2026 IL App (2d) 250419-U No. 2-25-0419 Order filed July 1, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedential except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MARIO H. HENDERSON, Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County. Honorable Mark R. Gerhardt, Judge, Presiding. No. 22-CF-171
PRESIDING JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Birkett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Because defendant failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024), we dismiss the appeal.
¶2 Defendant, Mario H. Henderson, entered an open plea of guilty to one count of domestic
battery (subsequent offense) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2020)), a Class 4 felony (id. § 12-
3.2(b)), in exchange for the dismissal of several additional charges, and was sentenced to two years
and six months in prison. Defendant did not file a postplea motion. We granted defendant leave to
file a late notice of appeal. On appeal, defendant contends that, although the trial court admonished
defendant in accordance with the language of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 605(b) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024) 1, the admonitions were “deficient” because defendant told the court that he did not
understand them. According to defendant, his lack of understanding should excuse his failure to
file a postplea motion as required under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024).
Defendant also maintains that, under the circumstances, the court had an affirmative duty to inquire
whether new counsel be appointed. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On March 17, 2022, defendant was indicted on seven counts of domestic battery (720 ILCS
5/12-3.2(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2020)) (counts I through VII) and one count of interfering with the
reporting of domestic violence (id. § 12-3.5(a)) (count VIII), stemming from an incident that
occurred on November 13, 2021. The Office of the Public Defender was initially appointed to
represent defendant. However, on November 30, 2023, the trial court discharged the public
defender after private counsel—Philip Nathe—filed an appearance on behalf of defendant.
¶5 On March 17, 2025, while represented by Nathe, defendant entered an open plea to one
count of domestic battery (subsequent offense) (id. § 12-3.2(a)(1)), a Class 4 felony (id. § 12-
3.2(b)) (count I), in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges. The terms of defendant’s
sentence were not negotiated. Prior to accepting defendant’s plea, the trial court held a colloquy
with defendant pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012). During the
colloquy, defendant agreed that he wanted to waive his right to a jury trial or bench trial. He agreed
that he had discussed this with counsel, understood the waiver form that he signed, and had no
questions about the form. The court next advised defendant that the minimum penalty for the
1 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 605 was amended on September 24, 2025, effective January 1, 2026.
See Ill. S. Ct. R. 605 (eff. Jan. 1, 2026). We cite to the version of the rule in effect at the time of the
admonishments.
-2- offense was probation or conditional discharge, with 72 hours imprisonment, and that, if the State
showed that this was a second or subsequent offense, the maximum penalty was one to three years
in prison, with the possibility of an extended-term sentence of up to six years, subject to four years’
mandatory supervised release (MSR). Defendant stated that he understood. The court advised
defendant that there was “no definitive sentence at this time” and that, after a sentencing hearing,
defendant could be sentenced anywhere between the minimum and maximum sentences.
Defendant agreed that he understood. Defendant also indicated that he understood the potential
future consequences of the plea as explained by the court. Finally, the court asked defendant
whether anyone “forced, threatened, or coerced” him to plead guilty, and defendant replied, “No,
sir.” The court also asked defendant, “Other than what we’ve just spoken about, has anyone
promised you anything in exchange for doing so,” and defendant replied, “No, sir.” The court
found that defendant knowingly, willfully, and voluntarily pleaded guilty.
¶6 The State presented the factual basis for the plea. The State indicated that, if the matter
proceeded to trial, the State would prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, on November 13, 2021,
defendant bit the victim—a family or household member of defendant—on the abdomen, causing
her bodily harm. The State would also prove that defendant had previously been convicted of
violating an order of protection in Cook County. Defendant stipulated to the factual basis and its
sufficiency. The court accepted the stipulation and found that there was a sufficient factual basis
for the plea. Thereafter, court found defendant guilty of count I and dismissed the remaining
charges. The matter was continued for the preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI)
and a sentencing hearing.
¶7 The sentencing hearing took place on June 13, 2025. At the outset, after accepting certain
corrections to the PSI, the trial court confirmed the potential sentences with counsel and defendant.
-3- Defendant indicated that he understood. The State argued in aggravation that (1) defendant’s
conduct caused or threatened serious harm, (2) defendant had a history of prior delinquency for
criminal activity, and (3) the sentence was necessary to deter others from committing the same
crime. The State also admitted into evidence (1) a certified copy of defendant’s prior conviction of
violating an order of protection, a Class 4 felony, and (2) several photographs of the victim taken
by a police officer on the scene. The State asked for an extended-term prison sentence. The State
emphasized that the incident at issue was a “a very violent attack.” The State also emphasized
defendant’s criminal history dating back to 1997, noting that it was “replete with a history of
violence,” and included two convictions of violating an order of protection, a prior domestic
battery conviction, multiple battery charges, and crimes of dishonesty.
