People v. Hodge

2018 COA 155

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 1, 2018
• Docket: 18CA0710
• Status: Published

Opinion

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY November 1, 2018

2018COA155

No. 18CA0710 People v. Hodge — Crimes — Unlawful Sexual Behavior — Sexual Assault on a Child

In this interlocutory appeal, a division of the court of appeals

interprets section 18-3-405(1) and (2)(a), C.R.S. 2018, to hold that a

child sexual assault victim cannot legally consent to the use of force

during an unlawful sexual act. The division reverses the district

court’s order dismissing the use of force aggravator after a

preliminary hearing and remands the case for reinstatement of the

original charges as class 3 felony sexual assault on a child. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2018COA155

Court of Appeals No. 18CA0710 El Paso County District Court No. 18CR287 Honorable Theresa M. Cisneros, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Travis Hodge,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Furman and Dunn, JJ., concur

Announced November 1, 2018

Daniel H. May, District Attorney, Doyle J. Baker, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Oliver A. Robinson, Deputy District Attorney, Stephanie J. Redfield, Deputy District Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Megan M. Morris, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 The prosecution charged Travis Hodge with three counts of

sexual assault on a child and alleged that he “applied force against

the victim to accomplish or facilitate the sexual contact,” rendering

each a class 3 felony under section 18-3-405(1) and (2)(a).

¶2 The People appeal the district court’s order dismissing three

force aggravators for three sexual assault on a child charges against

defendant, Hodge, based on its finding that because the victim had

consented to the force used (restraints), the prosecution did not

establish probable cause for the use of force at the preliminary

hearing. We resolve a novel question in Colorado by concluding

that a child victim cannot consent to the use of force. Therefore, we

reverse the order and remand the case for reinstatement of three

sexual assault on a child charges as class 3 felonies.

I. Background

¶3 At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution presented

testimony from a police officer and a forensic interviewer. The

officer testified that Hodge, who lived out of state, met the fourteen-

year-old victim in an online chat room. Hodge and the victim

discussed, among other things, sexual fantasies, which included

1 bondage and dominant and submissive sexual acts (BDSM).1 The

victim told the officer that they had arranged to meet in person and

had devised a plan whereby Hodge would pose as the father of one

of the victim’s friends and then pick him up for a purported

overnight at the friend’s house.

¶4 Hodge flew to Colorado and retrieved the victim from his home

in Boulder. He drove the victim to a vacation rental home in

Colorado Springs. When they arrived, Hodge asked the victim to

undress to his level of comfort — the victim removed all of his

clothing except his underwear. Hodge then placed a padlocked

collar around the victim’s neck, handcuffed the victim’s hands

behind his back, and placed a ball gag in the victim’s mouth.

According to the forensic interviewer, Hodge then sodomized the

victim with his fingers, a dildo, and his penis. Hodge and the victim

also performed fellatio on one other. The victim remained

handcuffed throughout these acts.

1 “BDSM” is a common initialism for “sexual activity involving such practices as the use of physical restraints, the granting and relinquishing of control, and the infliction of pain.” Merriam- Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/UVM9-FSVN.

2 ¶5 Eventually, the victim realized the events had become “real”

and wanted to end the encounter. He told Hodge he felt sick and

needed to throw up. Hodge removed the restraints, and the victim

suggested that they take a nap. When Hodge fell asleep, the victim

left the house and contacted the police.

¶6 At the end of the hearing, the court concluded that the

evidence supported probable cause for the sexual assault on a child

charges as class 4 felonies. However, the court requested

additional briefing on whether it could bind over the same charges

as class 3 felonies when the undisputed evidence showed that the

victim had consented to the use of the restraints.

¶7 After considering the parties’ arguments and briefs, the court

issued a written order in which it found that the handcuffs and ball

gag were “part of the sexual activity that the [victim] and the

defendant agreed to, and they were not used as force in order to

accomplish or facilitate the sexual contact.” The court concluded

there was “insufficient evidence to establish that force was used to

accomplish or facilitate the sexual contact,” and it bound over the

relevant sexual assault charges as class 4 felonies. Thus, it was the

3 consensual use of the restraints rather than the restraints

themselves, that rendered the evidence of force insufficient.

¶8 The People contend that the preliminary hearing evidence was

sufficient for the court to infer that Hodge facilitated sexual contact

with the victim by the use of the restraints, and that the court

legally erred in finding that a fourteen-year-old victim could consent

to the use of restraints as part of a sexual act. We agree.

II. Sufficient Evidence Established Probable Cause for the Force Aggravator

A. Standard of Review and Law

¶9 A district court’s dismissal of one or more counts of a charging

document before trial is a final order reviewable on appeal.

