2020 IL App (1st) 172829-U
FIFTH DIVISION January 10, 2020
No. 1-17-2829
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 15 CR 6548 ) RAQUELLE KEEFER, ) Honorable ) Mary Margaret Brosnahan, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Hoffman and Justice Rochford concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling on evidence related to defendant’s motion in limine. The court effectively cured any error by providing a limiting instruction regarding the evidence presented in violation of the motion in limine. Defendant is not entitled to a new trial when he himself invited additional error after the court’s correction. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing defendant’s sentence.
¶2 A jury convicted defendant Raquelle Keefer of two counts of being an armed habitual
criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2014)). The circuit court sentenced defendant to eight years’
imprisonment. On appeal, defendant challenges the admission of evidence that police found a large
sum of money in his home and contends that the State twice violated a motion in limine ruling 1-17-2829
precluding evidence that police recovered cannabis in his home. In addition, defendant argues that
he received an excessive sentence. We affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 On March 23, 2015, Chicago police executed a search warrant for the recovery of two
firearms from defendant at his residence located on South Parnell Avenue in Chicago. The
defendant was arrested and charged under indictment with two counts of being an armed habitual
criminal and eight counts of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-
1.1(a) (West 2014)). The State voluntarily dismissed the counts for unlawful possession of a
weapon and proceeded to trial on the two counts of being an armed habitual criminal.
¶5 Before trial, defendant moved in limine to preclude the State from introducing evidence
that $39,000 in cash and a small amount of cannabis were recovered in his home along with the
two firearms. Defendant argued that the admission of the money and drugs would suggest to the
jury that he was a drug dealer. The circuit court heard argument on the motion and precluded
evidence of the drugs recovered in his home. However, the court also noted defendant
acknowledged in a preliminary hearing that the money found in the home belonged to him. The
court partially denied defendant’s motion in limine on the admission of the money, concluding:
“I think that does go to show residency in this case. It goes to show the knowledge
of the money. The admission of the money goes to show that just like [People v.
Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094] if he knows about the presence of the cash and
that its located there it goes to establish that he lived there and to establish
residency. So I find based upon that that it would be relevant in the case.”
¶6 At trial, Chicago police officer G. McFadden testified that on March 23, 2015, at about
7:50 p.m., he and a team of officers executed a search warrant on the residence in question. As
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other officers attempted to breach the front entrance of the home, Officer McFadden positioned
himself at the back of the home, where he observed defendant attempt to flee through a first floor
window. He then identified defendant in open court as the person attempting to escape. During the
execution of the warrant, Officer McFadden ordered defendant to stop as the entry team cleared
the home and detained defendant in the enclosed porch at the rear of the home. He read defendant
his Miranda warnings, which defendant indicated that he understood. Defendant voluntarily
agreed to speak to Officer McFadden and the officers standing in the porch. Officer McFadden
asked defendant “if there was anything in the house that I should know about.” Defendant told
Officer McFadden that a black revolver was in a kitchen cabinet and a .40 caliber firearm was
located in a fish tank in the front room. Three police officers searched the kitchen and the front
room and found the weapons in the locations defendant described.
¶7 Chicago police officer Joseph Chlipala testified that he was one of the officers who
recovered a Glock .40 caliber semiautomatic weapon from a cabinet underneath the fish tank
during the execution of the search warrant. He photographed and inventoried the weapon and its
ammunition and then proceeded to the kitchen. There, Officer Chlipala also photographed and
inventoried the revolver located by another officer.
¶8 The State next asked whether Officer Chlipala recovered anything else on the first floor of
the residence. Defense counsel objected on the basis of foundation. The circuit court requested a
sidebar. The court asked the State whether it was going to elicit testimony concerning the drugs
because it wanted to ensure Officer Chlipala “wasn’t going to step into that.” The State responded
that it sought to elicit testimony of the money recovered from the home. The court sustained the
objection and stated that the officer “will be able to testify to what happened, where he was called
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to, what he was given etc. But he can’t testify that, you know, officer so and so recovered the
money from the dresser [and] then he called me.”
