People v. Jensen

2024 IL App (3d) 230229-U

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2024 IL App (3d) 230229-U

Order filed December 30, 2024 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, ) Iroquois County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-23-0229 v. ) Circuit No. 19-CF-119 ) ARTHUR C. JENSEN, ) Honorable ) Michael C. Sabol, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Peterson and Davenport concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress statements.

¶2 Defendant, Arthur C. Jensen, appeals his conviction for first degree murder, arguing

solely that the Iroquois County circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements

he made to the police. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 On August 7, 2019, the State indicted defendant on two counts of first degree murder

(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West 2018)). On March 4, 2022, defendant filed a motion to suppress

statements which, relevant to this appeal, requested the suppression of inculpatory statements

made by defendant to Sheldon Police Chief Bryan Havens. As far as we can discern from the

record, the only inculpatory statements that were at issue were the following: “I have an anger

issue,” made in response to Havens asking what was going on; “I fucking choked her to death.

She’s dead,” made in response to Havens asking what defendant’s previous statement meant;

“[T]he little girl from the yard sale. She was here the other day to buy Pocahontas toys,” made in

response to Havens asking who was dead; “I’m sure,” made in response to Havens asking

whether defendant was certain that the girl was dead; and “[S]he’s in there. I drug her in there,”

made in response to Havens asking where the girl was. Defendant’s motion alleged that he was

in custody when he made the statements in response to investigatory questioning.

¶5 At the hearing on the motion to suppress statements, Deputy Douglas Brenner of the

Iroquois County Sheriff’s Department testified that on August 5, 2019, at approximately 4:30

p.m., he responded to a call at a trailer in Sheldon. The caller, Joan Kish, indicated that she and

her brother, Steven Cox, had heard sounds coming from a neighboring residence that sounded

like a person was being sexually assaulted. Upon speaking with Kish and Cox, Brenner learned

that they had gone to defendant’s trailer to speak with him, and they heard noises and screaming

coming from defendant’s residence. They disclosed that initially they did not know whether

“there was a porn being played inside or if there was an actual incident going on.” Kish and Cox

left defendant’s residence and “waited sometime” before calling the police.

¶6 Brenner knocked on defendant’s door and no one answered the door. Brenner remained at

the residence for approximately one hour and 15 minutes. During that time, Brenner gathered

2 information, including phone numbers for defendant and his wife, Sue Jensen, and spoke with

neighbors. Brenner called both defendant and Sue. They did not respond, and Brenner left

messages. Brenner testified that it was common for people not to answer his calls because he had

a restricted phone number. Brenner asked another individual to attempt to contact defendant.

That person was able to reach defendant on the phone and told Brenner that defendant said he

was 20 minutes away from the residence.

¶7 At approximately 5:45 p.m., Brenner received another emergency call and left

defendant’s residence. Brenner confirmed that at the time he left, no one had been reported

missing and he did not know if anyone was inside defendant’s trailer. Brenner testified that his

“gut told [him] something was wrong” but he could not arrest people or obtain search warrants

based only on that feeling. Brenner spoke with Havens to discuss the situation. He asked Havens

to check out defendant’s residence once he started his shift.

¶8 After leaving the scene, Brenner received two phone calls from Havens. During the first

call, Havens informed Brenner that defendant had called him and asked to speak with him but

did not want Brenner present. On the second call, Havens told Brenner that he needed him at the

residence. Havens indicated that defendant told him he had strangled a girl later identified as

Adara Bunn, and Havens did not know what to do. Havens entered the garage while he was

talking to Brenner. Havens told Brenner that he could see Bunn lying on the floor in the living

room and asked if he should check to see if she was breathing. Brenner told Havens to check,

and Havens indicated that Bunn was dead.

¶9 When Brenner returned to the residence, defendant was sitting handcuffed in the back of

Havens’s squad car. Brenner asked Havens if he had checked Bunn’s vitals. Havens indicated

that he had made a visual observation that Bunn was discolored and not breathing but had not

3 approached her or checked for a pulse. Brenner told Havens that they still needed to check Bunn

and they entered the residence. After feeling no pulse on Bunn, Brenner quickly looked in each

room to make sure no one else was present. He indicated this was standard procedure to secure

the area. He did not search the residence for anything else. Shortly thereafter, Bunn was

confirmed to be deceased by emergency medical technicians (EMT).

¶ 10 Havens testified that at the time of the incident he was working with the Watseka and

Sheldon Police Departments. On August 5, 2019, he was scheduled to work in Sheldon at 6 p.m.

Havens received a call from Brenner at approximately 4:30 p.m. Brenner advised him that there

was a disturbance call for defendant’s residence. At approximately 5:30 p.m., Havens received

another call from Brenner informing him that he was unable to contact anyone from the

residence. Havens told Brenner he would try to contact the residents when he started his shift in

Sheldon.

¶ 11 At 5:50 p.m., Sue called Havens. She told him that a neighbor informed her that the

county police were at her trailer and wanted to know what was going on. Havens told Sue he did

not know but would be following up. Sue gave Havens defendant’s phone number and asked him

to call defendant.

