People v. Harwell

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 22, 2026
• Docket: 3-25-0356
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2026 IL App (3d) 250356-U

Order filed June 22, 2026 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, ) Kankakee County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-25-0356 v. ) Circuit No. 24-CM-446 ) ROMESA K. HARWELL, ) Honorable ) Brenda L. Claudio, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Brennan and Anderson concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶2 The defendant, Romesa K. Harwell, appeals her convictions for battery, asserting the State

presented insufficient evidence to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 The State charged the defendant with two counts of battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1),

(2) (West 2024)), alleging that she, knowingly and without legal justification, sprayed Jewell

Davis with pepper spray, resulting in insulting and provoking contact and causing bodily harm.

The matter proceeded to a bench trial.

¶5 At trial, Davis testified that she and Howard Wilson shared a child, J.C. On July 18, 2024,

Wilson lived with the defendant. Davis drove to the defendant’s residence to retrieve J.C.’s

clothing from the previous day. Upon arrival, Davis exited her vehicle, leaving J.C. sitting in the

front passenger seat and her daughter in the back seat. Davis approached the defendant’s door, and

after approximately one minute, the defendant and Wilson arrived in their vehicle. Wilson exited

the vehicle and engaged in a heated conversation with Davis. Approximately one minute later, the

defendant exited the vehicle and entered her residence. When the discussion with Wilson became

“intense” and involved verbal threats, Davis returned to her vehicle to leave. The defendant exited

the residence and yelled as she approached Davis’s open driver’s side window. The defendant

pointed pepper spray at Davis and sprayed while Davis was reversing her vehicle to leave. The

defendant was approximately three feet from Davis’s window when she sprayed the pepper spray

directly into Davis’s face and eyes. Davis believed that the pepper spray also reached J.C.’s face

and eyes, who was seated next to her. While she did not observe the pepper spray hit J.C., Davis

could hear him screaming. The pepper spray impaired Davis’s vision, causing her to tear up

“profusely.” Davis felt “blind” and “didn’t know if [the defendant] was gonna jump on [her]”

Davis saw the defendant and Wilson return to their vehicle without “check[ing] on anybody.”

Davis pulled onto the street and called the police. Davis and J.C. received emergency medical

treatment soon after.

2 ¶6 On cross-examination, Davis denied threatening Wilson with a weapon or hearing Wilson

call for help. Davis indicated that Wilson did not physically attack her. However, Wilson

threatened to slap Davis if she did not leave. Davis denied that she instigated the argument with

Wilson, possessed the pepper spray, or that she was sprayed in the process of the defendant taking

her pepper spray.

¶7 Officer Danielle Seacrest testified that she responded to the defendant’s residence

following Davis’s call to the police. Seacrest observed that Davis was upset, distressed, and her

eyes were “red and watering.” Seacrest also saw that J.C. “was upset, crying,” “had snot running

down his nose,” and had red “watering eyes.” First responders provided Davis with a towel.

Seacrest’s body camera footage was entered into evidence. The footage briefly showed Davis’s

face, including her red and swollen eyes. Throughout the encounter, Davis held a damp towel and

periodically wiped her own face and J.C.’s face. The recording depicted J.C. crying but did not

show that he had red eyes. 1

¶8 Wilson testified for the defense that he was in a dating relationship with the defendant. On

the date in question, Wilson recalled that Davis was at the defendant’s door when Wilson and the

defendant arrived. Wilson immediately exited the vehicle, and the defendant exited at the same

time. Wilson described his conversation with Davis regarding J.C.’s clothing as heated. While

Wilson was speaking with Davis, the defendant remained outside. Wilson denied that the

defendant entered the residence or that Davis was physically attacked. Instead, Davis and the

defendant began fighting, and in the process the defendant obtained Davis’s pepper spray and

sprayed Davis in the face. Wilson observed that Davis grabbed her face, ran to her vehicle, and

1 The State’s brief relies on portions of the video which were not admitted at trial. For purposes of this appeal, we have limited our consideration of the evidence to the clip the State admitted. See People v. Johnson, 2026 IL 131337, ¶¶ 93, 97 (a review of the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial must be limited to evidence actually admitted at trial).

3 drove away. Wilson stated that J.C. was “nowhere around.” Wilson could not see into Davis’s

vehicle due to the “black tint” and did not know if anyone else was in the vehicle.

¶9 The defendant testified that Davis was on her front porch when she arrived home with

Wilson. The defendant allowed Davis and Wilson to talk until Davis became too loud and

aggressive and started “acting crazy.” The defendant stated that they were all standing outside their

vehicles when she approached Davis. The defendant denied having pepper spray in her possession.

The defendant explained that Davis “act[ed] like she was fittin” to pepper spray her, so the

defendant “snatched it” from Davis’s keychain and sprayed Davis. The defendant clarified that she

and Davis were “struggling” for the pepper spray and both the defendant and Davis had their hands

on the pepper spray when the defendant “snatched” the cannister. The defendant did not want

Davis to spray her and was trying to get Davis to move back, in an attempt to protect herself. After

the defendant sprayed Davis, she watched Davis drive away. The defendant then left the residence.

The defendant denied seeing or hearing J.C.

¶ 10 The court found the defendant guilty of both counts of battery. In doing so, the court

commented on Seacrest’s testimony and body camera footage, which corroborated Davis’s version

of events. Specifically, the body camera video showed that J.C. was present and upset, and Seacrest

personally observed that J.C.’s eyes were red and watery. The court stated, “I believe that when

*** Davis said that she saw the defendant go in the house, that [the defendant] went in the house

to get her pepper spray. I don’t believe that it was taken from *** Davis’ hand.” The court

discussed the defendant’s version of events and did not believe an argument occurred between

Davis and the defendant requiring the defendant to defend herself. Instead, the evidence showed

that Davis and Wilson were in an argument, and the defendant intervened with pepper spray. The

4 court found that the defendant’s version of events was “not adding up,” and was incredible. The

two counts merged, and the court sentenced the defendant to one year of conditional discharge.

