People v. Jones

2023 IL App (5th) 220467-U

Opinion

2023 IL App (5th) 220467-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 09/15/23. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-22-0467 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Champaign County. ) v. ) No. 20-CF-1151 ) MARTEZ L. JONES, ) Honorable ) Randall B. Rosenbaum, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cates and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the judgment of the circuit court revoking defendant’s probation where the State proved defendant violated a condition of his probation by a preponderance of the evidence.

¶2 Defendant, Martez L. Jones, appeals the Champaign County circuit court’s judgment

revoking his probation for domestic battery with a prior domestic battery conviction, arguing that

the State failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he violated the condition of his

probation requiring him to notify his probation officer of any change of residence. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. Background

¶4 On October 13, 2020, the State charged defendant with domestic battery with a prior

domestic battery conviction, a Class 4 felony (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2020)), for striking

1 a household member on the head after he was previously convicted of domestic battery. Defendant

agreed to plead guilty to the charge on February 25, 2021, and the circuit court sentenced him to

12 months’ probation. As a condition of his probation, defendant was required to “advise the

Probation Officer immediately in writing of any change of residence, school, or employment.”

Defendant completed an intake form and indicated that he resided at 2712 Carrelton Drive,

Champaign, Illinois 61821 (Champaign address).

¶5 On December 2, 2021, the State filed a petition to revoke defendant’s probation. The State

alleged that defendant violated the condition of his probation which required him to notify his

probation officer of a change of residence. In support, the State alleged that, on December 1, 2021,

defendant informed police officers that his address was 405 Glenn Drive, Urbana, Illinois 62802

(Urbana address) and that he “lived there since before he was placed on probation on February 25,

2021.” The State further alleged that defendant only informed the probation department of the

Champaign address.

¶6 On June 8, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on the State’s petition to revoke. The State

called defendant’s probation officer, Lucas Roush, to testify at the hearing. Roush confirmed that,

as a condition of his probation, defendant was required to advise his probation officer immediately

in writing of any change of residence. Roush explained this condition to defendant during their

first in-person meeting. Roush confirmed that defendant listed the Champaign address on the

intake form he completed. Roush believed defendant lived at the Champaign address with his

grandmother and sister. Roush denied that defendant provided notice that he moved to or resided

at a different address.

¶7 On cross-examination, Roush testified that defendant fathered “seven children, and the

majority stay with the victim in this case.” Roush denied that defendant provided the Urbana

2 address as the address where his children lived. Roush also denied talking to defendant about

defendant visiting his children.

¶8 The State next called Deputy Amanda Reifsteck, a patrol deputy with the Champaign

County Sheriff’s Office. Deputy Reifsteck testified that she was dispatched to the Urbana address

on December 1, 2021, to speak with defendant regarding a domestic incident that occurred in

November 2021. Deputy Reifsteck spoke with defendant at the Urbana address and at the

Champaign County jail following his arrest. Deputy Reifsteck confirmed that she asked defendant

how long he had been living at the Urbana address, and that defendant stated “approximately two

years.” Defendant admitted that he slept at the Urbana address and kept personal items, including

clothing, there. Deputy Reifsteck located men’s clothing in a bedroom at the Urbana address,

including a pair of pants that had defendant’s name inscribed on the waistband.

¶9 Defendant testified on his own behalf at the hearing. Defendant informed his probation

officer that he lived at the Champaign address when he was placed on probation. Defendant

explained that three of his children stayed at the Urbana address. When asked if he “told this to

[his] probation officer,” defendant responded, “I absolutely did. I was back and forth with

addresses.” When asked if he provided his probation officer with the Urbana address, defendant

responded, “He knew the address already because I had a pending case on it. I asked him was it

okay, and he told me yeah.” Defendant testified that he occasionally stayed at the Urbana address

on the weekends to watch his children. Defendant testified that he “live[d] more in Champaign”

than he lived in Urbana. When asked if he advised Deputy Reifsteck that he lived at the Urbana

address, defendant responded, “I might have told her that I lived there or I was staying there to

watch the kids. I can’t remember.” Defendant claimed the pants that Deputy Reifsteck found at the

Urbana address belonged to his father, who had the same name as defendant.

