2021 IL App (1st) 171026-U
THIRD DIVISION June 30, 2021
No. 1-17-1026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 14 CR 19077 (01) ) LEONDO JOSEPH, ) Honorable ) Dennis J. Porter, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Howse and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Affirmed. Defendant did not receive per se ineffective assistance of counsel when non-lawyer, pro se, codefendant brother conducted his direct examination at joint trial; because defendant was called as witness in codefendant’s case, codefendant was not representing defendant. Evidence sufficient to prove that codefendant, for whom defendant was accountable, was armed with a firearm.
¶2 A jury convicted defendant Leondo Joseph, and his codefendant and brother, LB Joseph,
of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and aggravated battery. The jury
also found that LB, for whom Leondo was accountable, was armed with a firearm during the
kidnapping and sexual assault.
¶3 Codefendant LB has filed his own appeal and is not a party to this one. See People v. LB
Joseph, 2021 IL App (1st) 170741. Here, defendant Leondo contends that he received per se No. 1-17-1026
ineffective assistance of counsel when his non-lawyer, codefendant brother conducted his direct
examination at their joint jury trial, a proceeding at which Leondo, having waived his right to
counsel, otherwise represented himself. (As did LB). Defendant also argues that the testimony of
the victim, L.D., was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that codefendant LB was
armed with a firearm. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 Defendant Leondo and codefendant LB waived their respective rights to counsel. They
were tried jointly, before a single jury. Each defendant represented himself, making his own
closing argument (defendant Leondo waived his opening statement) and conducting his own
cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, among other things.
¶6 The key witness for the State, particularly for our purposes here, was L.D., the victim of
the charged offenses. L.D. testified that she was approached by the defendants on the night of
December 17, 2011, while waiting for a bus on a street corner. L.D. gave conflicting accounts of
exactly which corner it was, but she was clear that the encounter began late at night, sometime
around midnight, when a car pulled up and stopped in front of her.
¶7 The driver, codefendant LB, rolled down the window to talk to L.D., but she ignored him.
LB then got out of the car. He was holding a gun at his side. He walked toward L.D. and said
that she had “two options, get in the car or get shot.”
¶8 L.D. did not know what kind of gun it was. As a general matter, she explained, she “don’t
know nothing about no guns.” As best she could recall, it was not silver or blue steel. By the time
of trial, she could not remember whether it was a revolver.
¶9 Scared for her life, L.D. got into the front passenger seat. Codefendant LB drove around
for “a long time” before eventually parking in an alley. Along the way, L.D. noticed defendant
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Leondo in the back of the car.
¶ 10 The defendants told L.D. to get into the back seat and take off her clothes. She complied.
Over the next several hours, until 8 a.m. or so, the defendants took turns forcing L.D. to perform
oral, vaginal, and anal sex. When she tried to escape, defendant Leondo punched her in the face,
below her right eye. Before the trial, she had told the police it was below her left eye.
¶ 11 Sometime after daybreak, another car drove into the alley. The defendants told L.D. to
get dressed and let her out of the car at the end of the alley. She went into a nearby business, said
she was just raped, and asked to call the police. She was taken directly to the hospital in an
ambulance, where she reported that she had been raped orally, vaginally, and anally.
¶ 12 Swabs were taken from L.D.’s mouth, vagina, anus, and underwear. Semen was detected
in every sample and there was blood in the underwear sample. Although the DNA analysis was
not conclusive, it did show, in sum, that neither of the codefendants could be excluded from the
sperm fractions identified in the oral, anal, and underwear samples. The vaginal sample matched
defendant Leondo but not codefendant LB.
¶ 13 The State also offered other-crimes evidence to show propensity, modus operandi, and
lack of consent. Another complainant, D.K., testified to an unrelated incident in which she was
abducted off the street and forced to perform oral and vaginal sex on Leondo in the back seat of
the defendants’ car. LB stood by, waiting for his “turn” (as he called it) with his pants down,
only to be interrupted by an approaching police car.
