2025 IL App (4th) 240374-U NOTICE This Order was filed under FILED July 16, 2025 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-24-0374 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Peoria County MICHAEL R. HOWARD, ) No. 17CF168 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Kevin W. Lyons, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Vancil and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court remanded the cause for a preliminary inquiry into defendant’s pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶2 Defendant, Michael R. Howard, appeals his convictions of first degree murder (720
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2016)) and armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West 2016)). Although
defendant challenges the judgment on many bases, we agree with his contention that the trial court
failed to conduct an adequate preliminary inquiry into his pro se claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel in accordance with the procedure tracing its origins to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d
181 (1984). Accordingly, we remand for a proper preliminary inquiry into defendant’s ineffective-
assistance claims and decline to address defendant’s other arguments at this time.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 We provide only the facts necessary to understand the dipositive Krankel issue. ¶5 On February 28, 2017, defendant, Gemia Shird, and Samantha Gordon drove to
Garrison Collins’s home. While defendant and Shird remained in the vehicle, Gordon entered
Collins’s home and went down to the basement, where Collins resided. Eventually, defendant
entered the home with a firearm, and Collins sustained a fatal gunshot wound shortly thereafter.
¶6 The State’s theory was that defendant was involved in a plan to commit an armed
robbery against Collins and that defendant shot Collins during the commission of that offense.
Accordingly, the State charged defendant with first degree murder under a felony-murder theory
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2016)), armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West 2016)), and
unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2016)). Gordon faced
her own charges in separate proceedings, but Shird was never charged.
¶7 Defendant’s case proceeded to a jury trial in June 2018, at which he was represented
by counsel. Gordon testified for the State against defendant, contradicting her previous testimony
in her own trial. Shird did not testify. The jury found defendant guilty of all three charges.
¶8 On July 18, 2018, defendant filed a pro se motion for a new trial. Although the copy
of the motion that we have is extremely difficult to read, the trial court later read some of
defendant’s claims into the record. We discern that defendant alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel for six overarching reasons: (1) failing to subpoena Shird as a defense witness; (2) failing
to move for a mistrial due to improper comments made by the prosecutor during closing
arguments; (3) failing to file a written motion for discovery, file a motion asking the court to review
that discovery in camera, and have that discovery impounded for purposes of appeal; (4) failing
to object to the State not performing a database search including Collins’s genetic marker material
to determine whether Collins’s DNA was on the gun used in the shooting; (5) failing to refute the
State’s evidence that the absence of stippling showed that Collins was not shot from a close range;
-2- and (6) failing to introduce additional portions of defendant’s recorded police interrogation that
the State did not play at trial.
¶9 On July 18, 2018, the trial court conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry with
respect to these claims and determined they lacked a valid basis. The court then sentenced
defendant to 47 years in prison for first degree murder, consecutive to a 2-year sentence for
unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The court did not enter judgment on the armed robbery
conviction.
¶ 10 In March 2021, the appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence
for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon but reversed and remanded for a new trial on the
other two counts. People v. Howard, 2021 IL App (3d) 180441-U, ¶ 34. The court reasoned that
the weapon charge should have been tried separately from the other charges.
¶ 11 On remand, defendant, through counsel, filed motions seeking to suppress his
custodial statements and conduct an additional database search including Collins’s genetic profile
to determine whether Collins’s DNA was on the gun used in the shooting. The trial court denied
those motions.
¶ 12 The matter proceeded to a second jury trial in July 2023 on the first degree murder
and armed robbery charges. Before jury selection began, the trial court mentioned that it received
pro se filings from defendant dated July 3, 2023. Those filings are not included in the record on
appeal. When questioned by the court, defendant expressed dissatisfaction at not having reviewed
all the discovery. After some conversation, the court ruled that, to the extent this could be
considered a “pre-Krankel hearing,” defendant’s claim was “not well-taken and will be denied.”
¶ 13 Unlike the first trial, Shird testified against defendant at the second trial, but Gordon
did not testify. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and armed robbery.
