Filed 2/11/15 P. v. Hedgecock CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D064977
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD228615; SCE330151) RACHELLE HEDGECOCK,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Patricia K.
Cookson, Judge. Affirmed.
Janice R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
Eric Swenson, Lynne McGinnis and Ryan H. Peeck, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent. A jury convicted Rachelle Anne Hedgecock of burglary. (Pen. Code,1 § 459.) It
found true allegations that the building was inhabited (§ 460) and another person other
than an accomplice was present in the residence during the commission of the crime.
(§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21).) The court sentenced Hedgecock to three years in state prison in
this case and to a concurrent three-year term on a related probation violation.
Hedgecock contends the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction
because she did not act with the intent to commit theft. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Prosecution Case
At around 8:00 a.m. on May 19, 2013, Shaun Richardson was awakened by a loud
noise at his residence on Riverdance Court in Alpine. From his upstairs bedroom
window, he saw Hedgecock standing outside holding a pair of scissors. He asked her
what she was doing there. She replied she was looking for a woman and mentioned a
name but Richardson was unsure of the name. He went downstairs and noticed that two
of his window screens had been cut and removed. Richardson had lived at the residence
since 2009 but had never seen Hedgecock before. He called the sheriff's department.
San Diego County Sheriff's Department Detective Richard Bolter reported to the
scene and detained Hedgecock near Richardson's home. Hedgecock had a pair of scissors
in her bag. She said she had been looking for her niece named Jessica.
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Defense Case
James Danielson, Hedgecock's father, testified Hedgecock had telephoned him on
either May 18 or 19, 2013, asking for a shower and possibly a meal.
Jessica Vanderbilt testified that for 18 months, until 2008, she lived at the Alpine
residence where Richardson lived at the time of the burglary. Approximately one year
before the burglary, Vanderbilt told Hedgecock she had moved to a different house in the
same general area. In either April or May 2013, Hedgecock had telephoned Vanderbilt,
stating she needed a place to stay the night.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
"In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction, the reviewing court must examine the whole record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—
evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate
court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citations.] The same standard applies when the
conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] Although it is the
jury's duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two
reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the
jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citation.] ' "If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's
3 findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably
be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment." ' "
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053-1054; see also People v. Ceja (1993) 4
Cal.4th 1134, 1139.)
In making our determination, we do not reweigh the evidence; the credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be accorded to the evidence are matters exclusively within
the province of the trier of fact. (People v. Stewart (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 785, 790.) We
will not reverse unless it clearly appears that on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d
745, 755; see also People v. Stewart, at p. 790; People v. Olea (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 508,
513.)
II. Legal Principles
Burglary is committed when a "person . . . enters any house, room, apartment . . .
or other building . . . with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony[.]"
(§ 459; People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1041; see People v. Lawrence (2000)
24 Cal.4th 219, 232-233.) It is settled that the essence of the offense is entry with the
proscribed intent; such entry constitutes the completed crime of burglary regardless of
whether any felony or theft actually is committed. (People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th
846, 863, fn. 18; see also Montoya, at pp. 1041-1042.) It does not matter whether a
person who enters a house with larcenous or felonious intent does so through a closed
door, an open door, or a window; the entry with the requisite intent constitutes the
burglary. (People v. Nunley (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 225, 231.)
4 "[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a burglary finding, the
requisite intent is rarely demonstrated by direct proof, and as a result, may be inferred
from facts and circumstances. [Citation.] As a result, evidence such as theft of property
from a dwelling may create a reasonable inference that there was intent to commit theft at
the time of entry." (In re Leanna W. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 735, 741; see People v.
Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 643.)
However, an intent to steal may also be inferred from an unlawful entry without
reasonable explanation of the entry (see People v. Jordan (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 782,
786) or from flight after being discovered. (People v. Frye (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 941,
947 [codefendant made an unauthorized entry into a vacant home at 1:00 a.m. and ran out
the back door after a police officer yelled, " '[F]reeze' "; the "late hour and sudden flight
upon discovery support the inference [he] entered with intent to steal"]; People v. Lopez
(1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 93, 98.) Such intent may be inferred when the defendant is a
stranger and enters a home at a late hour, without permission, and without announcing his
intent. (People v. Swenson (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 636, 639-640 [evidence was sufficient
to prove a defendant entered a room with the intent to commit larceny because he entered
the hotel room at 3:00 a.m. without authorization, knocking or giving a prior warning].)
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Filed 2/11/15 P. v. Hedgecock CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D064977
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD228615; SCE330151) RACHELLE HEDGECOCK,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Patricia K.
Cookson, Judge. Affirmed.
Janice R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
Eric Swenson, Lynne McGinnis and Ryan H. Peeck, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent. A jury convicted Rachelle Anne Hedgecock of burglary. (Pen. Code,1 § 459.) It
found true allegations that the building was inhabited (§ 460) and another person other
than an accomplice was present in the residence during the commission of the crime.
(§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21).) The court sentenced Hedgecock to three years in state prison in
this case and to a concurrent three-year term on a related probation violation.
