IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 2 ) 3 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRIMINAL CA~mf9f'\r=111 ~~4fl: ) 4 vs. ) ) DECISION i~fi ;6~EiO U R T 5 JEFFINS KEBEKOL, ) (Motion to Suppress) Defendant. 6
8 This matter came on for hearing on March 1, 2012 before the HONORABLE JUDGE 9 ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON, on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant is represented 10 by Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath. The People are represented by Assistant Attorney II General James c. Collins. Having considered the arguments and briefs herein, the Court DENIES said 12 motion. 13 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 14 On October 22, 2011, at approximately 11:05 p.m., Officers of the Guam Police Department 15 (hereinafter "Officers") effected a traffic stop of the Defendant (hereinafter "Kebekol") by the 16 intersection of Route#1 and Route #14. Kebekol had been observed weaving in and out of traffic, and 17 nearly colliding into the median divider while turning from Route 1 to Route 14. The Officers 18 approached Kebekol's vehicle and requested his driver's license and vehicle registration. The Officers 19 noted an open can of Budlight in the vehicle, and when asked Kebekol admitted the Budlight belonged 20 to him. At approximately 11:15 p.m. Kebekol agreed to perform the Standardized Field Sobriety Test 21 ("SFST"), which he failed. Kebekol was arrested at 11 :05 p.m and processed in the D.U.I van in the 22 Cost-U-Less parking lot. At 11 :25 p.m., the Officers gave Kebekol his Miranda warnings and then 23 proceeded to question Kebekol, who adrnitted to drinking seven cans of Budweiser between 1 PM and 24 10 PM earlier that day. Officers then tried to administer a breathalyzer test, but after four attempts, no 25 result was forthcoming. Kebekol was transported to the Guam Memorial Hospital Lab where a blood 26 alcohol test was administered at 12:37 a.m. There is no dispute as to these facts. On March 12, 2011, 27 Siren was charged with 1) Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor; 2) Driving 28
Page I of4 While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor (BAC); 3) Possession of an Open Container, as
2 a misdemeanor; and 4) Reckless Driving, as a petty misdemeanor. 3
4 DISCUSSION
5 Kebekol moves to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained by the Officers as a result of an
6 unlawful detention of his person in violation of 8 Guam Code Annotated § 30.10-30.60, Guam's "Stop
7 and Frisk" statute. Guam law provides that "[n]o person shall be detained under the provisions of § 30.10
8 longer than is reasonable necessary to effect the purposes of that section, and in no event longer than
9 fifteen (15) minutes .... " 8 GCA § 30.30. Kebekol argues that he was detained more than the permitted
10 fifteen (15) minutes, and therefore, the remedy for violation should be suppression of any and all
11 evidence seized. Kebekol cites the Court to an earlier decision of this Court in People v. Santos, CM
12 805-09 (Super. Ct. Guam July 2, 2010), wherein this Court concluded the police officers had detained
13 the defendant longer than lawfully permitted under the facts of the case. For the following reason, the
14 Court is abandoning its ruling in Santos based on the following analysis.
15 The purpose for Guam's "Stop and Frisk Act" is for 'investigatory stops' where the police
16 officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to commit a criminal offense. 8 G.c.A.
17 §30.20. A police officer then has fifteen (15) minutes to ascertain the identity of individual and
18 determine the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.30. If probable cause arises during the
19 'investigatory stop' the police officer is permitted to arrest the individual. See §30AO The time limitation
20 for the statute's 'brief detention' under section 30.10 no longer governs once probable cause has been
21 formed.
22 At 11 :05 p.m. on October 22, 2011, Officers pulled over the Defendant for an 'investigatory
23 stop' because he was weaving in and out of traffic. At 11 :05 a.m. the Officers requested Kebekol to
24 submit to the blood or breath test based on the observation of Kebekol's vehiele nearly collided onto the
25 median on Route #14. Based on the Defendant's admittance to drinking three cans of Budweiser, Officer
26 arrested Kebekol at 11 :05 p.m. for Driving under the Influence of Alcohol. During the investigatory stop,
27 the Officers had probable cause to arrest Kebekol shortly before 11 :05 p.m. based on his admission to
28 having drunk alcohol. Once probable cause is formed during the "investigatory stop", the fifteen (15)
Page 2 of 4 minute time limit for purposes of section 30.10 no longer governed. The "investigatory stop", then
2 becomes a detention and need only pass constitutional muster against unreasonable searches and seizures
3 guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
4 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of a bright-line time
5 limit for Fourth Amendment detentions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985).
6 Although having a 'bright-line' rule would be helpful in evaluating whether an investigative detention is
7 unreasonable, a police officer's common sense and judgment must ultimately govern their conduct. In
8 United States v. Place, the Court reasoned that "[ s]uch a limit would undermine the equally important
9 need to allow authorities to graduate their responses to the demands of any particular situation." Place,
10 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.10 (1983). The Guam legislature has provided clear framework for 'stops' for the
11 purposes of section 30.30 and the facts in this case do not trigger its application.