¶8 Defense counsel asked for probation. In mitigation, counsel claimed that defendant
suffered from mental and physical health issues that would be endangered if he were imprisoned.
Counsel noted that defendant suffered a work-related injury in April 2023. Counsel noted that the
PSI reflects “a history of mental health concerns from PTSD to depression to traumatic brain
injury. All of those concerns he’s dealt with for some time.” Regarding defendant’s criminal
background, counsel argued that “really nothing has occurred with the exception of the instant
offenses since the year 2015” and that “[defendant has] been rebuilding his life for ten years
seeking counseling, undergoing treatment, remaining employed, and doing what it takes to raise
his daughter, support his daughter, and live a crime-free life[.]” . Counsel also noted that defendant
pleaded guilty and thus accepted responsibility for the matter.
¶9 In allocution, defendant stated:
-4- “I’m sorry this happened. I’ve really never been out here before. I shouldn’t have
probably been out here. I’m sorry I put myself in the position to get myself in trouble again
after all the stuff that I’ve been through in my life trying to stay out of trouble.
I don’t know. I just was in a bad position. It shouldn’t have happened. It would
never happen again. I mean, I was homeless at the time. I met this girl online. I just should
have never been out here, and that incident should have never happened. And I apologize
for that.”
¶ 10 Prior to imposing sentencing, the trial court noted that it considered the PSI and the
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors. The court acknowledged the photographs but gave
them little weight. The court commented that defense counsel was asking the court to make
assumptions regarding defendant’s physical and mental health issues, noting that “no one has told
[the court] how they would affect [defendant] whether he’s on probation [or] in [prison].” The
court also rejected defense counsel’s assertion that defendant had been crime free for ten years,
noting that the time between the last offense and present offense was only six years.
¶ 11 The trial court sentenced defendant to two years and six months in prison, with day-for-
day credit to apply. The court stated that, given defendant’s criminal history and recidivism, he
was not a good candidate for probation. The court also noted that a sentence of incarceration was
necessary to deter others and that a probation sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the
offense, especially given defendant’s continued criminality through the years.
¶ 12 Thereafter, defendant attempted to address the trial court. The trial court stated, “Sir, you
had your opportunity.” The parties proceeded to discuss presentencing credit and the MSR term.
Thereafter, the following colloquy took place:
-5- “THE DEFENDANT: Judge, could I take my plea back? I did not plead to this. I
feel like the lawyer and the State’s Attorney agreed to have me plead guilty to this. I did
not know this girl. I’ve never been out here. She’s not my girlfriend. It was a mistake of
me coming out here for trying to get help before I found a place to live.
THE COURT: [Defendant], if you’d like to file pretrial motions—
THE DEFENDANT: Please. I did not want to plead guilty to this case. It was a
bunch of things that happened in this case that I should not have pleaded guilty to. I did not
know that girl. She was not my girlfriend.
THE COURT: Please listen. After we get done with the paperwork, I’m going to
give you some admonishments regarding posttrial motions. That may answer some of your
questions.
THE DEFENDANT: While I’m in prison?
THE COURT: Pardon?
THE DEFENDANT: While I’m in prison? I did not want to plead guilty to this
case. The State’s Attorney and my lawyer made me plead guilty to this case.
THE COURT: Again, sir, you’ll have the opportunity to file posttrial—excuse me—
post-sentencing motions, but, please, let’s get to that point first.
THE DEFENDANT: I've never been out—I’ve been the only black—everything
that happened in this courtroom has not been me, Judge. I know what my background says.
THE COURT: That’s strange because—
THE DEFENDANT: I know what my background says.
THE COURT: Stop talking.
-6- THE DEFENDANT: But I’ve been trying to get away from that background. And
I told this girl about my background, and when I told her that, she did what she did. And
I’ve pled this was self-defense for me.
THE COURT: Please stop for a moment.
THE DEFENDANT: This was self-defense, Judge.
THE COURT: Please stop for a moment. You stood in front of me. I gave you all
the admonishments, me personally.
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, and I felt like that was a setup. It was immediately—
y’all came me here and you told me I needed to plead guilty to this case.
THE COURT: I didn’t tell you any such thing.
THE DEFENDANT: Not you, Judge, I meant my lawyer and my—my lawyer and
the State’s Attorney. Whatever they agreed to, I did not agree to that. I felt like I was set
up. As soon as I came in here, he told me I needed to plead guilty.
THE COURT: I’m going to take a brief recess while the paperwork is prepared.
Please do not leave this room during that time.”
¶ 13 Following a short recess, the matter continued:
“THE COURT: All right. [Defendant], you are going to receive a financial order in
a moment. It indicates the total to pay, the $75 fine is $2,487.85.
THE DEFENDANT: I’m sorry, Judge. I can’t hear you.
