People v. Jones

565 N.E.2d 240, 207 Ill. App. 3d 30, 151 Ill. Dec. 969, 1990 Ill. App. LEXIS 1860

Opinions

JUSTICE O’CONNOR

delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, defendant, James Jones, was convicted of possession of a controlled substance. He was sentenced to 18 months’ periodic imprisonment. On appeal defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence.

At the pretrial hearing, Chicago police officer Duffin testified that on May 31, 1987, he was traveling along Ashland Avenue when he noticed an automobile with a cracked windshield, which he described as a “hazardous vehicle.” The officer pulled the car over into a restaurant parking lot, and he and his partner exited the squad car. As Officer Duffin approached the vehicle, he noticed the driver making turning movements. As the officer got closer, he saw defendant place a plastic bag underneath the armrest between the seats. At this time he ordered defendant out of the vehicle, entered the car and retrieved the plastic bag. The bag contained 108 grams of marijuana. The officers placed defendant under arrest and searched him. The search revealed additional marijuana as well as United States currency.

In denying the motion to suppress, the court specifically noted that the officer saw defendant placing the plastic bag under the armrest and that he saw part of the plastic bag.

At trial, defendant testified that the car he was driving was not his and that he was unaware that there was any marijuana in the car. The parties stipulated that the officer would testify as he had at the pretrial hearing.

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress was manifestly erroneous because the State failed to prove that the initial stop was justified. Additionally, defendant contends that even if the traffic stop was justified, there was no probable cause to seize the plastic bag.

Both parties cite the Illinois Vehicle Code, which makes it unlawful for a person to drive a vehicle where the windshield is in such defective condition as to materially impair the driver’s vision. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 12 — 503(e).) Defendant suggests, without citation to any authority, that because there was no testimony that defendant’s vision was materially impaired, the officers lacked probable cause for the stop and the seizure was illegal. A police officer may, however, stop a vehicle in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably infers from the circumstances that the person is violating the Illinois Vehicle Code. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 107 — 14; see also People v. Stroud (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 546 N.E.2d 293.) Here, the evidence is incontroverted that the windshield of the vehicle defendant was driving was cracked. This fact supports the conclusion that the stop was justified (cf. People v. LaGrone (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 301, 464 N.E.2d 712), and not merely pretextual, a problem of concern to re-viewing courts. (People v. Patterson (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 144, 410 N.E.2d 223.) Because the initial stop was lawful, we need not address defendant’s contentions regarding the inapplicability of the doctrines of plain view and search incident to arrest.

Defendant also argues that even assuming that the initial stop was valid, the subsequent search was improper because the officer lacked probable cause. Probable cause to search an automobile exists when, in light of totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that there was contraband in the vehicle. (People v. Clark (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 96, 440 N.E.2d 869.) We agree with defendant that defendant’s twisting motion, without more, would not give rise to probable cause. Here, however, the officer noticed not only defendant’s twisting motion, but saw defendant place the bag under the armrest, suggesting that defendant was attempting to hide something. Based on the record before us we cannot say that the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress was manifestly erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

BUCKLEY, P.J., concurs.