NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 231257-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is August 4, 2025 NO. 4-23-1257 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Adams County RICHARD L. HOOD, ) No. 18CF148 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Zachary P. Boren, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding (1) defendant’s successive postconviction petition could not be deemed his initial postconviction petition because there were no deficiencies in the proceedings on the initial petition and (2) alternatively, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to file a successive postconviction petition because he failed to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant, Richard L. Hood, was convicted of three counts
of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(1) (West 2018)) and one count of unlawful
restraint (id. § 10-3), and he was subsequently sentenced to an aggregate term of 30 years in
prison. This court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See People v.
Hood, 2022 IL App (4th) 200260, ¶ 141.
¶3 While defendant’s direct appeal was pending, he pro se filed a postconviction
petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West
2020)). The trial court summarily dismissed his petition, finding that the issues he raised were (1) not new, (2) going to be addressed on direct appeal, or (3) frivolous or patently without merit.
Defendant appealed. This court allowed defendant to proceed pro se, as he requested, and we
ultimately dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution after defendant failed to file a brief.
¶4 Thereafter, defendant moved to file a successive postconviction petition. See 725
ILCS 5/ 122-1(f) (West 2022). The trial court denied the motion.
¶5 Defendant appeals that denial, arguing (1) his successive postconviction petition
must be treated as his first because the proceedings on the initial petition were deficient and
(2) alternatively, the trial court erred in denying him leave to file a successive petition. We
affirm.
¶6 I. BACKGROUND
¶7 The facts of this case are well known to the parties and this court. Accordingly,
we recite here only those facts necessary to resolve the issues defendant raises in this appeal.
¶8 A. The Conviction and Filing of the Direct Appeal
¶9 In February 2018, the State charged defendant with criminal sexual assault and
unlawful restraint after he lured B.L.M. to his home under the guise that she could do her laundry
at his house, and he would pay her to clean his home. While in the house, defendant kept B.L.M.
in his bedroom for several hours and repeatedly assaulted her.
¶ 10 In April 2019, a jury found defendant guilty of all counts, and the trial court
subsequently sentenced defendant to a total of 30 years in prison.
¶ 11 In June 2020, after defendant was sentenced, he filed a notice of appeal, and
appellate counsel was appointed to represent him.
¶ 12 In November 2020, appellate counsel moved to withdraw and asked this court to
allow defendant to proceed pro se. We denied both motions. Defendant moved to reconsider and
-2- appealed to the supreme court via a mandamus action.
¶ 13 In January 2021, we denied defendant’s motion to reconsider, explaining that
“[defendant] has presented no valid reason to believe the Office of the State Appellate Defender
cannot represent his interests adequately.”
¶ 14 B. The Initial Postconviction Petition
¶ 15 In February 2021, while defendant’s direct appeal was pending in this court,
defendant pro se filed his initial postconviction petition. His allegations were handwritten on a
preprinted form. Under the section that asked defendant to specify the constitutional rights he
was denied, he asserted, in total, the following:
“I want to raise all the issues that I raised and tried to raise in all my pre
and post trial motions and the newly discovered issues discovered during [another
case]. I want a different judge to consider [the] petition. Also, see my wife’s
affidavit filed in her case *** and the affidavit from Cameron Coulter I’m mailing
with this.”
Attached to defendant’s petition was Coulter’s affidavit, which was (1) written by defendant,
(2) not notarized, and (3) dated February 4, 2019, two months before defendant’s trial began.
Coulter attested he (1) had provided drugs to defendant in the past, (2) did not provide defendant
with drugs on the day of the incident, and (3) had partied with defendant and women with whom
he and defendant had sex.
¶ 16 Thereafter, defendant filed four supplements to his petition, one on February 22,
2021, two on February 26, 2021, and one on March 9, 2021. In these supplements, defendant
claimed (1) the State engaged in various acts of misconduct; (2) the State withheld from the jury
recordings of phone calls between B.L.M. and her boyfriend, who was in jail; (3) a nurse lied
-3- about bruises on B.L.M.’s neck; (4) “[h]ad there been any bruise, pictures of it would have been
mandated”; (5) a therapist who treated B.L.M. knew about and was prejudiced by another
woman who falsely accused defendant of holding her against her will for hours and beating her;
(6) Betsy Bier, an assistant public defender appointed to represent defendant after trial who was
subsequently dismissed when defendant was allowed to proceed pro se, was ineffective because
she failed to raise “all the relevant and meritorious issues [defendant] raised and tried to raise,”
including that the therapist who treated B.L.M. also treated another woman who accused
defendant of similar offenses; and (7) he was not allowed to see the warrant for his arrest where,
regarding the bond amount, a “5” was written over a “0.” Attached to defendant’s last
supplement was his wife’s affidavit, wherein she attested that (1) she and defendant wanted to
help B.L.M., (2) B.L.M. sexually assaulted defendant, and (3) defendant never harmed B.L.M.