THE COURT: $2,487.85. You are going to get a copy of this in just a moment.
THE DEFENDANT: And what’s that for?
THE COURT: Majority of that is assessments and sheriff’s fees on the $75 fine. So
the order shows the fine—
-7- THE DEFENDANT: Judge—
THE COURT: —the assessments—
THE DEFENDANT: —can we talk about me pleading guilty to a case that I didn’t
do?
THE COURT: —the domestic violence, family member, two State’s Attorney
service fees, a variety of sheriff’s fees for a grand total of $2,487.85. We’ll get to your
posttrial motions in a moment. Okay. That document is going to come off the printer. When
it does, please review it with [defense counsel].
THE DEFENDANT: What is the posttrial? Judge, I’ve asked my lawyer to go to
trial every single time. At the last second, him and the State’s Attorney, I don’t know what
they talked about, but he forced me to plead guilty to this case.
THE COURT: Again, I’m going to go over post-sentencing motions in just a
moment, okay? I have to get through the sentencing order including the financial order
first.
So I believe that’s printed out, [defense counsel]?
MR. NATHE [(DEFENSE COUNSEL)]: Yes.
THE COURT: You can take a look at that if you want. That may answer your
answers [sic] as to what was on that order.
THE DEFENDANT: And this is for the sheriff’s?
THE COURT: That’s the amount of fines, fees, contributions, et cetera, that you are
liable for based on the $75 fine.
[Defense counsel], were there any issues –
THE DEFENDANT: When am I supposed to pay this?
-8- THE COURT: Were there any issues with the sentencing order?
MR. NATHE: None.
THE COURT: At your earliest opportunity.
THE DEFENDANT: I’m going to lose everything. If I go to jail, I’m not going to
have anything when I get out. That’s why I’m in this position now.
Judge, I was in a serious semi-truck auto accident. I almost died. I had three
surgeries on my shoulder and I had two procedures in my neck, and I’m having another
procedure in my neck and my hand also. There’s certain feelings that I can’t—I do not have
with my functions. I also have something in my mouth. If I take this out, my teeth are going
to fall out. There is a lot of things going on with me that my lawyer did not even do
anything. Like, I told him from the very beginning, even I have letters from Steve Yeschek 2.
I have letters from my psychology. I have letters from people who know I’ve been trying
and know that I did not put myself in this position. This girl, she grabbed my hair, Judge,
and was pulling my hair to the point I couldn’t get out of her hold. I wanted to go to trial
and speak about all of this, but the lawyer and the State’s Attorney, they conspired together
to get me to plead guilty to this case.
THE COURT: I’m going to talk about what your options are at this point, okay? So
you have—excuse me. You have the right to appeal. Prior to taking an appeal, you must
file in the trial court within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed a written
motion asking to have the trial court reconsider the sentence or to have the judgment
2 The PSI indicated that defendant “had attended mental health counseling through Yeschek &
Associates, but [was] no longer engaged in sessions.”
-9- vacated and for leave to withdraw your plea of guilty setting forth your grounds for the
motion.
If the motion is allowed, the sentence will be modified or the plea of guilty,
sentence, and judgment will be vacated and a trial date will be set on the charges to which
the plea of guilty was made.
Upon the request of the State, any charges that may have been dismissed as a part
of the plea agreement will be reinstated and also set for trial.
THE DEFENDANT: I have nobody, Judge, on the outside. I take care of myself
and my daughter. I have nobody that’s going to help me with this. My finances, my money,
everything is going to be gone. My lawyer, the people that’s helping me get myself healthy
again, all of that is going to be gone. When I get out of here, I’m not going to have any—
I’m going to be homeless again.
THE COURT: If the motion to reconsider sentence or vacate the judgment is denied
and you still desire to appeal, you must file your notice of appeal within 30 days of the date
that the motion was denied.
If you are indigent, a copy of the transcript of the proceedings at the time of the
plea of guilty and sentence will be provided without cost to you and counsel will be
appointed to assist you with the preparation of the motion.
If any appeal taken from the judgment on the plea of guilty—excuse me. Any appeal
taken from the judgment on the plea of guilty, any issue or claim of error not raised in the
motion to reconsider the sentence or to vacate the judgment and to withdraw your plea of
guilty shall be deemed waived by the Appellate Court.
Do you understand your right to appeal?
- 10 - THE DEFENDANT: I’m not sure if I understand anything. I’m mentally messed
up. I don’t have a mental capacity for this, Judge. I was mentally messed up when she
grabbed—when I was in the position. I have the papers that are saying the traumatic brain
injury. She didn’t go to the hospital. I went to the hospital after this and got a traumatic
brain injury from this incident, and I have the proof from it. That was the reason I was
going to see Steve Yeschek and the counselors. I’m telling you, my lawyer, he did not—he
played the game with the State’s Attorney, Judge. I’ve been the only black person in this
courtroom. I’ve been totally intimidated. And when he came in here and told me I needed
to plead guilty, I pled guilty.