¶ 14 After the State rested, the trial court asked each defendant separately whether he had any
evidence or witnesses to present. The court started with LB, who called Leondo to the stand.
¶ 15 Defendant Leondo testified that he was driving with LB, in an area known for drugs and
prostitution, when he saw L.D. standing on a street corner. They pulled up and talked to her. L.D.
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said that “she was out there dating” and that her pimp “got a little rough with her.” After talking
and smoking a cigarette together, Leondo offered L.D. $100 for sex. She got into the backseat of
the car willingly and Leondo drove off.
¶ 16 At first, Leondo testified that his brother got out of the car after they parked. He later
testified that he dropped LB off at a friend’s house along the way. In any event, Leondo and L.D.
had oral and vaginal sex, but not anal sex, in the back seat. It was consensual, no force was ever
used, and LB did not participate at all.
¶ 17 Afterwards, L.D. demanded more money. When Leondo refused, L.D. grew angry, got
out of the car, and slammed the door.
¶ 18 Leondo denied that he had a gun or a knife with him during the encounter. He further
testified, in sum, that D.K. was also a prostitute, whom he paid $20 for oral sex.
¶ 19 LB did not call any more witnesses and rested his case after Leondo testified. The trial
court then asked Leondo if he wished to call any witnesses. Leondo said no and rested.
¶ 20 After the jury returned its verdicts, the trial court sentenced defendant to 147 years in
prison. That was the minimum sentence allowed by the confluence of consecutive-sentencing
provisions and 15-year firearm enhancements that applied to the aggravated kidnapping and six
aggravated criminal sexual assault convictions (two counts each of oral, vaginal, and anal
penetration—one committed by defendant himself, and one by LB, for whom defendant was
accountable). “These are strange sentencing laws,” the trial judge lamented, but he lacked any
discretion to depart downward from the de facto life sentence they generated.
¶ 21 ANALYSIS
¶ 22 I. Ineffective assistance of counsel
¶ 23 Codefendant LB called defendant Leondo to the stand and questioned him on his direct
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examination. To this extent, defendant argues, he was represented by LB, albeit temporarily,
during a critical stage of the proceedings. And because LB was not a licensed attorney, he must
be deemed per se ineffective. People v. Allen, 220 Ill. App. 3d 772, 781 (1991). On this basis,
defendant thus claims he was denied his sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of
counsel—notwithstanding his waiver of counsel and exercise of his right to self-representation
throughout the rest of the joint trial.
¶ 24 The record rebuts defendant’s contention. After the State rested, the trial court explained
how the defense cases, if any, would proceed. The court would ask each defendant separately if
he had any evidence that he wanted to present, and after each defendant finished presenting his
evidence, the court would ask that defendant whether he would rest at that time. The court began
with LB, who sought to introduce various pieces of documentary evidence that we need not
discuss in any detail here.
¶ 25 When that discussion concluded, LB indicated that he was ready to proceed with his case.
But the State interjected that, as it understood the defendants’ intentions, “Mr. LB Joseph will be
calling Mr. Leondo Joseph as a witness,” and so Leondo “need[ed] to waive his right against
self-incrimination.” The trial court responded that defendant Leondo waives the privilege by
testifying and asked him whether he understood that “there is going to be cross-examination.”
Leondo answered, “I don’t care.”
¶ 26 The trial court then formally asked, in the presence of the jury, “Do you wish to present
any evidence, LB Joseph?” LB replied, “Other than the evidence I mentioned before the jury’s
appearance, your Honor.” The court followed up by asking LB, “Do you have any witnesses you
wish to call?” LB answered, “Mr. Leondo Joseph to the stand.”
¶ 27 Defendant Leondo took the stand. He was questioned by LB on direct, cross-examined by
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the State, and questioned again by LB on redirect. After defendant testified, the trial court asked,
“Any other witness you with to call, Mr. LB Joseph?” LB said no and rested. The trial court then
asked defendant Leondo if he wished to call any witnesses. He said no and rested.
¶ 28 The record thus shows that LB was not representing defendant during direct examination.