¶9 After the sidebar, the State asked Officer Chlipala whether he was directed anywhere else
by any of the officers. He responded that he was directed to a bedroom on the first floor, where
another officer had recovered a bag, at which point defense counsel objected and the circuit court
sustained the objection. Officer Chlipala continued testifying that another officer directed him to
enter a bedroom on the first floor. Inside the bedroom, he observed a bag with a large amount of
money inside. Officer Chlipala photographed the bag and inventoried it. He then proceeded to a
basement bedroom, stating “[f]rom there some cannabis was recovered.” Defense counsel objected
and the court sustained the objection.
¶ 10 The State asked immediately thereafter whether Officer Chlipala searched anywhere else
on the first floor of the home. Officer Chlipala responded that he proceeded to the front room,
where he observed a pile of envelopes with defendant’s name on them. He photographed those
envelopes and inventoried them. After the search concluded, the officers took the inventoried items
and defendant to the police station for processing.
¶ 11 Officer Chlipala next authenticated the evidence collected and inventoried at the scene,
which was then published to the jury. He testified that defendant indicated he resided at the home
during the search.
¶ 12 Before Officer Chlipala’s cross-examination, the circuit court ordered another sidebar due
to its concern that the officer had already mentioned the presence of drugs at the home. The court
proposed providing a limiting instruction to the jury that a “misdemeanor amount of cannabis
[was] recovered from the basement [t]hat was not attributed to [defendant].” At that point,
defendant moved for a mistrial due to the violation of the motion in limine, which the court denied.
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The court again offered to provide a limiting instruction, but defense counsel stated, “I think we
want to leave it alone. I don’t want to highlight it. I have made my record.” The court then stated,
“I want to make sure that the record is clear that should you choose not to avail yourself of my
offer of a limiting instruction and that [the jury is] told it’s a misdemeanor[,] it’s not attributed to
your client and disregard it.” Defense counsel responded that “[i]t will be to not highlight that fact,
but I’m not in a position at this particular moment to make a final decision on that.” The court
stated that defense counsel could take time to think about that decision and could instead decide
to include the limiting instruction at the end of trial.
¶ 13 On cross-examination, Officer Chlipala testified about the evidence recovered from the
premises that he included in his police report. Defense counsel asked the officer about the money
recovered from the scene, stating “are you aware that where this money was located there were
also files and folders and paper work regarding the buying and selling of automobiles. Were you
award of that?” Officer Chlipala responded affirmatively and stated that he did not take
photographs of that documentation. Defense counsel then asked whether “there was anything
preventing you from doing that or you chose not to?” After the circuit court overruled an objection
from the State, the officer answered, “[o]f financial records for evidentiary value. The money was
inventoried due to the large amount of quantity. Narcotics were also recovered from the house.”
Defense counsel objected and the court sustained the objection. Officer Chlipala explained that the
money was inventoried “because after Mr. Keefer was taken into custody and transported to the
station if I were to leave what was $39,400 *** and the money came up missing that would be a
complaint against me.” Officer Chlipala agreed that he did not take any photographs of the
documentation located near the money. Defense counsel then asked, “And if the drugs were located
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near the money you would have taken photographs of those; correct?” The State objected and the
court sustained the State’s objection.
¶ 14 After Officer Chlipala’s testimony concluded, defendant renewed his motion for mistrial
because the officer “intentionally violated this court’s order on a motion in limine.” The circuit
court denied the motion for mistrial, stating:
“I have no problem with his demeanor. It was a very vigorous cross-
examination. Very animated. The demeanor of counsel that was questioning him
was *** angry and accusatory in an appropriate manner. I’m not saying it was
inappropriate at all. You are representing your client strongly. I think he was
reacting to that. He did answer the question. So the jury will ultimately make a
credibility determin[ation].
The question was at one point he said there were narcotics. The objection
was sustained. I don’t know if he was talking about cannabis inaccurately referring
to his narcotic [or] if he was talking about negative white powder. Whatever came
out what it was. The jury would assume that it was the same that already come [sic]
out.”
¶ 15 The circuit court again proposed a limiting instruction to the jury, which defense counsel
accepted. The court then admonished the jury:
“You did hear testimony there was cannabis recovered from the basement bedroom
of the house in question. I want to let you know that was a misdemeanor or small
amount. You’re not to consider it. It’s not relevant to this defendant. It’s not
relevant to these charges. And that has not been, when I say that, the cannabis that
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was talked about has not been attributed to Mr. Keefer. All right. So you are to
disregard.”