3 ¶ 10 On cross-examination, the State asked defendant if he admitted to staying at the Urbana

address, and defendant responded, “When I’m watching my kids. Not staying there. When I’m

watching my kids.” When the State asked defendant to clarify if he stayed the night at the Urbana

address in the past, defendant responded, “I have stayed there, yeah, babysitting kids.”

¶ 11 The State recalled Roush as a rebuttal witness. Roush testified that he met with defendant

approximately six times. Roush confirmed that he asked defendant at each meeting if there was a

different address where defendant stayed or lived. Roush testified that defendant never specifically

mentioned the Urbana address at any point in time.

¶ 12 After the State presented argument, the circuit court asked the State if case law defined

“what residence means for the purposes of a sentencing hearing” and if the definition was similar

to sex offender cases, where a sex offender may be permitted to live at a different location for a

certain period of time. The court then posed the following question: “So in this context, could it

be that his residence is, in fact, [the Champaign address] and he was just periodically staying [at

the Urbana address] and his residence never changed?” In response, the State indicated that it had

not done any research on the issue but posited that probation violations differed from sex offender

registration violations. The State maintained that defendant told Deputy Reifsteck he lived at the

Urbana address for approximately two years and that defendant never provided the Urbana address

to his probation officer. Thus, the State argued that the evidence showed defendant was “not just

staying there for a couple days here and there, but he’s been living there for about two years.” The

court then asked the State if defendant failed to inform probation of a change of residence or if he

lied to probation when he provided the Champaign address. The State responded, “Well, Judge, I

don’t know which one he did, but if he lied to them at first and then continued to live at [the Urbana

address], it was incumbent upon him to notify probation that that is, in fact, where he was living.”

4 The State added that defendant was also required to advise probation if he changed residences.

¶ 13 Defense counsel argued that “[t]here’s a lot of definition of residence, and it all has to do

with intent.” Defense counsel stated that defendant “doesn’t think about the nuances of things. If

the police are talking to him, he says, ‘I’ve been living here.’ To him, that could mean I spend a

lot of time here or I babysit and watch my kids for their mother.” Defense counsel concluded by

arguing that defendant advised his probation officer of the Champaign address and that there was

no evidence showing that his actual residence was “someplace else, only that he might have told

Deputy Reifsteck that he lived somewhere different, and used the word ‘live.’ ”

¶ 14 The circuit court stated that the issue was “whether or not by a preponderance of the

evidence the State has shown that the defendant had a court order, was aware of it, and violated

the court order.” The court noted that a condition of defendant’s probation required him to

immediately notify his probation officer in writing of any change of residence. The court found

Roush credible, where he testified that defendant did not provide the Urbana address at any point

during his probation. The court also found Deputy Reifsteck credible, where she testified that

defendant advised he lived at the Urbana address for approximately two years and slept at that

address. The court further found that Deputy Reifsteck credibly testified regarding the pants she

found at the Urbana address.

¶ 15 The circuit court then stated, “But the real issue is how do you define residence.” The court

determined that “residence is where you live most of the time.” The court noted that defendant

advised probation that he was living at the Champaign address and never advised that he stayed at

the Urbana address. The court noted that police found defendant at the Urbana address and that

defendant admitted he may have told Deputy Reifsteck he lived there. The court then stated:

“Again, this is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt; it’s proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Although I don’t have details of how long [defendant] was staying at [the

5 Urbana] address, he himself said that he had been staying there for about two years, although how often and to what extent, I don’t know. Again, it’s not proof beyond reasonable doubt; it’s preponderance of the evidence. I have some doubts as to the interest, bias, and motive of the defendant. I do give him credit for saying he may have told the deputy certain information, but I find the deputy and probation officers credible.

If he was living at [the Urbana address] all along, he never changed that with probation and he lied to probation when he said it was [the Champaign address]. If he was at [the Champaign address], which I believe he was, he at some point may have moved to [the Urbana address] and he didn’t advise the probation department. I find by a preponderance of the evidence that the State has proven the petition to revoke. The probation his hereby revoked.”

¶ 16 On July 21, 2022, the circuit court resentenced defendant to three years in prison followed

by four years of mandatory supervised release. Defendant timely appealed.