Rather, as a pro se litigant, LB was examining a witness he had called in his own (that is, LB’s)
case. LB, in other words, was representing himself; defendant was his witness, not his “client,”
as it were. Thus, the per se rule that defendant invokes does not apply here, and his novel claim
that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, even after waiving counsel, fails.
¶ 29 Whatever grasp of the proceedings the pro se defendants may (or may not) have had, the
simple and dispositive fact remains that Leondo was called to the stand as a witness in LB’s case.
The State aptly makes this point, and in the face of the record, defendant is powerless to dispute
it. Instead, in his opening brief, he points out that he did not testify “in the narrative form” or
present “his own questions and answers to the jury by himself.”
¶ 30 Of course he didn’t. Defendant was called as witness in LB’s case. And that is why he
testified in the manner of an ordinary witness, namely, by answering questions put to him by his
codefendant’s counsel, or as it happened here the codefendant himself, pro se. Thus, the fact that
defendant did not testify in the pro se manner does not establish that LB was temporarily
representing him. Defendant was still a pro se litigant—and his codefendant brother’s witness.
¶ 31 In his reply brief, defendant appears to acknowledge that he testified in his codefendant’s
case in chief. But he did not “merely” do that. He also—and at the same time—testified on his
own behalf, or so he claims. And thus LB, having taken the wheel during his direct examination,
was, in “reality,” representing him.
¶ 32 It is true, as defendant says in this context, that the trial court did not instruct the jury to
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consider his testimony only in determining LB’s guilt. And once testimony or other evidence is
admitted, the jury is free to consider it for any relevant purpose that is not precluded by a
limiting instruction from the court. Thus, the jury was also free to consider defendant’s testimony
as to the charges against him, not just LB.
¶ 33 But what does that show? That defendant had every right to invoke his privilege against
self-incrimination and refuse to testify in LB’s case, if he did not wish to. (He makes no such
claim.) It does not show that defendant’s waiver of counsel momentarily lapsed, and that his
representation was temporarily put into LB’s (per se deficient) hands, when he agreed to testify
as a witness in LB’s case.
¶ 34 One final point. We reject defendant’s seeming implication that the trial court had a duty
to give a limiting instruction, seat separate juries, or otherwise ensure, on its own initiative, that
defendant’s testimony could not be considered as to charges against him. The trial court was not
his advocate. And defendant may have wanted the jury to consider his testimony—elicited
though it was in LB’s case, by his codefendant’s inartful questioning—when deliberating about
his own guilt. If he did not, it was his burden to say so. It was not the trial court’s duty, or even
its prerogative, to unilaterally decide these questions of strategy for him.
¶ 35 II. Firearm enhancements
¶ 36 L.D. testified that codefendant LB approached her while carrying a gun at his side and
said that she had “two options, get in the car or get shot.” Based entirely on this testimony, the
jury found that LB, for whom defendant was accountable, was armed with a firearm during the
kidnapping and six distinct acts of sexual assault that followed. Defendant was thus subject to
seven consecutive 15-year firearm enhancements, increasing his mandatory minimum sentence
by an additional105 years.
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¶ 37 Defendant claims this finding was error. He says the uncorroborated testimony of L.D.—
who could not describe the gun, and who, in her own words, “don’t know nothing about no
guns”—was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was carrying a real
firearm, rather than a toy or other look-alike.
¶ 38 If defendant’s sufficiency challenge is to succeed, he must show that L.D.’s testimony
was so “unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory” that no rational trier of fact, viewing it in
the light most favorable to the State, could accept it as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People
v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008); see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). The trier of
fact’s findings regarding the credibility of witnesses and the inferences to be drawn from the
evidence are not conclusive, but they are entitled to significant deference. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d at
272.
¶ 39 For the enhancements to apply, the State had to prove that codefendant LB was “armed
with a firearm.” 720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(6) (West 2011) (aggravated kidnapping); id. § 11-1.30(a)(8)
(aggravated criminal sexual assault). Unless a specific provision states otherwise, the term
“firearm,” when used in the Criminal Code, “has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 1.1 of the
Firearm Owners Identification Card (FOID) Act.” Id. § 2-7.5.