¶ 16 Chicago police officer Roderick Dillard testified that he inventoried the firearms, money,
and the envelopes recovered from the house and stated that the police did not request that DNA or
fingerprint testing be performed on the weapons. Chicago police officer Christopher Lenti testified
that the recovered firearms were in working order and capable of discharging live rounds of
ammunition. The parties stipulated that defendant had two prior qualifying felony convictions to
establish the statutory requirement for the offense of being an armed habitual criminal. After the
State rested its case in chief, defendant moved for a directed finding and judgment of acquittal,
which the court denied. Defendant did not testify or present any witnesses or additional evidence.
¶ 17 At a sidebar before closing argument, the court reiterated that it had allowed evidence of
the money found on the premises to be admitted for the limited purpose of establishing defendant’s
residency at that location. The court stated that it had confidence the State would argue this issue
properly during closing argument, but it made a record of the discussion to avoid unnecessary
objections.
¶ 18 During closing argument, the State asked why defendant would voluntarily tell the officers
where the weapons were located, stating “defendant told them where the guns were because he
hoped that these officers would recover the guns and stop searching.” Defendant objected and the
court overruled the objection. The State contended the officers “continued searching and they
found $39,000 in cash in the defendant’s bedroom.” The State argued that once the officers found
the money, they brought it to defendant, who confirmed the money belonged to him. The State
argued, “That’s his money. That’s his bedroom. That’s his house. That’s where he lives.
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Everything in that house is his and he knows about it.” The State made no mention of the excluded
drugs found at the premises.
¶ 19 During defendant’s closing argument, defense counsel voluntarily mentioned the excluded
drugs and later argued, “You notice how they’ve got $39,000. We know what that’s about. They’re
trying to give you the impression that he’s a drug dealer protecting his stash.” The State objected
and the circuit court sustained the objection. The court stated, “That is absolutely not what that
evidence was admitted for and that argument has not been made, and the jury will be instructed to
not make that inference and to disregard that argument.” Defense counsel then stated to the jury
that the “$39,000 was there because he auctions cars.” The defense argued that the officers chose
not to photograph the documentation supporting the source of the money because of their bias and
prejudice. In rebuttal, the State argued it did not dispute that defendant earned the money found in
the home from car sales. However, the State also argued that defendant needed two guns in his
home to protect that cash.
¶ 20 The jury found defendant guilty on both counts of being an armed habitual criminal. Before
sentencing, defendant presented 21 very detailed and personal character-supporting letters from
family members, clergy, co-workers, and others. The circuit court indicated that it had considered
the statutory factors in mitigation, including the substantial period of time between offenses,
defendant’s likelihood of reoffending, and that his incarceration would pose a hardship upon his
dependents. The court also considered the requisite factors in aggravation, including defendant’s
criminal history and the deterrence value attached to his sentence. The court sentenced him to eight
years in prison, which is only two years above the statutory minimum of six years. The court also
denied defendant’s motion for a new trial or for judgment of acquittal and oral motion seeking
leave to file a motion to reconsider sentence. This appeal followed.
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¶ 21 ANALYSIS
¶ 22 Defendant argues on appeal that he is entitled to a new trial because the circuit court
allowed the State to introduce prejudicial evidence of the $39,000 recovered in his home. He
contends the money was irrelevant to the question of whether he possessed the weapons because
his residency was not in issue. He also argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the State
twice violated the motion in limine order precluding evidence that drugs were found in defendant’s
home. Finally, defendant argues he received an excessive sentence considering the nature of the
offense, his criminal history, and his rehabilitative potential.
¶ 23 Motion in Limine
¶ 24 The circuit court partially denied defendant’s motion in limine, allowing the State to
introduce evidence of the $39,000 recovered from defendant’s home specifically to establish his
residency at that location. Further, the court partially granted defendant’s motion, precluding any
mention of the drugs the officers found in the basement of the home. However, Officer Chlipala
twice testified that narcotics were recovered in the home. We address these issues in turn.
¶ 25 Defendant argues that evidence of the money recovered from the home was irrelevant to
the possession of the weapons, and to the purported justification that the admission of the money
was necessary to establish his residency. Defendant contends this is particularly true considering
the money was found in a different location than the weapons. Defendant argues that because his
knowledge of the presence of the weapons was established through properly presented evidence,
there was no need to present the money to establish possession.
