2026 IL App (3d) 240690
Opinion filed February 10, 2026 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Kankakee County, Illinois, ) v. ) Appeal No. 3-24-0690 ) Circuit No. 24-CF-317 TAYONNA HARVEY, ) ) Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Kathy Bradshaw-Elliott, ) Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Peterson and Bertani concurred in the judgment and opinion. ____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 Following a jury trial, defendant, Tayonna Harvey, was convicted of criminal sexual abuse
pursuant to section 11-1.50(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.50(a)(1)
(West 2024)) and sentenced to sex offender probation for a period of 30 months. Defendant
challenges her conviction on appeal, arguing that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant used force or the threat of force to commit an act of sexual conduct. For the
reasons set forth below, we reverse.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND ¶3 Defendant was charged with one count of criminal sexual abuse (id.), alleging that, on
February 3, 2024, she “knowingly committed an act of sexual conduct with [M.P.], in that said
defendant, by the use of force, intentionally touched [M.P.’s] vagina with her hand, for the purpose
of the sexual arousal of the defendant.” Defendant pleaded not guilty.
¶4 The jury trial commenced on August 19, 2024. The State called M.P. as its first witness,
who testified as follows. On February 3, 2024, M.P. went to a local bar called Jensen’s with
Florence Lane, Kahdijah Waiters, and Martesha Finch to celebrate Lane’s birthday. M.P. did not
consume alcohol prior to arriving at Jensen’s but drank one shot and part of one mixed drink at the
bar. M.P. was wearing a “short black dress” and was not wearing underwear. M.P. physically
indicated the length of her dress as “a third of the way between her hip and knee.”
¶5 Music played throughout the bar, but there was no designated dance floor. People were
dancing “[w]herever they could.” At some point, M.P. began dancing and defendant “bumped into
[M.P.] really hard” but did not stop. Defendant then approached M.P. a second time and “inserted
[defendant’s] left finger in [M.P.’s] vagina.” M.P. felt “disgusted, puzzled,” and “violated.” M.P.
confronted defendant and asked her why she touched her, to which defendant responded, “I like
girls, I like p***, I finger b***.” Thereafter, defendant approached Waiters, put her finger in
Waiters’s face, and said, “smell your best friend’s p***.” M.P. explained that this was a slang term
for vagina. At that point, Finch noticed the commotion and asked defendant why she touched M.P.,
and defendant denied doing so. Defendant “became very aggressive and loud,” her eyes bulged,
and she had veins protruding from her neck. M.P. interjected that defendant had touched her
without permission, and defendant stated, “okay, I touched her, your friend p*** stink.” M.P.,
Finch, and defendant eventually ended up outside in the parking lot of Jensen’s and got into a
physical altercation. M.P. and her friends left Jensen’s before the police arrived.
2 ¶6 M.P. did not report defendant’s conduct to the police until May 2024 because she “had to
build up the courage” to do so and was deciding whether she wanted to pursue legal action. M.P.
was concerned that she would be judged, and she was embarrassed.
¶7 On cross-examination, M.P. explained that defendant approached her from behind and that
she was unaware of defendant’s presence. M.P. was dancing by herself and described the dance
style as “twerking,” which she agreed meant that “you kind of bend over and you shake your rear
end.” She denied coming into contact with other people while she danced. She further denied
“twerking and grinding on” defendant. M.P. confirmed that defendant loudly said she “smelled
bad” and that she was embarrassed. M.P. stated that her dress lifted as she was dancing but that,
despite not wearing underwear, her genitals were never exposed.