Hedgecock contends the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction
because she did not act with the intent to commit theft. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Prosecution Case
At around 8:00 a.m. on May 19, 2013, Shaun Richardson was awakened by a loud
noise at his residence on Riverdance Court in Alpine. From his upstairs bedroom
window, he saw Hedgecock standing outside holding a pair of scissors. He asked her
what she was doing there. She replied she was looking for a woman and mentioned a
name but Richardson was unsure of the name. He went downstairs and noticed that two
of his window screens had been cut and removed. Richardson had lived at the residence
since 2009 but had never seen Hedgecock before. He called the sheriff's department.
San Diego County Sheriff's Department Detective Richard Bolter reported to the
scene and detained Hedgecock near Richardson's home. Hedgecock had a pair of scissors
in her bag. She said she had been looking for her niece named Jessica.
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Defense Case
James Danielson, Hedgecock's father, testified Hedgecock had telephoned him on
either May 18 or 19, 2013, asking for a shower and possibly a meal.
Jessica Vanderbilt testified that for 18 months, until 2008, she lived at the Alpine
residence where Richardson lived at the time of the burglary. Approximately one year
before the burglary, Vanderbilt told Hedgecock she had moved to a different house in the
same general area. In either April or May 2013, Hedgecock had telephoned Vanderbilt,
stating she needed a place to stay the night.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
"In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction, the reviewing court must examine the whole record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—
evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate
court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citations.] The same standard applies when the
conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] Although it is the
jury's duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two
reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the
jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citation.] ' "If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's
3 findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably
be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment." ' "
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053-1054; see also People v. Ceja (1993) 4
Cal.4th 1134, 1139.)
In making our determination, we do not reweigh the evidence; the credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be accorded to the evidence are matters exclusively within
the province of the trier of fact. (People v. Stewart (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 785, 790.) We
will not reverse unless it clearly appears that on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d
745, 755; see also People v. Stewart, at p. 790; People v. Olea (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 508,
513.)
II. Legal Principles
Burglary is committed when a "person . . . enters any house, room, apartment . . .
or other building . . . with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony[.]"
(§ 459; People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1041; see People v. Lawrence (2000)
24 Cal.4th 219, 232-233.) It is settled that the essence of the offense is entry with the
proscribed intent; such entry constitutes the completed crime of burglary regardless of
whether any felony or theft actually is committed. (People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th
846, 863, fn. 18; see also Montoya, at pp. 1041-1042.) It does not matter whether a
person who enters a house with larcenous or felonious intent does so through a closed
door, an open door, or a window; the entry with the requisite intent constitutes the
burglary. (People v. Nunley (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 225, 231.)
4 "[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a burglary finding, the
requisite intent is rarely demonstrated by direct proof, and as a result, may be inferred
from facts and circumstances. [Citation.] As a result, evidence such as theft of property
from a dwelling may create a reasonable inference that there was intent to commit theft at
the time of entry." (In re Leanna W. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 735, 741; see People v.
Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 643.)
However, an intent to steal may also be inferred from an unlawful entry without
reasonable explanation of the entry (see People v. Jordan (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 782,
786) or from flight after being discovered. (People v. Frye (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 941,
947 [codefendant made an unauthorized entry into a vacant home at 1:00 a.m. and ran out
the back door after a police officer yelled, " '[F]reeze' "; the "late hour and sudden flight
upon discovery support the inference [he] entered with intent to steal"]; People v. Lopez
(1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 93, 98.) Such intent may be inferred when the defendant is a
stranger and enters a home at a late hour, without permission, and without announcing his
intent. (People v. Swenson (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 636, 639-640 [evidence was sufficient
to prove a defendant entered a room with the intent to commit larceny because he entered
the hotel room at 3:00 a.m. without authorization, knocking or giving a prior warning].)
The intent to steal may be inferred from the totality of the facts and circumstances.
(Frye, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 947.) If the circumstances of a particular case and the
conduct of the defendant reasonably indicate that his or her purpose in unlawfully
entering a home is to commit larceny, a reviewing court will not disturb a guilty verdict
on a burglary charge. (Swenson, 28 Cal.App.2d 636 at pp. 639-640.)
5 It is, of course, settled that a conviction cannot be based on mere speculation and
conjecture. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 35 ["mere speculation cannot
support a conviction"]; People v. Harvey (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 90, 105, fn. 7
["Substantial evidence means more than simply one of several plausible explanations for
an ambiguous event."].)
III. Analysis
Hedgecock concedes that her cutting the screen to Richardson's house satisfied the
"entry" element of the burglary statute under People v. Valencia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1, 13-
14, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Yarbrough (2012) 54 Cal.4th 889,
894. The evidence supporting the intent element of the burglary statute include that
Hedgecock was a stranger to Richardson and did not ring the doorbell to be allowed
inside; rather she cut the screen window open. Based on her phone call to her father
around the date of the burglary, Hedgecock apparently wanted a place to shower or food
to eat. The jury could reasonably infer that she entered Richardson's home looking for
those things. Vanderbilt had told her she no longer lived at the address where Richardson
lived, permitting an inference that Hedgecock knew her entry was without permission.
Hedgecock also fled from the scene, indicating a consciousness of her guilt. It was the
jury's duty to evaluate the evidence and counterarguments tending to support
Hedgecock's claim of innocence. The jury did so and found Hedgecock guilty. We
conclude sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict.
6 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.