People v. Haywood

2024 IL App (1st) 220028-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 15, 2024
• Docket: 1-22-0028
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (1st) 220028-U

No. 1-22-0028

Order filed March 15, 2024

FIFTH DIVISION

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 03 CR 16999 ) DONALD HAYWOOD, ) Honorable ) Vincent M. Gaughan, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Mikva and Justice Lyle concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s 29-year sentence for first-degree murder is affirmed.

¶2 Defendant Donald Haywood appeals his 29-year sentence for first-degree murder.

Originally, defendant was sentenced to 55 years for a murder that he committed at age 17. This

court reversed the circuit court’s order denying defendant leave to file his successive post-

conviction petition and remanded for reconsideration in light of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460

(2012). See People v. Haywood, 2016 IL App (1st) 142833. In this appeal, defendant now argues

that the circuit court abused its discretion because (1) the circuit court failed to fully consider the No. 1-22-0028

mitigating sentencing factors applicable to juvenile offenders set forth in the Unified Code of

Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2020)) and (2) the circuit court imposed an excessive

sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Defendant and his older brother, Karl Haywood, were each charged with multiple offenses

stemming from the shooting death of Ruby Lasecki in 2003. At defendant’s jury trial, the State

introduced defendant’s videotaped statement to the police into evidence. In that statement,

defendant recounted the following facts.

¶5 On July 5, 2003, Karl called a cab company from his residence on Chicago’s South Side.

He intended to rob the cabdriver, and defendant agreed to assist and to act as a lookout. Prior to

the robbery, Karl gave defendant a gun, which defendant hid in his waistband. Once in the cab,

defendant returned the gun to Karl. Karl then ordered Lasecki at gunpoint to drive into a parking

lot and to hand over her money and jewelry. Karl gave defendant the gun and Lasecki’s belongings.

Following the robbery, Karl repeatedly ordered defendant to shoot Lasecki, but defendant refused.

Karl took the gun back from defendant. As defendant started to walk away from the vehicle, he

heard Lasecki say “[D]on’t shoot” and try to sound the horn of her vehicle. Defendant then heard

a single gunshot. Karl caught up with defendant, and they both ran through an alley as Karl gave

defendant the gun again. Later, defendant threw the gun away.

¶6 The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder and the circuit court sentenced him

to 55 years of imprisonment. On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant’s conviction. People

v. Haywood, Nos. 1-05-4075, 1-06-0200 (Cons.) (2008) (unpublished order under Supreme Court

Rule 23). This court also affirmed the second stage dismissal of defendant’s initial pro se petition

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for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)). People

v. Haywood, 2012 IL App (1st) 111554-U, ¶ 18.

¶7 In 2014, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition

under the Act. Relying on Miller, he argued that the court imposed a de facto life sentence after

failing to consider factors specifically applicable to the sentencing of juveniles and that the proper

remedy was a new sentencing hearing. The circuit court denied the motion. On appeal, this court

reversed the denial of leave to file the Miller claim. Haywood, 2016 IL App (1st) 142833-U, ¶ 40.

On remand, the circuit court stated it would undertake “a re-sentencing under Illinois law pursuant

to *** Miller” and that, to avoid reversible error, it would not sentence defendant to more than a

40-year term.

¶8 Defendant’s sentencing hearing was conducted over several court dates. Defendant

testified that his father had died when defendant was seven years old. At age eight or nine, he

witnessed the fatal shooting of his 14-year-old uncle. Defendant’s mother was also shot in the

incident. She thereafter began using heroin and stopped paying her bills, and Karl began dealing

drugs. Post-conviction counsel argued in mitigation that defendant’s mother was a “drug addict”

who had “rejected” her children and left defendant “more or less” to Karl’s care, that Karl had

“ruled his life,” that defendant had consistently taken opportunities for rehabilitation and had good

prospects upon his release, and that he required medical care that was difficult to obtain in prison.

The State argued in aggravation that defendant had been only five months shy of 18 years old at

the time of the murder, had agreed to commit the robbery, had transported the firearm, and given

it to Karl prior to the murder. Lasecki’s two sons read victim impact statements.

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¶9 In allocution, defendant stated, “I’m sorry to the victim and the families, as well as our

community.” He believed his continued imprisonment would be “wrong,” because he was “very

sick” and would receive inadequate medical treatment. He noted he was a first-time offender who

had merely acted as a “look out” and been convicted under an accountability theory.

¶ 10 Before sentencing defendant, the court stated it had listened to the prosecution and defense

regarding factors in aggravation and mitigation and to defendant’s testimony. The court recognized

that defendant was “not [his] brother” Karl:

“I have taken into account, sir, the parameters of *** [B]uffer and Miller ***, the

presentence investigation, the statutory issues in aggravation, and the statutory issues in

mitigation, and the nonstatutory issues in mitigation. First of all, in considering a—the

resentence, *** the main emphasis should be on the age of the convicted person at the time

of the offense, and also the chances for rehabilitation. *** [Defendant] was convicted on

accountability. It’s certainly clear that at the time of the offense, that [defendant] did not

have the adult maturity, nor the responsibility, which led to this type of conduct. He

certainly was under the—and I can’t emphasize this enough—the negative influence of his

older brother. And I find that *** [in] allocution, he’s stated regret to the victim’s family.