¶ 17 II. Analysis

¶ 18 On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred by revoking his probation where

the State failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he violated the condition of his

probation requiring him to notify his probation officer of a change of residence. We disagree.

¶ 19 The State must prove a violation of a condition of probation by a preponderance of the

evidence. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(c) (West 2020). “A proposition is proved by a preponderance of the

evidence when the proposition is more probably true than not true.” People v. Love, 404 Ill. App.

3d 784, 787 (2010). The circuit court is responsible for weighing the credibility of witnesses and

evaluating the testimony when the evidence is conflicting. People v. Crowell, 53 Ill. 2d 447, 451-

52 (1973). This court will not disturb a circuit court’s ruling on a petition to revoke probation

unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Love, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 787. “A decision

is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where an opposite conclusion is clearly

apparent or where the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence

presented.” In re T.J.D., 2017 IL App (5th) 170133, ¶ 29.

6 ¶ 20 Here, the circuit court determined that the State proved, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that defendant violated his probation. As a condition of his probation, defendant was

required to “advise the Probation Officer immediately in writing of any change of residence ***.”

The evidence demonstrated that defendant advised probation he resided at the Champaign address.

Roush testified that defendant never provided the Urbana address at any point in time. Deputy

Reifsteck testified that defendant advised he lived at the Urbana address for approximately two

years when he was arrested on December 1, 2021. Deputy Reifsteck also testified that defendant

admitted he slept at the Urbana address, and that she discovered a pair of pants with defendant’s

name inscribed on the waistband at that address. From this evidence, the court could have

reasonably concluded that the State proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant

resided at the Urbana address and violated a condition of his probation by failing to advise his

probation officer of a change in residence. Accordingly, we cannot say that the court’s judgment

revoking defendant’s probation was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 21 Relying on People v. Lara, 2012 IL 112370, ¶ 17, defendant maintains that the

confessional, out-of-court statement he made to Deputy Reifsteck was insufficient to support a

finding that he violated his probation. Defendant, again relying on Lara (id.), asserts that the State

was required to present independent evidence corroborating his statement. We find defendant’s

reliance on Lara misplaced. In Lara, our supreme court discussed the propositions the State must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction, not the propositions the State must prove

by a preponderance of the evidence to establish a violation of a condition of probation. See id.

Defendant appears to acknowledge this distinction, arguing that “[e]ven under the lenient burden

of proof applicable here, [defendant’s] statement alone should not be sufficient to support a finding

that he violated his probation.” However, Deputy Reifsteck also testified that she found personal

7 items, including clothing, belonging to defendant at the Urbana address. Moreover, as the circuit

court noted, defendant testified that he may have told Deputy Reifsteck he lived at the Urbana

address. As stated, it is our view that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the State

proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant violated a condition of his probation.

¶ 22 We reject defendant’s assertion that the only evidence demonstrating where he “actually

live[d]” was his testimony that he lived at the Champaign address and only occasionally stayed at

the Urbana address. The circuit court could have reasonably found defendant’s testimony lacked

credibility. Defendant also maintains that it is unclear from the record whether he told Deputy

Reifsteck that he “lived” or “stayed” at the Urbana address. While defendant was unable to recall

whether he told Deputy Reifsteck that he lived or stayed at the Urbana address, Deputy Reifsteck

testified that defendant advised he lived at the Urbana address for approximately two years. The

circuit court could have reasonably found Deputy Reifsteck’s testimony credible. It is not this

court’s job to reweigh the evidence, and we decline defendant’s invitation to do so. See Crowell,

53 Ill. 2d at 451-52 (it is the circuit court’s responsibility to weigh the credibility of witnesses and

evaluate the testimony).

¶ 23 Lastly, we reject defendant’s assertion that the circuit court’s ruling “contradicts itself.”

This court reviews the circuit court’s judgment not the court’s reasoning, and we may affirm on

any basis supported by the record if the judgment is correct. People v. Anderson, 401 Ill. App. 3d

134, 138 (2010). Because we have concluded that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant violated a condition of his probation, we may

affirm the court’s judgment revoking probation without considering the court’s reasoning.

8 ¶ 24 III. Conclusion

¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign

County revoking defendant’s probation.

¶ 26 Affirmed.