¶ 40 The FOID Act defines a firearm as follows: “[A]ny device, by whatever name known,
which is designed to expel a projectile or projectiles by the action of an explosion, expansion of
gas or escape of gas,” but excluding, among other items, pneumatic, spring, paint ball, and BB
guns, and certain antique firearms. 430 ILCS 65/1.1 (West 2011).
¶ 41 Because the term “firearm” bears this “technical” meaning, defendant argues, the State
must prove that an alleged firearm was designed to expel projectiles of a relevant type in one of
the specific “manners” listed in the definition. Direct evidence of the design and functionality of
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the alleged firearm is necessary to rule out the possibility that it was a just BB gun, for instance,
or some other type of “gun” that the statutory definition of a firearm specifically excludes.
¶ 42 This burden of proof would easily be satisfied when a witness with a working knowledge
of firearms can inspect the device in question. And presumably it would be satisfied by evidence
that the defendant used the device to “expel a projectile” of a relevant type during the offense.
¶ 43 But in this case, and in countless others like it, the alleged firearm was neither discharged
nor recovered, so the only relevant evidence is an eyewitness’s testimony that the defendant had
a gun. Defendant argues that such “conclusory” testimony generally cannot prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the gun was a real firearm, as defined by the FOID Act.
¶ 44 After all, he says, appearances often deceive. Not everything that looks like a real firearm
turns out, upon inspection, to be one. So much so that even “trained police officers” mistake BB
guns or other toys for real firearms when sizing them up on the fly, as a host of tragic cases cited
by defendant reminds us. Even less can we expect the average witness, lacking training and
experience with firearms, to reliably distinguish a real one from a realistic toy—and to do so, no
less, based on whatever observations the witness can muster as the gun is brandished during a
criminal offense.
¶ 45 Defendant’s concerns are not unreasonable. In real time, it can be difficult indeed to
distinguish real firearms from, say, air guns—especially the air guns that are selected for use in
coercive criminal acts, “where they would lose most of their efficacy” if they were recognized
for what they really are. United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 777 (7th Cir. 2014).
¶ 46 That said, our supreme court has held that such eyewitness testimony can prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that a defendant possessed a real firearm. The clearest example of this holding
from our supreme court is People v. Wright, 2017 IL 119561. The issue in Wright was whether
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the codefendant “possessed a firearm as defined by the FOID act.” Id. ¶ 39. Because the alleged
firearm was neither discharged nor recovered, the only evidence that it was a real firearm came
from the witnesses who saw it during the armed robbery and testified that they “believed” it was,
or that it “looked like,” a semiautomatic handgun. Id. ¶ 76. That testimony alone was sufficient
evidence that the codefendant possessed a firearm. Id. ¶ 39.
¶ 47 In reaching that conclusion in Wright (id. ¶ 76), the supreme court took the “rationale” of
People v. Washington, 2012 IL 107993, to be “controll[ing].” In Washington, the victim testified,
in sum, that the defendant pointed “a gun” at him and forced him into a truck, where the “gun”
was then held to his head. Id. ¶ 35.
¶ 48 It is true, as defendant notes here, that the precise question in Washington was whether
there was sufficient evidence of a “dangerous weapon,” a broader statutory category than
“firearm.” Id. ¶¶ 1, 5-7; see 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(c). But the supreme court expressly found that
“the jury could reasonably infer” from the victim’s testimony that “defendant possessed a real
gun.” (Emphasis added.) Washington, 2012 IL 107993, ¶ 36.
¶ 49 In so finding, the supreme court rejected the defense argument that because the gun was
not recovered, “it could not be known for sure whether the gun was real or a toy.” Id. And if the
victim’s testimony was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the “gun” was real, it
was sufficient to prove not only that the “gun” was a dangerous weapon, but also that the “gun”
was a firearm, within the meaning of the FOID Act. Id.; see Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 76.
