People v. Jeffries

2025 IL App (3d) 240572-U

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2025 IL App (3d) 240572-U

Order filed December 8, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 13th Judicial Circuit, ) La Salle County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-24-0572 v. ) Circuit No. 22-CF-366 ) RANDOLPH D. JEFFRIES, ) Honorable ) Cynthia M. Raccuglia, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BERTANI delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Holdridge and Anderson concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: (1) The evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for armed violence. (2) Defendant’s convictions violated the one-act, one-crime doctrine.

¶2 Defendant, Randolph D. Jeffries, appeals from his convictions for armed violence and

burglary. Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for armed

violence, and alternatively, his convictions violated the one-act, one-crime doctrine. We affirm in

part and vacate in part. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On September 20, 2022, the State charged defendant by information with armed violence

predicated on burglary (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2022)) and burglary (id. § 19-1(a)). On July

9, 2024, the matter proceeded to a bench trial, and the following pertinent evidence was presented.

¶5 Benjamin Ruiz testified he lived in Ottawa, Illinois in an apartment above Ruiz

Construction, a business owned by his father, Michael Ruiz. On September 18, 2022, Benjamin

arrived home between 10 and 10:30 p.m. and recalled there was a thunderstorm. He went upstairs

to his apartment, did not turn on any lights, and watched television. Approximately 20 minutes

later, he heard a noise and assumed it was a cat or the wind. He then heard two more loud noises

and looked through the glass door of his apartment into the garage bay. He saw two flashlights

being used to look at tools and an individual taking items outside. He called the police. The police

arrived a minute later, and the individuals ran away. Benjamin observed that a window above a

freestanding sink was broken, the sink was knocked over, the door used to carry tools outside

remained open, and tools were scattered outside.

¶6 Michael testified he owned Ruiz Construction. His company used the subject building

daily—employees would check in and out, pick up tools, and store tools in the building. The

building had an office in the front and an apartment upstairs. On the night at issue, Benjamin

contacted Michael regarding a potential burglary. Michael met with the police and noticed many

tools were missing. Michael also noticed the shotgun he stored in his office closet was missing.

Michael noted, while his building had security cameras, the footage was obscured by the rain.

¶7 Jayden Hawley, a former sheriff’s deputy for the La Salle County Sheriff’s Office, testified

he was dispatched to Ruiz Construction that night for a potential burglary, and upon his arrival, he

observed a red Chrysler van fleeing from the property. At that time, an officer with the Ottawa

2 Police Department arrived on the scene, and Hawley and the officer followed the van. After a

pursuit of approximately a quarter of a mile, the van hit a decorative rock and came to a stop. A

passenger fled. Hawley did not see the driver flee based on his point of view. However, a woman

in the passenger seat and another woman found in the trunk were placed in custody. The van’s

front license plate was covered with duct tape, and the inside was full of tools marked “Ruiz

Construction.”

¶8 Noah Rowe, a deputy with the La Salle County Sheriff’s Office, testified he was on patrol

when he was dispatched to Ruiz Construction for a burglary in progress. Inside the building, he

noticed open cabinets and closets and shelves that were empty. He noted the broken window and

observed on the outside of the window that there were tire tracks in the grass, muddy footprints,

and a plastic barrel on its side.

¶9 Michael Kasprak, a master sergeant with the Illinois State Police, testified he was on

routine patrol on Interstate 80 during the evening at issue. At approximately 12:13 a.m., he

received a call from dispatch regarding a pedestrian, later identified as defendant, walking on the

shoulder of the interstate. Kasprak drove to the location and observed defendant walking on the

entrance ramp. Kasprak asked defendant about his situation and defendant stated, “I am who you

are looking for” and explained he was trying to find a police station to turn himself in. Kasprak

did not know what defendant was talking about, placed defendant in handcuffs, and put him in the

front seat of his squad car. Kasprak asked defendant questions to ascertain the situation, and

defendant stated he had been at a gas station when his van was stolen and the van was further down

the interstate. Kasprak drove toward that location and noticed an Ottawa squad car on the shoulder

of the interstate with its emergency lights on. Kasprak learned from the other officer that the

perimeter was being secured as part of a burglary investigation and the officer had already spoken

3 to defendant and released him. Defendant was then questioned by the officers about the burglary.

