YOUNG, J.
We ordered oral argument on the prosecution’s applications for leave to appeal to consider the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment and MCL 780.653, as well as the proper remedy for violations of MCL 780.653. Because we find no constitutional or statutory violation, these consolidated appeals do not present the opportunity to discuss remedies for such violations. Therefore, we reverse the judgments of the lower courts, which held that violations of the statute and the constitution had occurred, and remand the cases to the Genesee Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Crime Stoppers1 received an anonymous tip that defendants were operating a marijuana growing and [470]*470distribution operation out of their home in Flint. Crime Stoppers passed the tip on to the Flint police, who conducted surveillance at defendants’ home on three separate days, but did not observe any evidence of a marijuana growing and distribution operation. The police then conducted a “trash pull” at defendants’ home and discovered a partially burnt marijuana cigarette, a green leafy substance on the side of a pizza box, and correspondence tying defendants to the residence. Based on this information, the police applied for a search warrant for defendants’ home.
The affidavit in support of the warrant application is particularly important to this appeal. Paragraph 7 stated:
That during the past several weeks, your affiant received an anonymous tip stating that large quantities of marijuana was being sold and manufactured out of 3828 Maryland, City of Flint, Genesee County Michigan. The tipster also indicated that there is a hidden room used for manufacturing Marijuana inside said residence.
In paragraph 8, the affidavit stated:
That on November 30, 2004, your affiant removed two (2) trash bags, white in color with red ties that were located on the south side of Maryland, east of the driveway, near the curb of 3828 Maryland. After removing the trash bags your affiant transported the bags directly to the office of the City of Flint Police Department. Your affiant and fellow officer Marcus Mahan examined the contents of the trash bags. Found inside the trash bags were one (1) suspected marijuana roach, and a green leafy substance on the side of a pizza box, and several pieces of correspondence addressed to Michael/Melinda Keller of 3828 Maryland.
[471]*471Paragraph 9 stated that “[y]our affiant field test[ed]... the suspected marijuana which tested positive for the presence of marijuana.” Based on the affidavit, the magistrate issued a search warrant.
When the police executed the search warrant, they uncovered nearly six ounces of marijuana, as well as firearms and marijuana smoking paraphernalia. Both defendants were charged with maintaining a drug house2 and possession of marijuana.3 The district court bound both defendants over to the circuit court for trial on those charges.
In the circuit court, defendants filed motions in limine to suppress any evidence obtained during the execution of the search warrant, arguing that “the reliability and credibility standards set forth in MCLA 780.653 are totally absent from this case relative to the time of the issuance of the search warrant.” Specifically, defendants argued that the police misled the district judge issuing the warrant, and that there was no support for the anonymous tip. The circuit court found a violation of MCL 780.653, but the court held that it could not order suppression based on that violation, citing People v Hawkins.4 To remedy the violation, the court held that defendants could “argue to the jury that the police department intentionally violated the law of the State of Michigan; that the police department deliberately conducted or mislead [sic] a magistrate when seeking the search warrant.”5
[472]*472The prosecutor filed interlocutory appeals, raising only the issue of the proper remedy for a violation of MCL 780.653. The Court of Appeals granted the prosecutor’s applications for leave to appeal, but instead of addressing the issue raised by the prosecutor, the Court held that the search warrant and the underlying affidavit could not support a finding of probable cause. “Therefore, any evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant was illegally obtained and should be suppressed by the operation of the exclusionary rule unless an exception applies.”6 The Court then opined that “the good-faith exception is inapplicable in this case.”7 The Court cited two facts to support that conclusion. First, “[t]he affiant indicated that she had directly received the anonymous tip and then conveyed it to police.”8 Second, “the affidavit indicates that only a roach and some possible marijuana residue were found during a trash pull — hardly evidence that would lead a reasonable person to believe that drug trafficking was occurring at the house.”9 Additionally, the Court held that “[bjecause the affidavit was insufficient, we would also conclude that the magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role when he issued the warrant.”10