§ 16-12-102(1), C.R.S. 2018; see also People v. Severin, 122 P.3d

1073, 1074 (Colo. App. 2005) (explaining that reducing a charge “in

effect dismisses the greater charge and substitutes a lesser one”

under C.A.R. 4(b)(3), and is properly appealed under C.A.R. 4.1).

¶ 10 A preliminary hearing is not a mini trial. People v. Jensen,

765 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Colo. 1988). Rather,

[a] preliminary hearing serves the limited purpose of determining whether there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person charged

4 committed the offense. The prosecution is not required to produce evidence sufficient to support a conviction; rather, it need only present evidence sufficient to induce a person of ordinary prudence and caution to entertain a reasonable belief that the defendant committed the crime.

People v. Collins, 32 P.3d 636, 639-40 (Colo. App. 2001); see People

v. Simpson, 2012 COA 156, ¶ 11. “The court must view all evidence

and draw all inferences in favor of the prosecution . . . .” People v.

Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 221 (Colo. 2000).

¶ 11 We will uphold the district court’s decision that probable

cause has not been established absent a showing that the court

abused its discretion. Id. Only when we determine that the district

court has “applied an erroneous construction of law at a

preliminary hearing” will we review the record to determine whether

the evidence, “when viewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, would induce a reasonably prudent and cautious

person to entertain the belief that the defendant committed the

crime charged.” Id. We review the court’s legal conclusions de

novo. Id.

¶ 12 In addition, we review questions of statutory interpretation de

novo. Bostelman v. People, 162 P.3d 686, 689 (Colo. 2007). “In

5 interpreting a statute, our primary goals are to discern and give

effect to the General Assembly’s intent.” Krol v. CF & I Steel, 2013

COA 32, ¶ 2. “We look first to the statutory language, giving the

words and phrases used therein their plain and ordinary

meanings.” Id. “When the statutory language is clear and

unambiguous, there is no need to resort to interpretive rules and

statutory construction.” People v. Rice, 198 P.3d 1241, 1244 (Colo.

App. 2008).

B. Analysis

¶ 13 Hodge contends that the use of restraints does not satisfy the

definition of “force” when a child victim consents to their use. “Any

actor who knowingly subjects another not his or her spouse to any

sexual contact commits sexual assault on a child if the victim is

less than fifteen years of age and the actor is at least four years

older than the victim.” § 18-3-405(1). “Sexual assault on a child is

a class 4 felony, but it is a class 3 felony if . . . [t]he actor applies

force against the victim in order to accomplish or facilitate sexual

contact . . . .” § 18-3-405(2)(a). These statutes contain no language

requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendant’s conduct was

against the victim’s will.

6 ¶ 14 The General Assembly has not defined “force,” and the People

contend that the plain and ordinary meaning of force is “violence,

compulsion or constraint exerted upon or against a person or

thing.” They argue that the restraints Hodge used were constraints

exerted upon the victim. Consistent with this argument, several

divisions of this court have defined “physical force” in the adult

sexual assault statute, § 18-3-402, C.R.S. 2018, as “force applied to

the body,” and they have defined “physical violence” as “unjust or

unwarranted exercise of physical force.” People v. Keene, 226 P.3d

1140, 1143 (Colo. App. 2009) (citation omitted); see also People v.

Bryant, 2013 COA 28, ¶ 17; People v. Holwuttle, 155 P.3d 447, 450

(Colo. App. 2006). “Physical force,” therefore, only requires that

some exertion of energy (force) be applied to the body and does not

require an “extra application” of force. Bryant, ¶ 17 (quoting Keene,

226 P.3d at 1143). Such force includes a defendant’s use of his

body weight to hold a victim down. See Keene, 226 P.3d at 1143.

And it includes evidence that a defendant grabbed a woman’s

breasts and held them tightly. People ex rel. VanMeveren v. Dist.

Court, 195 Colo. 1, 4-5, 575 P.2d 405, 407 (1978).

7 ¶ 15 Hodge contends that these readings are incorrect and involve a

“strained” definition. He relies on Black’s Law Dictionary, which

defines force as “[p]ower, violence, or pressure directed against a

person or thing,” Black’s Law Dictionary 760 (10th ed. 2014), and

on the definition cited by the People ― “violence, compulsion, or

constraint exerted upon or against a person or thing,” ― from

Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 489 (11th ed. 2004). He argues that

these definitions necessarily connote coercion or compulsion, which

include a lack of consent, and that they foreclose any consensual

actions.

