People v. Jackson CA4/2

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: April 24, 2026
• Docket: E085641
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 4/24/26 P. v. Jackson CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E085641

v. (Super.Ct.No. CR69388)

JONATHAN KEITH JACKSON, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Samah Shouka, Judge.

Dismissed.

Benjamin Kington, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, James William Bilderback II, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens and

Meredith S. White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 Defendant and appellant Jonathan Keith Jackson filed a petition for resentencing

pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6,1 which the court denied. On appeal, defendant

contends the court erred in denying his petition. We dismiss.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 9, 1999, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (§ 187,

count 1); willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, count 2);

and being a felon in possession of a firearm (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1), count 3). The

jury also found true allegations that defendant inflicted great bodily injury upon the

attempted murder victim (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)), personally used a

handgun in the commission of the murder and attempted murder (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a),

1192.7, subd. (c)(8)), and that a principal was armed with a handgun in the commission

of the murder (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The jury additionally found true a special

circumstance allegation that defendant committed the murder while engaged in the

commission of a robbery or attempted robbery (former § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)). (People

v. Jackson (2014) 58 Cal.4th 724, 731-732 (Jackson I); People v. Jackson (July 24, 2020,

E073960) [nonpub. opn.] (Jackson II); People v. Jackson (July 26, 2023, E079526)

[nonpub. opn.] (Jackson III); People v. Jackson (Dec. 11, 2025, E083072) [nonpub. opn.]

(Jackson IV).)

Thereafter, the court determined that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony

conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and a prior strike

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e), 1170.12, subd. (c)). The jury returned a verdict of

death on the murder conviction. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) (Jackson I, supra, 58 Cal.4th at

p. 732 & fn. 2; Jackson II, supra, E073960; Jackson III, supra, E079526; Jackson IV,

supra, E083072.)

The court imposed an indeterminate sentence of death on the murder offense; the

court imposed a consecutive sentence of life with the possibility of parole on the

attempted murder offense, but stayed that sentence. The court imposed but stayed all

attached enhancements, including the prior prison term enhancement and stayed sentence

on the count 3 offense. (Jackson IV, supra, E083072.)

On automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court, that court affirmed the

judgment. (Jackson, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 732; Jackson II, supra, E073960; Jackson

III, supra, E079526; Jackson IV, supra, E083072.)

On January 7, 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to former

section 1170.95,2 which the court denied. Defendant appealed. Appellate counsel filed a

brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967)

386 U.S. 738. We affirmed. (Jackson II, supra, E073960.)

On July 5, 2022, defendant filed another petition pursuant to former

section 1170.95, which the court denied. (Jackson III, supra, E079526.)

Defendant appealed contending the court erred in relying on the factual summary

of the opinion in Jackson I in denying the petition. The People conceded the order

2 Effective June 30, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended and renumbered section 1170.95 as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

3 denying the petition must be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings;

however, the People requested that any remand be without prejudice to the People raising

the issue of whether the only method of challenging the verdict was by way of a petition

for writ of habeas corpus, since the court sentenced defendant to death. (§ 1509,

subd. (a).) We reversed and remanded but agreed with the People that they could raise

the issue of whether defendant was required to proceed by way of habeas corpus on

remand. (Jackson III, supra, E079526.)

On December 21, 2023, the court found defendant ineligible for resentencing

pursuant to section 1172.75 and denied defendant’s “motion.” The court vacated the

previous sentence on defendant’s prior prison term, imposed a one-year sentence, and

then struck punishment on the enhancement. (Jackson IV, supra, E083072.)

Defendant appealed. We affirmed the court’s order because defendant’s judgment

had included a prior prison term upon which the court stayed punishment; thus, we held

that since defendant was not serving a term of imprisonment for the enhancement, he was

not entitled to a full resentencing hearing.3 (Jackson IV, supra, E083072.)

3 The People alternatively argued that defendant was ineligible for resentencing because he was under a judgment of death. We assumed for purposes of the appeal that section 1172.75 could potentially apply but found that defendant was ineligible because the court had stayed imposition of punishment on the enhancement. We noted that the legislative purposes of section 1172.75 would not be furthered by permitting resentencing where the court did not execute sentence on the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement. We further observed this was “especially true here, where the court sentenced defendant to death, and the California Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. (People v. Jackson, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 732.)” (Jackson IV, supra, E083072.)

4 On September 3, 2025, the California Supreme Court issued an order directing us

to vacate our decision in Jackson IV and reconsider the cause in light of People v.

Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050. The People contended defendant remained ineligible

for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 because he was under a judgment of death.

We reversed and remanded the matter with directions to hold a full resentencing hearing

on the noncapital portions of defendant’s sentence. (Jackson IV, supra, E083072.)

On January 3, 2025, on remand from Jackson III, the court denied defendant’s

second former section 1170.95 petition. The court cited this court’s opinion in People v.

Thompson (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 101 (Thompson), noting that “if the death penalty case

is on direct appeal, then we would need a remittitur before we can do anything. The trial

court would have no jurisdiction. [¶] Once the direct appeal has been handled and

affirmed, then this court might have jurisdiction.” The court noted that otherwise,

defendant would have to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the court erroneously denied his petition based on Thompson

because Thompson was wrongly decided. Specifically, defendant maintains that a

petition pursuant to section 1172.6 is not a collateral attack governed by section 1509 and

that, even if it is a collateral attack, section 1509 “does not dictate the exclusive method

of postconviction relief for death-sentenced individuals.”

