NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 240934-U FILED This Order was filed under June 26, 2025 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-24-0934 Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County RAYONNA JONES-SNOW, ) No. 19CF304 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) John M. Madonia, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Steigmann and Knecht concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea, holding defendant (1) forfeited her claim trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise her about her ability to appeal the length of her sentence, (2) failed to show her postplea counsel rendered ineffective assistance regarding sentencing-enhancement admonishments when she could not show prejudice based on any of the alleged deficiencies in representation, and (3) failed to show ineffective assistance of postplea counsel based on counsel’s alleged failure to raise a plausible defense.
¶2 In January 2022, defendant, Rayonna Jones-Snow, entered a partially negotiated
guilty plea to the aggravated kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(6) (West 2018)) of Kathleen
Camarano following a home invasion and armed robbery. Under the agreement, the State
dismissed four additional charges and recommended a sentencing cap of 25 years’ imprisonment.
During the plea hearing, the trial court incorrectly advised defendant that, based on her prior
juvenile criminal history, she was subject to an extended-term sentencing range of 6 to 60 years, when defendant was actually subject to a nonextended maximum of 45 years. Defendant was
also advised that she was subject to a 15-year firearm enhancement. The court sentenced
defendant to 16 years’ imprisonment.
¶3 Defendant’s trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw the plea, and this court
remanded for compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). People v.
Jones-Snow, 4-22-0993 (2023) (order). On remand, new postplea counsel filed an amended
motion to withdraw the plea, alleging (1) defendant was incorrectly admonished that the 15-year
firearm enhancement was mandatory instead of discretionary, (2) the plea was induced by
promises relating to a future sentencing hearing that did not come to fruition, and (3) trial
counsel failed to (a) advise defendant of sentencing enhancements or provide guidance about
possible penalties and the different outcomes that could occur, (b) advise defendant of the
meaning of a sentencing cap and a partially negotiated plea and the pros and cons of pleading
guilty, and (c) offer evidence in mitigation at sentencing. Postplea counsel neither alleged the
admonishments concerning the sentencing range and extended-term eligibility given at the plea
hearing were incorrect nor included specific allegations concerning the ability to appeal the
sentence. The trial court denied the motion.
¶4 On appeal, defendant argues (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when
counsel failed to advise her that she could not challenge the length of her sentence on appeal and
(2) postplea counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to argue in the amended motion to
withdraw that (a) the trial court erred in admonishing defendant that she was extended-term
eligible, (b) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise defendant she was not extended-
term eligible, and (c) defendant had a plausible defense because Camarano did not identify
defendant and had described the perpetrators of the crimes as males.
-2- ¶5 We affirm.
¶6 I. BACKGROUND
¶7 In April 2019, following transfer from the juvenile court, defendant, who was
approximately a week shy of her eighteenth birthday at the time of the crimes, was indicted on
charges of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(3) (West 2018)), residential burglary (id.
§ 19-3(a)), armed robbery (id. § 18-2(a)(2)), theft (id. § 16-1(a)(3)), and aggravated kidnapping
(id. § 10-2(a)(6)). The home invasion, armed robbery, and aggravated kidnapping charges each
alleged defendant committed the crimes while armed with a firearm.
¶8 At the hearing on the motion to transfer the case from juvenile court, Sergeant
Michael Mazrim with the Springfield Police Department testified he responded to the scene of
the home invasion and investigated the crimes. Camarano told officers she was dog sitting for the
homeowners and woke up at around 4 a.m. to the doorbell ringing. When Camarano answered,
two people forced their way into the home. One person was wearing a hooded sweatshirt cinched
tight around the face and was armed with a handgun. The people threatened Camarano and a dog
with the gun. The people were in the house for approximately 45 minutes and took multiple
items, including a television and various electronics. The person with the cinched sweatshirt and
gun then forced Camarano to drive Camarano’s car to an automated teller machine (ATM) while
the other person followed in a silver car, which later was revealed to belong to defendant’s
mother. Based on threats from the people, Camarano withdrew money from the ATM. Camarano
dropped the person with the gun off at another location and then was able to call the police.
¶9 Defendant’s mother, Priscilla Snow, told police defendant’s coconspirator had
arrived at Snow’s home with her car and there were several large items in it, such as a television,
but Snow was not involved in the crime. Defendant then arrived or was found nearby and said
-3- she had lost her phone. Snow drove defendant and the coconspirator back to the scene of the
home invasion, apparently to look for the phone. Defendant kicked in the door to the home in
order to enter it.
¶ 10 Snow left, and the police arrived while defendant was still in the home. A video
from the home’s pet-monitor cameras depicted her wearing the hooded sweatshirt, “hobbling,”
and rolling on the ground outside of the home, as she broke her ankle when she attempted to flee
by jumping from a second-story balcony. Defendant was also wearing the sweatshirt and had
$1,100 and six to eight credit cards bearing the name of the homeowner when she was taken into
custody.
