People v. Jackson

166 Cal. App. 3d 187, 212 Cal. Rptr. 121, 1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 1822
California Court of Appeal·Decided March 27, 1985·No. B006262·Published·Cited by 6 cases

Opinion

Opinion

LUI, J.

Kenneth Jackson appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of three counts of first degree burglary, *189 two counts of robbery, and nine counts of residential robbery. (Pen. Code, §§459, 211, 211/213.5.) He was sentenced to 21 years and 4 months in the state prison and contends: “The trial court erred in sentencing appellant to subordinate terms in excess of five years [because] Penal Code section 1170.95(a) does not permit the aggregate consecutive sentences for various crimes to exceed five years unless all of the crime [sz'c] are residential burglaries.”

Factual Background

As appellant’s sole contention concerns the proper interpretation of Penal Code section 1170.95, which increases the limits on total subordinate terms for consecutive residential burglary offenses, the substantive facts underlying appellant’s convictions need not be set forth in detail.

It is sufficient to observe that appellant was convicted following jury trial of three counts of first degree residential burglary, two counts of robbery, and nine counts of residential robbery in connection with a crime spree during late 1982 and 1983, which involved the forcible taking of money and property from eleven elderly persons and three instances of burglary of residences, also occupied by senior citizens.

At the sentencing hearing, the court selected the upper base term of six years for one of the first degree burglary counts, and imposed two consecutive one year terms for the two robbery counts, consecutive sixteen-month terms for eight of the nine residential robbery counts and two consecutive sixteen-month terms for the two remaining first degree burglary counts for a total unstayed term of twenty-one years and four months. Appellant claims that the maximum permissible sentence is eleven years and the excess term must be stayed.

Statement of the Issues

With certain exceptions not applicable to the instant matter, Penal Code section 1170.1 imposes two relevant limitations upon subordinate terms of imprisonment consecutively imposed for offenses, such as here, which are not “violent felonies” within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c). The total of subordinate terms for such offenses may not exceed five years, nor may they exceed twice the number of years imposed by the trial court as the base term pursuant to Penal Code section 1170. (Pen. Code, § 1170.1, subds. (a) and (g).)

*190 In 1982, section 1170.8 was added to the Penal Code, and was subsequently renumbered as section 1170.95. 1 That section provides, in pertinent part: “(a) Notwithstanding Section 1170.1 relating to the maximum total of subordinate terms for consecutive offenses which are not ‘violent felonies,’ the total of the subordinate terms for consecutive offenses which are all residential burglaries may exceed five years but shall not exceed 10 years. [f] (b) Notwithstanding Section 1170.1, the term of imprisonment may exceed twice the number of years imposed by the trial court as the base term pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1170 if the defendant stands convicted of at least two residential burglaries. ” (Italics added.)

Appellant contends that, since 11 of his 14 crimes were not residential burglaries, neither subdivision (a) nor subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 1170.95 applies and the total consecutive terms for all subordinate offenses may not exceed 5 years. We disagree. Nevertheless, as will appear, the sentence must be modified to the extent that the unstayed consecutive subordinate terms imposed for offenses other than the residential burglaries exceed five years.

Discussion

Initially, it is necessary to examine the words of Penal Code section 1170.95 to determine whether the meaning of its express terms are clear or ambiguous. “ ‘When statutory language is thus clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 723 [195 Cal.Rptr. 503, 669 P.2d 1278].)

Penal Code section 1170.95, subdivision (a) increases the five-year limitation for consecutive subordinate terms to ten years “for consecutive offenses which are all residential burglaries . . . .” This provision might be constnied to permit the 10-year limitation to apply on subordinate burglary terms only when all of a defendant’s convictions are for residential burglary. Alternatively, the increased limits on subordinate terms might also be interpreted to apply to all convictions for residential burglary, even when a defendant is convicted of other, unrelated offenses to which the five-year limitation of Penal Code section 1170.1 would apply.

*191 Subdivision (b) of section 1170.95 provides that the double the base term limits of Penal Code section 1170.1 do not apply, “. . . if the defendant stands convicted of at least two residential burglaries.” This provision might be construed to apply only when a defendant sustains multiple convictions for residential burglary to the exclusion of other crimes. On the other hand, subdivision (b) may be interpreted as abolishing the double the base term limitation so long as the defendant sustains at least two convictions for residential burglary, regardless of the sentences imposed for other crimes. Thus, the express terms of subdivisions (a) and (b) of Penal Code section 1170.95 are susceptible to different interpretations that could materially affect the sentence under review.

This court’s analysis of the statutory provisions is guided by settled principles of statutory construction. “ ‘Where language [of a statute] is susceptible of more than one meaning, it is the duty of the courts to accept that intended by the framers of the legislation, so far as its intention can be ascertained.’ [Citation.]” {Sand v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 567, 570 [194 Cal.Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787].) “To discern legislative intent, we must examine the legislative history and statutory context of the act under scrutiny.” {Ibid.; see also People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 5 [184 Cal.Rptr. 454, 648 P.2d 104].)

Penal Code section 1170.8, the statutory predecessor to current Penal Code section 1170.95, was added by statute as Assembly Bill No. 501 during the 1982 regular legislative session. In its original form, the bill amended Penal Code section 1170.1 by completely eliminating the existing five-year limitation on subordinate prison terms for all criminal offenses. (Assem. Bill No. 501 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) as introduced in the Assembly, Feb. 12, 1981; hereinafter AB 501.) In its first amended version, the bill also eliminated “. . . the limitation of twice the base term on total terms of imprisonment to which it applies . . . .” for all crimes. (AB 501 (1981-1982 Reg.

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People v. Jackson, 166 Cal. App. 3d 187, 212 Cal. Rptr. 121, 1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 1822 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).

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