-3- ¶ 14 On July 28, 2023, defendant filed a 12-page, pro se posttrial motion. Pages 6
through 12 of the motion outlined a series of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We discern
that defendant alleged his counsel was ineffective for the following 14 overarching reasons:
(1) failing to subpoena Gordon as a defense witness; (2) failing to move for a mistrial due to
unspecified improper comments made by the prosecutor during closing arguments; (3) failing to
file a written motion for discovery, file a motion asking the trial court to review that discovery
in camera, and have that discovery impounded for purposes of appeal; (4) failing to object to the
State not performing a database search including Collins’s genetic marker material to determine
whether Collins’s DNA was on the gun used in the shooting; (5) failing to confront or challenge a
witness for the State who failed to swab the barrel of the subject gun for purposes of facilitating
DNA testing; (6) failing to challenge or refute the State’s evidence—such as through an
investigation, cross-examination, calling a defense expert, and use of an autopsy photograph with
a clear view—that the absence of stippling showed that Collins was not shot from a close range;
(7) failing to subpoena forensic scientist Jason List as a gun expert for the defense; (8) failing to
introduce additional portions of defendant’s recorded police interrogation that the State did not
play at trial; (9) failing to move to reopen defendant’s motion to suppress his custodial statements;
(10) failing to show defendant the discovery; (11) failing to impeach Shird on four points;
(12) failing to file a motion to compel production regarding Shird’s deal with the State to testify
against defendant; (13) arguing some theory of defense but then failing to offer an unspecified
instruction on that theory; and (14) making a closing argument that prejudiced defendant.
¶ 15 On August 1, 2023, the matter came before the trial court for a hearing on posttrial
motions and sentencing. The court first heard and denied a posttrial motion that defense counsel
had filed on defendant’s behalf, which did not include any ineffective-assistance claims. When the
-4- court said it would proceed to sentencing, defendant interjected that he had filed his own motion.
The court addressed and commented on some of defendant’s arguments in the first portion of his
pro se motion filed on July 28, 2023, which did not involve allegations of ineffective assistance.
Defendant subsequently directed the court’s attention to pages 6 through 12 of that pro se motion.
The court said it would conduct what it called a “pre-Krankel hearing,” which would consist of a
conversation between defendant and the court. The court stated that this would not be “a
conversation between [the prosecutor] or [defense counsel] or me or you.” The court told defendant
that “to raise a claim that would have strength enough to change lawyers,” the court “would have
to first be convinced that an adequate claim was made that would provide for that.”
¶ 16 The trial court then asked defendant to “give me in your own words what you think
you want to tell me in support of your claims.” Defendant responded that his allegations in pages
6 through 12 of his motion were “self-explanatory.” The court said, “You don’t have any thoughts
about it? You just want me to read it?” Defendant replied, “I mean, if you want to pick out
something we can talk about it.” The court asked defendant what “axiomatic” meant, which
defendant had used in an introductory paragraph citing boilerplate caselaw about ineffective-
assistance claims. The court then asked defendant, “What else do you want to tell me?” Defendant
responded, “Whatever you want to talk about. It’s there.” Defendant suggested that the court
should read the motion, and the court said, “I have read it.” When defendant expressed doubt that
the court had read the motion, the court told defendant to “[d]ial it back.” Defendant reiterated that
the motion contained his reasons for his ineffective-assistance claims. The court then ruled, “The
motion is denied.” The court later added, “The defendant has elected to provide no argument with
regard to his motion so the motion is denied.”
¶ 17 The trial court again sentenced defendant to 47 years in prison for first degree
-5- murder and imposed no sentence for armed robbery. A different judge, Paul P. Gilfillan, denied
defendant’s postsentence motion. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 Defendant raises numerous issues on appeal, one of which is that the trial court did
not conduct a proper preliminary inquiry into his pro se claims of ineffective assistance. For the
following reasons, we agree and remand the cause for a preliminary inquiry into defendant’s
claims. We decline to address at this time the other issues defendant raises.
¶ 20 Beginning with our supreme court’s decision in Krankel, courts have developed a
procedure to address pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Jackson,
2020 IL 124112, ¶ 95. Specifically, a court first must “examine the factual basis of the defendant’s
claim.” People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 35. “If the court determines that the claim lacks merit
or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new counsel and may
deny the pro se motion.” Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 35. “However, if the allegations show possible
neglect of the case, new counsel should be appointed.” Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 35. This process
of screening a pro se claim is often referred to as a “preliminary Krankel inquiry.” People v. Jolly,
2014 IL 117142, ¶ 30. The goal of Krankel proceedings is to “facilitate the trial court’s full
consideration of a defendant’s pro se claim,” thus creating a record and potentially limiting issues
raised on appeal. People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 13.