¶ 11 After defendant was arrested and transported to the hospital, Mazrim searched the
area. Various items were found in the backyard, including a 9-millimeter cartridge, an unspent
cartridge case, a tennis shoe, several credit cards or gift cards, and a piece of foreign currency.
Mazrim described it as a “trail” of items leading from a door of the residence to where defendant
was found.
¶ 12 Mazrim interviewed defendant, who initially told him she had a sexual
relationship with Camarano and had gone to the house to retrieve a phone. However, when
Mazrim told defendant there were video and audio recordings from pet-monitor cameras located
inside of the home showing what actually happened, defendant admitted to the crimes. Mazrim
confirmed the videos existed and corroborated Camarano’s version of the events. Video from the
ATM location also corroborated Camarano’s version of the events. A video also showed the
person with the gun wearing a hooded sweatshirt cinched tight around the face. Camarano, who
described the two people who robbed her, including the person wearing the sweatshirt, as Black
males, was unable to identify defendant at the scene or in a photo lineup. A firearm was never
-4- recovered.
¶ 13 A. Guilty Plea Proceeding
¶ 14 On January 19, 2022, defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated kidnapping, and the
State dismissed the remaining charges. The agreement included that the State would recommend
a 25-year sentencing cap.
¶ 15 At the plea hearing, the following colloquy occurred:
“[THE COURT]: It’s the Court’s understanding, [defendant], that after all
this time you’re convinced that the best way to resolve your charges here today is
to accept the partial agreement offered by the State to plead to one count, Count
V, which is a charge of aggravated kidnapping. It is an enhanced Class X felony
based on your prior criminal history. It would be a six minimum to 60-year term
in the Illinois Department of Corrections, and the State could seek for the Court to
impose an otherwise mandatory enhancement based on the use of a firearm in this
offense and enhance your case to a minimum of 15 years. And if the Court would
agree with them ultimately at the time of your sentence, the minimum sentence
the Court could impose is not six, it would be 21. The maximum sentence would
be not 60, it would be 75. And any sentence which would be mandatory would be
followed by three years of supervised release. Any sentence that is imposed based
on truth in sentencing would be served at 85 percent. There is a new provision in
the law that allows you to seek release. If you are still in custody after ten years of
serving a sentence, you could petition to have the remainder of your sentence
vacated or at least released from the penitentiary after serving that time. That is all
subject to further sentencing to be held in this case. Understood?
-5- [THE DEFENDANT]: Are you talking to me?
THE COURT: I am.
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, it’s understood.
THE COURT: All right. Do you understand everything that I just said?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: And is it your intention then to continue with this plea and
then accept responsibility to Count V and have a Sentencing Hearing at some
point after the Court has received a report about your history and about your life
and your background, right?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yeah.
THE COURT: And then your lawyer could argue for the minimum
sentence that your lawyer believes is appropriate. The State has agreed to cap
their recommendation at 25 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections.
[THE DEFENDANT]: Okay.
THE COURT: Court could sentence somewhere in between potentially 6
to 25. Technically, the Court could go over the State’s range. I’ve never done that
in the history of my career. I don’t know why I would start with your case. All
right?
THE COURT: You can rest assured that the State’s maximum would be
equal to the Court’s maximum if the Court ever got into that range at all,
understood?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Okay. Yes, sir.
-6- THE COURT: All right. Knowing all of that, is it your intention to
continue with this plea and plead guilty to Count V here today?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Uhm, yeah, yeah.”
Defendant also stated she understood her other option was to go to trial, where the State would
likely seek a substantially higher sentence.
¶ 16 Defendant told the trial court there were no issues with her mental health
preventing her from understanding the proceedings. She said she took medications but could not
identify what they were for. The court admonished defendant a second time about the sentencing
range, stating:
“[B]ecause of representations that will be presented about your prior criminal
history, you’re eligible to be sentenced from 6 to 60 years in the Illinois
Department of Corrections. Based on potential for a sentencing enhancement of
15 years due to a firearms allegation contained in your charge, the Court could
extend your minimum sentencing range to 21 years and your maximum
sentencing range of 75 years if it applied.”
The court also repeated that defendant could seek release after 10 years. The following colloquy
then occurred:
“THE COURT: Do you have any questions about the charge to which
you’re pleading guilty here today?
THE COURT: I will hear your questions, ma’am.
[THE DEFENDANT]: Basically what I’m saying is this, this is the only—
I’m saying is this the only—I know this is basically the only option I got left is to
-7- plead out, but is this charge necessary?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Listen, there’s always another option, it’s called
a trial.
[THE DEFENDANT]: I understand that.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.
THE COURT: And I understand your concern, and that’s kind of why I
started—
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yeah, I understand that. I’m not saying I didn’t
listen to anything that you’re saying. But I’m just saying, you know, like what I
did was as a juvenile, okay. Like, —
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: This will come out at sentencing.