¶ 16 We acknowledge that it is “not error to turn to Black’s Law

Dictionary to glean the most widely accepted legal meaning of” a

term. Holwuttle, 155 P.3d at 450. However, we disagree with

Hodge’s interpretation and find persuasive the authorities noted

above that require only the application of force to the body.

Moreover, our reading of “force” is consistent with the adult sexual

assault statute, which requires proof of nonconsent by defining

sexual assault as the knowing infliction of sexual intrusion or

sexual penetration, and stating that “[t]he actor causes submission

of the victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably

8 calculated to cause submission against the victim’s will.” § 18-3-

402(1)(a) (emphasis added). Unlike sexual crimes committed

against adults, in which the prosecution must prove nonconsent as

an element of the offense (or stated differently, where consent is a

defense to the crime), child sexual assault contains no such

element and recognizes that a child cannot legally consent to sexual

contact or to any conduct that facilitates that sexual contact. See

People v. Sparks, 2018 COA 1, ¶ 13 (explaining that the law does

not recognize the child as the initiator of unlawful sexual contact or

activity with an adult); see also § 18-1-505(1), C.R.S. 2018

(permitting consent as an affirmative defense only when it

“negatives an element of the offense”); United States v. De La

Cruz-Garcia, 590 F.3d 1157, 1160 (10th Cir. 2010) (construing

section 18-3-405(1) as recognizing that sexual activity between an

adult and a minor “inherently involves taking unfair or undue

advantage of the victim”). Hodge directs us to no authority, nor

have we found any, that would permit a defendant to assert the

defense of consent to the force aggravator in section 18-3-405(2)(a)

when it is not authorized as a defense to the crime itself under 18-

3-405(1). And we may not read a nonconsent element into the child

9 sexual assault statute or the force aggravator that is not there. See

People v. Diaz, 2015 CO 28, ¶ 12 (“We do not add words to the

statute or subtract words from it.” (quoting Turbyne v. People, 151

P.3d 563, 567 (Colo. 2007))).

¶ 17 For the same reasons, we are not persuaded that the language

“against the victim,” § 18-3-405(2)(a), implies that the force must be

nonconsensual or that the child may consent to the force used. If

the General Assembly had intended the force to be against the

victim’s will, it would have said so, as it did in the adult sexual

assault statute, section 18-3-402(1)(a) (“The actor causes

submission of the victim by means of sufficient consequence

reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim’s

will . . . .”).

¶ 18 Because we conclude that the court legally erred in finding

that the victim’s agreement to use the restraints did not constitute

the use of force, we review the record to determine whether the

evidence, “when viewed in the light most favorable to the

person to entertain the belief that the defendant committed the

crime charged.” Hall, 999 P.2d at 221.

10 ¶ 19 The People presented evidence that Hodge and the victim

discussed BDSM and sexual fantasies at length before they met,

that Hodge applied the restraints in preparation for the sexual

contact, and that the restraints remained on the victim throughout

the sexual activities.2 Given the limited nature of a preliminary

hearing and the low standard for establishing probable cause, we

conclude that it is reasonable to infer from the evidence presented

that Hodge used force to facilitate the sexual contact under section

18-3-405(2)(a), and, therefore, we necessarily reject his contention

to the contrary. Accordingly, we agree with the People that a person

of ordinary prudence and caution could reasonably believe that the

restraints used here constituted force that facilitated the sexual

contact, and thereby established probable cause for sexual assault

on a child as a class 3 felony. Of course, whether the use of these

restraints constitutes force beyond a reasonable doubt is for a jury

to determine.

2 Because Hodge only contests the force aggravator and does not contest the sufficiency of probable cause as to the remaining elements of sexual assault on a child, we do not further discuss those other elements.

11 ¶ 20 Finally, we decline to address Hodge’s constitutional

challenges to the sexual assault on a child statute on vagueness

and equal protection grounds. Hodge did not make these

challenges in his briefing to the district court, and, thus, they are

not properly before us in this interlocutory appeal. See People v.

Canton, 951 P.2d 907, 909 n.4 (Colo. 1998) (“We do not address

issues raised by the defendant and not resolved by the trial court in

an interlocutory appeal.”); People v. Bland, 884 P.2d 312, 322 (Colo.

1994) (declining review of the defendant’s strip search argument

“because it was not addressed by the trial court and in any event is

not appropriate for review under C.A.R. 4.1” because a defendant is

not entitled to interlocutory relief).

III. Conclusion

¶ 21 The order is reversed, and the case is remanded for

reinstatement of counts one through three as class 3 felony sexual

assault on a child.

JUDGE FURMAN and JUDGE DUNN concur.