People v. Judson

11 Daly 1
CourtNew York Court of Common Pleas
DecidedSeptember 15, 1849
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 11 Daly 1 (People v. Judson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Common Pleas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Judson, 11 Daly 1 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1849).

Opinion

Judge Daly.

—The application is twofold. Four of the defendants move for separate trials, and two of these de[23]*23fendants, in the event of the denial of that application, move to postpone the cause, from the absence of material witnesses. The grand jury have included all the defendants in one indictment, with the view that they should be tried together for one offense—the propriety of which course is obvious. The acts of each individual constitute part of the history of a common transaction; and, to enable the jury to determine whether a riot existed, they should have detailed to them the acts of all the parties indicted for creating or maintaining a riot. If the defendants, instead of being tried together, should be tried separately, it would be necessary to repeat a great portion of the same testimony in each case, which would lead to an unnecessary consumption of public time, and greatly increase the expense of the trial, to say nothing of the loss and inconvenience to jurors, witnesses, etc. There are, therefore, the strongest reasons for trying all the defendants together. The cases cited by the district attorney show that all who participate in a riot may be indicted jointly and tried together. In a case not cited by him (The Queen v. Solely and others, 2 Salk., 593) it is said, by the court, that a riot is a “ compound offense,” to constitute which there must be an unlawful assembly of more than two persons. All, therefore, who unite or participate in it are principals, and jointly guilty of the offense. It is not, consequently, a matter of right to be tried separately for the offense, though the court undoubtedly have a discretion. If there is reason to believe that a party cannot have a fair trial—if mingling his case with that of the others may tend seriously to his detriment or prejudice—he should have a separate trial. There is nothing, however, in the affidavit of the defendant Judson to induce the court to grant him a separate trial. Nothing appears from which the court might infer that his rights would be affected, in the slightest particular, by trying him jointly with the rest. Nor is the deafness of the defendant Douglass, or his youth, a reason for granting him a separate trial. Whatever considerations may arise fix m [24]*24his youth may as well be addressed to one jury as to another.

The motion to put off the trial must also be denied.

The defendants have not shown due diligence. The trial of this ease has been delayed for a long time; indeed, it has been delayed so long as to afford ground for public complaint. It is very different from the ordinary class of criminal trials. The transaction involved in it is more especially of a public nature. The great number of defendants of counsel and of witnesses distinguish it from other cases. It was set down, therefore, at the beginning of the term for a certain day, that ample time might be afforded to parties to get ready, and all parties were notified that it would be proceeded with to-day. The defendant Judson, having neglected to make an effort to get his witnesses with due diligence, if these witnesses were material, cannot now ask to put off the cause. He has not shown that the witnesses are material. He has not disclosed what he expects to prove by the two witnesses alleged to be» absent.

It would be insufficient for the postponement of the most ordinary suit in a civil court, and is entitled to but little weight on an application, by a single individual, for the postponement of a case of this magnitude, when the parties, witnesses, etc., are so numerous. There should be a good, substantial reason either for postponing the cause or authorizing separate trials, which, in the opinion of a majority of this court, does not appear. For these reasons the applications for separate trials, as, also, to postpone trials, are denied.

The prisoners were thereupon arraigned, and each, through his counsel, pleaded not guilty.

Four days were spent in obtaining a jury. By the act of 1847 every person tried for an offense not punishable with death, or by imprisonment in the state prison for life, is entitled to challenge five jurors peremptorily. Under this act Busteed claimed that each of the prisoners was entitled to five peremptory challenges.

[25]*25The District Attorney objected. He insisted that the prisoners were tried collectively for one offense, and that there could be on their behalf but five peremptory challenges altogether.

The court held that each prisoner under the act was entitled to five peremptory challenges. If this construction were not given, one prisoner might exhaust the five challenges and place it out of the power of the others to exercise a right which was manifestly designed for the protection of every individual who was put upon his trial for a criminal offense. It would in this case, from the number of persons upon trial, greatly increase the difficulty of obtaining a jury, but that was unavoidably incident to trying so many persons collectively for the crime of creating a riot.

The jury were then called. The first juror called was challenged to the favor, and triers were appointed. He declared that he believed that a riot had occurred on the night, of the 10th of May. Smith insisted that this disqualified him, as that was one of the questions to be tried. Judge Daly then charged the triers, who, after conferring together, found that the juror was competent, upon which he was immediately challenged by the defense peremptorily and set aside. As each juror was called, a challenge to the favor was interposed and tried. Each of the ten counsel exercised the right of interrogating the juror, of discussing the admissibility of the questions put to him, the great bulk of which were overruled by the court as irrelevant, but were again put as each new juror was called, and pertinaciously insisted upon in declamatory speeches designed to prejudice the jury against any trial of the prisoners at all. These occasions were so constantly taken advantage of for declamatory denunciations of the prosecution, and for commentary upon the rights of the prisoners upon political or popular grounds, that at last Whiting, on the part of the prosecution, made an energetic appeal to the bench, in response to which Judge Daly condemned the course of [26]*26the counsel, and in the course of his remarks characterized it as an abuse of the privilege of challenge, and so calculated, if persevered in, to bring the administration of justice into contempt.

Mr. Smith asked the judge if any of these remarks applied to him.

Judgé Daly replied that what he said would apply to the counsel for the defense generally.

Mr. Smith retorted, that where rebuke was undeserved it was harmless, and he did not apply one word of all that had just reached his ears from the bench to himself; such reproof was as unjust as it was unmerited. So far as his conduct was concerned, he should pursue a fearless course. He should never quarrel with the law, but should defend the rights of his clients according to the best of his abilities, unawed by courts, counsel, jurors or witnesses.

Judge Daly remarked, in answer, that Mr. Smith was certainly correct in sajdng that rebuke was harmless if undeserved.

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Bluebook (online)
11 Daly 1, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-judson-nyctcompl-1849.