*** And I’ve been looking at the other elements for rehabilitation, his effort, and also his

success in rehabilitating and better improving himself through the different courses that he

has taken in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The idea that his sister retired from the

military is going to provide support, gives insight that [defendant] has demonstrated an

adult maturity at this time, and also his chances of rehabilitation are also great. A fair

sentence at this time would be 29 years.” (Paragraph break omitted.)

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¶ 11 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, arguing the new sentence was excessive due to his

background and limited role in the offense. The circuit court denied the motion to reconsider. This

timely appeal followed. Ill. S. Ct. R. 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); Ill. S. Ct. R. 606 (eff. Dec. 7, 2023).

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 Defendant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion because (1) the circuit court

failed to fully consider the mitigating sentencing factors applicable to juvenile offenders set forth

in the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2020)) and (2) the circuit court

imposed an excessive sentence.

¶ 14 A. Jurisdiction

¶ 15 This court’s previous decision to remand defendant’s successive post-conviction petition,

while technically not vacating defendant’s sentence, effectively required as much in light of Miller

and its progeny. Haywood, 2016 IL App (1st) 142833, ¶¶ 2, 40. On remand, the State conceded

that defendant had to be resentenced in light of Miller. Despite this, the circuit court did not enter

an order granting post-conviction relief and vacating defendant’s prior sentence, which creates a

jurisdictional wrinkle. People v. Hill, 2022 IL App (1st) 171739-B, ¶¶ 22-26 (questioning a circuit

court’s jurisdiction to enter a new sentence for the defendant based on Miller where it failed to

enter an order formally granting postconviction relief and vacating the original sentence); 725

ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2022) (“If the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate

order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings ***.”). However, the

parties litigated the issue and the circuit court conducted proceedings as if defendant’s prior

sentence had been vacated, and by their conduct the parties revested the circuit court with

jurisdiction. Hill, 2022 IL App (1st) 171739-B, ¶¶ 26-28.

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¶ 16 B. Sentencing

¶ 17 Defendant argues that in sentencing him to 29 years of imprisonment, the circuit court

abused its discretion because it failed to consider, or inadequately considered, the factors set forth

in subsection 5-4.5-105(a), a provision of Illinois’s juvenile sentencing statute that effectively

codifies the mitigating factors set forth in Miller. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2020). We

do not disturb a court’s sentencing decision absent an abuse of discretion. People v. McKinley,

2020 IL App (1st) 191907, ¶ 70. Defendant’s 29-year sentence is within the statutory sentencing

range for first-degree murder and is therefore presumptively proper and will not be disturbed

absent an affirmative showing that it is at variance with the purpose and spirit of the law or

manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2020);

People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36.

¶ 18 Defendant concedes that he failed to raise this argument in his motion to reconsider

sentence, but he contends the issue is reviewable under either prong of the plain error doctrine or

as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant’s contention is unpersuasive because the

argument fails on the merits.

¶ 19 We note that case law is currently unclear as to whether the circuit court was required to

apply subsection 5-4.5-105(a) to this defendant, who committed his offenses on July 5, 2003. In

People v. Gunn, 2020 IL App (1st) 170542, this court held that this “plain language” shows that

subsection 5-4.5-105(a) “applies only to offenses committed on or after *** January 1, 2016,” the

effective date of the subsection, regardless of the sentencing date. Id. ¶ 153; People v. Clark, 2021

IL App (1st) 180523-U ¶ 130 (finding that subsection 5-4.5-105(a) was inapplicable because the

offense predated 2016); but see McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, ¶¶ 67, 88, 91 (holding that

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the circuit court should have applied the factors of subsection 5-4.5-105(a) in reducing the

defendant’s previous 100-year sentence to 39 years, despite the offense occurring before 2016).

We need not decide this issue since, regardless of whether the circuit court was required to consider

the statutory factors, the circuit court did consider the statutory factors.

¶ 20 At the time of the sentencing hearing, the subsection 5-4.5-105(a) factors could be

summarized as follows: (1) the juvenile offender’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity, and the

presence of any cognitive or developmental disabilities; (2) whether he was subjected to outside

pressure, including peer or familial pressure and negative influences; (3) his family, home

environment, and educational and social background; (4) potential for or evidence of

rehabilitation; (5) the circumstances of the offense; (6) his degree of participation and specific role,

including his level of planning in the offense; (7) whether he was able to meaningfully participate

in his defense; (8) prior juvenile or criminal history; and (9) any other information the court finds

relevant and reliable, including an expression of remorse, if appropriate. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a)

(West 2020).

¶ 21 Defendant acknowledges that the circuit court considered “some” of these factors but

argues the court “overlooked *** or at least misapplied” them. However, it is well-settled that “a

sentencing court is not required to recite and assign value to each factor in aggravation and

mitigation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421, ¶ 16;

see also People v. Jarrell, 248 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1051 (1993) (holding that the fact that the trial

court did not articulate its process in determining the appropriateness of a given sentence does not

render the sentence invalid).