¶8 The State called Finch as its next witness. Finch testified that she had known M.P. for
approximately nine years. She stated that M.P. was dancing by herself at Jensen’s. M.P. was not
intoxicated. Finch, M.P., Lane, and Waiters were already inside Jensen’s when defendant arrived,
at which point defendant told the group that they were pretty and walked away. Finch explained
that defendant later approached the group again, tapped Waiters on the shoulder, and “put her
fingers in her face like smell your friend p***, it stink.” Immediately after, M.P. came to Finch
looking upset and said, “this b*** just touched my p*** and I don’t play like that because I don’t
like girls.” Finch confronted defendant, and defendant stated, “yeah, I touched her, I always touch
p***.” Finch detailed the physical altercation that ensued in the bar’s parking lot. The following
day, Finch received phone calls and text messages informing her that defendant had “tagged”
Waiters in a Facebook Live video.
¶9 On cross examination, Finch acknowledged that, as M.P. was dancing, she was slightly
bent over but “[n]ot a whole lot.” Her legs were not “all the way together,” but they were not “all
3 the way open” either. M.P.’s dress did not rise over her buttocks as she danced. Finch did not see
defendant touch M.P.
¶ 10 The Facebook Live video broadcasted by defendant the day after the incident was admitted
into evidence and contained the following. Defendant stated, “You know me, I’m always smelling
a b*** p***. I like p***. I’mma smell some p***, I’mma rub some p***. That’s what I get,
though. Just because a b*** look good don’t mean her p*** good.” She continued to say that she
rubbed M.P.’s vagina and then, in the video, mimicked smelling her hand and described an
unpleasant odor. Defendant stated that she got into a fight because she said M.P.’s “p*** stink.”
She further explained that she “put [her] hand in the p*** like,” and gestured with two fingers
towards the camera, and then put her hand to her nose. She stated that she said, “you can grab
mine. I don’t know what you wanna go p*** for p*** or something.” She also said, “If I smelled
the wrong p***, don’t be mad at me. Wash your p***.”
¶ 11 The State’s next witness was Bryce Hale, a patrol officer with the Kankakee Police
Department. He testified that, on May 13, 2024, he took M.P.’s report concerning the incident on
February 3, 2024. He learned that M.P. had been sexually assaulted at a local bar, and M.P.
provided him with the video. He prepared the report but was not involved in the follow-up
investigation.
¶ 12 The State rested. The defense moved for a directed verdict, which the court denied.
¶ 13 Pascal Joiner was the first witness for the defense. Joiner shares a child with defendant and
was also at Jensen’s on February 3, 2024. He testified that, although he was trying to “dodge”
defendant that night, he did see a “young lady” dancing on defendant in his peripheral vision. He
described the young lady as “twerking” with her head down, which prevented him from seeing her
full face. Joiner testified that the young lady’s buttocks were in contact with defendant. He did not
4 know who she was and could not recall what she was wearing. He stepped away to use the restroom
and, when he returned, heard the physical altercation taking place in the parking lot.
¶ 14 During cross-examination, Joiner confirmed that he did not see defendant touch anyone’s
vagina but that he was not watching defendant the entire time because he left to go to the restroom.
¶ 15 The defense next called Shameka Brown. Brown is defendant’s cousin and was with
defendant at Jensen’s on the date of the incident. Brown testified that she saw a “very intoxicated”
woman, who she later identified as M.P., “dancing all around” and that Brown had asked her to
move “out of [Brown’s] boundaries.” M.P. complied with Brown’s request and then moved to
where defendant was sitting and began dancing. Defendant asked M.P. to move twice, but she did
not comply. Eventually, defendant said, “b***, move, you stink.” M.P. replied by calling
defendant a “fat a*** b***.” Brown did not see M.P. physically come into contact with defendant
while she danced. Brown did not hear M.P. tell defendant not to touch her or to stop what she was
doing, nor did she hear M.P. indicate that defendant lifted her dress.
¶ 16 Brown then observed M.P. leave the bar and, when Brown left the bar herself, saw M.P.
and her friends standing in a circle with M.P. saying, “oh, we fittin’ to bust this b*** head when
she come out, we fittin’ to bust this fat a*** b*** head.”