[THE DEFENDANT]: I understand. What I’m saying, I don’t want to
seem like I’m not listening to what they’re saying, but what I’m saying, at the
same time, I want testimony to let them know that I feel like this, I just feel like
I’m getting bombarded. I mean, ain’t nobody forcing me to do nothing. It’s all
about taking responsibility, and that’s me growing as a person.
But at the same time I don’t want to feel like, *** I just don’t want to get
railroaded because that’s what happened as a juvenile. That’s the only reason that
my juvenile history the way it is because of this. I was young and dumb and ***
naive. And I chose to get it over with *** because not taking everybody through
everything. But at the same time I feel that I just—now that I’m in adult court it’s
getting thrown in my face when, *** like—I don’t know.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You want to take a minute and talk in the back?
-8- THE COURT: [Defendant], that’s not the first time I’ve heard someone
sitting in your position who suggests that they’re getting doubly punished for a
sentence they’ve already served, time they’ve already done, a sentence they’ve
already accepted responsibility for, accepted responsibility for and wish now that
they would have maybe fought harder against those charges knowing what you do
as you sit there. But you have to hope that your attorney is going to argue on your
behalf that it is mitigating and that you shouldn’t get “railroaded” for a past
offense. Those are all arguments that this Court will consider when it sentences
you, I guarantee you that.
The thing that we cannot, your attorney or the Court, is negotiate away the
charges if there’s a factual basis to support the plea.
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yeah, yeah.
THE COURT: And I understand you get it, I’m just—
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: I’m just making sure the record is clear that I’ve tried to
explain as best we can why the State is making this offer with this charge, that’s
their job.
[THE DEFENDANT]: I understand.
THE COURT: And if the facts fit, I mean, yes, they have the ability to use
discretion, they have the ability to allow you to plead to a lesser charge to lesser
impact, but they also think they have a community and a victim to represent under
some drastic circumstances that’s going to require them to make some powerful
arguments as to why you should be incarcerated. Believe me, you’re going to hear
-9- some powerful arguments at the sentencing as to why you should be locked up. I
also expect to hear some powerful arguments why you were young, why you were
an accomplice. At the end what I can guarantee is that I’m going to render a fair
and just sentence in this case. I honestly believe that. I always have and I always
will. Okay?
THE COURT: So, wherever the chips may fall, it will be somewhere in
that sentencing range. I have to do that. I’m going to take it all in. And if that’s
what you choose to do, continue with this plea, I’m going to hear it all. And at the
end you’ll end up accepting the sentence, I think might be able to explain why it’s
happening and then you’ll still have a right to appeal if it all goes really, really
south. Understood?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.”
¶ 17 Following a recess for defendant to discuss the matter further with counsel,
defendant stated she wished to plead guilty. The trial court admonished defendant of her right to
a trial and her waiver of that right, and it asked questions to determine whether the plea was
voluntary. The following factual basis was given for the plea:
“[O]n March 16th of 2019, the Springfield Police Department *** responded to a
reported home invasion.
The Defendant was found injured on scene.
The victim was located and reported two intruders broke into a home that
she was house-sitting and held her at gunpoint while they burglarized the home.
She was then compelled to travel by a vehicle with the Defendant to a bank to
- 10 - withdraw some cash. And she was transported to the bank under threat of force.
The Defendant admitted her role. And when she was found by law
enforcement, she was found with live ammunition. These events occurred in
Sangamon County.”
Defendant stipulated the State could produce witnesses to support the factual basis. Defendant
pleaded guilty, and the court accepted the plea.
¶ 18 B. Sentencing
¶ 19 The presentence investigation report (PSI) showed defendant’s criminal behavior
began when she was 12 years old. She had previously been committed to the Illinois Department
of Corrections as a juvenile for Class 3 felony theft and Class 1 felony aggravated robbery while
armed with a firearm. The PSI reported difficulties defendant had growing up and in school, and
reported defendant had medical, mental health, and substance abuse issues.
¶ 20 At the sentencing hearing, the State provided details of the crime, including that
defendant pointed a gun at Camarano and threatened to kill Camarano and a dog. At one point, a
dog was picked up by the head or throat and a countdown was started, indicating either the dog
or Camarano would be shot. Evidence of defendant’s involvement in another armed robbery was
also presented. Victim impact statements described the various psychological and emotional
harms caused by the crimes and a physical injury to a dog. Defense counsel did not offer
evidence in mitigation. Defendant gave a statement in allocution, in which she apologized to the
victims and her family and expressed remorse. Defendant specifically stated she took
responsibility for her actions. Defendant stated she was sorry and said, “And I’m not just saying
this because I’m facing 25.”