THE COURT: Sir, do you understand your right to appeal, that you have a right to
appeal?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Judge. I need—I’m mentally messed up, Judge.
THE COURT: Would you like me to read—
THE DEFENDANT: I’ve been mentally messed up for a long time.
THE COURT: Would you like me to read it again?
THE DEFENDANT: I need some mental help, Judge. I’ve been mentally messed
up for a long time, I’m telling you. I know this and my background looks bad, but I was
abused as a kid. Y’all never evaluated me as a kid and seen what was wrong with me. Y’all
always tried to throw me in jail. Like, I was abused. My mother abused me. My
grandmother abused me as a kid. I didn’t even get out of my own mental [sic] until I was
damn near 30. This was the things I found out when I was going through these counselors
and these psychotherapy and the stuff that I know I need. I need this stuff. Without it I
- 11 - know I’m going to lose my mind. I’m going to lose everything, Judge, and I’m going to be
homeless and I’m going to be messed up all over again.
THE COURT: Do you understand that you have the right to appeal?
THE DEFENDANT: I need some mental help. I don’t understand. This lawyer just
tricked me into pleading guilty. I don’t understand. I don’t understand. I needed mental
help 20 years ago and didn’t get it.
THE COURT: [Defendant], I wasn’t your judge 20 years ago.
THE DEFENDANT: You’re my judge today.
THE COURT: I know. That’s why I’m trying to explain to you your rights, but you
keep cutting me off and—
THE DEFENDANT: I don’t understand my rights, Judge.
THE COURT: —although you are being very lucid—
THE DEFENDANT: That’s what I’m telling you.
THE COURT: All right. I’m done because you keep cutting me off. I’ve explained
all your rights to appeal. I’ve offered to explain them again to you, but you apparently don’t
want me to. If you want me to, I will go through them again one at a time. Would you like
me to do that?
THE DEFENDANT: (Nodding.)
THE COURT: Okay. You are nodding your head yes. I’ll go through them again.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: Give me a moment. Do you understand that you have the right to
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
- 12 - THE COURT: Prior to taking an appeal, you must file in the trial court within 30
days of the date on which the sentence is imposed a written motion asking to have the trial
court reconsider the sentence or to have the judgment vacated and for leave to withdraw
your plea of guilty setting forth your grounds for the motion.
Do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT: Can you say that one more time?
THE COURT: Sure. Prior to taking an appeal, you must file in the trial court within
30 days of the date on the which sentence is imposed a written motion asking to have the
trial court reconsider the sentence or to have the judgment vacated and for leave to
withdraw your plea of guilty setting forth your grounds for the motion.
THE DEFENDANT: See, I don’t understand some of this, Judge.
THE COURT: Well, I’m going to jump forward. If you are indigent, a copy of the
transcript of the proceedings at the time of the plea of guilty and sentence will be provided
without cost to you and counsel will be appointed to assist you with the preparation of the
Do you understand that?
THE COURT: Now, I’m going to go back to where we were. If the motion is
allowed, the sentence will be modified or the plea of guilty, sentence, and judgment will
be vacated and a trial date will be set on the charge to which the plea of guilty was made.
THE COURT: You are nodding your head yes.
- 13 - THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. The next point is, upon request of the State, any charges that
may have been dismissed as a part of the plea agreement will be reinstated and also set for
trial. In other words, if the plea is vacated, Counts 2 through 8 get reinstated and everything
gets set for trial.
THE COURT: If the motion to reconsider sentence or vacate the judgment is denied
and you still desire to appeal, you must file your notice of appeal within 30 days of the date
THE DEFENDANT: Judge, this is just like the last time when you were reading
this stuff. I didn’t understand then. I don’t really understand now, Judge. I’m telling you,
my lawyer don't even know how to—I don’t understand what’s going on.
THE COURT: Let me read that again. If the motion to reconsider, the one we just
talked about, or vacate the judgment is denied—
THE DEFENDANT: How am I supposed to do all this? Like, this is what I don’t
understand. Like, I’m not understanding.
THE COURT: Well, I just told you, if you’re indigent, you can have a new lawyer
appointed to assist you with the appeal.
So if the motion to reconsider the sentence or judgment is denied and you still desire
to appeal, you must file your notice of appeal within 30 days of the date that the motion
- 14 - was denied. So if you file said motion and you are not successful, you have 30 days to file
a notice of appeal from then.
Understood?
THE DEFENDANT: (Unintelligible.)
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
THE COURT: All right. [Defendant] said yes and is nodding his head yes.
