2026 IL App (2d) 240569-U No. 2-24-0569 Order filed February 23, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AZMI IBRAHIM JR., Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County. Honorable D. Christopher Lombardo, Judge, Presiding. No. 22-CF-2055
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Birkett and Mullen concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: There was slight evidence that warranted instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter; however, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as there was ample circumstantial evidence he acted knowingly and intentionally when he shot the victim.
¶2 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Lake County, defendant, Azmi Ibrahim Jr., was
found guilty of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2020)) and sentenced to a 50-year
prison term. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 On December 12, 2022, at around 9:30 p.m., the body of Roy Hoffman—naked except for
a pair of socks—was discovered in his apartment in Fox Lake. He had suffered a single gunshot
wound to the head. Hoffman’s downstairs neighbor, Eric Paszczyk, testified that at about 9:30 p.m.
that night, a man he did not know knocked on his door. Thinking the man might be a neighbor,
Paszczyk invited him into his apartment and offered him a beer. They chatted for a few minutes,
at which point the man’s phone rang and he answered it. Paszczyk did not hear the details of the
conversation, but he heard a female voice coming from the phone. The voice sounded “frantic”
and was “screaming.” The man then left Paszczyk’s apartment. Shortly thereafter, Paszczyk saw
the man walking upstairs toward Hoffman’s apartment. The man was holding a firearm in both
hands. A minute or two later, Paszczyk saw the man walking back down the stairs with a woman
behind him. They got into a minivan and drove away. After a few minutes, Paszczyk walked up to
Hoffman’s apartment. Hoffman’s door was open, and Paszczyk saw his body on the floor.
Paszczyk could tell that Hoffman was deceased. Paszczyk then called 911.
¶5 Caalyn MacKay testified that she had been in a relationship with defendant prior to
December 12, 2022. At around 9 or 9:15 p.m. on that date, she received a text message from
defendant containing a photo of a gun. At about that time, MacKay engaged in a video call with
defendant, who was in a motor vehicle. Defendant said that he was waiting for Kathryn Deason,
who was in an apartment having sex with her “boyfriend.” MacKay relayed the information to a
McHenry County sheriff’s deputy.
¶6 Deason testified that on December 12, 2022, she was at defendant’s house. They were
drinking and had taken some Xanax. At some point, she received a Facebook message from
Hoffman offering to pay her for sex. Deason accepted, and defendant agreed to drive her in her
van to Hoffman’s home. Defendant remained in the van while Deason went inside. She engaged
-2- in consensual oral and vaginal sex with Hoffman. Deason testified that defendant called her several
times while she was in Hoffman’s apartment, but she answered only one of the last calls, which
she received while she was getting dressed. She told defendant that she was fine. While Deason
was still getting dressed, her phone rang again and there was a knock on the door. Hoffman opened
the door, and Deason heard defendant’s voice asking if she was inside. Hoffman tried to close the
door, but defendant kicked it in. Defendant was carrying a gun. He aimed it at Hoffman and told
him to get down on the ground. Hoffman complied. Defendant then “pulled back something on
the gun.” Deason assumed that defendant was checking to see if the gun was loaded. According to
Deason, “[Defendant] looked at me, and I don’t know. I just didn’t even recognize him. He turned
back, and the gun went off. He shot him.” Defendant told Deason that “he didn’t mean to do it.”
¶7 They returned to defendant’s house, and defendant told her to take a shower to wash off
any gunpowder residue. Eventually, she fell asleep on the couch. She awoke when she heard the
police knocking on the door. They interviewed her at the police station. She initially denied going
to Hoffman’s apartment. Then she told the police that she went there alone. She falsely claimed
that Hoffman was alive when she left and that he had raped her. The police took her to the hospital,
where a rape kit was performed. Ultimately, Deason was charged with disorderly conduct and
obstruction of justice in connection with her false statements to the police. She pleaded guilty
under an agreement with the State and was sentenced to probation. The agreement provided that
Deason would testify truthfully at defendant’s trial.
¶8 Two interviews with defendant were conducted by investigators Jose Barrera and Greg
Pilaski. Video recordings of both interviews were admitted into evidence and played for the jury.
During the first interview, defendant denied owning any weapons but admitted that he had shared
-3- photographs of weapons by text message. He explained that his “ex” had various men “talking all
kinds of shit” to him, so he sent one of them a picture of a rifle.