12 Accordingly, this Court does not agree with Defendant's assertion that "all and any" evidence
13 from a detention should be suppressed under §30.60. Although the Court in Santos did not address the
14 suppression issue, the Court will do so now. Guam law provides that "[n]othing seized by a peace officer
15 in the search authorized by §30.50 [Weapons Search Permitted] shall be admissible against any person
16 in any court of this Territory unless both the detention and the search which disclosed its existence was
17 authorized by and conducted in compliance with the provisions of this Chapter" 8 G.C.A. §30.60. In the
18 present case, there is no evidence to suppress from a search of the Defendant based on the following
19 analysis.
20 A "detention" for purposes of section 30.30 is limited to ascertaining the identity of the person
21 and the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.20. A request for identification and
22 investigation does not generally constitute a seizure under Terry, and more importantly, does not
23 implicate the Fourth Amendment. Under Terry, a 'detention' occurs when a "police officer accosts an
24 individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968); see also
25 People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1, '152 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2003) The Court of Appeals in Michigan found the
26 determining factor in assessing whether a "detention is too long in duration to be justified as an
27 investigatory stop is whether the police were diligently pursuing a means of investigation that was likely
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 2 ) 3 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRIMINAL CA~mf9f'\r=111 ~~4fl: ) 4 vs. ) ) DECISION i~fi ;6~EiO U R T 5 JEFFINS KEBEKOL, ) (Motion to Suppress) Defendant. 6
8 This matter came on for hearing on March 1, 2012 before the HONORABLE JUDGE 9 ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON, on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant is represented 10 by Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath. The People are represented by Assistant Attorney II General James c. Collins. Having considered the arguments and briefs herein, the Court DENIES said 12 motion. 13 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 14 On October 22, 2011, at approximately 11:05 p.m., Officers of the Guam Police Department 15 (hereinafter "Officers") effected a traffic stop of the Defendant (hereinafter "Kebekol") by the 16 intersection of Route#1 and Route #14. Kebekol had been observed weaving in and out of traffic, and 17 nearly colliding into the median divider while turning from Route 1 to Route 14. The Officers 18 approached Kebekol's vehicle and requested his driver's license and vehicle registration. The Officers 19 noted an open can of Budlight in the vehicle, and when asked Kebekol admitted the Budlight belonged 20 to him. At approximately 11:15 p.m. Kebekol agreed to perform the Standardized Field Sobriety Test 21 ("SFST"), which he failed. Kebekol was arrested at 11 :05 p.m and processed in the D.U.I van in the 22 Cost-U-Less parking lot. At 11 :25 p.m., the Officers gave Kebekol his Miranda warnings and then 23 proceeded to question Kebekol, who adrnitted to drinking seven cans of Budweiser between 1 PM and 24 10 PM earlier that day. Officers then tried to administer a breathalyzer test, but after four attempts, no 25 result was forthcoming. Kebekol was transported to the Guam Memorial Hospital Lab where a blood 26 alcohol test was administered at 12:37 a.m. There is no dispute as to these facts. On March 12, 2011, 27 Siren was charged with 1) Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor; 2) Driving 28
Page I of4 While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor (BAC); 3) Possession of an Open Container, as
2 a misdemeanor; and 4) Reckless Driving, as a petty misdemeanor. 3
4 DISCUSSION
5 Kebekol moves to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained by the Officers as a result of an
6 unlawful detention of his person in violation of 8 Guam Code Annotated § 30.10-30.60, Guam's "Stop
7 and Frisk" statute. Guam law provides that "[n]o person shall be detained under the provisions of § 30.10
8 longer than is reasonable necessary to effect the purposes of that section, and in no event longer than
9 fifteen (15) minutes .... " 8 GCA § 30.30. Kebekol argues that he was detained more than the permitted
10 fifteen (15) minutes, and therefore, the remedy for violation should be suppression of any and all
11 evidence seized. Kebekol cites the Court to an earlier decision of this Court in People v. Santos, CM
12 805-09 (Super. Ct. Guam July 2, 2010), wherein this Court concluded the police officers had detained
13 the defendant longer than lawfully permitted under the facts of the case. For the following reason, the
14 Court is abandoning its ruling in Santos based on the following analysis.
15 The purpose for Guam's "Stop and Frisk Act" is for 'investigatory stops' where the police
16 officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to commit a criminal offense. 8 G.c.A.
17 §30.20. A police officer then has fifteen (15) minutes to ascertain the identity of individual and
18 determine the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.30. If probable cause arises during the
19 'investigatory stop' the police officer is permitted to arrest the individual. See §30AO The time limitation
20 for the statute's 'brief detention' under section 30.10 no longer governs once probable cause has been
21 formed.
