People v. Hayes

2020 IL App (1st) 172848-U

Opinion

2020 IL App (1st) 172848-U Order filed: June 26, 2020

FIRST DISTRICT FIFTH DIVISION

No. 1-17-2848

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 97 CR 10247 ) RONALD HAYES, ) Honorable ) Vincent M. Gaughan, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Hoffman and Delort concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: First-stage dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition is reversed, where defendant’s assertion—that an aggregate 80-year sentence imposed upon him for crimes committed when he was 18 years old violated the proportionate penalties clause—was not frivolous or patently without merit.

¶2 Defendant-appellant, Ronald Hayes, was found guilty of—inter alia—first degree murder,

and was sentenced to a total of 80 years in prison for crimes he committed when he was 18 years

old. Defendant’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and he thereafter filed

a postconviction petition asserting—inter alia—that his sentence violated the proportionate

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, Art. I, § 11). That petition was No. 1-17-2848

dismissed by the trial court at the first stage. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for

further proceedings. 1

¶3 Defendant was charged by indictment with, inter alia, the October 31, 1996, murder of

DeMarco Lofton, the attempted murder of Shamika Boykin, and the armed robbery of both

victims. Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of murder, attempted murder, armed

robbery, aggravated vehicular hijacking, and aggravated battery with a firearm. Following a

sentencing hearing, the trial court merged some of the convictions and sentenced petitioner to 60

years’ imprisonment for murder, a consecutive sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment for attempted

murder, and a concurrent sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for armed robbery, for a total

aggregate sentence of 80 years’ imprisonment. Defendant would be eligible for day for day credit

against that sentence.

¶4 On direct appeal, defendant’s convictions and sentences were affirmed. People v. Hayes,

319 Ill. App. 3d 810 (2001).

¶5 On May 16, 2017, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-

Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1, et seq. (West 2016)). 2 Therein, defendant

asserted that, as applied to him, it was a violation of the proportionate penalties clause of the

Illinois Constitution for the trial court to impose a de facto life sentence upon defendant for crimes

he committed when he was 18 years old. In support of this argument, defendant’s petition asserted

that his sentence amounted to a de facto life sentence, as he would not be eligible for parole until

1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order stating with specificity why no substantial question is presented. 2 Although styled as a petition for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, it is undisputed that the trial court properly treated this pleading as defendant’s initial postconviction petition.

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he had served least 40 years, when he was 58 years old. He further contended that such a sentence

violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, where he was only 18 at the

time of the offenses, “neuroscience research suggests that the human brain’s capacity to govern

risk and reward is not fully developed until the age of 25,” the trial court failed to consider

defendant’s “age, family support and education in sentencing,” and the sentence therefore failed

to properly account for his relative youth and rehabilitative potential.

¶6 On July 20, 2017, the trial court entered a written order dismissing defendant’s

postconviction petition at the first stage. The trial court explained its decision by noting that

defendant was not a juvenile at the time he committed his offenses, and further concluding that

defendant was not actually sentenced to a de facto life sentence. Defendant now appeals.

¶7 On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition at the first

stage because he sufficiently stated an as-applied challenge to his sentence under the proportionate

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. We agree.

¶8 The Act “provides a remedy to a criminal defendant whose federal or state constitutional

rights were substantially violated at trial or sentencing.” People v. Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 28.

At the first stage of a postconviction proceeding, the trial court independently reviews the

defendant’s petition, taking the allegations as true, and determines if it is frivolous or patently

without merit. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (2009). If the petition is not dismissed at the first

stage it advances to the second stage. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2016). At the second stage, the

defendant must make a substantial showing of a deprivation of constitutional rights or the petition

is dismissed. Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 28. If such a showing is made, the postconviction petition

advances to the third stage where the court conducts an evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122–6

(West 2016).

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¶9 A petition is frivolous or patently without merit if it “ ‘has no arguable basis *** in law or

in fact.’ “ People v. Papaleo, 2016 IL App (1st) 150947, ¶ 19 (quoting Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11–

12 (2009)). A petition has no arguable basis in law or fact if it is based on an indisputably meritless

legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16. “A legal theory is

‘indisputably meritless’ if it is ‘completely contradicted by the record,’ and a factual allegation is

‘fanciful’ if it is ‘fantastic or delusional.’ “ Papaleo, 2016 IL App (1st) 150947, ¶ 19 (quoting

Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16–17(2009)). We review the first-stage dismissal of a postconviction

petition de novo. People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 131359, ¶ 28.

¶ 10 In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75 (2005), the Supreme Court found that the death

penalty was unconstitutional as applied to minors. In Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), the

Supreme Court held that “[t]he Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole

sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.” Id. at 82. Then, in Miller v.

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012), the Supreme Court concluded that the eighth amendment

“forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile

offenders” convicted of homicide. In each case, the Supreme Court relied in part on the lesser

moral culpability and greater rehabilitative potential of minors in support of its decisions, and “it

is clear the United States Supreme Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller has provided juveniles

with more constitutional protection than adults.” People v. Pacheco, 2013 IL App (4th) 110409,

¶ 68.

¶ 11 However, Miller itself did not impose an outright ban on the imposition of a life sentence

upon a juvenile convicted of homicide, let alone a ban on lengthy term-of-years sentences imposed

upon juveniles. See, Miller, 567 U.S. 479-80 (refusing to completely foreclose the possibility that

a life sentence could be constitutionally imposed upon a juvenile convicted of homicide). Rather,

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the Supreme Court held only that such a sentence could not be mandated, and that before a life

sentence could be properly imposed, “mitigating circumstances” such as “an offender’s youth and

attendant characteristics” must be considered. Id. at 483, 489.