¶9 Asked why he had been to Fox Lake, defendant replied that he did not know that he had
been to Fox Lake and that he did not think he had ridden in Deason’s van. He stated that Deason
drove her van to Fox Lake for her “pimp,” Leo. He later admitted that he rode in the van with
Deason and Leo to an apartment building at a location he was unfamiliar with. Deason left the van,
apparently to have sex with a client. Defendant and Leo remained in the van. Defendant denied
exiting the van. He stated that Leo got out and returned sometime later with Deason, at which point
they drove off.
¶ 10 When told he was being interviewed in connection with a shooting, defendant stated that
he had never shot anybody. He stated that when Deason and Leo returned to the van, Leo said, “It
shouldn’t have went down like this.” Deason and Leo began arguing. Defendant saw a weapon the
size of an Uzi. At some point, Deason told defendant that Leo killed somebody. Barerra accused
defendant of lying and of killing the victim. Defendant vehemently denied the accusation.
¶ 11 During the second interview, defendant admitted he went up to Hoffman’s apartment and
knocked on the door. He explained that Deason had called him and claimed that Hoffman was
trying to rape her. When Hoffman opened the door, he told defendant to “get the f*** away from
here” and threatened to call the police. Thinking he had knocked on the door to the wrong
apartment, defendant then went downstairs and knocked on the door to another apartment. The
occupant let defendant in, gave him a beer, and told him that Hoffman was “crazy.”
¶ 12 Defendant went to the van, retrieved a pistol, and went back upstairs to Hoffman’s
apartment. Defendant told Hoffman to let Deason go. Hoffman said, “What the f*** are you going
to do?” At that point, the gun “went off” and Hoffman was struck. Questioned in more detail about
-4- the shooting, defendant said he did not know whether Hoffman had a gun, but there was a knife
and some money on a table. Hoffman said that he had forgotten to pay Deason. At first, defendant
pointed the gun at Hoffman’s legs and threatened to shoot him in the leg if he “[did not] stop.”
Defendant explained that Hoffman was getting “hyper.” When Hoffman reached toward the
table—for either the money (to pay Deason) or the knife—defendant pointed the gun up. (Later in
the interview, defendant indicated that Hoffman handed him the money. Deason counted it while
they were either still in Hoffman’s apartment or in the van after they left.) Defendant stated that
he “didn’t mean to pull the trigger, but it pulled.” At several points during the interview, defendant
stated that the gun “just fired,” “just went off,” or “just shot.” Defendant indicated that the gun
was a Draco pistol and that he had hidden it under his trailer. The weapon was ultimately recovered
from that location.
¶ 13 Defendant testified that on December 12, 2022, Deason told him she had plans to go on a
“companionship date.” She asked defendant to come with her because the person she was going
to meet seemed creepy. Defendant agreed. It was Deason’s idea to bring a gun. When they arrived
at Hoffman’s apartment, Deason said she would be inside for less than an hour. Deason entered
the building while defendant remained in her van. After about an hour and 15 minutes, defendant
started texting Deason. After another half hour, he went into the building to try to find Deason. He
went upstairs and knocked on the door of what turned out to be Hoffman’s apartment. He asked
through the door if Deason was there. A voice from inside the apartment responded, “ ‘No. Get
the f*** out of here.’ ” The speaker threatened to get a gun if defendant did not leave. At that
point, defendant thought that he had gone to the wrong apartment, so he went downstairs and
knocked on another door. Paszczyk opened the door, invited defendant in, and offered him a beer.
-5- Defendant told Paszczyk that he was looking for Deason. Paszczyk thought that she might be
upstairs because Hoffman always had women coming and going from his apartment.
¶ 14 After a few minutes, Deason called defendant. She told him to come upstairs right away
because Hoffman was raping her. Defendant heard Deason cursing and screaming at Hoffman.
Defendant asked Deason where she was. She replied, “ ‘You were just f*** here.’ ” When
defendant told Paszczyk that Deason was in Hoffman’s apartment, Paszczyk replied, “Oh, that
guy’s crazy like that.”
¶ 15 Defendant left Paszczyk’s apartment, retrieved his gun from the van, and returned to
Hoffman’s apartment. Deason opened the door, but Hoffman, who must have been behind her,
slammed it shut. Defendant turned the doorknob and shoved his way into the apartment. Defendant
pointed the gun down at Hoffman and threatened to shoot his legs. At some point, Hoffman reached
for what appeared to be a knife. Defendant testified, “Right away, *** I just said, ‘No, don’t f***
do that,’ and I pointed up and I shot right away.” Defendant later explained that his actions were,
“[j]ust, you know, instinct, *** just I [sic] pointed the gun and it fired.” (Emphasis added.)