¶ 21 The State asked the trial court to apply the firearm enhancement and sought a
- 11 - sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment. The State did not seek an enhancement based on
defendant’s previous juvenile criminal history. Defense counsel referenced defendant’s age and
difficult childhood, as shown in the PSI, and asked for a 10-year sentence. The court addressed
the aggravating and mitigating factors at length and sentenced defendant to 16 years’
imprisonment. The record shows defendant then had an emotional reaction, stating, “Christ. Oh,
God,” and “I can’t. I can’t do 16 years. I can’t. Oh, my God. Mom, I can’t. I can’t.”
¶ 22 The trial court admonished defendant she had 30 days to appeal and that, if she
wished to challenge the sentence, she had 30 days to file a motion to reconsider. Defendant
continued to make emotional statements indicating displeasure with the sentence.
¶ 23 C. Motions to Withdraw the Plea Filed by Trial Counsel
¶ 24 On April 26, 2022, trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw the plea, alleging
defendant instructed counsel to file the motion and that she contended “she entered into this plea
absent a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights.” No specific details were provided.
¶ 25 On November 4, 2022, trial counsel filed an amended motion to withdraw the
plea or reconsider the sentence, contending defendant entered the plea “absent a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of her rights” and “the interests of justice require that the cause
proceed to [a] jury trial.” The motion did not provide specific details and stated defendant had
been advised of her appeal rights.
¶ 26 At the hearing on the motion, trial counsel noted defendant was informed by the
trial court at the guilty plea hearing of the possible punishments. However, counsel argued that,
based on defendant’s reaction to the sentence, he was not sure she knowingly understood the
sentencing range. Counsel argued that, based on defendant’s reaction at sentencing, the court
should allow defendant to withdraw the plea so she could have a fitness evaluation.
- 12 - ¶ 27 The State noted defense counsel had not pointed to any defect in the
admonishments at the plea hearing and there was no indication at the time of the hearing that
defendant was unfit. The State argued, “It’s clear [defendant] was disappointed in the outcome,
and it’s clear she hoped for a different outcome. But her reaction alone should not be a basis to
withdraw a plea to examine fitness when up to that point no one had any concerns about her
fitness.”
¶ 28 The trial court denied the motion, finding the proceedings showed defendant was
fit to enter the plea and the plea was knowing and voluntary. In doing so, the court stated:
“I am also absolutely convinced that you were aware that the State’s
recommendation was capped at 25 years and that not only could you receive a
sentence up to and including that 25 years, but the Court in its admonishments
will tell you that it could technically go over the sentencing range if the Court
thought that was appropriate, which the Court clearly didn’t in this situation.
Under the totality of the circumstances, I believe you entered into a
knowing and voluntary plea, that you held a sentencing hearing where you asked
for some mitigation, you gave a statement in allocution. The Court heard it all.
But the Court also heard a very involved role that you played in the crime. And
ultimately that caused this Court not to impose an enhancement that the Court
could have and was urged to by the State.
But to give you a sentence probably in excess of what you hoped, less than
15 years maybe is what you were hoping for, and I don’t think 16 was anywhere
excessive or anything out of the realm of reasonableness that you should have
expected under these circumstances. Buyer’s remorse is no way to proceed legally
- 13 - in these circumstances. And simply to look at your reaction and see the
disappointment is not a realistic fact that this Court will consider in determining
that your plea was not voluntary.”
¶ 29 Defendant appealed, and this court remanded for compliance with Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). Jones-Snow, 4-22-0993 (2023) (order).
¶ 30 D. Motion to Withdraw the Plea filed By Postplea Counsel
¶ 31 On remand, new postplea counsel filed a new motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
Counsel alleged defendant was incorrectly admonished on multiple occasions that the 15-year
firearm enhancement was mandatory instead of discretionary. Counsel also alleged facts
pertaining to truth in sentencing admonishments and eligibility for parole after 10 years.
¶ 32 Postplea counsel further alleged there were no conversations with defendant’s
trial counsel regarding sentencing enhancements or guidance about possible penalties and the
different outcomes that could occur. Counsel also alleged defendant was advised that a plea
would be in her best interest, but no further discussions occurred regarding the strength of the
State’s case or the reasons she should plead, the pros and cons of a plea, or what a cap or a
partially negotiated plea was. Counsel noted defendant felt “ ‘bombarded’ ” during the plea
hearing and “did not ‘want to get railroaded’ ” based on her juvenile record. Counsel further
noted trial counsel did not offer evidence in mitigation at sentencing.
¶ 33 Counsel noted the admonishments concerning the sentencing range and extended-
term eligibility given at the plea, but she did not allege those admonishments were incorrect.
Ultimately counsel stated:
“[Defendant] contends that her [trial] counsel was ineffective in failing to
adequately explain the terms of the plea, minimum and maximum exposure, the
- 14 - firearm enhancement, the alternatives of trial or a fully open plea, the evidence
against her, the significance of a truth-in-sentencing sentence in the Department
of Corrections, and the plans for mitigation evidence at sentencing. Further, her
plea was induced by assurances relating to the depth and content of a future
sentencing hearing that did not come to fruition. [Defendant] received
representation that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and but for
plea counsel’s errors, [defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.”