If any appeal taken from the—or in any appeal taken from the judgment on the plea
of guilty, any issue or claim of error not raised in the motion to reconsider the sentence or
to vacate the judgment and withdraw your plea of guilty—
THE DEFENDANT: Judge?
THE COURT: —shall be deemed waived by the Appellate Court. Do you
understand? In other words, you have to raise all the issues in the motion otherwise the
Appellate Court won’t—
THE DEFENDANT: Judge, I’m in serious pain right now as well. It’s hard for me
to really, like, grasp what’s going on or what you are saying or how am I supposed to do it.
I understand what you are saying about the appeal.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: But I just don’t understand how I’m supposed to do any of
this. I don’t—I feel like I’m alone. I feel like I don’t know what happened here.
THE COURT: You have a lawyer sitting right next to you who can explain what it
means.
- 15 - THE DEFENDANT: My lawyer just literally made me do something I did not want
to do. I have not seen anybody in this courtroom who was helping me at all. I’ve been
only—I don’t—like I said, I’ve been the only minority since I’ve been coming in here, and
I don’t know how to speak for myself about some of the stuff that’s been going on. It’s hard
for me to understand what’s going on. As far as mental, I have a lot of paperwork about my
mental health and that I can’t understand certain things. A lot of things happened to me
back when I was younger that never got evaluated.
THE COURT: Anything else—
MR. NATHE: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: Anything else from the State?
MR. GREGOROWICZ [(ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY)]: No, Judge.
THE COURT: Court is adjourned. Good luck, [defendant].”
¶ 14 Three months later, on September 22, 2025, defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal,
claiming that defense counsel was ineffective. In an attached affidavit, defendant averred that his
notice of appeal was untimely due to counsel’s failure to file it. He also claimed that he was coerced
to enter the open guilty plea. Defendant did not first file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or
for reconsideration of his sentence.
- 16 - ¶ 15 The Office of the State Appellate Defender was appointed to represent defendant. On
October 31, 2025, we granted defendant’s third motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal. The
State did not object. 3
¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 Defendant contends that, although the trial court admonished him in accordance with the
language of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 605(b) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024), the admonitions were
“deficient” because defendant told the court that he did not understand them. According to
defendant, his lack of understanding should excuse his failure to file a postplea motion as required
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). In addition, defendant maintains
that, under the circumstances, the court had an affirmative duty to inquire whether new counsel
should have been appointed.
¶ 18 In response, the State contends that defendant’s appeal must be dismissed because he failed
to comply with Rule 604(d). According to the State, the admonition exception to Rule 604(d) does
not apply, because trial court properly admonished defendant per Rule 605(b). The State further
3 In its brief, the State asserts that it “continue[s] to maintain [its] objections to jurisdiction” based
on Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(c) (eff. Jan. 1, 2026), which provides for the filing of a late notice of
appeal. Defendant sought leave in this court to file a late notice of appeal three times. We denied, without
prejudice, defendant’s first two motions for leave; we granted defendant’s third motion for leave. Although
the State objected to the first two motions, based on defendant’s failure to comply with Rule 606(c), the
State raised no objection to the third motion. Indeed, defendant’s third motion expressly stated that
“[o]pposing counsel has seen a draft of this Motion and will not be filing a response.” The State raises no
argument in its brief concerning our grant of defendant’s third motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal.
- 17 - contends that the court had no duty to ascertain whether new counsel should be appointed, where
defendant was properly admonished and represented by private counsel.
¶ 19 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) provides, in relevant part:
“No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless the
defendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial court
a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea
is being challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.
***
The motion shall be in writing and shall state the grounds therefore. *** The motion
shall be presented promptly to the trial judge by whom the defendant was sentenced ***.
The trial court shall then determine whether the defendant is represented by counsel, and
if the defendant is indigent and desires counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel.” Ill.
S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024).
¶ 20 Compliance with Rule 604(d) is a condition precedent to an appeal from a judgment
entered on a plea of guilty. People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 300-01 (2003). While the failure to
file a timely Rule 604(d) motion does not deprive this court of jurisdiction over the appeal, it does
require us to dismiss the appeal. Id. However, “[d]ismissal of an appeal based on a defendant’s
failure to file the requisite motions in the trial court would violate due process if the defendant did
not know that filing such motions was necessary.” Id. Thus, to guard against the inadvertent loss
of the right to appeal from a judgment entered on a guilty plea, Rule 605(b) mandates that the trial
court advises the defendant, at the time sentence is imposed, of the procedural steps required to
appeal. Id.