¶ 50 Our supreme court’s latest word on this topic came in People v. McLaurin, 2020 IL
124563, issued after defendant filed his opening brief. Defendant thus relied on the appellate
opinion in McLaurin, 2018 IL App (1st) 170258, in which we reversed the trial court’s finding
that the defendant possessed a firearm—only to be reversed, in turn, by the supreme court.
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¶ 51 In McLaurin, an officer saw the defendant walk out of a building carrying a silver or
chrome handgun. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. She had an unobstructed view, from about 50 feet away, in the
middle of the day. Id. But the defendant was holding the gun by the barrel, so she could not tell
what kind of gun it was, or even whether it was a revolver or a semiautomatic. Id. ¶ 6.
¶ 52 In our appellate decision, we took the trial court’s finding to be based entirely on the
“circumstantial evidence” provided by this officer’s testimony; and we found that her testimony,
on its own, did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the item she saw satisfied the specific
criteria set forth in the statutory definition of a firearm. Id. ¶¶ 22, 24, 28.
¶ 53 In reversing our judgment, the supreme court reiterated that under Washington and
Wright, circumstantial evidence alone, in the form of eyewitness testimony, can prove that a
defendant is armed with a firearm. McLaurin, 2020 IL 124563, ¶¶ 17, 24-31. The supreme court
also cast doubt on the conclusion that this particular officer’s testimony would not suffice, on its
own, to sustain the trial court’s judgment. See id. ¶¶ 35-36. But the supreme court did not have to
answer that question definitively, because the officer’s testimony was not the only evidence that
supported the judgment.
¶ 54 After the defendant in McLaurin left the building, carrying a supposed handgun, he got
into a van, which was stopped and searched a few minutes later. Id. ¶¶ 4-9. The officers did not
find a gun inside the van or on any of the occupants, but they did find one directly underneath the
van; and it matched the general description, in terms of size and color, of the supposed handgun
that the defendant was seen carrying into the van. Id. ¶ 6-8. Thus, it was reasonable to infer that
it was the same handgun. See id. ¶ 37. And although the State chose not to introduce the handgun
into evidence, the officer who found it did testify that it was a loaded .9 millimeter, from which
he removed a magazine and found another bullet in the chamber. Id. ¶¶ 8, 32.
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¶ 55 To this extent, the evidence in McLaurin was different in kind than the evidence in
Washington, Wright, or this case. The officer who found the gun in McLaurin did not merely see
it in someone’s hand; he held it in his own hands and verified that it was loaded with bullets—
not with BBs or pellets or whatever else. That is direct, rather than circumstantial, evidence that
the gun was a real firearm. And it should be proof enough for any reasonable trier of fact.
¶ 56 On a close reading of its facts, McLaurin does not (because it was unnecessary to)
squarely answer the question defendant has put to us: Whether an eyewitness who sees an
apparent gun in a defendant’s hand can provide sufficient evidence that it was a firearm, and not
something that merely looked like a firearm. Washington and Wright, however, do answer that
question head-on, and McLaurin, if nothing else, leaves those holdings undisturbed.
¶ 57 Together, these cases tell us that defendant sets the bar too high. To prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that a defendant was armed with a firearm, the State generally does not need to
offer direct evidence of the alleged firearm’s “design” or its precise method of expelling
projectiles, as defendant would have us require. And a single witness, with no training,
experience, or knowledge of firearms, is enough. The witness need not provide any meaningful
description of the gun. Nor, for that matter, does any witness need to see the whole gun, much
less see it for more than a brief moment or from a favorable vantage point.
¶ 58 True, in Washington, Wright, and the appellate decisions cited by the State, the testimony
had at least some feature(s) along these lines to (arguably) bolster its claim of reliability. Wright,
2017 IL 119561, ¶¶ 9,12 (multiple witnesses, some claiming firearms experience; description of
gun); Washington, 2012 IL 107993 ¶ 35 (arguably better vantage point, more time to observe);
People v. Toy, 407 Ill. App. 3d 272, 293 (2011) (multiple witnesses); People v. Lee, 376 Ill. App.