22 At 11 :05 p.m. on October 22, 2011, Officers pulled over the Defendant for an 'investigatory
23 stop' because he was weaving in and out of traffic. At 11 :05 a.m. the Officers requested Kebekol to
24 submit to the blood or breath test based on the observation of Kebekol's vehiele nearly collided onto the
25 median on Route #14. Based on the Defendant's admittance to drinking three cans of Budweiser, Officer
26 arrested Kebekol at 11 :05 p.m. for Driving under the Influence of Alcohol. During the investigatory stop,
27 the Officers had probable cause to arrest Kebekol shortly before 11 :05 p.m. based on his admission to
28 having drunk alcohol. Once probable cause is formed during the "investigatory stop", the fifteen (15)
Page 2 of 4 minute time limit for purposes of section 30.10 no longer governed. The "investigatory stop", then
2 becomes a detention and need only pass constitutional muster against unreasonable searches and seizures
3 guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
4 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of a bright-line time
5 limit for Fourth Amendment detentions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985).
6 Although having a 'bright-line' rule would be helpful in evaluating whether an investigative detention is
7 unreasonable, a police officer's common sense and judgment must ultimately govern their conduct. In
8 United States v. Place, the Court reasoned that "[ s]uch a limit would undermine the equally important
9 need to allow authorities to graduate their responses to the demands of any particular situation." Place,
10 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.10 (1983). The Guam legislature has provided clear framework for 'stops' for the
11 purposes of section 30.30 and the facts in this case do not trigger its application.
12 Accordingly, this Court does not agree with Defendant's assertion that "all and any" evidence
13 from a detention should be suppressed under §30.60. Although the Court in Santos did not address the
14 suppression issue, the Court will do so now. Guam law provides that "[n]othing seized by a peace officer
15 in the search authorized by §30.50 [Weapons Search Permitted] shall be admissible against any person
16 in any court of this Territory unless both the detention and the search which disclosed its existence was
17 authorized by and conducted in compliance with the provisions of this Chapter" 8 G.C.A. §30.60. In the
18 present case, there is no evidence to suppress from a search of the Defendant based on the following
19 analysis.
20 A "detention" for purposes of section 30.30 is limited to ascertaining the identity of the person
21 and the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.20. A request for identification and
22 investigation does not generally constitute a seizure under Terry, and more importantly, does not
23 implicate the Fourth Amendment. Under Terry, a 'detention' occurs when a "police officer accosts an
24 individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968); see also
25 People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1, '152 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2003) The Court of Appeals in Michigan found the
26 determining factor in assessing whether a "detention is too long in duration to be justified as an
27 investigatory stop is whether the police were diligently pursuing a means of investigation that was likely
28 to confirm or dispel their suspicions" People v. Chambers, 489 N.W.2d 168, 125, (1992).
Page 3 of 4 Defendant urges the Court to rely on its ruling in People v. Santos. CM 0332-11, Superior Court
2 of Guam, July 2, 2010. This Court abandons its ruling in Santos l wherein it concluded police officers
3 have fifteen (15) minutes to make an arrest after the onslaught of probable cause following an initial
4 investigatory stop. This Court has not previously adhered to such analysis. People v. Pascual CF 370-08,
5 Superior Court of Guam, January 11, 2010; People v. Tedtaotao CF 50-09, Superior Court of Guam,
6 April 20, 2009.
7 Even if Section 30.30 was violated, this Court finds that suppression is not an appropriate
8 remedy. The fifteen (15) minute limitation is a statutory right prescribed by the Guam legislature, not a
9 constitutional right. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures applies
10 pursuant to § 1421 b(c) of the Organic Act of Guam; however, nothing in the Act incorporates the fifteen
II (15) minute limitation as a constitutionally-afforded right to the people of Guam. In addition, Section
12 30.50 only applies to weapons search and is inapplicable to the present case, as no weapons search
13 occurred. Section 30.60 provides the admissibility of seized evidence found in searches authorized by §
14 30.50 to be limited to weapons searches. Since no weapons search occurred, this Court finds the
15 suppression of evidence not an appropriate remedy. Based on the foregoing analysis the Defendant's
16 Motion to Suppress is DENIED. 17 This matter is set for Criminal Trial Setting JUNE 4,2012 at 9:30 a.m. 18 SO ORDERED: 19
21 HONORABLE ELIZABETH ARRETT-ANDERSON Judge, Superior Court of Guam 22
27 iMore this Court abandons its faulty 2, 2010) on p. 5 2. "The cause does not alter the time limitations of 8 §30.20" the Court find 28 IJIVUaUlti even after the pV"','r<:l1hAl1
40f4