People v. Jacotin

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Jacotin

304 A.D.2d 447, 757 N.Y.S.2d 563, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4220

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 22, 2003

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 304 A.D.2d 447 (People v. Jacotin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Jacotin, 304 A.D.2d 447, 757 N.Y.S.2d 563, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4220 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003).

Pincite

Opinion

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx Comity (Joseph Cerbone, J.), rendered December 18, 2000, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree, and sentencing him to 15 years to life, unanimously affirmed.

It appears that counsel advised defendant that an extreme emotional disturbance (EED) defense under Penal Law § 125.25 (1) (a), if successful, would reduce second-degree murder to first-degree manslaughter, and that defendant would likely receive a sentence for EED manslaughter on the high end of the scale. On the basis of this advice, and because he believed that the two eyewitnesses to the charged stabbing would not appear to testify, defendant elected to forgo the EED defense. Consistent with this choice, counsel, who had previously obtained a CPL article 730 evaluation when he learned of defendant’s psychiatric history, moved to suppress the identifications, delivered an opening statement telling the jury that the People do not always prove what they say and that defendant was innocent as evidenced by the lack of fingerprint evidence and his cooperation with police, and cross-examined witnesses. Then, after an eyewitness testified, dooming defendant’s wait-and-see strategy, and after defendant became aware that a second eyewitness was present and would corroborate the first, defendant pleaded guilty based on the court’s representation that it would likely impose the statutory minimum sentence notwithstanding the prosecutor’s objections. Under these circumstances, defendant, who was asserting his innocence and would have been required, had he chosen to as[448]*448sert EED and to present psychiatric evidence explaining or excusing his acts, to give pretrial written notice of such intent (CPL 250.10 [1] [b]; [2]), cannot complain that counsel was ineffective either for not preparing an EED defense or for not dissuading defendant from rejecting it (see People v Petrovich, 87 NY2d 961 [1996]; see also People v Modica, 64 NY2d 828 [1985]; People v Baldi 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]). We have considered defendant’s other arguments and find them unavailing. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Sullivan, Lerner, Friedman and Gonzalez, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx Comity (Joseph Cerbone, J.), rendered December 18, 2000, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree, and sentencing him to 15 years to life, unanimously affirmed.

It appears that counsel advised defendant that an extreme emotional disturbance (EED) defense under Penal Law § 125.25 (1) (a), if successful, would reduce second-degree murder to first-degree manslaughter, and that defendant would likely receive a sentence for EED manslaughter on the high end of the scale. On the basis of this advice, and because he believed that the two eyewitnesses to the charged stabbing would not appear to testify, defendant elected to forgo the EED defense. Consistent with this choice, counsel, who had previously obtained a CPL article 730 evaluation when he learned of defendant’s psychiatric history, moved to suppress the identifications, delivered an opening statement telling the jury that the People do not always prove what they say and that defendant was innocent as evidenced by the lack of fingerprint evidence and his cooperation with police, and cross-examined witnesses. Then, after an eyewitness testified, dooming defendant’s wait-and-see strategy, and after defendant became aware that a second eyewitness was present and would corroborate the first, defendant pleaded guilty based on the court’s representation that it would likely impose the statutory minimum sentence notwithstanding the prosecutor’s objections. Under these circumstances, defendant, who was asserting his innocence and would have been required, had he chosen to as[448]*448sert EED and to present psychiatric evidence explaining or excusing his acts, to give pretrial written notice of such intent (CPL 250.10 [1] [b]; [2]), cannot complain that counsel was ineffective either for not preparing an EED defense or for not dissuading defendant from rejecting it (see People v Petrovich, 87 NY2d 961 [1996]; see also People v Modica, 64 NY2d 828 [1985]; People v Baldi 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]). We have considered defendant’s other arguments and find them unavailing. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Sullivan, Lerner, Friedman and Gonzalez, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

304 A.D.2d 447, 757 N.Y.S.2d 563, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4220, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-jacotin-nyappdiv-2003.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack