People v. Hutchins

Opinion

People v Hutchins

2026 NY Slip Op 05037

August 19, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

The People of the State of New York, respondent,

v

Sharaya Hutchins, appellant.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 19, 2026

2022-06832, (Ind. No. 72987/21)

Colleen D. Duffy, J.P.

Paul Wooten

Helen Voutsinas

James P. McCormack, JJ.

Patricia Pazner, New York, NY (David P. Greenberg of counsel), for appellant.

Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Michael Bierce, and Daniel Berman of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Heidi C. Cesare, J.), rendered August 15, 2022, convicting her of criminal possession of a firearm, upon her plea of guilty, and imposing sentence of a term of probation, including Condition No. 14, requiring the defendant to support dependents and meet other family responsibilities, Condition No. 15, requiring the defendant to submit to any assessments and/or tests to determine the presence of alcohol or illegal substances if directed by the Department of Probation, Condition No. 24, requiring the defendant to participate in an alcohol, substance abuse, intervention, domestic violence or alternative to violence program as directed by the Department of Probation, Condition No. 25, requiring the defendant to refrain from wearing or displaying gang paraphernalia and having any association with a gang or members of a gang if directed by the Department of Probation, and Condition No. 28, requiring the defendant to consent to a search by a probation officer of her person, vehicle, and place of abode, and the seizure of any illegal drugs, drug paraphernalia, firearm, or other weapon or contraband found.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting Condition Nos. 14 and 25 from the conditions of probation; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

"Pursuant to Penal Law § 65.10(1), the conditions of probation 'shall be such as the court, in its discretion, deems reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so'" (People v Dranchuk, 203 AD3d 741, 742, quoting Penal Law § 65.10[1]). "The statute 'quite clearly restricts probation conditions to those reasonably related to a defendant's rehabilitation'" (id. at 742-743, quoting People v Letterlough, 86 NY2d 259, 265).

Under the circumstances of this case, Condition No. 14, requiring that the defendant "[s]upport dependents and meet other family responsibilities," was improperly imposed because it was not individually tailored in relation to the offense, and therefore, was not reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation or necessary to insure that she will lead a law-abiding life (see People v Aldea, 244 AD3d 745, 746; People v Sobers, 235 AD3d 908, 909-910).

Further, Condition No. 25, requiring that the defendant "[r]efrain from wearing or displaying gang paraphernalia and having any association with a gang or members of a gang if [*2]directed by the Department of Probation," was improperly imposed because it was not reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation or necessary to ensure that she will lead a law-abiding life (see People v Balogh, 245 AD3d 572, 574; People v Seymore, 245 AD3d 423, 424). The record is devoid of evidence that the defendant had any history of gang affiliation or that the conviction was connected to gang activity in any respect.

However, contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court appropriately imposed Condition Nos. 15 and 24 based upon, among other things, the defendant's admitted regular use of marijuana, as those conditions were reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation and necessary to ensure that she will lead a law-abiding life (see People v Elijah C., 241 AD3d 1361, 1364; People v Fields, 84 Misc 3d 19, 20-21 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists]).

Further, the Supreme Court properly imposed Condition No. 28, as it was individually tailored in relation to the conviction of criminal possession of a firearm, and therefore, was reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation or necessary to ensure that she will lead a law-abiding life (see People v Grandstand, 236 AD3d 817, 818; People v Rogers, 235 AD3d 781, 782). Moreover, the portion of Condition No. 28 that allowed a probation officer, incident to a search of the defendant's person, vehicle, or place of abode, to seize illegal drugs or drug paraphernalia, was not unlawful, as a probation officer otherwise conducting a lawful search would be entitled to seize any contraband found regardless of that condition being in place (see People v Grandstand, 236 AD3d at 818; People v Rogers, 235 AD3d at 782).

The defendant's contention regarding the imposition of mandatory surcharges and fees is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Clemmons, 171 AD3d 1207), and we decline to reach it in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.

DUFFY, J.P., WOOTEN, VOUTSINAS and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court