of mental-deficiency evidence to rebut mens rea like they
consider admissibility of any other evidence in Illinois—on a case-by-case basis, by applying [the]
Illinois Rules of Evidence.” Id. ¶ 138. Acknowledging that he was found to be legally sane at the
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time of the offense, defendant asserts that, under Valdez, evidence of his mental illness could be
considered not as an affirmative defense, but as relevant evidence rebutting the State’s position
that he acted knowingly in killing Smith. See id. ¶ 117 (an affirmative defense does not attack the
State’s proof but rather presupposes the defendant’s guilt and provides a ground to wholly or
partially excuse the defendant from criminal responsibility). Indeed, our supreme court has cited
Valdez approvingly, albeit in the context of voluntary intoxication, for the proposition that whether
a doctrine is recognized as an affirmative defense is a different question from whether certain
evidence is admissible to disprove an element of the charged crime under the facts of a particular
case. See People v. Grayer, 2023 IL 128871, ¶ 24 (citing Valdez, 2022 IL App (1st)
181463, ¶ 116).
¶ 42 Even considering evidence of defendant’s mental illness as relevant, however, our holding
remains the same. First, the evidence at trial showed that defendant’s mental illness did not affect
his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. In rebuttal, the State presented evidence by
way of stipulation that, if called, a licensed clinical psychologist would testify that, while
defendant’s mental illness may have impaired his judgment, there was no indication his symptoms
were so severe that he lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.
As such, the trial court was “not required to disregard the reasonable inferences that naturally
flow[ed] from” the evidence before it (People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 37), i.e., that
defendant knew his actions of punching Smith, who was standing on the edge of the platform as a
train approached, created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Smith.
¶ 43 Moreover, the evidence at trial showed that defendant was aware of his actions and the
consequences they carried, as he immediately attempted to distance himself from the crime. Just
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after hitting Smith, defendant left the train station and went to a gas station store, where he left his
jacket. He soon after returned to the station and surrendered to the police. A reasonable trier of
fact could have inferred from this evidence that, regardless of defendant’s diagnosed
schizophrenia, he still acted knowingly when he punched Smith. 720 ILCS 5/4-5(b) (West 2020)
(defining knowledge); Leib, 2022 IL 126645, ¶ 37 (knowledge is often proved by circumstantial
evidence). For these reasons, we find the evidence was sufficient to establish defendant’s guilt of
first degree murder.
¶ 44 In the alternative, defendant contends that this court should reduce his conviction to second
degree murder because he acted under an unreasonable belief that self-defense was necessary.
Defendant argues that, based on his mental health crisis, which included hearing voices, he
unreasonably believed Smith was acting aggressively toward him and that he needed to defend
himself. He maintains that the video from the train station corroborated this defense, as it showed
Smith briefly speaking to defendant on the platform and gesturing.
¶ 45 To reduce a charge from first to second degree murder, a defendant bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a mitigating factor was present at the time of the
killing, one factor being that the defendant had an unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense,
which is referred to as imperfect self-defense. 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(1)-(2), (c) (West 2020); People
v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 112-13 (1995).
¶ 46 Once a defendant has proven that he unreasonably acted in self-defense, the State must
disprove that factor beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Castellano, 2015 IL App (1st)
133874, ¶ 154. The presence of a mitigating factor, here imperfect self-defense, is a factual
question for the trier of fact, and this court’s task on review is not to reweigh the evidence and
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substitute our judgment for that of the finder of fact. People v. Castejon, 2025 IL App (1st)
221918, ¶ 178. When a defendant contends that his first degree murder conviction should be
reduced to second degree murder, we must consider whether “after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the
mitigating factors were not present.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Castellano, 2015 IL App
(1st) 133874, ¶ 144.
¶ 47 Imperfect self-defense “occurs when there is sufficient evidence that the defendant
believed he was acting in self-defense, but that belief is objectively unreasonable.” People v.
Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d at 113. As such, to be found guilty of second degree murder based on an
unreasonable belief in self-defense, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the other five elements of self-defense existed. Castellano, 2015 IL App (1st) 133874, ¶ 149;
People v. Mujkovic, 2022 IL App (1st) 200717, ¶ 26. These five elements are: (1) force was
threatened against him; (2) he was not the aggressor; (3) the danger of harm was imminent; (4) the
threatened force was unlawful; and (5) he actually and subjectively believed a danger existed
requiring the use of the force applied. People v. Vesey, 2026 IL 130919, ¶ 42.
¶ 48 In reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that a rational
trier of fact could have concluded that defendant did not act with an unreasonable belief that self-
defense was justified because the State disproved four of the first five elements of self-defense.
Specifically, the evidence showed that defendant was the aggressor, and not in imminent danger,
as he chased after Smith, who was walking away when defendant punched him. See id. (elements
of self-defense); see also People v. Guja, 2016 IL App (1st) 140046, ¶ 54 (“[T]he right of self-
defense does not permit one to pursue and inflict injury upon even an initial aggressor.”). The
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State’s evidence also showed that Smith never threatened defendant with force of any kind, much
less unlawful force. See Vesey, 2026 IL 130919, ¶ 42. Therefore, the State negated at least four of
the elements of self-defense, namely, that (1) force was threatened against defendant; (2) defendant
was not the aggressor; (3) the danger of harm was imminent; (4) the threatened force was unlawful.
Id.
¶ 49 As noted by the trial court, no evidence explained why defendant believed, even
unreasonably, that he needed to defend himself. Consistent with the State’s evidence, defendant
also acknowledged that Smith was no longer speaking and was walking away when defendant
punched Smith. Defendant could not identify any specific aggressive movements made by Smith,
nor could he specifically recall anything that Smith said to him. While defendant attributes his acts
to his schizophrenia and hearing voices, there was also no evidence as to how exactly his condition
led him to believe he needed to defend himself as Smith was walking away. Thus, defendant failed
to meet his burden in proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in imperfect self-
defense. See 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(2), (c) (West 2020). See People v. Bennett, 2017 IL App (1st)
151619, ¶¶ 44-45 (the trial court was “free to reject” the defendant’s argument that he acted in
unreasonable self-defense, where witness testimony showed that the victim had ceased to make
threatening actions or statements when the defendant returned to confront the victim and shot him).
Based on the record, we cannot say that the evidence at trial was so improbable or unsatisfactory
that it could not support the trial court’s conclusions. Bush, 2023 IL 128747, ¶ 33. We therefore
will not disturb the trial court’s findings on review.
¶ 50 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 51 Affirmed.
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