People v. Jeanpierre

2025 IL App (4th) 240462

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: August 4, 2025
• Docket: 4-24-0462
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 240462-UB This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-24-0462 August 4, 2025 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County WILNER JEANPIERRE, ) No. 23CF506 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Rudolph M. Braud Jr. ) Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Doherty concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court erred in granting the State’s petition to deny defendant pretrial release where the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence no conditions of release could mitigate the threat of his dangerousness.

¶2 Defendant, Wilner Jeanpierre, appealed the trial court’s order denying him pretrial

release pursuant to section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS

5/110-6.1 (West 2022)), as amended by Public Acts 101-652, § 10-255, and 102-1104, § 70 (eff.

Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). This court found the trial

court erred in detaining defendant without addressing potential conditions of release and

remanded for a new detention hearing. The supreme court subsequently entered a supervisory

order directing this court to vacate its judgment and consider the effect of People v. Cousins,

2025 IL 130866, on the issue of whether the trial court should conduct a new detention hearing

on remand or a hearing on the conditions of release. People v. Jeanpierre, No. 130879 (Ill. June 4, 2025) (supervisory order). For the reasons discussed below, we find the appropriate remedy is

to remand for the trial court to conduct a hearing on the conditions of release.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In June 2023, defendant, Wilner Jeanpierre, was charged with four counts of

predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2022)) and three

counts of criminal sexual assault (id. § 11-1.20(a)(3)). He was arrested, and the trial court set his

bond at $500,000. Defendant was unable to pay the bond and remained in pretrial custody.

¶5 On November 3, 2023, defendant filed a “Motion for Hearing” pursuant to

section 110-7.5(b) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022)) “to determine appropriate

pretrial conditions” of release. Defendant indicated in the motion that if he were to be released

on bail, he could live with a family friend in Springfield, Illinois, or, if approved by the court,

with his mother in Indianapolis, Indiana.

¶6 On December 6, 2023, the State filed a petition to deny pretrial release based on

the dangerousness standard. The State provided the following factual basis in its petition:

“On or about June 15, 2023, members of the Chatham Police Department

were notified that [defendant] has inappropriately touched his 11 year old

daughter. The 11 year old step daughter was visibly upset and disclosed

[defendant’s] inappropriate touching to her sisters. The sisters (18 and 17) who

were independently suffering with [defendant] assaulting them on previous

occasions then realized that all of them had been assaulted by the defendant. The

Chatham Police Department conducted an investigation through the Sangamon

County [Child Advocacy Center]. The 18 year old disclosed inappropriate

touching by the defendant since she was 14 and penetration by the defendant

-2- since she was 16. The 17 year old disclosed penetration 2-3 times per week for the

past year. The 11 year old disclosed that the defendant touche[d] her breasts and

genitals with his hands on one occasion right before the disclosure. The 18 year

old recorded the defendant admitting the sexual relationship and text messages

also indicate a sexual relationship.”

The State also filed a pretrial investigation report. According to the report, defendant had no

criminal history, reported he could live with his cousin if he was not allowed to return to his

residence, and scored a 3 on the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument-Revised (VPRAI),

which placed him “at a low-moderate risk level.”

¶7 On February 29, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s petition

to deny defendant pretrial release. The State proffered the factual basis from its petition. It also

introduced the probable cause statement for defendant’s arrest, which indicated the 18-year-old

victim had video recordings and text messages in which defendant admitted to engaging in

sexual conduct with her. In addressing potential conditions of release, the State argued “that

based on the specific nature of the facts in this cause,” “there is no condition or combination of

conditions that would keep these children safe, or any child within our community as well, based

on the behavior and conduct of [defendant].” The State maintained that neither electronic

monitoring nor home confinement could mitigate the threat defendant posed because “all these

crimes did occur within the home.” The State concluded by asserting that “based on the totality

of this cause, the facts within, and also the types of conditions that this Court can put in place,

there are no conditions *** that would keep these children specifically or the community safe.”

¶8 Defendant acknowledged he had been charged with a detainable offense, and he

made no argument challenging his dangerousness. Instead, he argued conditions of release could

-3- be imposed to mitigate the threat he posed. In support of his argument, defendant noted that he

had no criminal history and scored a 3 on the VPRAI. The score placed him at “risk level 2” out

of 6 risk levels. Defendant introduced the VPRAI Instruction Manual into evidence as an exhibit.

He noted that the manual recommended pretrial release for level 2 offenders. He suggested the

court place him on the strictest level of pretrial supervision provided for in the VPRAI. This

level of supervision included a reminder for every court date, a “criminal history check before

every court date,” “face-to-face contact every week,” and “special condition compliance

verification.” With respect to the special conditions of release the court could impose, defendant

suggested that the court could order him to “obtain a sex offender evaluation and commence any

recommended treatment” and order him to comply with the two-year order of protection entered

in his divorce proceedings that prohibited him from having contact with the three alleged victims

in this case. Defendant indicated he would also agree to any additional conditions of release the

court deemed necessary to mitigate the threat of his dangerousness. Defendant concluded his

argument by noting the alleged conduct “happened within the confines of his family,” the

victims were “protected by that order of protection,” and there was “not an allegation that any

other member of the community has ever been either threatened or is subject to be threatened” by

him.