¶ 34 Postplea counsel included defendant’s affidavit. Defendant averred she was
diagnosed with various mental illnesses and had an individualized education program when she
was in school. She averred in part that trial counsel did not discuss the discretionary firearm
enhancement with her and she did not independently know what that was or what the sentencing
range for her charges would be. She averred that, once the possibility of parole after 10 years
was raised, trial counsel told her she was not going to serve more than 10 years. She averred, if
she had adequate information, she would not have pleaded guilty. She made no specific
allegations concerning extended-term sentencing or advice regarding whether she could appeal
her sentence.
¶ 35 On July 2, 2024, a hearing was held on the motion. Defendant testified about
various educational and mental health issues affecting her development as a child and teenager.
She also testified about various related behavioral issues she had as a teenager. Defendant said
trial counsel told her he would raise those issues at sentencing, but he did not do so.
¶ 36 When asked if she was familiar with the penalty structure of the charges she
faced, defendant stated, “not necessarily. But I know it’s not, you know, good, so—.” Postplea
- 15 - counsel asked defendant, “Was there a lot of discussion about what your possible sentence could
be throughout this case?” Defendant replied, “ [Y]es ma’am.”
¶ 37 Defendant testified she met with her trial counsel “probably four times” at the jail
and spoke to him when they went to court. Trial counsel would also communicate with
defendant’s mother. Defendant said that she had to ask her mother about her case because she
had trial counsel’s numbers, “but he never answered.” Defendant did not remember trial counsel
reviewing discovery with her, and she did not feel that she had gotten enough of a look at what
the State’s evidence was against her.
¶ 38 Defendant said trial counsel did not explain what her options were, but she said
she was aware that at one point, the State offered 25 years in prison. She said the State then
offered 17 years, and trial counsel told her she should plead guilty because “it looks really bad”
and they kept bringing up her coconspirator. Defendant stated, “[O]ther than that, he didn’t give
me any insight on what is for the future.” Defendant stated she did not understand what a “cap,”
a “fully negotiated plea,” or an “open plea” were. When asked if she understood the difference
between those options and going to trial, defendant said, “Not necessarily.” She said the only
insight she got about the plea was “that the judge would say something,” and she “felt like that
was because [the judge was] fair.”
¶ 39 Defendant testified based on paperwork from an unidentified person or entity, she
thought the sentencing range for aggravated kidnapping was 6 to 30 years. When asked about the
possibility of an extended term being applied based on her juvenile history, she stated “Not that I
know of.” Defendant indicated she did not understand what her sentence would be if she served
85%, the “truth in sentencing” provisions, and how that could impact her eligibly for prison
programming. Defendant remembered the judge admonishing her about parole eligibility.
- 16 - However, she stated, “[A]fter [trial counsel] mapped out sentencing, he told my mom and me I
wasn’t doing more than ten years. So, in my mind, *** I didn’t quite understand.” Defendant
testified she did not have an adequate understanding of the facts and law to enter a plea in the
case, and she would have gone to trial if her counsel had provided better advice. However, on
cross-examination, defendant admitted she understood the maximum sentence under the plea
would be 25 years.
¶ 40 The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the plea, stating,
“I think the record is clear in the case. The Court was very aware of any academic
deficiencies, potential intellectual deficiencies, comprehension issues that
[defendant] would have had during relevant portions of the proceedings at issue in
this hearing. That’s why the Court took extensive time with [defendant] at
multiple hearings, adjourning the proceedings, stopping proceedings, allowing for
further conferences, all with an understanding that the Court is going to engage
[defendant] and understand what her desires were in regards to these proceedings.
And this isn’t a case of closely balanced evidence. Nor is it a case of a
lack of intent where you see these like felony charges that are trumped up by
somebody who is just in the get away car not knowing that the person inside is
holding a gun to someone’s head, robbing them of all their possessions. That’s not
what happened here either. You were actively engaged in the violent commission
of this offense. To claim now that you would or potentially could have gone to
trial with the evidence that you were facing seems implausible.
You acknowledged on the record before this Court the importance of
pleading guilty and accepting responsibility.
- 17 - And, furthermore, when I weigh your academic deficiencies and
intellectual challenges, I also balance that with your prior history in the system.
And you were very keen on what it meant to be sentenced. You had been
sentenced before. And in your opinion you had been sentenced unfairly, and that
weighed on you, and it impacted a lot of your decision-making during these
proceedings. And you questioned accurately what was taking place in your
proceedings and the impact your decisions were going to have. And you reflected
and were given plenty of time to reflect on the impact your decisions would have.
I mean, to say now that witnesses weren’t called on your behalf and that
you wouldn’t have pled guilty if this evidence would have been presented, that
belies the circumstances. And if your attorney promised that the Court would be
made aware of the issues that were you concerned about, the Court was made of
the issues you were concerned about. There was a very thorough [PSI] prepared in
your case that thoroughly documented your history and your concerns, all of
which was considered by this Court.
