People v. Johnson CA4/1

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJuly 25, 2023
DocketD080683
StatusUnpublished

This text of People v. Johnson CA4/1 (People v. Johnson CA4/1) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Johnson CA4/1, (Cal. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

Filed 7/25/23 P. v. Johnson CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D080683

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD288890)

RYAN JAIRE JOHNSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David M. Gill, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Stephanie A. Mitchell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION1 A jury convicted Ryan Jaire Johnson of pandering by procuring Jane

Doe for prostitution (Pen. Code,2 § 266i, subd. (a)(1); count 1); pimping Jane Doe for prostitution (§ 266h, subd. (a); count 2); and pandering by encouraging an undercover officer to become a prostitute (§ 266i, subd. (a)(2); count 3). The trial court sentenced Johnson to the middle term of four years in prison on each of the three counts, and ordered the sentences on counts 2

and 3 to run concurrent to the sentence on count 1.3 On appeal, Johnson contends substantial evidence does not support his convictions on counts 1 and 2, and his sentence on those counts violated section 654’s proscription against multiple punishments. We reject his substantial evidence challenge but conclude the trial court erred in imposing separate and unstayed terms for both pimping and pandering Jane Doe. Because the sentencing triad for counts 1 and 2 are the same, we will modify the judgment by staying the sentence for count 1 and affirm the judgment as modified.

1 Because this appeal raises no substantial issues of law and the factual issues presented are determined by the substantial evidence rule, we resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.

2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3 Johnson was also charged with carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle, a misdemeanor (§ 25400, subd. (a)(1)), in count 4. He pled guilty to the misdemeanor count before trial and he was later sentenced to time served on it.

2 I. Substantial Evidence Supports Johnson’s Convictions on Counts 1 and 2 In reviewing Johnson’s sufficiency-of-the evidence challenges, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 504.) “We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury reasonably could deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638−639.) We reverse for insufficient evidence only where it clearly appears that upon “no hypothesis” is there sufficient evidence to support a conviction. (People v. Ewing (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 359, 371.) The standard of review is the same whether the People’s case relies on direct or circumstantial evidence. (Abilez, at p. 504.) Given our limited role on appeal, a defendant bears “an enormous burden” in claiming there is insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions. (People v. Veale (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 40, 46.) Applying these principles, we have no difficulty concluding substantial evidence supports Johnson’s convictions on counts 1 and 2. A. Pandering by Procuring (Count 1) A person is guilty of pandering if he “[p]rocures another person for the purpose of prostitution.” (§ 266i, subd. (a)(1).) “[T]he term ‘procure’ has been construed to mean ‘assisting, inducing, persuading, or encouraging’ a person to engage in prostitution.” (People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 485 (Campbell).) “Pandering is a specific intent crime. To be guilty of the offense, the defendant must have the specific intent to persuade, encourage or otherwise influence the target” to engage in prostitution. (Id. at p. 487; People v. Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 977 [holding a defendant can be

3 convicted of pandering even if the target is already a prostitute].) “The crime of pandering requires no monetary gain.” (Campbell, at p. 487.) Nor does it require that actual acts of prostitution take place. (People v. Osuna (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 528, 531 (Osuna).) The trial court correctly instructed the

jury on the elements of pandering.4 The People’s evidence at trial⎯including the testimony of officers who worked undercover in the human trafficking operation that led to Johnson’s arrest, and Johnson’s own recorded words⎯was more than sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the essential elements of pandering (and pimping)

beyond a reasonable doubt.5 On January 21, 2021, Johnson contacted “Savannah” on a dating website used by human traffickers and sex workers called “Tagged.” Savannah was a fictional White, 33-year-old female sex worker created by

4 CALCRIM No. 1151 provided, in relevant part, that the People must prove (1) Johnson successfully persuaded or procured Jane Doe to become a prostitute and (2) he intended to influence Jane Doe to be a prostitute.

5 In his opening brief on appeal, Johnson sets out the corpus delicti rule but does not provide any specific argument regarding its application in this case. To the extent he contends the People failed to establish the corpus of pandering without reliance on his out-of-court statements, we would reject the contention for two reasons. First, the rule does not apply to words that constitute a part of the crime itself (see People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 393−394, overruled on other grounds in People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1190−1191; Carpenter at p. 394 [“the corpus delicti rule is designed to provide independent evidence that the crime occurred, not to help determine whether the statement was made”]), such as words to assist, induce, persuade, or encourage another person to engage in prostitution. Second, even if the rule applied here, the People need only prove the corpus delicti by some slight or prima facie evidence that the charged crime, not some other crime, was committed. (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1171.) On this record, we conclude the People have met that low bar.

4 Christian Franco of the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, Human Trafficking Task Force. During the exchange on Tagged, Johnson recruited

Savannah to “join [his] team.”6 The phrase is known to be used by pimps to recruit sex workers to refer to “a stable or a team,” and means “multiple women are working under the direction of one trafficker or one pimp.” Johnson told Savannah he had another woman named “Kakes,” later

identified as Jane Doe,7 working for him and who would be Savannah’s “wifey.” That term is used by two sex workers “working under the umbrella of a trafficker” to refer to each other. Posing as Savannah, Franco contacted Kakes at the phone number Johnson provided so Kakes could “vouch” for him. Franco then located a sex advertisement for Kakes on “Mega Personals,” a “heavily trafficked” website with the “sole purpose” of facilitating commercial sex. On January 25, 2021, Franco texted Kakes, this time posing as a sex buyer, to solicit “a sex act.” Kakes agreed and provided him with the address of a Motel 6.

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Related

People v. Correa
278 P.3d 809 (California Supreme Court, 2012)
People v. Zambia
254 P.3d 965 (California Supreme Court, 2011)
People v. Harrison
768 P.2d 1078 (California Supreme Court, 1989)
People v. Bean
760 P.2d 996 (California Supreme Court, 1988)
People v. White
89 Cal. App. 3d 143 (California Court of Appeal, 1979)
People v. McNulty
202 Cal. App. 3d 624 (California Court of Appeal, 1988)
People v. Dell
232 Cal. App. 3d 248 (California Court of Appeal, 1991)
People v. Lewis
77 Cal. App. 3d 455 (California Court of Appeal, 1978)
People v. Osuna
251 Cal. App. 2d 528 (California Court of Appeal, 1967)
People v. Veale
72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 360 (California Court of Appeal, 2008)
People v. Abilez
161 P.3d 58 (California Supreme Court, 2007)
People v. Alvarez
46 P.3d 372 (California Supreme Court, 2002)
People v. Diaz
345 P.3d 62 (California Supreme Court, 2015)
People v. Ewing
244 Cal. App. 4th 359 (California Court of Appeal, 2016)
People v. Corpening
386 P.3d 379 (California Supreme Court, 2016)
People v. Carpenter
935 P.2d 708 (California Supreme Court, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
People v. Johnson CA4/1, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-johnson-ca41-calctapp-2023.