¶ 21 Rule 605(b) states in relevant part:
- 18 - “In all cases in which a judgment is entered upon a plea of guilty, other than a
negotiated plea of guilty, at the time of imposing sentence, the trial court shall advise the
defendant substantially as follows:
(1) that the defendant has a right to appeal;
(2) that prior to taking an appeal the defendant must file in the trial court, within 30
days of the date on which sentence is imposed, a written motion asking to have the trial
court reconsider the sentence or to have the judgment vacated and for leave to withdraw
the plea of guilty, setting forth the grounds for the motion;
(3) that if the motion is allowed, the sentence will be modified or the plea of guilty,
sentence and judgment will be vacated and a trial date will be set on the charges to which
the plea of guilty was made;
(4) that upon the request of the State any charges that may have been dismissed as
a part of a plea agreement will be reinstated and will also be set for trial;
(5) that if the defendant is indigent, a copy of the transcript of the proceedings at
the time of the defendant’s plea of guilty and sentence will be provided without cost to the
defendant and counsel will be appointed to assist the defendant with the preparation of the
motions; and
(6) that in any appeal taken from the judgment on the plea of guilty any issue or
claim of error not raised in the motion to reconsider the sentence or to vacate the judgment
and to withdraw the plea of guilty shall be deemed waived.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 605(b) (eff. Apr.
15, 2024).
¶ 22 Unless the trial court has “strictly complied” with Rule 605(b)’s admonishment
requirements, a defendant’s failure to comply with Rule 604(d)’s motion requirement will not
- 19 - result in the irretrievable loss of the right to appeal; instead, the appellate court will remand the
case to the trial court for proper admonitions. People v. Dominguez, 2012 IL 111336, ¶ 11. This
well-recognized principle is known as the “admonition exception.” People ex rel. Alvarez v. Skryd,
241 Ill. 2d 34, 41 (2011). By its own terms, Rule 605(b) “requires only that a defendant be
‘substantially’ advised of the actual content of [the rule].” Dominguez, 2012 IL 111336, ¶ 11.
“[U]nder its plain and ordinary meaning, ‘substantially’ in the rule does not require a strict
verbatim reading of the rule ***. Rather, the court must impart to a defendant largely that which
is specified in the rule, or the rule’s ‘essence,’ as opposed to ‘wholly’ what is specified in the rule.”
Id. ¶ 19. We review de novo the sufficiency of admonitions under Rule 605(b). Id. ¶ 13.
¶ 23 Here, there is no question that the trial court substantially complied with Rule 605(b)’s
admonishment requirement. Indeed, the court twice expressly and correctly advised defendant—
essentially verbatim—of the contents of the rule. After the first set of completed admonitions,
when the court asked defendant whether he understood his right to appeal, defendant replied: “I’m
not sure if I understand anything.” After additional colloquy, the court stated: “If you want me to,
I will go through them again one at a time.” Defendant agreed that the court should do so.
Thereafter, the court restated each individual admonishment and asked defendant whether he
understood each one. Defendant expressly confirmed his understanding to all but one
admonishment. Nevertheless, although defendant claimed to not understand “some of” the
admonition concerning the requirement that he file a written motion within 30 days of sentencing,
he ultimately stated: “I understand what you are saying about the appeal.” When defendant
thereafter stated that he did not “understand how [he was] supposed to do any of this,” the court
told him that his counsel “can explain what it means.”
- 20 - ¶ 24 Defendant makes no claim—nor could he—that the trial court’s oral admonitions were
substantively deficient. Nevertheless, relying on Dominguez, defendant suggests that unless
defendant actually understands the admonitions, there can be no substantial compliance with Rule
605(b). At issue in Dominguez was whether “a signed form from [the] defendant containing nearly
word-for-word Rule 605(c) admonishments” could be used in determining whether the trial court
substantially complied with Rule 605(c). Dominguez, 2012 IL 111336, ¶ 24. The defendant argued
that the written form should not be considered because (1) the form was written in English, (2) the
defendant spoke Spanish, and (3) the record did not show that the form had been translated. Id. In
rejecting the defendant’s argument, the supreme court noted that the defendant told the court that
he had signed the form after making himself aware of rights therein and that the defendant had a
Spanish interpreter present with him. Id. ¶ 35, 36. The court stated: “[T]he written admonishments
signed by defendant here were discussed with [the] defendant by the circuit court in open court
immediately after the oral admonishments, providing the judge with an opportunity to ascertain
that defendant signed the form and to verify that defendant understood and was aware of the
important rights contained in the admonishment form.” Id. ¶ 35. The court concluded that,
although the oral admonishments were “imperfect,” “the admonishments provided in this case as
a whole, both oral and written, were sufficient to impart the essence or substance of the rule to
[the] defendant.” Id. ¶ 54.