¶ 21 In conducting this inquiry, “ ‘some interchange between the trial court and trial
counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation
is permissible and usually necessary in assessing what further action, if any, is warranted on a
defendant’s claim.’ ” Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 12 (quoting Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 30). Thus,
the court may “inquire of trial counsel about the defendant’s allegations” and “discuss the
-6- allegations with [the] defendant.” Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 12. The court may also “make its
determination based on its knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial and the
insufficiency of the defendant’s allegations.” Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 12.
¶ 22 Our standard of review “depends on whether the trial court did or did not determine
the merits of the defendant’s pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Jackson,
2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98. To that end, we review de novo the issue of whether a defendant’s
allegations triggered a duty to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry. People v. Bell, 2018 IL App
(4th) 151016, ¶ 36. Likewise, “[w]hether the trial court properly conducted a Krankel preliminary
inquiry presents a legal question that we review de novo.” Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98.
“However, if the trial court has properly conducted a Krankel inquiry and has reached a
determination on the merits of the defendant’s Krankel motion, we will reverse only if the trial
court’s action was manifestly erroneous.” Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98. “Manifest error is error
that is clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98.
¶ 23 Here, defendant advanced approximately 14 ineffective-assistance claims in his
pro se motion filed on July 28, 2023. Filing that motion and bringing it to the trial court’s attention
on August 1, 2023, triggered the court’s duty to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry. See People
v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 79 (2003) (noting that to trigger the duty to conduct a preliminary Krankel
inquiry, “a pro se defendant is not required to do any more than bring his or her claim to the trial
court’s attention”). Thus, the question for our review is whether the court conducted a proper
preliminary Krankel inquiry.
¶ 24 We hold that the trial court failed to conduct a proper preliminary Krankel inquiry
on August 1, 2023. Although the court correctly recognized that it needed to conduct what it called
a “pre-Krankel hearing” and invited defendant generally to make an oral argument in support of
-7- his many written claims, the court never asked defendant or his counsel any questions about
specific claims. Rather than addressing the claims, the court seemingly quizzed defendant about
whether he knew what the word “axiomatic” meant, a word that defendant had used in the first
sentence of a prefatory paragraph as part of boilerplate language about the right to effective
assistance of counsel. The court then denied defendant’s motion without indicating whether any
claim evidenced possible neglect by counsel. The court’s only stated reason for its ruling was that
“defendant has elected to provide no argument with regard to his motion.” We acknowledge that
the court, having presided over defendant’s two trials, may have recognized that some of the claims
raised in defendant’s July 28, 2023, motion involved issues that were the same as or similar to
matters the court had already addressed. However, from our review of the record, not all the issues
that defendant raised in his July 28, 2023, motion had been addressed previously. Ultimately, the
way the court handled defendant’s claims on August 1, 2023, did not serve the goal of a
preliminary Krankel inquiry. See Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 13. The court left issues unresolved,
rather than creating a record conducive to determining whether defendant raised any claims that
might reflect possible neglect by his counsel.
¶ 25 Specifically, some of the claims in defendant’s July 28, 2023, motion were rather
vague and would have warranted asking defendant pointed questions to ascertain their factual
bases. It is not apparent what the factual bases were for defendant’s claims in his motion that his
counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to move for a mistrial due to improper comments in the
State’s closing arguments, (2) arguing a theory of defense and then failing to offer an instruction
on that theory, and (3) making a closing argument that prejudiced defendant. On appeal, defendant
points to specific examples of portions of the State’s closing arguments that he believes were
improper and prejudicial, but he did not do so in his pro se motion when alleging ineffective
-8- assistance of counsel.
