People v. Husband

38 Misc. 3d 957
CourtCriminal Court of the City of New York
DecidedNovember 30, 2012
StatusPublished

This text of 38 Misc. 3d 957 (People v. Husband) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Criminal Court of the City of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Husband, 38 Misc. 3d 957 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2012).

Opinion

[958]*958OPINION OF THE COURT

Robert M. Mandelbaum, J.

In 1996, the legislature established within the Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) a computerized state DNA identification index (see L 1994, ch 737, § 1 [codified at Executive Law § 995-c, eff Jan. 1, 1996]). Pursuant to that legislation, anyone convicted of and sentenced for certain enumerated felony assault, homicide or sex offenses was thenceforth required to provide a DNA sample for forensic testing and analysis “to determine identification characteristics specific to such person and to be included in [the] . . . index” (L 1994, ch 737, § 1 [codified at Executive Law § 995-c (3)]). In creating the index, “New York jointed] twenty-six other states which ha[d] enacted DNA databank statutes” and could “now participate in the national DNA identification system, known as CODIS [Combined DNA Index System], developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to enable federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to share DNA information when investigating sex offenses and violent crime” (Governor’s Mem approving L 1994, ch 737, 1994 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY at 3018).

Over the years, the legislature periodically expanded the list of crimes thus subject to mandatory provision of a DNA sample and inclusion in the databank (see L 1999, ch 560, § 1; L 2000, ch 8, § 1; L 2004, ch 1, part A, § 13; L 2004, ch 138, § 1; L 2004, ch 576, § 1; L 2006, ch 2, § 1; L 2006, ch 91, § 2; L 2006, ch 320, § 26; L 2010, ch 405, § 6), culminating in the enactment of chapter 19 of the Laws of 2012, which, effective August 1, 2012 (see L 2012, ch 55, part A, § 2), defined a “designated offender” subject to mandatory DNA collection as anyone “convicted of any felony defined in any chapter of the laws of the state or any misdemeanor defined in the penal law” (L 2012, ch 19, § 5 [codified at Executive Law § 995 (7)]).1 The 2012 enactment also, for the first time, set forth procedures for collection: “In the case of a designated offender whose sentence does not include either a term of imprisonment or a term of probation, . . . [w]ithin the [959]*959city of New York, the court shall order that the sample be collected by a court officer” (L 2012, ch 19, § 6 [codified at Executive Law § 995-c (3) (b) (iii)]).2

On August 8, 2012, seven days after the effective date of chapter 19, defendant pleaded guilty at his arraignment to the class A misdemeanor of theft of services and was sentenced to time served. Pursuant to chapter 19, defendant’s conviction rendered him a designated offender obligated to provide a DNA sample to be ordered collected by a court officer. A review of defendant’s criminal-history record report, generated by DCJS, revealed that defendant had been convicted of two prior felonies and 12 misdemeanors, and reflected that, as a result of such criminal history, his DNA sample had previously been collected, and his DNA profile was, therefore, already “on file in the DNA databank.” Accordingly, the court determined that collection of an additional sample was unnecessary and declined to order a court officer to obtain it. This opinion serves to explain the basis for the court’s decision.

Executive Law § 995-c provides (1) that subsequent to conviction and sentencing for a crime specified in Executive Law § 995 (7), “[a]ny designated offender . . . shall be required to provide a sample appropriate for DNA testing to determine identification characteristics specific to such person and to be included in [the] state DNA identification index” (Executive Law § 995-c [3] [a]), and (2) that in the City of New York, “the court shall order that the sample be collected by a court officer” (Executive Law § 995-c [3] [b] [iii]). The question thus arises whether the court must order a defendant who has previously provided a sample appropriate for DNA testing, and whose sample has already been analyzed and included in the databank, to give another.

“In implementing a statute, the courts must of necessity examine the purpose of the statute and determine the intention of the Legislature” (Williams v Williams, 23 NY2d 592, 598 [1969]). “Indeed, the primary consideration of the courts in the construction of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. Legislative intent drives judicial interpretations in matters of statutory construction” (People v [960]*960Santi, 3 NY3d 234, 243 [2004] [internal quotation marks, citations and brackets omitted]). To be sure, in determining the intent of the legislature, “courts normally accord statutes their plain meaning, but will not blindly apply the words of a statute to arrive at an unreasonable or absurd result” (id. at 242 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Rather, courts “look to a statute as a whole so as to construe it in a manner consistent with the presumption that unreasonable results are not intended by the Legislature” (Matter of Pokoik v Department of Health Servs., County of Suffolk, 72 NY2d 708, 718 [1988] [citations omitted]).

The underlying purpose served by the existence of the index and the inclusion of offenders’ samples within it is to solve crimes. Since the odds of two different people (other than identical twins) having the same DNA profile are nearly infinitesimal, a match between two DNA profiles (properly tested and analyzed) tends to establish that the samples came from the same person. Accordingly, comparison of an analyzed sample from a known individual with a sample retrieved from a crime scene enables law enforcement either to determine the identity of the perpetrator (if the samples match) or to exonerate a suspect whose DNA profile does not match.

“The DNA identification index ... is a powerful tool both for preventing and solving crimes and for establishing a defendant’s innocence. Since its inception in 1996, there have been more than 10,000 hits against the Databank resulting in over 2,900 convictions. Currently, convicted offenders who are in the Databank have, on average, been convicted of three crimes — and in some cases as many as 30 crimes — for which no DNA has been collected before they were convicted of the DNA-eligible offense. Because individuals who commit serious crimes also commit less serious crimes, collecting DNA from individuals convicted of any Penal Law misdemeanor and all felonies will help to prevent and solve murders, rapes, and other crimes. The last expansion of the Databank that included petit larceny provides concrete evidence of the promise that this expansion holds: when petit larceny was added to [the] list of DNA[-]eligible crimes in 2006, it resulted in solving almost 1000 crimes, including 223 rapes and 53 homicides.
“The Databank also plays a significant role in help[961]*961ing to determine who did not commit a crime. There have been 27 individuals exonerated in New York through DNA evidence, as well as countless suspects who have been excluded and cleared most often at the earliest stages of an investigation” (Senate Introducer’s Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2012, ch 19 at 2-3).

By expanding the index to include nearly every criminal offender, the legislature sought to increase the pool of people whose DNA would be maintained within the databank and thereby available for analysis and comparison with samples retrieved from crime scenes.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

People v. Santi
818 N.E.2d 1146 (New York Court of Appeals, 2004)
Pokoik v. Department of Health Services
533 N.E.2d 249 (New York Court of Appeals, 1988)
Williams v. Williams
246 N.E.2d 333 (New York Court of Appeals, 1969)
Howard v. Wyman
271 N.E.2d 528 (New York Court of Appeals, 1971)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
38 Misc. 3d 957, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-husband-nycrimct-2012.