¶ 25 Dominguez does not lead us to conclude that the trial court here did not substantially
comply with Rule 605(b). Under the circumstances presented in Dominguez, given the claimed
language barrier, it was necessary to consider whether the Spanish-speaking defendant was able to
understand the admonitions written in English to determine whether the written form could be used
to supplement the deficient oral admonitions for purposes of determining substantial compliance
- 21 - with the rule. Here, there was no language barrier and no dispute that the court’s admonitions
“were sufficient to impart the essence or substance of the rule to defendant.” Id. Moreover, as
noted, defendant did expressly confirm his understanding of all but one of the individual
admonitions. We note too that defendant was alert and coherent throughout both the plea
proceedings and sentencing proceedings. Defendant participated fully at the guilty plea hearing.
He responded appropriately throughout the proceedings and never expressed confusion or any
inability to understand. The same can be said for defendant’s participation at the outset of the
sentencing hearing. Defendant indicated that he had received and read a copy of the PSI. He also
indicated that he understood the potential sentences that he faced. At no point did defendant
interrupt or ask questions. He also made an appropriate statement in allocution, apologizing for
the incident. Indeed, it was not until the trial court indicated that it was going to impose a prison
sentence that defendant began to interrupt and later claimed an inability to understand the
admonitions. Even then, the court noted that defendant was “lucid.”
¶ 26 Defendant has not directed us to any authority holding that there can be no substantial
compliance with Rule 605(b) where a defendant claims that he did not understand properly stated
admonitions. Indeed, this court has already rejected such a claim. See People v. Griffin, 305 Ill.
App. 3d 326, 332 (1999) (distinguishing the issuance of the Rule 605(b) admonitions from a
defendant’s subjective understanding of them). We are not persuaded by defendant’s reliance on
People v. Blackmon, 2024 IL App (1st) 220586, and People v. Braden, 2018 IL App (1st) 152295,
as they are readily distinguishable. In each case, the defendants’ misunderstandings stemmed from
admonitions that did not substantially comply with the rule. See Blackmon, 2024 IL App (1st)
220586, ¶ 9 (“[T]he trial court failed to admonish [the] defendant that he had a right to be appointed
counsel to file a Rule 604(d) motion to vacate his guilty plea.”); Braden, 2018 IL App (1st) 152295,
- 22 - ¶ 29 (“[The trial court] did not, either orally or in writing, tell [the defendant] what he needed to
do to challenge his guilty plea.”).
¶ 27 Nevertheless, defendant contends that once he (1) manifested his desire to withdraw his
guilty plea, (2) told the court that he did not understand the admonitions, and (3) claimed that
defense counsel forced him to plead guilty, the court should have taken affirmative action and
inquired whether new counsel should have been appointed. In support, he cites People v. Perry,
2014 IL App (1st) 122584. In Perry, the defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with a gun,
and the trial court sentenced him per the terms of the parties’ plea agreement. Id. ¶ 1. Just over a
week later, the defendant filed a pro se “ ‘Notification of Motion,’ ” stating he wished to withdraw
his guilty plea. Id. ¶ 6. He did not state any reasons for his request or file an accompanying motion.
Id. At a subsequent hearing, when asked why he filed the notification, the defendant stated that it
was because he “ ‘had ineffective assistance of counsel.’ ” Id. ¶ 7. The trial court struck the
notification and told the defendant to file a motion. Id. He never did. Id. ¶¶ 7-9.
¶ 28 On appeal, in addition to finding that the trial court’s Rule 605(c) admonitions were clearly
deficient, the reviewing court found that, when the defendant indicated a desire to appeal—by
virtue of the written notification and discussions at the hearing—the court had an “ ‘affirmative
duty’ ” to offer the defendant counsel to assist him with his appeal. Id. ¶ 23. In support, the court
relied on Griffin, where we held that the trial court had a duty to ask the pro se defendant if he
wanted counsel appointed, where the defendant, following the Rule 605(b) admonitions, sought
clarification of the Rule 604(d) motion requirements, asked whether he was entitled to counsel,
and expressly asked the court, “ ‘Can I be appointed an attorney to represent me in this appeal?” ”
Griffin, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 329-32.
- 23 - ¶ 29 Perry and Griffin are distinguishable. Under Rule 604(d), when a defendant presents a
postplea motion to the trial court, “[t]he trial court shall then determine whether the defendant is
represented by counsel, and if the defendant is indigent and desires counsel, the trial court shall
appoint counsel.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). Here, unlike the
defendants in Perry and Griffin, defendant was represented by counsel. Indeed, after defendant
expressed his desire to withdraw his guilty plea and then claimed that he did not “understand how
[he was] supposed to do any of this,” the trial court stated: “You have a lawyer sitting right next to
you who can explain what it means.” Given that defendant was represented by private counsel and
expressed no intent to discharge counsel, the court had no duty to determine whether defendant
was indigent and wanted counsel appointed to represent him.
¶ 30 To be sure, defendant claimed that defense counsel had coerced him into pleading guilty.