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¶ 22 Here, the court entered two pre-sentencing investigation orders, each requiring that the

factors of subsection 5-4.5-105(a) be included. At the sentencing hearing, the court stated it

considered “the [PSI reports], the statutory issues in aggravation, and the statutory issues in

mitigation, and the nonstatutory issues in mitigation.” (Emphasis added.) In discussing “[t]he

guidelines,” the court noted that “the main emphasis” was defendant’s age at the time of the offense

and his “chances for rehabilitation.” The court pointedly distinguished defendant’s character from

Karl’s and acknowledged that at the time of the offense defendant had lacked “the adult maturity”

and “responsibility” which “led to this type of conduct.”

¶ 23 These comments demonstrate that the circuit court considered: defendant’s young age and

impetuousness as compared with his elder brother Karl, the fact that defendant was subjected to

peer or family pressure and negative influences, his family and home environment given that he

had been in Karl’s sole care, the circumstances of the offense, and defendant’s lack of planning.

Additionally, the PSI reports, which the circuit court said it considered, detailed defendant’s

susceptibility to peer and family pressure and other negative influences, as well as his family

background and home environment. Defendant testified as to his background at the hearing, and

defense counsel discussed it in oral argument.

¶ 24 The circuit court, having previously noted defendant’s “great consistency for future

rehabilitation,” reiterated at the sentencing hearing that his chances for rehabilitation and his

maturation since the offense were “great.” The circuit court cited the willingness of his sister to

support him after his release and noted her military background. The circuit court also stressed

defendant’s participation in rehabilitative programs while imprisoned. When, in arguing the

motion to reconsider, defense counsel stressed the lack of prior criminal history, the circuit court

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observed that defendant had argued this in allocution. Finally, the circuit court noted that defendant

expressed remorse in allocution.

¶ 25 The only statutory factor unaddressed was the defendant’s ability to meaningfully

participate in his own defense. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a)(7) (West 2020). However, defendant was

of age at the time of trial, and, as he concedes in his brief, “[t]here was no evidence that [he] was

unable to participate in his defense.”

¶ 26 In sum, the record, read as a whole, reflects that the court properly applied the factors of

subsection 5-4.5-105(a).

¶ 27 Next, defendant argues that his sentence is excessive because the court did not cite

aggravating factors and because the sentence exceeds the statutory minimum and fails to reflect

his limited role in the offense, strong rehabilitative potential, and traumatic personal history. He

argues, based on the mitigating factors and evidence, that any presumption or deference normally

accorded to a sentence is “rebutted” here by the mitigating evidence.

¶ 28 “Where mitigating evidence is presented to the trial court during the sentencing hearing,

we may presume that the trial court considered it, absent some indication, other than the sentence

itself, to the contrary.” People v. Hill, 408 Ill. App. 3d 23, 30 (2011). Here, the mitigating evidence

was presented at sentencing, including the PSI report recounting defendant’s history and the

evidence of his rehabilitation, and it was argued by defendant’s counsel. Defendant points to

nothing in the record to rebut the presumption that the circuit court considered the mitigating

evidence, and we therefore presume the circuit court considered it. Id.; People v. Powell, 159 Ill.

App. 3d 1005, 1011 (1987) (where a PSI report was before the sentencing court, it is presumed

that rehabilitation potential was considered).

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¶ 29 Moreover, the circuit court stated it had listened to defendant and considered the mitigating

factors and the PSI reports, specified that it looked at “the other elements for rehabilitation,

[defendant’s] effort, and also his success in rehabilitating and better improving himself,” and

concluded that defendant’s “chances of rehabilitation are also great.” Thus, the record

demonstrates the court did consider the mitigating evidence defendant now argues on appeal.

Defendant has not affirmatively shown otherwise. The presence of mitigating factors does not

mandate the imposition of the minimum sentence. People v. Contursi, 2019 IL App (1st) 162894,

¶ 25. We reject defendant’s reliance on McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, because there is

nothing in the record to suggest that the circuit court failed to consider mitigating evidence. See

id. ¶ 87.

¶ 30 For similar reasons, we reject defendant’s argument that the circuit court’s failure to cite

aggravating factors when sentencing defendant confirms that his new sentence is excessive. The

court stated it considered “the statutory issues in aggravation” at the time of sentencing. As with

mitigating factors, the sentencing court need not recite or expressly weigh aggravating factors for

the sentence to be valid. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421, ¶ 16. Further, the State presented

victim impact statements of Lasecki’s sons. The State argued that defendant agreed to commit the

robbery, had transported the gun, and given it to Karl. Defendant walked away while Karl held

Lasecki at gunpoint, failed to render aid to her, accepted her property and the firearm from Karl,

and discarded the firearm when pursued by police. Despite the aggravating evidence, his sentence

is 11 years below the median of the statutory range.

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¶ 31 Given the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing and deference to the circuit court’s

superior position to weigh and consider that evidence, we conclude that the circuit court did not

abuse its discretion.

¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 34 Affirmed.

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