¶ 12 The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that Miller applies to discretionary, as well as

mandatory life sentences (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40), and also to de facto life

sentences, or sentences “that cannot be served in one lifetime” and have “the same practical effect

on a juvenile defendant’s life as would an actual mandatory sentence of life without parole”

(People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶¶ 9-10). More recently, our supreme court concluded that any

sentence exceeding 40 years is a de facto life sentence, requiring the sentencing court to consider

“[the] defendant’s youth and its attendant circumstances.” People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327,

¶¶ 41-42.

¶ 13 Thus, while a juvenile offender may be sentenced to a natural life or de facto sentence of

life imprisonment, before doing so the trial court must:

“[D]etermine[ ] that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity,

permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.

The court may make that decision only after considering the defendant’s youth and its

attendant characteristics. Those characteristics include, but are not limited to, the following

factors: (1) the juvenile defendant’s chronological age at the time of the offense and any

evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and

consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant’s family and home environment; (3) the juvenile

defendant’s degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of familial or peer

pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant’s incompetence, including

his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own

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attorneys; and (5) the juvenile defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation.” Holman, 2017 IL

120655, ¶ 46.

¶ 14 Obviously, a number of these decisions involved analysis of the protections provided by

the eighth amendment, while here we address defendant’s as-applied challenge brought pursuant

to the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. However, as our supreme court

has indicated, the proportionate penalties clause provides “a limitation on penalties beyond those

afforded by the eighth amendment.” People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 69.

¶ 15 Furthermore, defendant—aged 18 at the time of the crimes to which he plead guilty—was

not a “juvenile” offender. “Because defendant was an adult, Miller [and its progeny] does not apply

directly to his circumstances.” People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 45.

¶ 16 Nevertheless, our supreme court specifically considered Miller’s applicability to a young

adult defendant in both People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, and Harris, 2018 IL 121932. It is

true that, in neither case did our supreme court expressly accept the premise that the protections

provided to juvenile offenders by Miller and its progeny should be extended to young adult

offenders; however, the court did not explicitly reject that assertion either. Moreover, in both cases

our supreme very explicitly did indicate that a postconviction proceeding would be an appropriate

venue to address that very issue. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 44; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48.

¶ 17 More recently, another panel of this court concluded that a postconviction petition was

improperly dismissed at the first stage, and explicitly concluded that a mandatory natural life

sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause as applied to a defendant who was 19-years-

old at the time he committed murder, pursuant to Miller and its progeny. People v. House, 2019

IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶ 65, appeal allowed, 140 N.E. 3d 231 (Ill. 2020).

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¶ 18 We find that the allegations underlying defendant’s as-applied proportionate penalties

claim was sufficient under Thompson, Harris, and House to avoid summary dismissal at the first-

stage for being frivolous or patently without merit. Considering these three decisions, the factual

allegations contained in the petition and the record before us, we find that defendant’s as-applied

challenge was not based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory or fanciful factual allegations.

As defendant notes on appeal, the record reflects that defendant did not finish high school, was the

father of two young children, and had a great deal of family support, with his family paying for

private counsel to represent him. Defendant contends that this evidence could support a finding of

his greater rehabilitative potential. Defendant also asserts on appeal that actions for which he was

convicted “support an arguable claim because they reflect the precise hallmarks of transient,

youthful recklessness and lack of impulse control that Miller requires trial courts to consider as

mitigation at sentencing and therefore should have been considered as mitigation at Hayes’

sentencing hearing.”

¶ 19 Moreover, while the record indicates that the trial court was presented with and did

consider defendant’s youth and some of the attendant characteristics outlined above in originally

sentencing defendant (supra, ¶ 13), we reject the State’s argument to the contrary and conclude

that the record does not reflect that the trial court considered all those characteristics. Nor did the

trial court explicitly determine from its consideration of those characteristics and the evidence

before it that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or

irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.

¶ 20 We also acknowledge that on appeal the State raised several other merit-based arguments

against such a conclusion. First, the State asserts that defendant cannot rely upon the Thompson,

Harris, and House decisions, where they involved adult offenders sentenced to mandatory life

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sentences while here defendant was sentenced to a discretionary sentence. Second, the State

contends that defendant was not actually sentenced to a de facto life sentence, as he acknowledges

that he will be eligible for parole in as few as 40 years. Third, the State faults defendant for failing

to support his petition with adequate factual and legal allegations in support of his arguments.

¶ 21 In response, we initially reiterate that our supreme court has determined that that Miller-

based protections apply to discretionary, as well as mandatory life sentences, and also to de facto

life sentences, which it has defined as any sentence exceeding 40 years. Supra ¶ 12. Moreover, we

find these arguments to be “more appropriate to the second stage of postconviction proceedings,

where both parties are represented by counsel, and where the petitioner’s burden is to make a

substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 22.

¶ 22 In reaching this conclusion we note that the first stage in the proceeding allows the trial

court “ ‘to act strictly in an administrative capacity by screening out those petitions which are

without legal substance or are obviously without merit.’ [Citation.] Because most petitions are

drafted at this stage by defendants with little legal knowledge or training, this court views the

threshold for survival as low.” People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 9. It is sufficient that defendant

presents an argument that has an “arguable” basis in law and fact. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 11-12.

¶ 23 Finally, we note that our finding in no way expresses an opinion on the ultimate merits of

the assertions contained in defendant’s postconviction petition, or on whether defendant will

ultimately prevail on his postconviction claims. See Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 22.

¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition

and remand for second-stage proceedings.

¶ 25 Reversed and remanded.

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