Judge TALBOT dissented. He argued that the suppression ruling was not properly before the Court because defendants never appealed that ruling. With respect to the issue properly before the Court, Judge TALBOT disagreed with the circuit court ruling that defendants [473]*473could argue to the jury that the police misled the magistrate and violated MCL 780.653. He concluded that “if the Legislature intended to allow a defendant to argue to the jury that the police illegally obtained a search warrant as a remedy for a violation of MCL 780.653, it would have specifically listed such a remedy and would not have provided the specific remedies in MCL 780.657 and MCL 780.658.”11
This Court scheduled oral argument on the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal.12 The order directed the parties to address four issues:
(1) whether the presence in the defendants’ trash of a small amount of marijuana constituted prohable cause justifying the search; (2) assuming there was a Fourth Amendment violation, whether the police acted in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance on the warrant; (3) whether the search violated MCL 780.653; and (4) assuming that the search violated MCL 780.653, hut not the Fourth Amendment, whether the trial court elected a proper remedy by permitting the defense to argue to the jury that the police misled the magistrate and violated Michigan law in their efforts to obtain a search warrant.[13]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Questions of law relevant to a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed de novo.”14 Similarly, constitu[474]*474tional and statutory construction involves questions of law that are also reviewed de novo.15 However, “ ‘after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review.
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YOUNG, J.
We ordered oral argument on the prosecution’s applications for leave to appeal to consider the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment and MCL 780.653, as well as the proper remedy for violations of MCL 780.653. Because we find no constitutional or statutory violation, these consolidated appeals do not present the opportunity to discuss remedies for such violations. Therefore, we reverse the judgments of the lower courts, which held that violations of the statute and the constitution had occurred, and remand the cases to the Genesee Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Crime Stoppers1 received an anonymous tip that defendants were operating a marijuana growing and [470]*470distribution operation out of their home in Flint. Crime Stoppers passed the tip on to the Flint police, who conducted surveillance at defendants’ home on three separate days, but did not observe any evidence of a marijuana growing and distribution operation. The police then conducted a “trash pull” at defendants’ home and discovered a partially burnt marijuana cigarette, a green leafy substance on the side of a pizza box, and correspondence tying defendants to the residence. Based on this information, the police applied for a search warrant for defendants’ home.
The affidavit in support of the warrant application is particularly important to this appeal. Paragraph 7 stated:
That during the past several weeks, your affiant received an anonymous tip stating that large quantities of marijuana was being sold and manufactured out of 3828 Maryland, City of Flint, Genesee County Michigan. The tipster also indicated that there is a hidden room used for manufacturing Marijuana inside said residence.
In paragraph 8, the affidavit stated:
That on November 30, 2004, your affiant removed two (2) trash bags, white in color with red ties that were located on the south side of Maryland, east of the driveway, near the curb of 3828 Maryland. After removing the trash bags your affiant transported the bags directly to the office of the City of Flint Police Department. Your affiant and fellow officer Marcus Mahan examined the contents of the trash bags. Found inside the trash bags were one (1) suspected marijuana roach, and a green leafy substance on the side of a pizza box, and several pieces of correspondence addressed to Michael/Melinda Keller of 3828 Maryland.
[471]*471Paragraph 9 stated that “[y]our affiant field test[ed]... the suspected marijuana which tested positive for the presence of marijuana.” Based on the affidavit, the magistrate issued a search warrant.
When the police executed the search warrant, they uncovered nearly six ounces of marijuana, as well as firearms and marijuana smoking paraphernalia. Both defendants were charged with maintaining a drug house2 and possession of marijuana.3 The district court bound both defendants over to the circuit court for trial on those charges.