¶ 26 It is also concerning that the trial court seemed to suggest at the outset of its
“pre-Krankel hearing” that it would not engage defense counsel in the conversation. As mentioned
above, it is usually necessary to solicit information from defense counsel during a preliminary
Krankel inquiry. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 12. For example, defendant’s contention that his
counsel should have “subpoenaed” two particular witnesses would have warranted soliciting a
response from defense counsel to ensure that counsel had a reasonable trial strategy for not calling
those witnesses. The State mentions in its brief that defense counsel likely declined to call Gordon
as a witness because her testimony at defendant’s first trial was detrimental to the defense’s theory
of the case. Although that might be a plausible basis for a trial court to find that this particular
claim did not evidence potential neglect, the problem is that the court said only that it denied
defendant’s pro se motion because defendant elected not to provide an argument. Essentially, the
State is outlining on appeal what might have been reasonable for the court to find had it actually
engaged in a meaningful inquiry with respect to the potential merits of one of defendant’s pro se
ineffective-assistance claims. This line of reasoning defeats the purpose of requiring trial courts to
conduct preliminary Krankel inquiries (see Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 13), especially considering
that the State does not argue that any error in not fully addressing defendant’s
ineffective-assistance claims was harmless.
¶ 27 In further defending the trial court’s preliminary Krankel inquiry on August 1,
2023, the State notes that the court “read defendant’s complaint and attempted to engage him in a
colloquy to determine whether new counsel should be appointed.” In the State’s view, defendant
“refused to engage” with the court when the court attempted to discuss defendant’s allegations.
The State also contends that the circumstances did not require the court to “engage in a lengthy
-9- colloquy” or “engage in extensive fact finding,” given that (1) defendant’s written motion
“completely set out his claims in factual detail supported by relevant authority” and (2) the court
was familiar with the case. Under the circumstances, the State submits that the court “conducted a
proper inquiry before determining defendant’s pro se claims were meritless, such that appointment
of new counsel was not warranted and no remand is necessary.”
¶ 28 The State’s arguments are unpersuasive. The record does not support the State’s
position that defendant “refused to engage” with the trial court’s attempt to elicit information from
him. Rather, although defendant generally rested on the contents of his motion, he also made it
clear that he was open to discussing any specific issues attendant to his claims that the court wished
to discuss. Certainly, this was not a situation where defendant expressed an intent to abandon the
claims in his motion. Moreover, as we already mentioned, some of defendant’s claims in his
motion either lacked the factual detail necessary to understand the precise nature of his grievances
or pertained to matters that may have occurred off the record. Thus, at least some discussion with
either defendant and/or his counsel about the claims would have been warranted and necessary to
create a sufficient record. Ultimately, the State seemingly wants us to assume that the court relied
on its own knowledge of the case to make implicit findings that all of defendant’s claims were
meritless and that it was unnecessary to appoint new counsel for him. Given that the court’s only
stated reason for denying the pro se motion was that defendant elected to provide no argument, we
cannot make that assumption.
¶ 29 Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for a proper preliminary Krankel inquiry
into defendant’s pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Given the number of
ineffective-assistance claims that defendant has asserted during various stages of these
proceedings, it would be helpful and appropriate for the court on remand to make express findings
- 10 - as to why each of the claims defendant wishes to advance does or does not reflect possible neglect.
We recognize that defendant raises many other issues in this appeal. However, until a trial court
completes posttrial proceedings, it is “premature” for an appellate court to address other
substantive issues. People v. Roberson, 2021 IL App (3d) 190212, ¶ 22; see People v. Lawson,
2019 IL App (4th) 180452, ¶ 57 (declining to address the defendant’s remaining arguments when
the matter had to be remanded for further Krankel proceedings); People v. Wilson, 2019 IL App
(4th) 180214, ¶ 25 (same); People v. Rhodes, 2019 IL App (4th) 160917, ¶ 21 (same). This is true
even where a defendant raises claims that would bar retrial if successful, such as a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence. See Bell, 2018 IL App (4th) 151016, ¶¶ 24, 37 (declining to address
the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence where the cause first had to be
remanded for the trial court to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry). Nevertheless, consistent
with this court’s precedent, we retain jurisdiction over defendant’s remaining claims; this means
that if defendant is dissatisfied with the outcome of the proceedings on remand, he may appeal
again and raise the claims we did not address in this appeal, along with any claims that arise from
the proceedings on remand. Wilson, 2019 IL App (4th) 180214, ¶ 26.
¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we remand the cause for a proper preliminary Krankel
inquiry into defendant’s pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 32 Remanded with directions.
- 11 -