Defense counsel asked the court to suppress the statements defendant made to the police once

Kasprak placed defendant in the squad car, which the court granted.

¶ 10 Kye Denault, a detective with the La Salle County Sheriff’s Office, interviewed defendant.

Initially, defendant stated he was the driver of the van and backed the van toward the subject

building. During a later interview, defendant stated he had further involvement and assisted with

loading items into the van. Defendant denied knowing anything about the stolen shotgun but stated

he had his own firearm in the van’s center console. Defendant stated he typically did not carry his

firearm with him but he specifically had it that night for protection during the burglary. Defendant

also explained how the events transpired that night. Defendant drove his van with his girlfriend

and her daughter to pick up Monkey, his girlfriend’s cousin. Monkey asked defendant to help him

with a pickup and told defendant where to go. Defendant stated neither he, his girlfriend, nor her

daughter entered the building, but Monkey entered through the window. Defendant loaded

equipment into the van and knew it was wrong, which was why he was looking for a police station

to turn himself in. Defendant stated he used duct tape to conceal his license plate, and he agreed

to help Monkey because he needed money.

¶ 11 Defendant consented to a search of the van. The search revealed numerous tools and

Michael’s shotgun. The photographs admitted into evidence demonstrated the rear and center of

the van were full and piled to the van’s roof with construction tools. Further, there were also tools

placed on the floor between the back passenger seats and the front seats. The police also found a

loaded firearm in the center console that was inside a holster. The photograph admitted into

evidence showed the holstered firearm was inside the center console on the top.

4 ¶ 12 Following arguments, the circuit court found defendant guilty of armed violence and

burglary. Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to reconsider or for a new trial, arguing the evidence

was insufficient. The court denied the motion and sentenced him to concurrent terms of 15 years’

imprisonment and 5 years’ imprisonment, respectively. This appeal followed.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 On appeal, defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt of armed

violence, and alternatively, his convictions violated the one-act, one-crime doctrine. We address

each contention in turn.

¶ 15 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 16 When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Gray, 2017

IL 120958, ¶ 35. The trier of fact determines the credibility of the witnesses, assigns weight to the

testimony, resolves conflicts in the evidence, and draws reasonable inferences from basic facts to

ultimate facts. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. A conviction will not be reversed unless

the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of

the defendant’s guilt. People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 225 (2009).

¶ 17 A person commits armed violence when, “while armed with a dangerous weapon,” he

commits a felony, with certain exceptions inapplicable here. 720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2022)).

A person is “armed with a dangerous weapon” if he “carries on or about his or her person or is

otherwise armed with a Category I, Category II, or Category III weapon.” Id. § 33A-1(c)(1). Our

supreme court has defined “otherwise armed” to mean the person had immediate access to or

timely control over a weapon. People v. Condon, 148 Ill. 2d 96, 110 (1992). The purpose of this

5 statute is to deter felons from using dangerous weapons and avoid the deadly consequences that

may result when a felony victim resists. Id. at 109. For instance, “[a] felon with a weapon at his or

her disposal is forced to make a spontaneous and often instantaneous decision to kill without time

to reflect on the use of such deadly force.” Id.

¶ 18 Here, defendant was charged with armed violence in that he committed a burglary while

armed with a dangerous weapon. Defendant agrees his firearm is a qualifying weapon but disputes

that he had immediate access to or timely control over the firearm.