In the circuit court, defendants filed motions in limine to suppress any evidence obtained during the execution of the search warrant, arguing that “the reliability and credibility standards set forth in MCLA 780.653 are totally absent from this case relative to the time of the issuance of the search warrant.” Specifically, defendants argued that the police misled the district judge issuing the warrant, and that there was no support for the anonymous tip. The circuit court found a violation of MCL 780.653, but the court held that it could not order suppression based on that violation, citing People v Hawkins.4 To remedy the violation, the court held that defendants could “argue to the jury that the police department intentionally violated the law of the State of Michigan; that the police department deliberately conducted or mislead [sic] a magistrate when seeking the search warrant.”5
[472]*472The prosecutor filed interlocutory appeals, raising only the issue of the proper remedy for a violation of MCL 780.653. The Court of Appeals granted the prosecutor’s applications for leave to appeal, but instead of addressing the issue raised by the prosecutor, the Court held that the search warrant and the underlying affidavit could not support a finding of probable cause. “Therefore, any evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant was illegally obtained and should be suppressed by the operation of the exclusionary rule unless an exception applies.”6 The Court then opined that “the good-faith exception is inapplicable in this case.”7 The Court cited two facts to support that conclusion. First, “[t]he affiant indicated that she had directly received the anonymous tip and then conveyed it to police.”8 Second, “the affidavit indicates that only a roach and some possible marijuana residue were found during a trash pull — hardly evidence that would lead a reasonable person to believe that drug trafficking was occurring at the house.”9 Additionally, the Court held that “[bjecause the affidavit was insufficient, we would also conclude that the magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role when he issued the warrant.”10
Judge TALBOT dissented. He argued that the suppression ruling was not properly before the Court because defendants never appealed that ruling. With respect to the issue properly before the Court, Judge TALBOT disagreed with the circuit court ruling that defendants [473]*473could argue to the jury that the police misled the magistrate and violated MCL 780.653. He concluded that “if the Legislature intended to allow a defendant to argue to the jury that the police illegally obtained a search warrant as a remedy for a violation of MCL 780.653, it would have specifically listed such a remedy and would not have provided the specific remedies in MCL 780.657 and MCL 780.658.”11
This Court scheduled oral argument on the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal.12 The order directed the parties to address four issues:
(1) whether the presence in the defendants’ trash of a small amount of marijuana constituted prohable cause justifying the search; (2) assuming there was a Fourth Amendment violation, whether the police acted in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance on the warrant; (3) whether the search violated MCL 780.653; and (4) assuming that the search violated MCL 780.653, hut not the Fourth Amendment, whether the trial court elected a proper remedy by permitting the defense to argue to the jury that the police misled the magistrate and violated Michigan law in their efforts to obtain a search warrant.[13]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Questions of law relevant to a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed de novo.”14 Similarly, constitu[474]*474tional and statutory construction involves questions of law that are also reviewed de novo.15 However, “ ‘after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate’s “determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.” ’ ”16
ANALYSIS
There are two separate but related issues presented by this appeal. The first concerns the constitutional validity of the affidavit in support of the search warrant. If the affidavit was constitutionally infirm, then the Court of Appeals correctly held that, absent an exception, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant must be excluded.17 However, if the affidavit passes constitutional muster, then the Court must determine whether the affidavit conformed to MCL 780.653.18
[475]*475THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT
The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.” The probable cause requirement is relevant to whether “contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”19 With respect to appellate review of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant,
[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a “substantial basis for... conclud[ing]” that probable cause existed.[20]
[476]*476In this case, the Court of Appeals cited two statements in the affidavit that the magistrate may have relied on to find probable cause: (1) the reference to the anonymous tip and (2) the reference to the roach and marijuana residue from the trash pull. The Court dismissed the tip as unreliable because the police could not prove that the source spoke with personal knowledge or was reliable. Additionally, the Court found that the tip “is at significant odds” with both the evidence from the trash pull and the evidence discovered during the execution of the warrant.21 The Court also dismissed the evidence of marijuana discussed in the affidavit as “only a roach and some possible marijuana residue ...[,] hardly evidence that would lead a reasonable person to believe that drug trafficking was occurring at the house.”22 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that