I cannot find that your attorney advising you to plead guilty, telling you it
was in your best interests to plead guilty, under the nature and circumstances of
both the factual basis for the charges but also the concessions made by the State,
the ability of the Court to exercise some discretion, which the Court did, all of
which this Court is of the firm belief was done with your understanding
conclusively of what was at stake.
When you sat before this Court and plead [sic] guilty to Count V, you
knew exactly what your risks were, what the Court’s sentencing options were,
- 18 - what the State’s recommendation was going to be. What you didn’t know was
what the Court’s ultimate sentence would be. And for you to tell the Court now
that you pled guilty because you thought you would never get sentenced to more
than ten years or spend more than ten years in prison, you had ample
opportunity—if you truly believe that, you had ample opportunity to bring that to
the Court’s attention when the Court asked you if you had any questions, which
the Court did several times. Do you have any questions about the nature of your
plea, the possible penalties the Court could impose. ***
So, it is not ineffective assistance of counsel. His conduct did not drop
below the objective standard of reasonableness, advising you to plead guilty and
making sure the [PSI] met the needs to demonstrate mitigation, to obtain
concessions from the State, to have other charges dismissed.”
¶ 41 This appeal followed.
¶ 42 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 43 On appeal, defendant argues (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when
counsel failed to advise her that she could not challenge the length of her sentence on appeal and
(2) postplea counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to argue in the amended motion to
withdraw that (a) the trial court erred in admonishing defendant that she was extended-term
eligible, (b) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise defendant she was not extended-
term eligible, and (c) there was the existence of a plausible defense because Camarano did not
identify defendant and described both intruders as males. Thus, defendant seeks a remand either
to be allowed to withdraw her plea or for new postplea proceedings.
¶ 44 A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel and Forfeiture
- 19 - ¶ 45 Defendant first contends that she should be allowed to withdraw her plea because
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform her that she would not be able to challenge the
length of her sentence on appeal. The State argues defendant could and did challenge the
sentence by filing a motion to withdraw the plea and also forfeited the issue by failing to raise it
in any of her motions to withdraw the plea. We agree.
¶ 46 Rule 604(d) provides, in part:
“No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless
the defendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in
the trial court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the sentence is being
challenged, or, if the plea is being challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of
guilty and vacate the judgment.
No appeal shall be taken upon a negotiated plea of guilty challenging the
sentence as excessive unless the defendant, within 30 days of the imposition of
sentence, files a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.”
Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Apr.15, 2024).
Rule 604(d) further provides, “Upon appeal any issue not raised by the defendant in the motion
to reconsider the sentence or withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment shall be
deemed waived.” Id.
¶ 47 Here, defendant did not raise any issue concerning her ability to appeal the length
of her sentence in any of her motions to withdraw the plea, nor did she ever argue that trial
counsel failed to advise her about her ability to appeal following her guilty plea. In particular,
defendant’s third motion to withdraw her plea, filed by new postplea counsel, who would have
been able to raise issues of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, made no mention of the issue.
- 20 - ¶ 48 Defendant points to generic references to trial counsel’s overall advice to argue
she raised the issue, but we find such generic references insufficient to preserve the issue. Thus,
defendant forfeited her argument concerning trial counsel’s advice regarding whether she could
appeal the length of her sentence. Defendant has also not argued that plain error applies, thus
forfeiting any plain error argument. See People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 503 (2000) (finding
that the failure to argue “that the evidence was closely balanced [or that] the error is so severe
that it must be remedied to preserve the integrity of the judicial process” forfeited plain error on
appeal); see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
¶ 49 B. Ineffective Assistance of Postplea Counsel
¶ 50 Although we find defendant forfeited her argument regarding trial counsel’s
advice to her concerning her ability to appeal, we note defendant, although not clearly raising the
matter, also suggests postplea counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately address the issue
and raises three additional issues of alleged ineffective assistance of post plea counsel. Those
issues are not forfeited. See People v. Stevenson, 2020 IL App (4th) 180143, ¶ 11 (allowing a
defendant to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel who filed the motion to withdraw
the plea for the first time on appeal). Accordingly, we address those claims. We conclude
defendant cannot show prejudice from any of the alleged instances of ineffective assistance of
counsel, including her forfeited claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
¶ 51 A guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent. People v. Blankley, 319 Ill. App.
3d 996, 1007 (2001). However, a defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty.
People v. Jamison, 197 Ill. 2d 135, 163 (2001). Rather, the defendant must show a manifest
injustice under the facts involved in order to obtain leave to withdraw the plea. Id. The defendant
bears the burden of showing the necessity for withdrawal. People v. Canterbury, 313 Ill. App. 3d
- 21 - 914, 917 (2000). We review the decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a plea for abuse
of discretion. People v. Glover, 2017 IL App (4th) 160586, ¶ 29.