¶ 19 We conclude the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant was armed with a

dangerous weapon when he committed the burglary. The evidence demonstrated defendant backed

his van up to the building and carried tools from inside the building into his van. Photographs

admitted into evidence showed the tools inside the van were piled high throughout the rear and

center of the van and were also on the floor between the back and front seats. Based on the

placement of the tools inside the van, one could reasonably infer that both the van’s trunk door

and rear passenger doors were accessed to load the tools into the van. Defendant’s firearm was in

a holster inside the center console between the driver’s seat and front passenger seat. Photographs

of the inside of the center console showed the holstered firearm sitting on the top. Thus, it would

be reasonable to find that defendant had immediate access to or timely control over the firearm

during the burglary. See People v. Harre, 155 Ill. 2d 392, 400-01 (1993) (the defendant had

immediate access to or timely control over the firearm sitting on the front seat of the vehicle where

the defendant was standing outside the vehicle and the window was more than half opened because

the defendant could have reached through the window or opened the door); People v. Norwood,

2018 IL App (4th) 150883, ¶¶ 5, 35 (the defendant had immediate access to the firearm located

behind a storage container that was within several feet of him); People v. Scott, 2011 IL App (2d)

6 100990, ¶ 30 (the defendant had immediate access to or timely control over the firearm located

under the cushion of a sofa that was “a foot or two away” from the defendant’s reach despite the

inconvenient presence of a coffee table). The evidence supports the firearm was at defendant’s

disposal where he could have been confronted with a spontaneous and instantaneous decision to

use it, the exact purpose for the enactment of the armed violence statute. Therefore, any rational

trier of fact could have found defendant had immediate access to or timely control over the firearm,

and accordingly, that he was armed with a dangerous weapon to satisfy the armed violence charge.

¶ 20 In reaching this conclusion, we address two cases defendant relies on to support his position

that he did not have immediate access or timely control of his firearm. First, in Condon, 148 Ill.

2d at 110, the defendant was apprehended by the police when he was in his kitchen and officers

found numerous firearms throughout the home in the first-floor bedroom and on the second floor.

The court concluded the defendant was not armed with a dangerous weapon as “[i]t was impossible

for the defendant to use the guns as they were situated because they were too far removed from

the defendant.” Id. Here, we cannot say that it would have been impossible for defendant to use

the firearm as it was situated in such close proximity to defendant as he loaded the van. Defendant’s

distance from the firearm in this case is a far cry from the distance in Condon, where the defendant

was separated from the firearms located in another room.

¶ 21 We likewise reject defendant’s reliance on People v. Wise, 2021 IL 125392. In that case,

the defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, and the supreme court

relied on Condon as an analogue. Id. ¶ 29. The evidence demonstrated an officer pulled the

defendant over, searched the vehicle, and found a firearm in the rear passenger area closest to

another person in the vehicle. Id. ¶ 34. The court concluded the defendant did not possess the

firearm, noting there was no evidence presented that the defendant owned the vehicle, the firearm

7 was found between 5 and 10 feet away from the defendant, the officer did not believe the defendant

could reach the firearm, the crime laboratory did not determine that the defendant’s fingerprints

were on the firearm, and the firearm was closest to another person. Id. We conclude Wise is

unpersuasive as applied to this case as it contains many facts that are not present here.

¶ 22 B. One-Act, One-Crime Doctrine

¶ 23 Defendant alternatively argues that his conviction for burglary should be vacated under the

one-act, one-crime doctrine, which provides that multiple convictions based on the exact same

physical act are improper. People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 565-66 (1977). A violation of this doctrine

constitutes plain error, and therefore, may be addressed for the first time on appeal. People v.

Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 10. Our review is de novo. Id. ¶ 12.

¶ 24 Defendant contends his convictions arose from the same physical act because burglary was

the predicate felony for his armed violence conviction (citing People v. Donaldson, 91 Ill. 2d 164,

170 (1982) (the defendant’s convictions for armed violence and aggravated battery causing great

bodily harm violated the one-act, one-crime doctrine where the defendant could not violate the

armed violence statute without first committing the battery)). The State concedes that defendant’s

burglary conviction should be vacated on this basis. We agree as burglary was an element of armed

violence and the two convictions arose out of the same physical act. Judgment should have only

been entered on the more serious offense, which is armed violence. Id. Thus, we vacate defendant’s

conviction for burglary and the accompanying sentence.

¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 26 The judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is affirmed in part and vacated in

part.

¶ 27 Affirmed in part and vacated in part.