¶ 26 “A defendant’s guilt must be established by legal and competent evidence, uninfluenced
by bias or prejudice raised by irrelevant evidence.” People v. Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d 359, 371 (1964).
The determination of whether evidence was “legal and competent” hinges, in turn, on whether the
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evidence was relevant and admissible. Although a defendant has the right to present a defense
(People v. Manion, 67 Ill. 2d 564 (1977)), a circuit court may prevent a defendant from introducing
irrelevant or unreliable evidence. People v. Hayes, 353 Ill. App. 3d 578, 583 (2004). Evidence is
relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
Ill. R. Evid. 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). And relevant evidence is admissible so long as its probative
value is not substantially outweighed by the danger that it will unduly prejudice the party against
whom it is admitted. Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).
¶ 27 In assessing the circuit court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence, we must
determine whether the proffered testimony would have made the question of the defendant’s guilt
of the charged offenses more or less probable. Hayes, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 583. It is axiomatic that
“[i]n all criminal cases it is important that the evidence be fairly limited to the issue on trial, as
collateral or extraneous matters can only mislead or prejudice a jury.” People v. Pickett, 34 Ill.
App. 3d 590, 598–99 (1975). The admissibility of evidence sought to be excluded as irrelevant is
committed to the sound discretion of the circuit court, and we will only reverse a decision whether
to admit evidence if the court abused its discretion. People v. Becker, 239 Ill. 2d 215, 234 (2010).
An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is “arbitrary, fanciful or
unreasonable,” or where “no reasonable person would agree with the position adopted by the trial
court.” Id.
¶ 28 We first note that defendant has forfeited this issue because he failed to make a proper
objection at trial contesting the relevancy of the money. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186
(1988) (holding that, to preserve an error, a party must contemporaneously lodge an objection and
raise the issue in a posttrial motion). Here, defendant objected at trial before the introduction of
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evidence concerning the money, but he objected on the basis of foundation rather than relevancy.
An objection on specific grounds forfeits assignments of error on other grounds not specified.
People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 230 (1991). Failure to raise an error to the circuit court with
sufficient specificity results in forfeiture. Id.
¶ 29 Forfeiture aside, we reject defendant’s argument. Possession of contraband may be either
actual or constructive. People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 335 (2010). Where, as here, defendant is
not found in actual physical possession of the contraband, the State must prove that he had
constructive possession. Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17. Constructive possession exists
where the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the drugs, firearm and ammunition, and
had immediate and exclusive control over the location where the items were found. Id. Knowledge
may be demonstrated by evidence of the defendant’s declarations, acts, or conduct from which it
can be inferred that he knew the contraband existed in the place where it was found. Id. Control is
established when the defendant has the capability and intent to maintain dominion and control over
the contraband, even if he lacks personal present dominion over it. Id. (citing People v. Frieberg,
147 Ill. 2d 326, 361 (1992)). Proof that the defendant had control over the premises where the
contraband was found gives rise to an inference of his knowledge and possession of that
contraband. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 335.
¶ 30 A defendant’s habitation in the premises where contraband is found is sufficient evidence
of his control of the location to establish constructive possession. Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st)
102094, ¶ 17. “Proof of residency in the form of rent receipts, utility bills and clothing in closets
is relevant to show the defendant lived on the premises and therefore controlled them.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting People v. Cunningham, 309 Ill. App. 3d 824, 828 (1999)
(quoting People v. Lawton, 253 Ill. App. 3d 144, 147 (1993))). See also People v. Spann, 332 Ill.
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App. 3d 425, 445 (2002) (defendant had constructive possession of drugs found in apartment
where he “stayed in the apartment, paid rent there, and possessed a key to the apartment”).
¶ 31 In Spencer, the evidence presented at trial established that three live rounds of .357-caliber
ammunition were found in a bedroom, along with numerous bundles of cash totaling $9,000. In
the same bedroom, police officers found an identification card listing the address of the house as
the defendant’s residence, in addition to a letter addressed to the defendant at the same address.
The defendant initially made a statement to the officers that they would not find anything but
money and, after the officers found the ammunition, he made an additional statement that he
needed to have a gun because of the amount of money he kept on the premises. Spencer, 2012 IL
App (1st) 102094, ¶ 18. The court found that, “by making these statements, the defendant linked
himself to both the gun and the large amounts of cash recovered in the house.” Id. In addition, the
defendant attempted to flee from the house, which the court found supported a reasonable inference
that he had knowledge of the presence of the weapon and ammunition. Id. The court concluded
that this evidence, coupled with the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom,
established that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant constructively possessed the
weapon and ammunition recovered at the time of the search. Id.