¶ 52 Withdrawal is appropriate if the guilty plea was entered through a
misapprehension of the facts or of the law and the defendant had a defense worthy of
consideration or there is doubt of the defendant’s guilt and the ends of justice would be better
served by submitting the case to a trial. People v. Staple, 233 Ill. App. 3d 8, 10 (1992). Another
basis for the withdrawal of a guilty plea is where defense counsel gives the defendant inadequate
advice before entering the plea. Glover, 2017 IL App (4th) 160586, ¶ 39. However, the fact of
erroneous advice by counsel alone does not destroy the voluntary nature of the plea. Id. Rather,
the defendant must have been denied the effective assistance of counsel. Id.
¶ 53 To establish that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must satisfy the
two-pronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984); see People v.
Valdez, 2016 IL 119860, ¶¶ 13-14. Counsel’s conduct is deficient under Strickland if counsel
fails to ensure that the defendant entered the plea voluntarily and intelligently. People v. Rissley,
206 Ill. 2d 403, 457 (2003). To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) People v. Manning, 227 Ill. 2d 403, 418 (2008). The defendant bears the burden of
establishing both prongs of the Strickland test. People v. Jones, 219 Ill. App. 3d 301, 305 (1991).
A failure to establish either prong of the Strickland test precludes finding ineffective assistance
of counsel. People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 79. Claims that are not substantiated in some
way by factual allegations must fail. Jones, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 305. Likewise, claims that the
- 22 - record refutes cannot succeed. People v. Strickland, 363 Ill. App. 3d 598, 607 (2006). We review
de novo whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. See People v. Hale,
2013 IL 113140, ¶ 15.
¶ 54 The standard required to establish prejudice based on a claim of ineffective
assistance of plea counsel differs depending on the type of claim raised. See People v. Brown,
2017 IL 121681, ¶¶ 40-46. When an ineffective assistance claim is related to a defendant’s
defense strategy or the chance of acquittal, the defendant must raise a claim of innocence or
demonstrate the existence of a plausible defense to establish prejudice. Id. ¶ 45. Conversely,
when the ineffective assistance claim involves counsel’s alleged failure to advise a defendant
about the consequences of pleading guilty, the defendant must show that a decision to reject the
plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances. Id. ¶ 40. Under the second
standard, which applies in this case, a court must consider the relevant circumstances
surrounding the guilty plea to assess prejudice. Id. ¶ 48. While the existence of a plausible
defense is not required under the second standard, a plausible defense may make a showing of
prejudice stronger. People v. Deltoro, 2015 IL App (3d) 130381, ¶ 24.
¶ 55 A lack of prejudice may also be shown when the trial court’s admonishments
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012) were sufficient to overcome any
prejudice created by the claims of ineffective assistance. See People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324, 339
(2005). The purpose of such a colloquy is to ensure that a defendant’s guilty plea is not accepted
unless it is intelligent and voluntary. People v. Horton, 250 Ill. App. 3d 944, 951 (1993). This
purpose would hardly be served if a defendant could state on the record that his plea was
voluntary and then turn around and claim that it was involuntary, as it would reduce the colloquy
to a meaningless exercise. See People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. App. 3d 622, 629 (1987).
- 23 - “[E]xhaustive admonitions cannot be disregarded as merely a ritualistic formality.” People v.
Ramirez, 162 Ill. 2d 235, 245 (1994). Thus, “a defendant cannot be rewarded for disregarding the
specific admonitions of the court.” People v. Radunz, 180 Ill. App. 3d 734, 742 (1989). If a plea
of guilty is to have any binding effect or is to be given any subsequent weight, extensive and
accurate admonishments given by a trial court must be held to overwhelm a defendant’s assertion
that he or she entered a plea involuntarily. Robinson, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 629. Where a defendant
has been meticulously advised of the consequences of the plea and has affirmatively
acknowledged an understanding of those consequences, the defendant may not claim error on
appeal merely because he or she is dissatisfied with the length of the sentence. People v.
Spriggle, 358 Ill. App. 3d 447, 455 (2005).
¶ 56 We note the State concedes defendant was incorrectly admonished that she was
eligible for extended-term sentencing. However, we determine defendant cannot show prejudice
on any of her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because she has not shown a decision to
reject the plea would have been rational under the circumstances.
¶ 57 Under the plea agreement, five additional charges against defendant were
dismissed, two of which alleged defendant committed the acts while armed with a firearm. In
particular, if defendant had gone to trial on all six charges and been additionally found guilty of
the remaining charges, at least some of the convictions would not have merged under the
one-act, one-crime doctrine because the offenses were carved from different physical acts and
neither offense was a lesser-included offense of the other. See People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App
(3d) 150679, ¶ 27 (citing People v. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 12). In particular, the home
invasion charge was based on the act of unlawful entry into the home where Camarano was dog
sitting, the aggravated kidnapping charge was based on the act of transporting Camarano from
- 24 - one place to another against her will, and the armed robbery charge was based on the act of
taking property from Camarano. None of the charges are lesser-included offenses of the others,
as they each contain elements that the others do not.