¶ 12 Approximately 15 minutes later, Havens received a call from defendant. Defendant stated

that the county police had just left his trailer. Havens asked defendant what was going on.

Defendant asked if Havens was working in Sheldon that night and if he would come by when he

had the time. Havens agreed and again asked defendant what was going on. Defendant said

“well, I will give myself up to you, but not county.” Havens asked, “give up what[?]” Defendant

responded that Havens should “swing by whenever you have time” and call first so he could

secure his dogs. Havens testified that he did not equate defendant’s statement with an intent to

4 turn himself in because to Havens’s knowledge no crime had occurred. He was only aware of an

ongoing investigation; he did not know what was being investigated. Havens indicated that,

during the phone conversation, defendant seemed very calm and collected. Havens changed into

his Sheldon Police Department uniform which consisted of a black polo shirt, Kevlar vest,

badge, and gun, and then went to defendant’s residence.

¶ 13 Havens called defendant upon arrival, as requested. Defendant informed Havens that he

would be exiting through the garage door. Less than a minute later, the garage door opened, and

defendant stood in front of the door with his hands up. Defendant walked toward a pickup truck

that was parked in the driveway and placed his hands on the tailgate. Havens did not give

defendant any Miranda warnings because he was not in custody. He asked defendant what was

going on. Defendant stated, “you know that I have an anger issue.” Havens denied knowing that

fact and asked defendant what that meant. Defendant replied, “it means I fucking choked her to

death. She’s dead.” Havens asked defendant “who is dead[?]” Defendant explained it was “the

little girl from the yard sale. She was here the other day to buy Pocahontas toys.” Havens asked

defendant if he was sure that she was dead and where she was. Defendant nodded behind him

and stated, “she’s in there. I drug her in there.”

¶ 14 At that point, Havens detained defendant, handcuffing him and placing him in the back of

his squad car. Havens radioed dispatch and requested an ambulance for a “potential choking

victim.” Havens explained that, at that time, he was unsure whether Bunn was deceased or

merely unconscious and in need of aid. Havens called Brenner and asked him to return to the

trailer. Havens told Brenner that defendant had informed him that he had killed someone, and

defendant would be unsupervised in his squad car while Havens went inside to attempt to render

5 aid. Havens testified that he had previously received first aid training and had held an EMT

license.

¶ 15 Havens walked through the open garage door. Upon entering the garage, Havens could

see into the living room through a glass door that led to the trailer’s interior. Havens observed

Bunn lying on her back on the floor. Havens entered the residence to check on Bunn. Bunn’s

skin was gray, and she did not appear to be breathing. Havens left the residence and began to

secure the scene. He testified that at no point in time did he draw or even touch his weapon.

¶ 16 Iroquois County Sheriff Clinton Perzee testified that on August 5, 2019, he was

employed as an investigator. He was called to defendant’s trailer to investigate a homicide.

When Perzee arrived, defendant was handcuffed in the back of Havens’s squad car. Perzee

removed defendant from the squad car and uncuffed him. Perzee read defendant a consent form

to search his residence and a form containing his Miranda warnings. Defendant gave consent to

search the trailer and signed both forms. Perzee did not ask defendant any questions.

¶ 17 The court denied the motion to suppress on November 7, 2022. It found that defendant’s

statements to Havens were not subject to Miranda warnings. The court reasoned that

(1) defendant chose the time and place to speak with Havens; (2) the interaction was short;

(3) the mode of questioning was straightforward and included general questions about what was

happening because Havens was unsure what was going on; (4) the interaction contained no

raised voices, yelling, or threats; (5) defendant chose the manner in which he exited the house,

where he went, and where he put his hands; (6) Havens was the only police officer present and

had not frisked, searched, or directed defendant to do anything; (7) Havens did not draw his

weapon; and (8) defendant displayed no intellectual disabilities or mental health issues. The

6 court found that, under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not have believed they

were in custody for the purposes of Miranda until after defendant admitted to strangling Bunn.

The court found that a reasonable person would feel they were not free to leave once that

admission was made. However, the court found that the questions that Havens asked after

defendant’s admission were follow-up questions for clarification not interrogation and did not

warrant suppression.

¶ 18 The case proceeded to a jury trial on March 6, 2023. In addition to the information above,

the following evidence was adduced at trial. Bunn attended multiple garage sales in Sheldon on

August 3, 2019, including a sale at defendant’s trailer. Bunn had purchased Disney items from

defendant. She returned to defendant’s trailer the next day to see if he had any items available.

Defendant told Bunn to return the next day. That same day, on August 4, 2019, defendant asked

a number of inappropriate sexual questions regarding Bunn to her ex-boyfriend. Defendant had

also stated that Bunn had “really grown into” her body and “it would be better if she was 18.”

Bunn returned to defendant’s trailer on August 5, 2019, as directed, to see what other items he

had available. Bunn’s cause of death was determined to be ligature strangulation. A blue nylon

rope found wrapped around Bunn’s neck contained both her and defendant’s DNA.

