People v. Keleub

Superior Court of Guam·Decided March 28, 2010·No. CM0480-13·Unknown

Opinion

.. ._ . FILED SUPE.F?!CY~ cn1 lfif

OF C_;', -.-~-

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, )

3 )

4 vs. )

) )

' JOHNNY KELEUB, ) 6 Defendant. )

7 )

8

9 INTRODUCTION

10 Tbis matter came before the Honorable James L. Canto II on Defendant's motion for 11 civil compromise, filed January 16, 2014. Having considered the parties' briefs and the 12 applicable law, the Court now issues the following Decision and Order.

13 BACKGROUND

14 Oo May 23, 2013, the Government filed a complaint to charge Defendant with (I)

IS Criminal Mischief, as a Misdemeanor; (2) Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a 16 Misdemeanor; (3) Violation of Court Order, as a Misdemeanor; and (4) Harassment, as a Petty 17 Misdemeanor.

18 On January 16, 2014, Defendant filed a motion for civil comprontise arguing that the 19 charges of Criminal Mischief, as a Misdemeanor, and Harrassment, as a Petty Misdmeanor, 20 should be dismissed because Defendant and the victim reached a civil compromise pursuant to 8 21 GCA § 80.90. (Mot. Civil Compromise, 2, Jan. 16, 2014). In support of this contention, 22 Defendant attached to the motion a declaration and a translated statement from the victim, 23 whereby victim acknowledges that she received satisfaction for the injury and that she does not 24 object to the disntissal of this case by way of civil comprontise. (Decl. Victim, I, Jan. 16,

2014).

26 On February 10, 2014, the Government filed an opposition. The Government argues 27 that dismissal on the basis of a civil compromise would be appropriate if the victim received 28 actual satisfaction for her injuries. blrR" tsG' rtrAT of what she received as satisfaction

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from Defendant. (Opp'n Mot., 2-3, Feb. 10, 2014). Absent actual receipt of satisfaction, the 2 Government argues that the motion should be denied. 3 DISCUSSION 4 Under Guam law, Title 8 Section 80.90 of the Guam Code regulates motions for civil 5 compromise. It provides as follows: 6 § 80.90. Misdemeanors May be Compromised; Procedure.

7 (a) When the defendant bas been charged with the commission of an offense which is not a felony for which the person injured by the act constituting the 8 offense has a remedy by a civil action, the offense may be compromised as provided by this Section.

9 (b) If the person injured appears before, or files his declaration in, the court in 10 which the criminal action is pending at any time before trial and acknowledges that he has received satisfaction for the injury, the court may, on payment of the II costs incurred, order the criminal action dismissed.

(c) A dismissal under this Section is a bar to another prosecution for the same 12 offense.

13 8 GCA § 80.90 (2013).

14 Section 80.90 (b) states that if the injured person submits a declaration acknowledging

" that he received satisfaction for the injury, the court may, on payment of the costs incurred, 16 order the criminal action dismissed. 8 GCA § 80.90 (b) (2013). Thus the Court bas discretion 17 to dismiss the criminal action only if Defendant has made payment to the victim of the costs 18 incurred. Id.

19 In this case, the victim acknowledged through a declaration that she received satisfaction 20 for her injuries. (Dec!. Victim, I, Jan. 16, 20 14). However, in her statement that was attached 21 to the motion, she states as follows: "since all the windows that he's been damaging was being 21 fix by me, I pay what ever need to be fix and it's all done. [They] have been fix[ed]."

23 (Victim's Statement, 1, Jan. 16, 2014). Her statement supports the conclusion that she was the 24 one that fixed the windows at her residence and that Defendant did not make any payment of the 25 costs incurred by the victim. Therefore, Defendant has not met the requirements for his 26 Criminal Mischief and Harassment charges to be dismissed under 8 GCA § 80.90 (b).

27 This conclusion is supported by the legislative intent behind the statute. This section is 28 based on former sections 1377 and 1378 of the California Penal Code, and therefore, California

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• • cases interpreting sections 1377 and 1378 are persuasive. See Crnz v. Cruz, 2005 Guam 3 ~ 9.

2 California courts interpreting former sections 1377 and 1378 of the California Penal Code have 3 found that the legislative intent behind allowing civil compromise of criminal offenses is "to 4 remove from criminal prosecution those offenses for which there is a civil remedy available; the s rationale being that the public interest in those cases is best served by requiring the accused to 6 make restitution directly and immediately to the individual victim instead of subjecting him to 7 criminal sanctions for the welfare of society in general." People v. Stephen, 227 Cal. Rptr. 380,

8 388 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1986) (emphasis added). Because the Court is not presented with 9 any evidence that Defendant made restitution directly and immediately to the victim, civil

10 compromise is not appropriate in this case. 11 For these reasons, Defendant's motion for civil compromise is denied. 12 ///

13 Ill 14 Ill IS CONCLUSION 16 Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant's motion for civil compromise is hereby 17 DENIED. 18

19

20 SO ORDERED this 'J.~-pf day of March, 2014. 21

22

23

24 HON. JAMES L. CANTO II

25 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 26 SERVICE VIA COURT SOX

27

28

ORIGINAL

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Related

People v. Stephen
182 Cal. App. 3d 1230 (California Court of Appeal, 1986)