¶ 11 The defendant filed a motion for a new trial alleging that the State failed to prove the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. At the hearing, counsel argued that the evidence

showed Davis was the initial aggressor as opposed to the victim, because Davis was being

physically aggressive and the defendant acted in self-defense. The court denied the defendant’s

motion, noting that Davis’s version, including J.C.’s presence, was corroborated by Seacrest’s

observations despite the defendant and Wilson denying seeing J.C. The court also noted that the

defendant fled the scene, and again, concluded that her version of events was incredible. The

defendant appealed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, the defendant argues that the State did not prove her guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of battery, where Davis’s testimony “did not comport with the laws of nature or universal

human experience.” Specifically, the defendant asserts that the court erred in finding Davis’s

testimony credible in light of extenuating facts and the defendant’s credible testimony.

¶ 14 When a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d

237, 261 (1985). “This standard of review does not allow the reviewing court to substitute its

judgment for that of the fact finder on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the

credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 280-81 (2009). Thus, we afford

great deference to the trier of fact, “to determine the credibility of witnesses, to weigh evidence

5 and draw reasonable inferences therefrom, and to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.” People v.

Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009). We will not retry a defendant and must allow all

reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State. People v. Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510,

¶ 42. To prove the defendant guilty of battery, the State had to establish that the defendant,

knowingly and without legal justification, made physical contact of an insulting and provoking

nature with Davis, and that physical contact resulted in bodily harm. See 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1),

(2) (West 2024).

¶ 15 In this case, Davis testified consistently that following her arrival at the defendant’s

residence, she and Wilson were involved in a verbal dispute. During the argument, Davis observed

the defendant enter the residence and return a few minutes later. Davis was attempting to leave

when the defendant approached her vehicle within three feet of the open driver’s seat window. The

defendant sprayed Davis with pepper spray, while J.C. sat in the front passenger seat.

Corroborating Davis’s statements, Seacrest testified that shortly after the incident, she observed

that both Davis and J.C. were upset, distressed, and both had red and watering eyes. Additionally,

Seacrest’s body camera footage captured Davis and J.C.’s demeanor and Seacrest had the benefit

of personally observing Davis and J.C. In the body camera footage, J.C. appeared upset while

lacking observable physical distress caused by the pepper spray, which corroborated Davis’s and

the defendant’s testimony that Davis was the defendant’s intended target. See People v. Spaulding,

68 Ill. App. 3d 663, 675 (1979) (“the trier of fact is free to believe part of one’s testimony without

believing all of it”). Thus, a reasonable inference exists that Davis would have taken the brunt of

the pepper spray and suffered more severe symptoms. See Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510, ¶ 42.

¶ 16 More importantly, the court found Davis credible. The court compared Davis’s and the

defendant’s testimony and found Davis’s version of events believable. In contrast, the court noted

6 that the defendant’s, and similarly Wilson’s, version did “not add[ ] up,” and were incredible.

Though the defendant offered the court an alternative version of what occurred, the court was not

required to believe her testimony. See Spaulding, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 675; see also Siguenza-Brito,

235 Ill. 2d at 228 (“the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to

convict, even though it is contradicted by the defendant”). Moreover, it was the court’s duty as the

trier of fact to weigh and resolve any possible conflicts regarding the location and manner in which

the battery occurred with the other evidence presented. See Siguenza- Brito, 235 Ill. 2d at 228; see

also Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d at 280-81. To the extent that the defendant asserts the court improperly

relied on disputed or misconstrued facts related to (1) J.C.’s presence, (2) whether the pepper spray

mechanism allowed the cannister to be separated from Davis’s keys, (3) the defendant’s motive

for leaving the residence after the battery, and (4) the lack of physical evidence in Davis’s vehicle,

we find the defendant’s argument asks this court to retry the defendant. See Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510,

¶ 42. Here, even assuming the defendant’s claims regarding these facts are true, considered in light

of the remaining evidence, we agree with the court’s credibility determinations and see no reason

to substitute our judgment. See Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d at 280-81; see also People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill.

2d 92, 114-15 (2007) (because the trier of fact is best equipped to determine the credibility of a

witness, we afford great deference to such credibility determinations unless the determination is

unreasonable). Therefore, taken in the light most favorable to the State, sufficient evidence was

presented to sustain the defendant’s convictions for battery.

¶ 17 In coming to this conclusion, we note that the defendant spent a significant portion of his

brief referencing the Sabre website, which offers educational information about pepper spray and

sells pepper spray products. Importantly, none of the Sabre information that the defendant used to

support his argument that Davis’s testimony “does not comport with the laws of nature or universal

7 human experience,” was presented, argued, or admitted at trial. See People v. Johnson, 2026 IL

131337, ¶¶ 93, 97 (a reviewing court evaluating sufficiency of evidence may not consider material

that was not considered by trier of fact in weighing witness’ credibility). Additionally, the

defendant attempts to use the lack of evidence admitted regarding Davis’s daughter to support an

argument that the evidence weighed against Davis’s credibility. Significantly, there was no

evidence presented regarding any effects or lack of effects occurring to Davis’s daughter. In both

instances, it would be improper to rely on facts outside of those presented to the trier of fact when

considering the defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim. See id. ¶¶ 92-94 (appellate court

erred when it sua sponte relied on research studies to support its reversal of defendant’s conviction

when the trier of fact had no opportunity to consider the matter). Therefore, we decline to do so

here.

¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 19 The judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.

¶ 20 Affirmed.