People v. Hendrix

2025 IL App (5th) 240896-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 13, 2025
• Docket: 5-24-0896
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 240896-U NOTICE Decision filed 11/13/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-0896 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Macon County. ) v. ) No. 15-CF-974 ) SHIRICE K. HENDRIX, ) Honorable ) Thomas E. Griffith Jr., Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Moore and Sholar concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The judgment of the trial court denying the defendant’s petition for relief from judgment is affirmed where the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute is not facially unconstitutional under the second amendment of the United States Constitution.

¶2 On October 23, 2015, the defendant, Shirice K. Hendrix, pleaded guilty of one count of

aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) in violation of section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5) of

the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5) (West 2014)). He was sentenced

the same day to 24 months of probation. On May 2, 2024, the defendant filed a petition for relief

from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-

1401 (West 2024)), which was denied by the trial court on June 11, 2024. The defendant now

appeals the denial of his petition arguing that the AUUW statute is facially unconstitutional under

1 the second amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. II). For the

following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On August 17, 2015, the defendant was charged by information with one count of

aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 2014)); two counts of

aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. § 24-1.2(a)(2)); and, one count of AUUW (id. § 24-1.6(a)(1),

(a)(3)(A-5)). Pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement, on October 23, 2015, the defendant

pleaded guilty to AUUW and was sentenced to 24 months of probation. The remaining charges

were dismissed by the trial court.

¶5 The defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the

Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2024)), on May 2, 2024. The defendant’s petition alleged that the

AUUW statute was unconstitutional and void ab initio pursuant to People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL

112116 1 and, as such, his conviction should be vacated. The trial court denied the defendant’s

petition on June 11, 2024, finding that the defendant’s conviction fell outside of Aguilar’s ruling

regarding the AUUW statute. This appeal followed.

¶6 II. ANALYSIS

¶7 On appeal, the defendant abandons the Aguilar issue raised in his section 2-1401 petition

and, instead, raises the issue of whether section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5) of the AUUW statute

(720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5) (West 2014)) is facially unconstitutional under the second

amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. II). Generally, an issue not

raised in the lower court is forfeited on review. See People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 15. An

1 In People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 22, section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), (d) of the AUUW statute was found unconstitutional. The Aguilar court noted that it made “no finding, express or implied, with respect to the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of any other section or subsection of the AUUW statute.” Id. ¶ 22 n.3. 2 exception to the general forfeiture rule, however, provides that a party may facially attack a

statute’s constitutionality on appeal even if the party did not raise the issue in the trial court and

the limitation period for filing a section 2-1401 petition has expired. See People v. Thompson,

2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 15, 32; see also People v. Price, 2016 IL 118613, ¶¶ 30-31. Therefore, the

defendant has not forfeited this issue and we will proceed to the merit of the defendant’s argument.

¶8 The defendant argues that the conduct of the defendant, i.e., possession of a weapon, is

protected by the second amendment and that the State cannot demonstrate that there is a historical

tradition of imposing criminal punishment on individuals who exercise the constitutional right to

bear arms in the absence of a license. As such, the defendant argues that this court should hold that

the provision of the AUUW statute rendering such possession to be a criminal felony

unconstitutional.

¶9 A party bringing a facial challenge to a statute faces a particularly heavy burden since

statutes are presumed constitutional. People v. Bochenek, 2021 IL 125889, ¶ 10. To rebut that

presumption, the party challenging a statute’s constitutionality has the burden of establishing a

clear violation of the constitution and courts have a duty to uphold the constitutionality of a statute

whenever reasonably possible. People v. Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 23. A statute will only be

deemed facially unconstitutional if there is no set of circumstances under which the statute would

be valid. Bochenek, 2021 IL 125889, ¶ 10. “So long as there exists a situation in which the statute

could be validly applied, a facial challenge must fail.” Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 24. Our review of

a constitutional challenge is de novo. Id. ¶ 23.

¶ 10 On July 1, 2025, the State filed a motion in this court for leave to cite People v. Thompson,

2025 IL 129965, as additional authority. We now grant that motion. In People v. Thompson, 2025

IL 129965, ¶ 1, our supreme court recently addressed the exact issue that is now before this court;

3 that is, whether section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5) of the AUUW statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1),

(a)(3)(A-5) (West 2020)) is constitutional under the second amendment. The Thompson court

found as follows:

“[W]e hold that the AUUW statute’s ban on unlicensed public carriage, coupled

with the requirements to obtain CCLs and FOID cards, is not facially

unconstitutional under the second amendment.” Id. ¶ 3.

¶ 11 Although the Thompson court reviewed a subsequent version of section 24-1.6(a)(1),

(a)(3)(A-5), that section remained unchanged from the time of the offense in this matter. Thus, we

find Thompson controlling to this appeal. This court is bound by stare decisis to the decisions of

our supreme court. People v. Jenk, 2016 IL App (1st) 143177, ¶ 26. “After our supreme court has

declared the law with respect to an issue, this court must follow that law, as only the supreme court

has authority to overrule or modify its own decisions.” Mekertichian v. Mercedes-Benz U.S.A.,

L.L.C., 347 Ill. App. 3d 828, 836 (2004).

¶ 12 As an inferior court of review, we are bound by our supreme court’s holding in Thompson

that section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5) of the AUUW statute is not facially unconstitutional under

the second amendment. Based on the ruling set forth in Thompson, no further analysis of this issue

is needed since the defendant has not presented any argument apart from the facial

unconstitutionality challenge addressed in Thompson. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

¶ 13 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 14 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court of Macon County denying the

defendant’s petition for relief from judgment is affirmed.

¶ 15 Affirmed.