Defendant’s attorney asked defendant, “[D]id the gun just go off?” Defendant responded, “Well,
it felt like it, you know, kind of when just like it went off, but, obviously I had to pull the trigger.”
¶ 16 Asked why he told the police that the gun “just went off,” defendant replied,
“It kind of felt like everything happened so fast like it was like, you know, just he reached,
and I just right away I had to shoot. So it was like it felt like, you know, it felt like I didn’t
even do it but I did it, you know, I had to pull it.”
Asked how he knew that he “pulled it,” defendant replied, “Because it fired.” Defendant further
testified that his finger was on the trigger and that he “did fire that weapon.” He did so “[b]ecause
-6- [Hoffman] reached for that knife. That was the only reason. I thought he was going to stab me.”
Defendant acknowledged on cross-examination that he “meant to shoot” Hoffman.
¶ 17 The trial court instructed the jury on the law of self-defense. It also gave the jury
instructions and a verdict form for the offense of second degree murder under the theory that
defendant was acting under the unreasonable belief that his actions were justified under the law of
self-defense. See 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(2) (West 2020). However, the court refused defendant’s
tendered instruction on involuntary manslaughter. The court reasoned:
“The defendant testified that he deliberately and intentionally shot Roy Hoffman because
he was reaching for a knife. The statement that was put into evidence before the defendant’s
case was that he made a video statement not under oath that the gun just went off. The
defendant explained it, that the gun just went off; that he pulled the trigger, it justs [sic]
happened so fast. So I’m going to deny. I don’t see the recklessness component being
supported by the evidence. In fact, clearly the defendant testified he intentionally [and]
deliberately defended himself by his testimony by [sic] shooting this man with his firearm.
***.”
¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-
included offense of involuntary manslaughter. “A ‘lesser-included offense’ is an offense proven
by lesser facts or a lesser mental state, or both, than the charged offense.” People v. Perry, 2011
IL App (1st) 081228, ¶ 28. The standard of review applicable here has been described as follows:
“In the context of jury instructions for lesser-included offenses, decisions from our
supreme court indicate a bifurcated standard of review. As to the first prong of the
analysis—determining whether an offense is a lesser-included of the greater offense—our
-7- supreme court has repeatedly said this involves a purely legal question and our review is
de novo. [Citation.] Then, as to the second prong of the analysis—determining whether the
evidence at trial supports giving the lesser-included instruction—our supreme court has
said, as the parties acknowledge, that our review requires the demonstration of an abuse of
the trial court’s discretion.” People v. Hill, 2020 IL App (1st) 162119, ¶ 17 (citing People
v. McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 42; People v. Kennebrew, 2013 IL 113998, ¶ 18).
¶ 20 As our supreme court has explained:
“[I]n an appropriate case, the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on less serious
offenses that are included in the charged offense. Such a practice provides an important
third option to a jury. If a jury believes that a defendant is guilty of something, but uncertain
whether the charged offense has been proved, the jury might convict the defendant of the
lesser offense rather than convict or acquit the defendant of the greater offense.” People v.
Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d 332, 359 (2003).
“[T]he appropriate standard for determining whether a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction
on a lesser-included offense is whether there is some evidence in the record that, if believed by the
jury, will reduce the crime charged to a lesser offense ***.” (Emphasis in original.) McDonald,
2016 IL 118882, ¶ 25. The “some evidence” standard does not involve an assessment of the
credibility of the evidence, which is a matter for the jury to decide. Id.
¶ 21 Evidence meeting this standard can include the defendant’s own statements admitted into
evidence by the State. For instance, in People v. Willett, 2015 IL App (4th) 130702, ¶¶ 1, 11, the
defendant was prosecuted for aggravated battery to a child under the theory that the infant victim’s
brain injury was the result of “ ‘shaken baby syndrome.’ ” The State’s evidence included the
defendant’s recorded interview with the police in which he stated that he gently shook the victim
-8- to wake her or to get her to stop crying and that he did not intend to hurt her. Id. ¶ 18. The Willett
court held that the statement was “ ‘some evidence’ ” that the defendant caused the injury
recklessly rather than knowingly. Id. ¶ 91. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to an instruction
on the lesser-included offense of reckless conduct.