¶ 32 In this case, defendant himself made a statement to police acknowledging the cash was his,
and that admission was relevant because it tended to show that he lived at the Parnell address. Like
Spencer, defendant attempted to flee, a circumstance tending to show consciousness of guilt. See
People v. Harris, 52 Ill. 2d 558, 561 (1972). The circuit court considered defendant’s argument at
great length and still found that “any evidence that is relevant in a criminal prosecution very often
is prejudicial and that’s the nature of the state’s evidence,” and “[t]he fact that it’s prejudicial in
and of itself does not bar it from being introduced by the state.” We agree and find the probative
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value of the cash evidence was not significantly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 18. Defendant’s reliance on People v. Barnes, 182 Ill. App.
3d 75 (1989) is misplaced, because that case did not involve the issue of whether money found on
the defendant’s person was relevant to the issue of his residency and control over the firearm.
Further, any risk of prejudice was alleviated by the State’s introduction of evidence that defendant
earned the money through the legal sale of cars. Finally, the issue of whether the money was
relevant does not evaporate simply because there is also other evidence of residency. Spencer,
2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ ¶ 18-19. Forfeiture aside, we conclude no abuse of discretion occurred
in the circuit court’s decision to allow evidence of the cash recovered at defendant’s home.
¶ 33 Next, defendant argues the State committed prosecutorial misconduct when it violated the
motion in limine ruling twice, allowing in evidence that cannabis was found in his home. He
contends the introduction of this evidence deprived him of a fair trial because the jury heard that
he possessed a large sum of money and drugs, implying that his criminal conduct far exceeded the
nature of the crime for which he was being accused – possession of firearms. Defendant argues
the introduction of the evidence tainted the proceedings, entitling him to a new trial.
¶ 34 Defendant’s claim that the State violated the motion in limine mischaracterizes what
occurred at trial. The State did not specifically elicit testimony from Officer Chlipala that he found
cannabis at defendant’s residence. The State asked Officer Chlipala whether he was directed
anywhere else by any of the officers. This was a broad question that elicited a lengthy answer by
the police officer, who eventually testified that he proceeded to the basement and found cannabis.
Before Officer Chlipala’s cross-examination, the circuit court proposed a limiting instruction to
the jury, which defendant specifically rejected, stating “I think we want to leave it alone. I don’t
want to highlight it. I have made my record.” Then during cross-examination, Officer Chlipala
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again volunteered that narcotics were recovered from the house. Thus, the second violation of the
motion in limine is not attributable to prosecutorial misconduct as defendant claims. After Officer
Chlipala testified, the court admonished the jury that it could not consider evidence of the cannabis
recovered from the premises because “[i]t’s not relevant to this defendant” or “to these charges.”
The court specifically ordered the jury to disregard that testimony.
¶ 35 By its very nature, other-crimes evidence can be prejudicial to a defendant. People v. Perez,
2012 IL App (2d) 100865, ¶ 45. Generally, the risk associated with the admission of other-crimes
evidence is that it might prove “overly persuasive to a jury, who may ‘convict the defendant only
because it feels he or she is a bad person deserving punishment.’ ” People v. Ward, 2011 IL
108690, ¶ 24 (quoting People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill.2d 129, 137 (1980)).
¶ 36 In this case, Officer Chlipala’s testimony violated the circuit court’s in limine order, but it
did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. A timely, sustained objection and instructing the jury to
disregard the testimony can correct this type of error. See People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 342
(2000) (State’s question regarding defendant’s prior criminal activity was improper, but error
cured by sustaining objection and admonishing jury to disregard). Here, the court provided a
limiting instruction. We find the testimony was not so prejudicial as to be incurable and deny
defendant a fair trial. Furthermore, after the court provided the limiting instruction correcting the
error, defense counsel again mentioned that drugs were recovered at the home during closing
argument. See People v. Hawkins, 181 Ill. 2d 41, 58 (1998) (“[T]he law is understandably reluctant
to aid litigants responsible for the very errors of which they complain”). Defendant cannot claim
error that he invited, specifically on this record where the court attempted to provide a limiting
instruction after the first violation and defendant declined, only later to once again reintroduce that
evidence after the court provided the limiting instruction. People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 114
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(2001) (“When a party procures, invites, or acquiesces in the admission of evidence, even though
the evidence is improper, that party cannot contest the admission on appeal.”).