¶ 17 In March 2021, the trial court, which construed defendant’s initial petition and the
supplements as one postconviction petition, summarily dismissed the petition. The court found,
“Defendant’s petition fail[ed] to clearly state the details as to how he believes his constitutional
rights were violated.” After noting defendant “appear[ed]” to focus on a freestanding actual
innocence claim based on newly discovered evidence, the court found that some of the new
evidence was addressed in another case of defendant’s that the State had nol-prossed. Thus, the
evidence was not new. The court also found that the following evidence was not new:
(1) allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, which the court addressed during trial and defendant
raised in a letter to his appellate counsel; (2) the recorded phone calls between B.L.M. and her
boyfriend, which were tendered to defendant during discovery; (3) Coulter’s affidavit, which did
not support an actual-innocence claim; (4) issues concerning the amount of bond on defendant’s
arrest warrant, which were addressed before trial; and (5) statements defendant’s wife made in
-4- her affidavit.
¶ 18 After the trial court noted that defendant “[c]ertainly” could initiate
postconviction proceedings while his direct appeal was pending, the court observed defendant
“allege[d] that on appeal he is seeking a remand for reconsideration based upon newly
discovered evidence.” The court asserted it “must assume that this precise issue of newly
discovered evidence is the one that [defendant] has raised on appeal.” The court found that
“[n]one of this information could be construed as newly discovered evidence.” (Emphasis
added.) The court concluded, “[Defendant’s petition] address[ed] issues being raised on appeal in
this case and all other issues are frivolous and patently without merit.” Accordingly, the court
summarily dismissed defendant’s petition at the first stage.
¶ 19 In April 2021, defendant filed a motion to have the trial court reconsider the
summary dismissal of his initial postconviction petition. In May 2021, he filed a supplement to
his motion. In June 2021, the court denied the motion to reconsider, noting that nothing in
defendant’s motion or supplement was new and unavailable to defendant when he filed his initial
postconviction petition.
¶ 20 C. The Direct Appeal Proceedings and Appeal of the Initial Petition’s Dismissal
¶ 21 In July 2021, appellate counsel filed a brief on defendant’s behalf in the direct
appeal.
¶ 22 In August 2021, defendant filed two supplements to the mandamus action brought
in the supreme court, noting in one supplement he was attempting to appeal this court’s refusal to
allow him to proceed pro se on direct appeal. The supreme court denied defendant’s mandamus
action in September 2021.
¶ 23 In January 2022, appellate counsel appointed to represent defendant in the appeal
-5- from the summary dismissal of his postconviction petition moved to withdraw and permit
defendant to proceed pro se, noting defendant “expressed a desire to represent himself in th[e]
appeal.” This court granted the motion in February 2022 and gave defendant until April 2022 to
file a brief. Thereafter, defendant moved to have counsel appointed to represent him. In May
2022, this court denied his motion for the appointment of counsel on appeal and extended the
time in which defendant had to file a brief. In August 2022, after “grant[ing] multiple motions
for extension of time” for defendant to file a brief, this court dismissed defendant’s appeal from
the summary dismissal of his initial postconviction petition because he “failed to file a brief.”
¶ 24 In November 2022, this court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences on
direct appeal. See Hood, 2022 IL App (4th) 200260, ¶ 141.
¶ 25 D. The Successive Postconviction Petition
¶ 26 In July 2023, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction
petition. In his motion, he argued he was forced to proceed pro se in the appeal from the
summary dismissal of his initial postconviction petition because counsel appointed to represent
him in both his direct appeal and initial petition appeal “fail[ed] to raise many meritorious
issues.” For example, defendant alleged that during his review of the common law record, which
he received in February 2022, he discovered for the first time a statement of facts from the State
wherein the State indicated “bruising was noted on [B.L.M.’s] neck and photographed, consistent
with being choked.” He also raised many vague claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that
concerned ancillary matters, such as counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to (1) obtain his
mother’s medical records and (2) protect him from unspecified prejudices the State and the trial
court held against him. Regarding the court’s actions, defendant argued it erred by summarily
dismissing his initial postconviction petition because it “misunderstood *** [defendant] was
-6- already raising those issues on direct appeal.” Defendant asserted claims of misconduct against
the trial court, this court, and the supreme court, which appeared to be related to not filing
pleadings or failing to tender the record to him. He also repeated many issues he had raised
earlier, such as his claim that the “0” on his arrest warrant was changed to a “5” and the therapist
who treated B.L.M. also treated another woman with whom defendant was familiar.