¶ 19 Defendant testified that after Bunn had purchased items from his garage sale, she

returned to his residence and asked about a specific item which he had just packed away.

Defendant retrieved the item, and she left. Defendant denied making inappropriate comments to

her ex-boyfriend, indicating that they had been engaged in “guy talk” but he did not say anything

specifically about Bunn. On August 5, 2019, Bunn appeared at defendant’s trailer and asked

about other Disney items. Defendant informed her that he had not had a chance to look through

his belongings yet. Bunn would not leave defendant’s house, so he grabbed her by the shoulders,

7 turned her around, and tried to shove her through the doorway. She “braced back and pushed

against [defendant] and that’s when a struggle started.” Defendant grabbed her, removed a length

of rope from his back pocket and indicated that “pretty much everything [was] pretty much a

blur.” Defendant was just trying to get her out of his trailer.

¶ 20 The jury found defendant guilty of both counts of first degree murder. Defendant filed a

motion for a new trial which argued, inter alia, that the court had erred in denying his motion to

suppress. The court denied the motion. Defendant was sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment.

Defendant appeals.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 On appeal, defendant argues that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress

statements. Defendant contends that the totality of the circumstances established that defendant

was in custody and impermissibly subjected to interrogation without the required Miranda

warnings where Havens was aware that defendant was a suspect in a criminal investigation who

intended to surrender himself to the police.

¶ 23 When determining whether the court properly ruled on a motion to suppress evidence, we

defer to the findings of fact and credibility determinations made by the court unless they are

against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149 (2008).

“However, a reviewing court reviews de novo the trial court’s ultimate legal ruling as to whether

suppression is warranted.” People v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 43.

¶ 24 If a person being questioned by law enforcement has been “ ‘taken into custody or

otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way,’ ” they must be apprised of

their Miranda rights. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 149 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444

(1966)). The finding of custody is essential as Miranda warnings are necessary to ensure that

8 defendants are not inherently coerced into making inculpatory statements by their custodial

surroundings. Id. “[I]n determining whether a person is ‘in custody’ for purposes of Miranda, a

court should first ascertain and examine the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and

then ask if, given those circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at

liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 506 (2003).

The second inquiry is objective, determining “what a reasonable person, innocent of any crime,

would have thought had he or she been in the defendant’s shoes.” Id.

¶ 25 When examining the circumstances of the interrogation, the supreme court has

recognized several factors to be considered:

“(1) the location, time, length, mood, and mode of the questioning; (2) the number

of police officers present during the interrogation; (3) the presence or absence of

family and friends of the individual; (4) any indicia of a formal arrest procedure,

such as the show of weapons or force, physical restraint, booking or

fingerprinting; (5) the manner by which the individual arrived at the place of

questioning; and (6) the age, intelligence, and mental makeup of the accused.”

Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 150.

Courts may also consider “the degree of police control over the environment in which the

interrogation takes place, and in particular whether the suspect’s freedom of movement is

physically restrained or otherwise significantly curtailed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

People v. Logan, 2024 IL 129054, ¶ 60.

¶ 26 Here, the circumstances surrounding the questioning establish that defendant was not in

custody prior to volunteering that he killed Bunn. Whether Havens went to defendant’s residence

suspecting defendant of committing sexual assault based on the information relayed to him by

9 Brenner is immaterial where this belief did not affect the conversation Havens had with

defendant. See id. (“An officer’s belief in the individual’s guilt is relevant only to the extent that

the officer’s views or beliefs were somehow manifested to the individual under interrogation and

would have affected how a reasonable person in that position would perceive his or her freedom

to leave.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Havens did not manifest his suspicion to

defendant upon arrival.

¶ 27 Defendant requested that Havens come to his residence. The questioning was brief and

occurred outside of defendant’s residence, during daylight hours, in plain view of anyone in the

area. Havens was the only officer present, and he made no show of force or attempt to physically

restrain defendant. The mood of the questioning was calm and informal. Havens’s questions

were inquisitive and not accusatory in nature. Defendant was not informed that he had to answer

any questions or that he was not free to leave. Havens exercised little to no control over the

situation where defendant determined when and where the questioning would occur when he

invited Havens to his residence. Defendant was an adult and able to effectively communicate

with and understand Havens.

¶ 28 After defendant’s initial statement that he “choked her to death,” a reasonable person

would not have felt free to terminate the encounter with Havens and leave. However, Havens’s

follow-up questioning was a neutral reflexive response intended to clarify defendant’s voluntary

declaration which does not require suppression. See People v. Peo, 391 Ill. App. 3d 815, 821

(2009) (“[S]imple questions seeking clarification of volunteered statements do not require

Miranda warnings.”); see also Andersen v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 532 (7th Cir. 1990) (not

interrogation for the police to ask “ ‘Who?’ ” after the defendant voluntarily stated, “ ‘I stabbed

her’ ”). Accordingly, the court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress statements.

10 ¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30 The judgment of the circuit court of Iroquois County is affirmed.

¶ 31 Affirmed.