¶ 58 Because defendant would have been subject to separate convictions, she would
have potentially been subject to permissive consecutive sentencing if the trial court found that it
was necessary for protection of the public. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(c)(1) (West 2022). Under the plea
agreement, at a minimum, defendant faced a statutory maximum of 45 years’ imprisonment,
consisting of 30 years’ imprisonment for the Class X offense and 15 years’ imprisonment for the
firearm enhancement. 720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(6), (b) (2022); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (2022). But
she potentially faced much greater than that were she to be convicted on the remaining charges
and consecutive sentences were imposed, although we recognize the imposition of a de facto life
sentence over 40 years would be unlikely given that defendant was a juvenile when the crime
was committed. See People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶¶ 26-44 (discussing the law of
sentencing juvenile offenders as adults); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2022) (addressing
sentencing for individuals who were under the age of 18 at the time of the crime).
¶ 59 Meanwhile, defendant had a significant juvenile criminal history and was a
particularly active participant in the crimes, which included violence to an animal and significant
threats of violence to Camarano. Considering the severity of the offenses, it would be
unreasonable for defendant to expect to receive a lower sentence had she gone to trial. By
accepting the plea agreement, defendant received only one conviction and a sentencing cap of 25
years’ imprisonment, as opposed to possible additional convictions and a potentially longer
sentence. The trial court made clear to defendant in its admonishments that it had no intention of
sentencing her to a term over the cap. Indeed, the court sentenced defendant to a term well below
- 25 - the cap that did not include the firearm enhancement. “Under these circumstances, defendant has
failed to show that rejecting the plea would have been rational under the circumstances.”
Johnson, 2018 IL App (3d) 150679, ¶ 28.
¶ 60 Nevertheless, defendant asserts the trial court’s incorrect admonishment that she
might face a maximum term of 60 years influenced her decision to enter the plea and that her
status as a juvenile potentially facing a de facto life sentence was additionally an important
factor. But the record does not contain evidence to support those arguments. Defendant failed to
present any evidence that the incorrect admonishments about eligibility for an extended term
played an important role in her decision to accept the plea agreement, especially in light of the
court’s admonishments concerning the cap and the fact that the State never sought the
enhancement and the court clearly did not apply it. While defendant made bare assertions that
she would not have pleaded guilty and would have gone to trial had trial counsel better advised
her, she provided no specific details for her reasoning. To the extent defendant argues postplea
counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit such details, we cannot find deficient assistance or
prejudice without evidence in the record to support the claim, especially when the record before
us shows a lack of prejudice from any alleged failings of counsel.
¶ 61 Further, despite defendant’s claims that she did not understand the cap and her
indications she believed she was going to receive a 10-year sentence, the trial court extensively
explained the effect of the agreement to her. Defendant told the court she understood the cap and
the possibility of seeking parole after 10 years. During her statement in allocution, defendant
even referred to the potential that she could be sentenced to 25 years. Thus, not only does the
record lack support for her claim that she misunderstood the admonishments to mean she would
receive a 10-year sentence, it also affirmatively rebuts it. When the court denied the motion to
- 26 - withdraw the plea, it noted its admonishments and defendant’s stated understanding of them. As
a result, the court found defendant understood what was at stake when she pleaded guilty. That
determination was not an abuse of discretion.
¶ 62 C. Lack of a Plausible Defense
¶ 63 Finally, defendant argues postplea counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to allege she had a plausible defense. Defendant argues evidence from the juvenile
transfer hearing shows that Camarano never identified her and identified the perpetrators as
male. However, the record from that hearing shows the evidence against defendant was
overwhelming. Defendant was identified by the police as the person wearing the hooded
sweatshirt cinched tightly around her face in the videos. Defendant was also wearing that
sweatshirt when she was arrested and had items obtained during commission of the crimes. Most
important, defendant admitted she committed the crimes. Then, at the plea hearing, defendant
stipulated the State could prove the factual basis showing she committed aggravated kidnapping.
Thus, the record does not support defendant’s argument of a plausible defense, and postplea
counsel’s representation was not deficient in declining to raise it. Further, as previously
discussed, defendant could not show prejudice. The evidence against defendant was
overwhelming. It would not have been rational under the circumstances to reject the plea bargain
and go to trial to raise the defense that Camarano could not identify defendant, when defendant
was clearly the perpetrator of the crimes and had admitted that.
¶ 64 In sum, defendant cannot show ineffective assistance of counsel because a
decision to reject the plea agreement would not have been rational under the circumstances, nor
did she show the existence of a plausible defense. Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied
the motion to withdraw the plea.
- 27 - ¶ 65 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 66 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 67 Affirmed.
- 28 -