¶9 In response to defendant’s argument, the State conceded that the alleged conduct

involved “a crime of opportunity for the children within his home.” Nonetheless, the State

asserted the order of protection could not mitigate the threat posed by defendant’s release due to

“the inherent nature that the piece of paper that an order of protection is, is as much.” The State

argued that “[b]ased on the particular nature of this offense, *** there are no conditions or

combination of conditions that would keep these children safe from [defendant] or the

-4- community other than for his detention.” Defendant countered the State’s position by noting the

State was merely arguing he should be detained “based upon the nature of the offense,” which

was not permitted under the statute.

¶ 10 Following the parties’ arguments, the trial court found the State had proven the

allegations in its petition by clear and convincing evidence and granted its petition to deny

defendant pretrial release. The court provided the following reasoning in open court:

“The verified petition that the state has filed is in compliance with the

statute. You are charged with a detainable offense[ ]. The Court has considered

the written pleading by the state, arguments in support, arguments by your

counsel against and in favor of your pretrial release. I am specifically finding that

the state has met their burden with respect to this petition by clear and convincing

evidence based on the following: I need to be specific with my findings. The

proffer contained in the petition, the verbiage used, the allegations of the potential

alleged criminal activity ***. You’re presumed innocent of the charges as you sit

here today. ***

***

Based on [the VPRAI], the probable cause statement, I do find,

specifically, based on the aforementioned, that there is no single condition or set

of conditions that could be implemented to mitigate the threat or safety for the

community at large. So I want to make sure that I’m crystal clear with my

findings, the allegations, per the proffer, in addition to the probable cause

statement.”

¶ 11 The trial court also entered a written order. The form order contained a section for

-5- the court to provide its reasoning for denying pretrial release. The nine reasons listed are the nine

statutory factors a court is to consider when making a determination of dangerousness. See

id. § 110-6.1(g). The trial court checked the boxes indicating it was basing its decision on (1) the

nature and circumstances of the charged offenses, (2) the identity of the people to whom

defendant posed a threat, and (3) statements made by defendant. The court did not provide any

additional explanation as to why no conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the threat

defendant posed.

¶ 12 Defendant appealed the trial court’s order. This court reversed on the basis the

trial court failed to address potential conditions of release and remanded for a new detention

hearing. We allowed defendant’s unopposed motion to stay the mandate while he appealed this

court’s order to the supreme court.

¶ 13 The supreme court ultimately entered a supervisory order denying defendant’s

petition for leave to appeal but directing this court to vacate its judgment and consider the effect

of Cousins “on the issue of whether, upon remand to the circuit court, the circuit court should

conduct a new hearing on the State’s petition to deny pretrial release or conduct a hearing on the

conditions of release, and determine if a different result is warranted.” Jeanpierre, No. 130879

(Ill. June 4, 2025) (supervisory order). In Cousins, the supreme court held that when a court of

review finds the State failed to satisfy its burden of proving pretrial detention is necessary, “the

remedy is to remand for a hearing on the conditions of release. At such time, the circuit court

shall impose the mandatory conditions required by the Act and may impose additional conditions

at its discretion to ensure the appearance of defendant and the safety of the community.”

Cousins, 2025 IL 130866, ¶ 36.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

-6- ¶ 15 On appeal, defendant argues the State failed to satisfy its burden of proving by

clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release could be imposed to mitigate his

dangerousness and, as a result, the appropriate remedy is to remand for the trial court to conduct

a hearing on the conditions of his release. “[W]hen the parties to a pretrial detention hearing

proceed solely by proffer, the reviewing court is not bound by the circuit court’s factual findings

and may therefore conduct its own independent de novo review of the proffered evidence and

evidence otherwise documentary in nature.” People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54.

¶ 16 The Code provides that all criminal defendants are presumed eligible for pretrial

release (725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 6.1(e) (West 2022)). To overcome the statutory presumption and

detain a defendant pretrial, the State bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing

evidence, in pertinent part, the following three elements: (1) the proof is evident or the

presumption great the defendant committed a detainable offense (id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)); (2) the

defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, based on

the specific articulable facts of the case (id. § 110-6.1(e)(2)); and (3) “no condition or

combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-10 of this Article can

mitigate *** the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community,

based on the specific articulable facts of the case” (id. § 110-6.1(e)(3)). “If the State fails to carry

its burden on any of these three facts, the presumption of release remains, and detention is

unlawful.” People v. Sorrentino, 2024 IL App (1st) 232363, ¶ 32 (citing 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)

(West 2022)).