[c]onsidering the search warrant and the underlying affidavit, as read in a commonsense and realistic manner, we conclude that a reasonably cautious person could not have concluded that there was a “substantial basis” for the finding of probable cause, i.e., for inferring a “fair probability” that evidence of drug trafficking would be found at defendants’ house.[23]
The Court of Appeals analysis is erroneous for a number of reasons. First, the Court reviewed the magistrate’s decision de novo.24 Review de novo is proper for “questions of law relevant to a motion to suppress.”25 However, that standard is not appropriate for review of the [477]*477magistrate’s probable cause determination. That determination is entitled to “ ‘great deference by reviewing courts.’ ”26
Second, the Court improperly framed this case as a test of the source’s reliability instead of examining all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit to determine whether there was a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that “there [was] a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime [would] be found” at defendants’ home.27 Focusing on the tip was inappropriate because, regardless of the veracity of the source, the officer participated in a trash pull that revealed evidence of marijuana and correspondence tying the trash to the defendants. The presence of marijuana in defendants’ trash shows “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”28 Because this officer uncovered direct evidence of illegal activity, the marijuana, it was unnecessary to delve into the veracity of the source.
The unnecessary focus on the tip stems from the Court inappropriately dismissing the marijuana from the “trash pull” as “only a roach.” The Court correctly stated that the tip suggested a drug trafficking operation; however, the police conducted further investigation, leading to the discovery of marijuana tied to defendants’ home. The marijuana established probable cause to search the home for additional contraband.29
[478]*478The dissent focuses on the scope of the warrant, arguing that “[a] warrant issued for drug possession would only authorize a search for marijuana and possibly paraphernalia used in the consumption of marijuana, not the array of evidence of distribution authorized by the warrant in this case.” Post at 487-488. The dissent’s argument is irrelevant, however, because even supposing for the sake of argument that probable cause did not exist to search for “evidence of distribution,”
‘■‘[t]he infirmity of part of a warrant requires the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to that part of the warrant, but does not require the suppression of anything described in the valid portions of the warrant (or lawfully seized — on plain view grounds, for example — during... execution [of the valid portions]).” [United States v Sells, 463 F3d 1148, 1150 (CA 10, 2006), quoting United States v Brown, 984 F2d 1074, 1077 (CA 10, 1993).]
This rule has been adopted by every federal circuit,30 as well as our Court of Appeals.31
As articulated in Sells, there is a “multiple-step analysis to determine whether severability is appli[479]*479cable.”32 First the court must divide the warrant into categories. Then, the court must evaluate the constitutionality of each category. If only some categories are constitutional, the court must determine if the valid categories are distinguishable from the invalid ones and whether the valid categories “make up the great part of the warrant.”33 Here, the warrant authorizes the seizure of three categories of evidence: marijuana; distribution evidence, such as currency and packaging paraphernalia; and possession evidence, such as proof of residency. Of these three categories, the only one that is arguably invalid is the distribution evidence. If it were invalid, that category would be severable from the others.
While all three categories are related to marijuana crimes, the distribution evidence relates to a distinct crime. Furthermore, when determining whether a valid portion constitutes the greater part of a warrant, “merely counting parts, without any evaluation of the practical effect of those parts, is an improperly ‘hyper-technical’ interpretation of the search authorized by the warrant.”34 Instead, a court should “evaluate the relative scope and invasiveness of the valid and invalid parts of the warrant.”35 In this case, the authorized search for marijuana permitted police officers to search the entire house and to investigate containers in which marijuana might be found. Hence, the scope of the search authorized by the valid portion of the search was extremely broad and allowed police officers to search in almost every place that the authorization to search for [480]*480distribution evidence permitted. For this reason, the valid portion of the warrant, in our judgment, formed the greater part of the search warrant. Therefore, even if the dissent is correct that the warrant is overbroad, the distribution category is severable.