The People argue the appeal should be dismissed because this court has no

jurisdiction since section 1509 “provides the sole and exclusive avenue for capital

5 defendants to collaterally attack their judgments.”4 We agree with Thompson and the

People; therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

“Senate Bill [No.] 1437 [(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)] significantly limited the scope

of” theories under which malice is imputed to a person based on that person’s

participation in a crime “to effectuate the Legislature’s declared intent ‘to ensure that

murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with

the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with

reckless indifference to human life.’” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708

(Strong).)

“Senate Bill [No.] 1437 also created a special procedural mechanism for those

convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as amended.

[Citations.] Under newly enacted section 1172.6, the process begins with the filing of a

petition containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met [citation],

including that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted

murder because of changes to . . . Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’

the effective date of Senate Bill [No.] 1437 [citation].” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at

p. 708, fn. omitted.)

“When the trial court receives a petition containing the necessary declaration and

other required information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the

4 The People filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which we denied “without prejudice to respondent raising the arguments in the respondent’s brief.” Because we follow Thompson, we grant the People’s motion to dismiss.

6 petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ [Citations.] If the petition and record

in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court

may dismiss the petition.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)

In November 2016, California voters approved Proposition 66, the “Death Penalty

Reform and Savings Act of 2016.” (Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 822 (Briggs).)

Section 1509 was enacted pursuant to Proposition 66. (Thompson, supra, 106

Cal.App.5th at p. 119.) Section 1509 provides that a “writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

this section is the exclusive procedure for [a] collateral attack on a judgment of death.”

(§ 1509, subd. (a).)

“[A] capital defendant is entitled to seek resentencing relief under section 1172.6,

absent an expression of legislative intent to limit resentencing relief to noncapital

defendants, but . . . the requested relief must be presented in a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to section 1509, to comply with the mandate of Proposition 66.”

(Thompson, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 118-119.)5

“Section 1509 is an initiative statute which prohibits a capital defendant from

bringing postconviction collateral challenges by a procedural vehicle other than a petition

for writ of habeas corpus under section 1509, as required by Proposition 66.”

5 In Thompson, the People agreed the matter should be remanded but asserted the issue should have been raised by a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Thompson, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 118-119.) The Thompson court remanded the matter “to the superior court with directions to vacate the trial court’s ruling on defendant’s section 1172.6 petition, without prejudice to defendant to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus per section 1509, seeking resentencing as provided in section 1172.6.” (Id. at p. 131.) Here, the People contend the appeal should be dismissed. We agree with the People.

7 (Thompson, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 123; see People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th

874, 955, 958 [Defendants under judgment of death may raise issues under the Racial

Justice Act but must do so by way of petition for writ of habeas corpus]; see People v.

Dixon (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 236, 249 (Dixon), review granted Oct. 22, 2025, S292223

[“Interpreting section 1172.75 to allow resentencing on a death sentence would authorize

what Proposition 66 prohibits: a collateral attack on a judgment of death by a procedural

vehicle other than a writ of habeas corpus under section 1509”]; see People v. Millsap

(2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 368, 381 (Millsap) [The exclusive means of attacking an

indivisible judgment that included death was the direct, automatic appeal to the

California Supreme Court and/or the filing of a petition for writ of habeas corpus].)

“It is not only the death sentence, but also all capital and noncapital convictions

and the sentences imposed within the judgment, that fall under the jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court.” (Millsap, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 378 [With respect to section

1172.75 proceedings].) “[T]he capital judgment over which the Supreme Court has

exclusive jurisdiction is indivisible and includes convictions and sentences for noncapital

as well as capital offenses.” (Id. at p. 383; contra, Dixon, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at

p. 240 [court could resentence the defendant pursuant to section 1172.75 “on the

noncapital portions of his sentence but not on the death sentence”]; People v. Cain (2025)

116 Cal.App.5th 917, 922 (Cain) [same], review granted Feb. 18, 2026, S294810.)6

6 Both Millsap and Dixon involved cases in which the defendants’ death judgments were still under review by the California Supreme Court. (Millsap, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 373; Dixon, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 239.) Like the defendant in [footnote continued on next page]

8 “[A] collateral attack is any procedural challenge that does not constitute a direct

attack. [Citation.] For example, a proceeding brought for some purpose other than

specifically attacking the judgment. [Citation.]” (OC Interior Services, LLC v.

Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1318, 1327 (OC).) “‘A collateral attack

is an attempt to avoid the effect of a judgment or order made in some other proceeding.’

[Citation.]” (F.E.V. v. City of Anaheim (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 462, 471 (F.E.V.).)

We agree with Thompson. Here, defendant’s request for resentencing pursuant to

section 1172.6 is “a proceeding brought for some purpose other than specifically

attacking the judgment. [Citation.]” (OC, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 1327.) Defendant

is not contending that the judgment was unsupported when rendered. Rather, it is “‘an

attempt to avoid the effect of a judgment or order made in some other proceeding.’

[Citation.]” (F.E.V., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 471.) Defendant argues that he should

be resentenced not because the judgment was unsupported but because subsequently

ameliorative provisions should apply. Thus, defendant’s petition is a collateral attack to

which section 1509 applies.

Therefore, defendant should have filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Thus,

we dismiss the appeal. (See Thompson, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th p. 131.)

Cain, the California Supreme Court has already affirmed defendant’s judgment of death. (Cain, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 922; Jackson I, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 732.)

9 III. DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. (See Thompson, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 131.)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

McKINSTER J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ P. J.

MENETREZ J.