¶ 17 Section 110-10(b) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-10(b) (West 2022)) sets forth a

nonexhaustive list of permissible conditions a trial court may impose on a defendant’s pretrial

release. Those conditions include that the defendant: (1) “[r]efrain from approaching or

-7- communicating with particular persons or classes of persons” (id. § 110-10(b)(3)); (2) “[r]efrain

from going to certain described geographic areas or premises” (id. § 110-10(b)(4)); (3) “[b]e

placed under direct supervision of the Pretrial Services Agency, Probation Department or Court

Services Department in a pretrial home supervision capacity” (id. § 110-10(b)(5)); and

(4) “[c]omply with the terms and conditions of an order of protection” (id. § 110-10(b)(7)).

Section 110-10 further provides that when a defendant has been charged with, in part, predatory

criminal sexual assault of a child or criminal sexual assault, the court “shall impose conditions to

restrict the defendant’s access to the victim which may include, but are not limited to conditions

that he will” “[v]acate the household” and “[r]efrain from contact or communication with the

child victim.” Id. § 110-10(c). The Code states that decisions regarding release and conditions of

release “must be individualized, and no single factor or standard may be used exclusively to

order detention.” Id. § 110-6.1(f)(7).

¶ 18 Here, the State’s detention petition consisted of a preprinted form with checked

boxes corresponding with certain provisions of the Code. The only assertions by the State

specific to defendant consisted of the factual basis quoted above, in its entirety. The factual basis

related solely to the nature and circumstances of the charged offenses. The State also filed a

pretrial investigation report, which indicated defendant had no criminal history and scored a 3 on

the VPRAI, which placed him “at a low-moderate risk level.” At the detention hearing, the State

conceded that “[t]his does appear to be, for [defendant], a crime of opportunity for the children

within his home.” Nonetheless, the State argued that “based on the specific nature of the facts in

this cause,” “there is no condition or combination of conditions that would keep these children

safe, or any child within our community as well, based on the behavior and conduct of

[defendant].” The State asserted that neither electronic monitoring nor home confinement could

-8- be imposed as conditions of release because “all these crimes did occur within the home.” The

State also argued that the condition defendant be ordered to comply with the order of protection

prohibiting him from having contact with the victims and their mother could not mitigate the

danger he posed due to “the inherent nature that the piece of paper that an order of protection is,

is as much.”

¶ 19 We agree with defendant that the State failed to satisfy its burden of proving by

clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of pretrial release could be imposed to mitigate

the threat he posed to any persons or the community. It appears the State relied exclusively on

the nature and circumstances of the charged offenses, as set forth in its factual basis and probable

cause statement, in arguing that no conditions could mitigate the threat posed by defendant. The

State did not present any evidence beyond the nature and circumstances of the alleged conduct

demonstrating defendant, based on his individual background and characteristics, was likely to

violate any condition imposed by the court. See People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 19

(finding the State’s reliance “on its factual proffer about the allegations *** did nothing to

establish that no combination of conditions could mitigate the threat”); see also 725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(f)(7) (West 2022) (“[N]o single factor or standard may be used exclusively to order

detention.”). Indeed, the evidence showed defendant had no criminal history and the VPRAI

placed him at a “low-moderate risk level.”

¶ 20 In addressing possible conditions of release, the State dismissed the efficacy of an

order of protection due to it being nothing more than a “piece of paper,” and it briefly discussed

home confinement and electronic monitoring. However, the State offered no explanation as to

why electronic monitoring could not be imposed as a condition of release, nor did it explain why

home confinement could not be ordered at a different residence. The State did not address any of

-9- the other conditions the trial court could have imposed pursuant to section 110-10(b) of the

Code, such as ordering that defendant: (1) “[r]efrain from approaching or communicating with

particular persons or classes of persons” (725 ILCS 5/110-10(b)(3) (West 2022)); (2) “[r]efrain

from going to certain described geographic areas or premises” (id. § 110-10(b)(4)); or (3) “[b]e

placed under direct supervision of the Pretrial Services Agency, Probation Department or Court

Services Department in a pretrial home supervision capacity with or without the use of an

approved electronic monitoring device” (id. § 110-10(b)(5)). See Cousins, 2025 IL 130866, ¶ 30

(“Although the State is not required to specifically address every conceivable condition or

combination of conditions and argue why each condition does not apply, the State must still

present sufficient evidence to allow the circuit court to determine whether pretrial release is

appropriate.”).

¶ 21 Accordingly, because the State did not present any evidence to justify detention

beyond the nature and circumstances of the charged offenses, we find it failed to satisfy its

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions could be imposed to

mitigate defendant’s dangerousness. As a result, the trial court erred in granting the State’s

detention petition, and we remand for the court to conduct a hearing on the conditions of release.

See id. ¶ 36.

¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 24 Reversed and remanded with directions.

- 10 -