¶ 27 Thereafter, defendant filed four supplements to his motion for leave to file a
successive postconviction petition, one of which was filed after the trial court ruled on the
motion. In the three supplements filed before the court’s ruling, defendant again referred to his
many meritorious issues and raised issues he raised previously, including that he was innocent.
Defendant never specifically alleged that he had cause for not raising issues earlier or that he was
prejudiced by this failure.
¶ 28 In August 2023, the trial court, which construed defendant’s first three
supplements as part of his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, denied
defendant’s motion in a thorough, eight-page order. The court found, “[T]he vast majority of the
filings do not indicate that [defendant] had cause for his failure to bring these claims in his initial
post-conviction proceedings, or that prejudice result[ed] from that failure.” The court continued,
“Virtually everything the Defendant raises now was previously discussed, and there is no
suggestion that the Defendant would have been unable to bring [them] as part of his initial post-
conviction petition.”
¶ 29 That said, the trial court did consider whether photographs of bruising on
B.L.M.’s neck were taken and withheld from defendant. (The court questioned whether
defendant was unaware of this issue during earlier proceedings, noting that the statement of facts
was mailed to defendant on November 4, 2019, with proof of service.) Presuming, as defendant
-7- alleged, he was unaware of this statement of facts until February 2022, and thus defendant had
cause for not raising it beforehand, the court nevertheless determined defendant failed to
establish prejudice because several other pieces of evidence produced at trial (1) indicated
B.L.M. had bruises on her neck after the incident and (2) established defendant’s guilt.
Therefore, even if photographs had been taken of the bruising and withheld from defendant, that
would not have affected the outcome of the trial.
¶ 30 The trial court also addressed defendant’s innocence claim, noting that defendant
used this term throughout his filings. The court found, “[N]othing contained in the Defendant’s
new filings can set forth such a claim.” The court continued, “Even assuming the discrepancy
regarding whether pictures were taken of bruising to [B.L.M.’s] neck was newly discovered,
material[,] and not cumulative, the Court finds that it is not of such a conclusive character that it
would probably change the result on retrial.” In so finding, the court quoted this court’s
determination on direct appeal that “ ‘the evidence of defendant’s guilt’ in this case was
‘overwhelming.’ ” (quoting Hood, 2022 IL App (4th) 200260, ¶ 123).
¶ 31 In September 2023, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s order
denying him leave to file a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 32 In October 2023, the trial court denied the motion to reconsider, which it
considered along with defendant’s fourth supplement to his motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition and two other pleadings. The court found, “Defendant is ‘simply
reargu[ing] the case and present[ing] the same arguments and authority already considered.’ ”
(quoting People v. Teran, 376 Ill. App. 3d 1, 5 (2007)).
¶ 33 This appeal followed. (Counsel appointed to represent defendant on appeal moved
to withdraw after filing a brief. We subsequently denied the motion.)
-8- ¶ 34 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 35 Defendant appeals that denial, arguing (1) his successive postconviction petition
must be treated as his first because the proceedings on the initial petition were deficient and
(2) alternatively, the trial court erred in denying him leave to file a successive petition. We
¶ 36 A. Successive Postconviction Petition Treated as the Initial Petition
¶ 37 1. The Law
¶ 38 The Act’s referring to “one petition *** filed *** without leave of the court” (725
ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020)) “indicates one complete opportunity to collaterally attack ‘the
proceedings which resulted in [the defendant’s] conviction.’ ” People v. Taylor, 2022 IL App
(2d) 190951, ¶ 29 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2018)). Where deficiencies arose
during the proceedings on that one opportunity—namely, the initial postconviction petition—a
successive postconviction must be treated as the initial one, which can be filed without leave of
court. Id.
¶ 39 “Deficiencies” in this context concern a defendant’s lost opportunity to
collaterally attack his conviction through no fault of his own. See id. ¶¶ 27-28 (initial petition
dismissed as moot after the defendant’s direct appeal was reinstated); People v. Sawczenko, 328
Ill. App. 3d 888, 897 (2002) (defense counsel withdrew the defendant’s initial petition at the
second stage of postconviction proceedings without conferring with the defendant first); People
v. Little, 2012 IL App (5th) 100547, ¶ 19 (the defendant filed an initial postconviction petition,
seeking only to reinstate his right to a direct appeal that was lost due to his counsel’s
ineffectiveness).
¶ 40 Whether a defendant’s successive postconviction petition should be treated as an
-9- initial petition is a question of law that we review de novo. Taylor, 2022 IL App (2d) 190951,
¶ 17.