¶ 37 In sum, the circuit court gave appropriate and direct instructions to the jury to disregard the
cannabis evidence and we must presume the jury followed its instructions. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 342.
Further, defendant cannot contest an error he invited. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d at 114.
¶ 38 Excessive Sentence
¶ 39 Finally, defendant argues that his eight-year sentence is excessive considering the nature
of the offense, his criminal history, and his rehabilitative potential. He seeks the minimum statutory
sentence of six years’ imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(b) (West 2014);730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a)
(West 2014).
¶ 40 In imposing a sentence, the circuit court must balance relevant factors, such as the nature
of the offense, the protection of the public, and the defendant’s rehabilitative potential. People v.
Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 213 (2010). The court has a superior opportunity to evaluate and weigh
a defendant’s credibility, demeanor, character, mental capacity, social environment, and habits. Id.
In addition, a court is not required to expressly outline its reasoning for sentencing, and absent
some affirmative indication to the contrary (other than the sentence itself), we must presume that
the court considered all mitigating factors on the record. People v. Perkins, 408 Ill. App. 3d 752,
762-63 (2011). Since the most important sentencing factor is the seriousness of the offense, the
court is not required to give greater weight to mitigating factors than to the seriousness of the
offense, and the presence of mitigating factors neither requires a minimum sentence nor precludes
a maximum sentence. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 214.
¶ 41 We review a sentence within statutory limits for an abuse of discretion, and we may only
alter a sentence when it varies greatly from the spirit and purpose of the law, or if it is manifestly
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disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Id. at 212. So long as the circuit court does not ignore
pertinent mitigating factors or consider either incompetent evidence or improper aggravating
factors, it has wide latitude in sentencing a defendant to any term within the applicable statutory
range. Perkins, 408 Ill. App. 3d at 762-63. This broad latitude means that this court cannot
substitute its judgment simply because it might have weighed the sentencing factors differently.
Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212-13.
¶ 42 In this case, the applicable sentencing range for armed habitual criminal, a Class X felony,
is no less than 6 years and no more than 30 years. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(b) (West 2014);730 ILCS
5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2014). Thus, the circuit court’s imposed eight-year sentence falls on the lower
end of this statutory range.
¶ 43 Defendant’s argument that he should receive a lesser sentence is unavailing. We
acknowledge the reams of laudatory letters submitted on behalf of defendant, but note that the trial
judge spent considerable time favorably commenting on them. Considering factors in mitigation,
the court specifically noted that defendant had been a law-abiding citizen during the 10 years prior
to the offense, which was “a significant amount or a substantial amount of time that comports with
the factors in mitigation.” The court also addressed defendant’s rehabilitative potential, noting how
defendant lived “a law-abiding life, so I think there is a significant possibility that this may not
occur down the road in the future once this sentence has been completed.” The court also gave
consideration to the hardship on defendant’s dependents.
¶ 44 The circuit court next considered the factors in aggravation, namely, defendant’s criminal
history and how a prison sentence could deter others from committing the same crime. The court
stated “it’s uncommon to get letters of mitigation submitted that have the depth of information and
the depth of knowledge that the writers seem to have of this Defendant.”
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¶ 45 The circuit court had a superior opportunity to evaluate defendant’s credibility, demeanor,
and character, and we are prohibited from substituting our judgment for that of the circuit court
simply because we might have weighed the sentencing factors differently. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d
at 212-13. Since defendant’s sentence falls within the sentencing range, we cannot say that it varies
greatly from the spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense. Id. at 212. Given defendant’s prior record, a sentence which was only two years over the
minimum and about 22 years below the maximum was not an abuse of discretion. Id.
¶ 46 CONCLUSION
¶ 47 We find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling on defendant’s motion in
limine and that the court effectively cured any error by providing a limiting instruction. Defendant
is not entitled to a new trial when he himself invited additional error after the court’s correction.
Finally, we find defendant’s sentence is not excessive.
¶ 48 Affirmed.