¶ 22 Moreover, when there is some evidence that would support a verdict on a lesser-included
offense, the defendant is entitled to an instruction even if the evidence is contrary to the defendant’s
own testimony. People v. Everette, 141 Ill. 2d 147, 156 (1990). In this respect, the Everette court
noted with approval the existence of “ ‘support [for] the proposition that a homicide defendant
may be entitled to an instruction on both accident and self-defense, two inconsistent affirmative
defenses.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. (quoting Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 64 (1988)).
¶ 23 We are aware that in People v. Ciavirelli, 262 Ill. App. 3d 966, 973-74 (1994), decided
after Everette, the appellate court held that the defendant was not entitled to instructions on both
self-defense and involuntary manslaughter where “[the] [d]efendant’s primary defense *** was
one of justifiable homicide (self-defense).” The court noted that ‘ “[b]ecause the theories of self-
defense or defense of a third party presuppose an intention to kill or cause great bodily harm, these
theories are inconsistent with the crime of involuntary manslaughter which, by definition, is
evidenced by the mental state of recklessness, not intent.” ’ Id. at 974 (quoting People v.
DeMumbree, 98 Ill. App. 3d 22, 25 (1981)). Notably, the Ciavirelli court did not mention Everette.
More importantly, perhaps, the outcome in Ciavirelli appears to have depended on the absence of
evidence of recklessness rather than the inconsistency of the defenses. See id. (“Here, although the
witnesses testified that [the] defendant stumbled as the beer can struck him, there is no evidence
that this caused the gun to accidentally discharge. Nor was any such claim made. To the contrary,
the witnesses testified that [the] defendant aimed the gun at persons in the group and fired between
-9- four and six shots into the group. Such deliberate action cannot be considered reckless.”). In any
event, Everette’s reasoning dictates the conclusion that a defendant charged with first degree
murder is entitled to instruction on both self-defense and involuntary manslaughter if there is
evidence to support both instructions. If a criminal defendant can receive instructions on
inconsistent affirmative defenses (a proposition the Everette court appears to have embraced), we
see no reason why a defendant could not be entitled to instructions on an affirmative defense and
a lesser-included offense that are mutually inconsistent.
¶ 24 With these principles in mind, we consider whether the evidence supported an instruction
on involuntary manslaughter. Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree murder. As
pertinent here, section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2020))
provides:
“(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first
degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:
(1) he or she either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual
or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another;
or
(2) he or she knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to that individual or another.”
¶ 25 Section 9-3(a) of the Code (id. § 9-3(a)) provides, in pertinent part, “A person who
unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter
if his acts *** which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to
some individual, and he performs them recklessly ***.” Involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-
included offense of first-degree murder. People v. Elizondo, 2021 IL App (1st) 161699, ¶ 70. Thus,
- 10 - whether defendant committed first-degree murder or involuntary manslaughter depended on his
mental state. If he acted intentionally or knowingly, he committed first degree murder. If he acted
recklessly, he committed involuntary manslaughter. If he acted with none of these mental states,
he would not be guilty of either offense.
¶ 26 Defendant cites, as “some evidence” supporting an involuntary manslaughter instruction,
his statement that the gun “just went off” and other similar statements during the police interviews.
The State responds that those statements, if believed by the jury, would have established that
defendant acted with no culpable mental state. Thus, according to the State, the evidence would
not support a finding of recklessness necessary for an involuntary manslaughter conviction. The
State insists that “[s]ince the [statements] defendant relies upon do not include any acceptance of
responsibility for the gun discharging, defendant cannot use it as evidence of recklessness.”
Alternatively, the State argues that defendant’s testimony that “he pointed the gun at the victim
and pulled the trigger based on his fear of violence from the victim” “cannot be the basis for a
finding of recklessness, because if accepted it justifies not only pointing a gun at someone, but
pulling the trigger.”
¶ 27 Neither argument is persuasive. Although it has been held that the accidental discharge of
a weapon is not, in itself, a reckless act (People v. Cunningham, 2019 IL App (1st) 160709, ¶ 31),
if the jury believed defendant’s testimony that the gun discharged accidentally, it might still found
that he acted recklessly, because “[i]t is considered settled law in Illinois that pointing a loaded
firearm at another person constitutes recklessness because that conduct is a gross deviation from
the standard of care exercised by a reasonable person.” People v. Lemke, 349 Ill. App. 3d 391, 396
(2004). Regarding the State’s second argument, the State appears to assume that if defendant
pulled the trigger, he necessarily intended to kill or cause great bodily harm to Hoffman or knew
- 11 - that there was a strong probability of those outcomes. Again, we disagree. Even though defendant
testified that he must have pulled the trigger, his testimony suggested that he acted reflexively,
without time for deliberation necessary to form a criminal intent or to appreciate the likely
consequences of his actions. Under these circumstances, a rational trier of fact could conclude that
defendant acted without the requisite intent or knowledge for a conviction of first-degree or
second-degree murder but, nonetheless, acted recklessly by confronting Hoffman with a gun.