In this case, the police did not seize any of the “evidence of distribution” for which the warrant authorized a search — “plastic packages, paper packets, and scales for weighing. .. and records of drug transactions . ...” Thus, even if that portion of the warrant is invalid, there is no need to suppress any evidence when no “evidence of distribution” was seized, because “ ‘the infirmity of part of a warrant’ ” only requires that “ ‘evidence seized pursuant to that part of the warrant’ ” be suppressed.36
Therefore, even accepting the Court of Appeals determination that the source was unreliable, the marijuana from the trash provides a “ ‘substantial basis for [481]*481concluding]’ that probable cause existed.”37 Because the magistrate properly found probable cause for the search, the evidence found during that search is not subject to the exclusionary rule. We reverse the Court of Appeals holding to the contrary.
STATUTORY CHALLENGE
The circuit court found a violation of MCL 780.653 because the hearsay information in the affidavit was not reliable and because the officer “misled” the magistrate. The Court of Appeals agreed, citing the fact that “[t]he affiant indicated that she had directly received the anonymous tip when, in fact, Crime Stoppers received the tip and then conveyed it to the police.”38 This conclusion was based on the affidavit, which stated:
That during the past several weeks your affiant received an anonymous tip stating that large quantities of marijuana was being sold and manufactured out of 3828 Maryland, City of Flint, Genesee County, Michigan. The tipster also indicated that there is a hidden room used for manufacturing marijuana inside said residence.
We find the Court of Appeals reasoning inadequate. First, the affiant does not indicate “that she had directly received” the tip. Because the affiant is the subject of the sentence, it is wholly unclear who relayed the tip to her. Clearly, one could infer that the anonymous source spoke directly to the affiant, but that is not the only inference possible. Nonetheless, under MCL 780.653, the key fact for purposes of probable cause is that the source was anonymous. The officer made no attempt to conceal that fact. The fact that the anony[482]*482mous source called Crime Stoppers instead of the police is immaterial under the statute.
The statute requires that “[t]he magistrate’s finding of reasonable or probable cause shall be based upon all the facts related within the affidavit made before him or her.”39 Further, “[t]he affidavit may be based upon information supplied to the complainant by a named or unnamed person if the affidavit contains” indications that the named person has personal knowledge, that the unnamed person spoke with personal knowledge and is credible, or that the unnamed person spoke with personal knowledge and the information is reliable.40
The issue then is whether the affidavit is “based upon” information supplied by an unnamed person. “Base,” when used as a verb, means “to place or establish on a base or basis; ground, found (usu[ally] followed] by on or upon): Our plan is based on an upturn in the economy.”41 In this case, the affidavit is “based upon” the affiant’s42 personal efforts to search the trash and discover the marijuana because that evidence is the foundation for probable cause. The affidavit states that “based upon the items found [in the trash pull] and [the] affiant’s experience in the investigation of marijuana ... [the] affiant has probable cause to believe that evidence of illegal drug activity” would be found at defendants’ address. Hence, the affidavit [483]*483was explicitly “based upon” the trash pull. While the anonymous tip prompted the investigation, the affidavit is not “based upon” that information because the marijuana found is by itself sufficient for probable cause. Thus, the statutory requirement that an anonymous tip bear indicia of reliability does not come into play.43 Because there is no statutory violation, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.44 Further, without a statutory violation, there is no need to discuss the propriety of the circuit court’s remedy for the alleged violation.
CONCLUSION
We disagree with the lower courts’ holdings that the affidavit in support of the search warrant failed to establish probable cause and that there was a violation [484]*484of MCL 780.653. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals order to suppress the evidence obtained from the search and the circuit court’s order allowing defendants to argue a statutory violation to the jury. We remand the cases to the circuit court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Taylor, C.J., and Weaver, Corrigan, and Markman, JJ, concurred with YOUNG, J.