3d 951, 953 (2007) (multiple witnesses; description of gun).
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¶ 59 In contrast, L.D.’s testimony about the gun exhibited no such features. For this reason,
defendant argues, it was simply too thin and unreliable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
codefendant LB was armed with a firearm. And that is particularly so, he claims, when L.D.
conceded that she knew nothing about guns.
¶ 60 But her testimony on that last point bears further scrutiny. This was the exchange on
cross-examination that yielded that statement:
“Q. What type of gun was it?
A. I don’t know nothing about no guns, so I don’t know what kind of gun it was.”
¶ 61 There is a difference, in our view, between not being able to recognize a gun as a gun, on
the one hand, and not being able to distinguish between a Glock versus a Ruger, a 9 millimeter
versus a .44 Magnum, or a semi-automatic versus an automatic. L.D.’s answer was that she could
not tell the type of gun, which puts her in company with a fair number of citizens of this state
who lack this level of familiarity with firearms.
¶ 62 Indeed, L.D.’s testimony in that regard is not different from the victim in Washington,
2012 IL 107993, ¶¶ 10, 35-36, who did not describe the gun in the slightest—he simply declared
that it was a “gun”—nor did he claim to know the first thing about guns. Yet the supreme court
found that his testimony was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was carrying “a
real gun.” Id. ¶ 36. It would be inconsistent with our supreme court precedent to hold that only
witnesses who understand the finer points of firearms are able to distinguish between a real gun
and a fake one.
¶ 63 We would add here a couple of points. First, L.D. did not merely see the handle of the
weapon or see it only in the flash of an instant; she saw defendant get out of the car and walk
toward her while holding the gun:
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“Q. What, if anything, did you notice when he got out of the car and came toward
you?
A. A gun.
Q. And where was that gun?
A. On his side. He had it in his hand.
***
Q. And when you saw that person approaching you with the gun what happened?
A. He approached me with the gun. He walked to me and told me I got two
options, get in the car or get shot.”
¶ 64 The evidence did not pin down the precise window of time that passed. It would appear
to be not particularly long, but it certainly was more than an instantaneous glance. Indeed, L.D.’s
testimony indicated that codefendant LB threatened her with the weapon, indicating that he was
not shy about calling it to her attention; he at least wanted her to believe it was a real gun.
¶ 65 Which leads into our final point—the fact that codefendant LB threatened her with the
weapon. A defendant’s threat to shoot a victim is circumstantial evidence that he was armed with
a firearm. Lee, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 956; cf. Toy, 407 Ill. App. 3d at 289 (threat to kill victim was
circumstantial evidence defendant armed with firearm); People v. Garcia, 229 Ill. App. 3d 436,
439 (1992) (threat to shoot victim was circumstantial evidence defendant armed with dangerous
weapon).
¶ 66 True, codefendant LB could have been faking it, so to speak—threatening to shoot her
with something that was not actually a firearm but rather an air gun or similar dangerous weapon
that does not qualify as a firearm. But that is not its most natural and ordinary meaning, nor is it
the interpretation most favorable to the State. Viewed in that light, a rational trier of fact could
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(and probably would) take it as a threat to “shoot” L.D. in the usual sense of the term—with a
gun, a real gun, and hence, with a firearm.
¶ 67 In sum, we must acknowledge the standing “possibility” that L.D. “saw a toy,” but such
possibilities alone, as we said in People v. Austin, 2017 IL App (1st) 142737, ¶ 69, do not “rise
to the level of reasonable doubt.” The evidence that codefendant LB was armed with a firearm,
as defined by the FOID Act, was far from overwhelming. But it was sufficient. A rational trier of
fact could draw this inference from L.D.’s testimony that he had a gun and threatened to shoot
her if she did not get into the car.
¶ 68 We thus reject the challenge to the sufficiency of the proof.
¶ 69 CONCLUSION
¶ 70 The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
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