Although not raised by defendant, defendant’s statements to the trial court arguably raised an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim sufficient to trigger the court’s duty to inquire into his
claim pursuant to the common-law procedure developed in People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181
(1984), and its progeny. In People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶¶ 35-36, our supreme court
explained the procedure, as follows:
“Under the common-law procedure, a pro se defendant is not required to file a
written motion but need only bring his or her claim to the trial court’s attention. [Citation.]
New counsel is not automatically appointed in every case when a defendant presents a
pro se posttrial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. [Citation.] Rather, when
a defendant makes such a claim, the court should first examine the factual basis of the
defendant’s claim. [Citation.] If the court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains
only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new counsel and may deny
- 24 - the pro se motion. [Citation.] However, if the allegations show possible neglect of the case,
new counsel should be appointed. [Citation.]
New counsel would then represent the defendant at the hearing on the pro se
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Appointed counsel can independently evaluate the
claim and avoid the conflict of interest that trial counsel would have in trying to justify his
or her own actions contrary to the defendant’s position. [Citation.]”
¶ 31 The Krankel procedure “encourages the trial court to exercise is fact-finding abilities and
‘create the necessary record for any claims raised on appeal.’ ” People v. Downing, 2019 IL App
(1st) 170329, ¶ 37 (quoting People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 38). These rules apply regardless of
whether the defendant was represented by retained or appointed counsel. See In re Johnathan T.,
2022 IL 127222, ¶¶ 38-40 (in a case involving juvenile delinquency, the supreme court agreed with
the view espoused in a special concurrence in an earlier criminal case that Krankel applies in
situations involving retained counsel).
¶ 32 As noted, defendant makes no argument on appeal that the trial court failed to conduct a
Krankel inquiry. Thus, any such argument is forfeited. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1,
2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument,
or on petition for rehearing.”); People v. Vargas, 2025 IL App (2d) 240690, ¶ 38.
¶ 33 Forfeiture aside, and assuming arguendo that defendant’s comments were sufficient to
trigger the trial court’s duty to inquire under Krankel, the court’s failure to conduct a Krankel
inquiry was harmless error. We find People v. Palomera, 2022 IL App (2d) 200631, instructive. In
Palomera, the defendant raised two ineffectiveness claims in a pro se posttrial motion. Id. ¶ 20.
Defense counsel withdrew and private counsel filed an appearance on defendant’s behalf. Id. ¶ 22.
The trial court never inquired into the claims. Id. One claim was later raised in a motion filed by
- 25 - new counsel and rejected. Id. ¶ 23. However, the remaining claim—that the defendant's jury waiver
was improperly coerced—was never raised and addressed. Id. ¶ 64. On appeal, the defendant
argued that, because the trial court never conducted a Krankel inquiry, the matter must be remanded
for the requisite inquiry. Id. ¶ 55.
¶ 34 We disagreed. We recognized that the failure to conduct a Krankel inquiry may be deemed
harmless error if the claim is positively rebutted by the record. Id. ¶ 62. We found that the court’s
failure to inquire into the first claim was harmless error, because it was ultimately considered and
rejected by the trial court. Id. ¶ 63. We found that the court’s failure to inquire into the defendant’s
second claim—that he was coerced into waiving his right to a jury—was also harmless error. Id.
¶ 64. We noted that the record showed that, before accepting the jury waiver, the trial court twice
asked the defendant whether anyone was forcing him to waive his jury right. Id. The defendant
indicated that he was not being forced and that he believed a bench trial was his best choice. Id.
Thus, we concluded that, because the defendant’s claims were positively rebutted by the record,
the court’s failure to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry was harmless error. Id.
¶ 35 So too here. Defendant’s only claim—that counsel forced him to plead guilty—is flatly
rebutted by defendant’s statements at the plea hearing. The record shows that, prior to accepting
defendant’s guilty plea, the trial court questioned defendant as to whether anyone had “forced,
threatened, or coerced” him to plead guilty and whether, “[o]ther than what [they had] spoken
about,” anyone had “promised [him] anything in exchange for doing so.” Defendant affirmatively
indicated that he was not being forced into pleading guilty and that no promises had been made to
him. Under the circumstances, any failure to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry into
defendant’s claim that counsel forced him to plead guilty was harmless error.
- 26 - ¶ 36 Based on the foregoing, because the trial court substantially complied with Rule 605(b)
and defendant failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 604(d), we must dismiss the appeal.
See Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291 at 301 (“As a general rule ***, the failure to file a timely Rule 604(d)
motion precludes the appellate court from considering the appeal on the merits. Where a defendant
has failed to file a written motion to withdraw his plea of guilty or to reconsider his sentence, the
appellate court must dismiss the appeal [citation], leaving the Post–Conviction Hearing Act as the
defendant’s only recourse [citation].”).
¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 38 For the reasons stated, we dismiss the appeal.
¶ 39 Appeal dismissed.
- 27 -