¶ 41 2. This Case
¶ 42 Defendant argues his successive postconviction petition should be treated as an
initial petition because the trial court summarily dismissed his initial petition, at least in part, on
the basis that some of the issues he raised in his initial petition were being raised on direct
appeal. According to defendant, because his brief in the direct appeal was filed four months after
the court ruled on his initial petition, it was unknown what issues were actually raised on direct
appeal when the court ruled, and, thus, the dismissal of some of his claims on that basis rendered
the proceedings deficient. Defendant also suggests his successive petition must be treated as his
initial petition because the court did not specify which claims it found frivolous or patently
without merit. We disagree.
¶ 43 Putting aside the fact defendant wanted this court to remand his direct appeal for
the trial court to consider new evidence that it found was not new in its order summarily
dismissing the initial petition, nothing suggests that the proceedings on the initial petition were
deficient. Specifically, nothing happened during the proceedings on defendant’s initial petition
that denied defendant his one complete opportunity to collaterally attack what transpired at trial.
Id. ¶ 29. Indeed, the record establishes defendant filed, and the trial court ruled on the merits of,
his initial petition.
¶ 44 Rather than a deficiency in the proceedings, defendant takes issue with the trial
court’s findings that some issues were frivolous or patently without merit and others were going
to be raised on direct appeal. Alleged errors in the court’s findings are not deficiencies in the
proceedings. Accordingly, we will not treat defendant’s successive petition as his initial petition.
- 10 - ¶ 45 B. Denial of the Motion for Leave To File a Successive Postconviction Petition
¶ 46 1. The Law
¶ 47 A defendant is generally limited to only one postconviction petition. People v.
Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 16. “Successive petitions are discouraged because the
defendant has already had one complete opportunity to show a substantial denial of his
constitutional rights.” (Internal quotations marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 48 When a defendant seeks to file a successive petition, he must file a motion for
leave to file a successive petition and satisfy an initial threshold. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL
111711, ¶ 24. Specifically, “the trial court must first determine whether the petition (1) states a
colorable claim of actual innocence [citation] or (2) establishes cause and prejudice.” People v.
Lee, 2016 IL App (1st) 152425, ¶ 43. On appeal, defendant asserts only that he has established
cause and prejudice.
¶ 49 Cause is defined as an “objective factor that impeded [the defendant’s] ability to
raise a specific claim during [the] initial post-conviction proceedings.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)
(West 2022). “[A] showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably
available *** will constitute cause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Blalock, 2022
IL 126682, ¶ 39. Prejudice “occur[s] if the [defendant] w[as] denied consideration of an error
that so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violates due process.”
People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 464 (2002). Both “cause” and “prejudice” must be
established for the defendant to prevail. Id. We review de novo the denial of a request for leave
to file a successive postconviction petition. People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 33.
¶ 50 2. This Case
¶ 51 Regarding cause, defendant asserts, “The resulting default of the issues he wished
- 11 - to raise did not occur until after the opening brief in his direct appeal was filed, and after his
initial postconviction petition had already been denied.” Concerning prejudice, defendant states
his “disagreement with decisions made by his appellate counsel and the ensuing denial of his
request to proceed pro se on direct appeal *** forced [him] to forfeit claims he wanted raised on
direct appeal.” We conclude that defendant’s arguments are unavailing.
¶ 52 First, as the trial court found, defendant has failed to satisfy the cause-and-
prejudice test as to any identifiable claim. All the issues he raised in his successive petition were
raised or could have been raised previously and did not so infect the proceedings that defendant
was denied due process.
¶ 53 Second, this court granted defendant’s request to proceed pro se on appeal from
the summary dismissal of his initial postconviction petition. As part of that appeal, defendant
could have taken issue with the trial court’s finding that his initial petition should not have been
summarily dismissed because it was not known at that time what issues appellate counsel was
going to raise on direct appeal. Moreover, defendant could have raised in that appeal all the
meritorious issues he claims he had. Instead, defendant chose not to pursue an appeal of the
summary dismissal of his initial petition by not filing a brief. Defendant must live with the
consequences of that decision and cannot raise now issues he should have raised then.
¶ 54 Third, we note the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for leave to file a
successive petition was extensive and written after a thorough examination of defendant’s
multiple pleadings and the entire record. We are grateful for the attention the court gave this case
that defendant has, simply put, mucked up. After our own review of the record, we
wholeheartedly agree with the trial court and emphatically reject all the arguments defendant has
raised in the trial court and in this court.
- 12 - ¶ 55 As a last matter, we caution defendant that if he were to file repetitive,
duplicative, or groundless pleadings in this court, he would be subject to sanctions under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 375 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).
¶ 56 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 57 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 58 Affirmed.
- 13 -