¶ 28 Moreover, even if defendant’s trial testimony was incompatible with a theory of
recklessness, that is no reason to withhold an instruction on the lesser-included offense of
voluntary manslaughter, where, as in Willett, defendant’s statements to police, which the State
offered into evidence, support a finding that defendant acted recklessly, rather than knowingly or
intentionally. Everette, 141 Ill. 2d at 156.
¶ 29 According to the State, the trial court, in refusing to give an involuntary manslaughter
instruction, found that defendant’s trial testimony “contextualized his statements [to the police]
that ‘the gun just went off’ to mean that it happened quickly but not recklessly.” We understand
the trial court’s position. As noted, however, a lesser-included offense instruction should be given
when there is “some evidence” to support it (McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 25), even if it is
inconsistent with the defendant’s testimony at trial. Defendant’s statements to police—which the
State offered into evidence—were some evidence that the shooting was reckless. Any question
how to interpret those statements, and what weight to give them in comparison to defendant’s
testimony, should have been left to the jury.
¶ 30 Although the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense
of involuntary manslaughter, the error does not necessarily require reversal. See People v.
Washington, 2012 IL 110283, ¶¶ 58-59 (error in failing to instruct jury on second-degree murder
- 12 - does not necessarily require reversal). “Error is harmless where a reviewing court can safely
conclude that a trial without the error would have produced no different result.” People v. Roman,
323 Ill. App. 3d 988, 999 (2001). That is the case here. Defendant’s evidence that he merely acted
recklessly, though not legally dependent on his claim of self-defense, was inextricably linked to
the factual narrative underlying both that defense and the theory that defendant was guilty of only
second-degree murder. Whether defendant pulled the trigger purposely or inadvertently, or the gun
somehow went off by itself, defendant steadfastly maintained that he confronted Hoffman with the
gun because he was trying to protect Deason and that when the gun went off (for whatever reason)
he was concerned that Hoffman might be reaching for a knife. Had the jury believed that that was
the case, it would have either acquitted defendant or found him guilty only of second-degree
murder. However, the jury clearly rejected that account, finding him guilty of first-degree murder.
It is practically inconceivable that the jury, having apparently rejected that narrative, would
nonetheless have credited defendant’s statements to police to the effect that he did not (or did not
mean to) pull the trigger when Hoffman was shot. As noted, the reason for instructing the jury on
a lesser-included offense is to provide an alternative to finding the defendant guilty or not guilty
of the charged offense. Here, however, the jury was already presented with, and rejected, a third
option: finding defendant guilty of second-degree murder. Thus, the jury did not find defendant
guilty of murder simply because it believed he was guilty of something and had no other option
except acquittal. The possibility that an instruction on voluntary manslaughter would have changed
the jury’s verdict is negligible at best, and the trial court’s refusal to give the instruction was
harmless.
¶ 31 Before closing, we note that in People v. Henson, 2017 IL App (2d) 150594, and People v.
Blan, 392 Ill. App. 3d 453 (2009), this court stated that the failure to give a lesser-included offense
- 13 - instruction is not amenable to harmless-error analysis. We believe that those decisions can only be
understood as limited to the facts and issues before the court at that time; they do not represent a
unique statement of the law on jury instructions and lesser-included offenses within this district.
For context, we note that the only instructional error that is deemed to be “structural”—and thus
subject to automatic reversal—is a “a defective reasonable doubt instruction.” People v. Averett,
237 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (2010). It stands to reason that any other type of jury-instruction error, short of
distorting the standard of proof for determining guilt or innocence, can be assessed for
harmlessness in light of the trial evidence. Failure to issue a lesser-included offense instruction
could result in plain error if the evidence was close, it does not always threaten the reliability of a
trial on the charged offenses. Here, the defense essentially asserted a paradox: “accidental self-
defense.” The jury rejected defendant’s claim of self-defense, and we have no real reason to think
they might have accepted the weak and incongruous explanation that Hoffman’s death was,
instead, merely an accident.
¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 33 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.
¶ 34 Affirmed.
- 14 -