¶ 17 On cross-examination, Brown confirmed that, while she did not witness any “sexual foul
play” from either woman, she was not always present in the bar with defendant.
¶ 18 The jury found defendant guilty of criminal sexual abuse. Defendant was sentenced to sex
offender probation for a period of 30 months. This appeal followed.
¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove her guilty of criminal sexual
abuse beyond a reasonable doubt because it did not prove that defendant used force or the threat
5 of force when committing an act of sexual conduct. The State counters that force is established
where a defendant uses the element of surprise to carry out a sexual act and that defendant did so
by approaching M.P. from behind.
¶ 21 It is the State’s burden to prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v. Wells, 2019 IL App (1st) 163247, ¶ 18. “ ‘Where a criminal conviction is challenged
based on insufficient evidence, a reviewing court, considering all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Siguenza-
Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 224 (2009)). A conviction will not be disturbed “unless the evidence is so
improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 22 To the extent questions arise concerning statutory construction, we review these de novo.
Grady v. Illinois Department of Healthcare & Family Services, 2016 IL App (1st) 152402, ¶ 9.
“The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s
intent. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain
and ordinary meaning.” People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12. We interpret the statute as a
whole and consider the language at issue in conjunction with other relevant statutory provisions.
Id. We may not “interpret statutory language in a manner that renders any part of the statute
‘redundant’ or ‘superfluous.’ ” Grady, 2016 IL App (1st) 152402, ¶ 25 (quoting Citizens Opposing
Pollution v. ExxonMobil Coal U.S.A., 2012 IL 111286, ¶ 29).
¶ 23 A person commits criminal sexual abuse pursuant to section 11-1.50(a)(1) of the Code
when the person “commits an act of sexual conduct by the use of force or threat of force.” 720
6 ILCS 5/11-1.50(a)(1) (West 2024). Section 11-0.1 of the Code defines “force or the threat of force”
as follows:
“ ‘Force or threat of force’ means the use of force or violence or the threat of force
or violence, including, but not limited to, the following situations:
(1) when the accused threatens to use force or violence on the victim or on
any other person, and the victim under the circumstances reasonably believes that
the accused has the ability to execute that threat; or
(2) when the accused overcomes the victim by use of superior strength or
size, physical restraint, or physical confinement.” Id. § 11-0.1.
“To prove force, there is no definite standard establishing the amount of force the State must prove
and each case must be considered on its own facts.” People v. Gonzalez, 2019 IL App (1st) 152760,
¶ 38. The force necessary to prove the offense requires something beyond the force inherent in the
sexual contact. See id. “[W]e may consider the size and strength of the defendant and the victim
as well as the place and conditions under which the incident occurred.” Id.
¶ 24 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt where
there was no evidence defendant physically overcame or trapped M.P. or that defendant otherwise
used force beyond that which is inherent in the sexual contact that occurred. Defendant continues
that M.P. was wearing a short dress without underwear and that defendant, being behind M.P.
while M.P. danced, would not have had to physically overcome M.P. in order to touch M.P.’s
vagina.
¶ 25 Recognizing that force as defined in section 11-0.1 may be lacking, the State resorts to a
“less-often cited example of force” where a defendant utilizes surprise as a means to commit a
sexual act. In such cases, the State contends that “the use of force is implied, such that the force
7 inherent in the act of sexual conduct is all that is required to prove the use of force element.” See
People v. Borak, 13 Ill. App. 3d 815, 820-21 (1973). The State characterizes this as “implied
force,” a concept first considered in Borak.
¶ 26 In Borak, the defendant was a gynecologist accused of rape and deviate sexual assault
based upon sexual acts committed on a patient during her examination. Id. at 816-17. While
examining the victim, the defendant asked personal questions about her sexual relations with her
husband while manipulating his finger inside her vagina. Id. at 817. The victim noticed that the
defendant was “breathing heavy and was flushed.” Id. The victim did not leave the examination
table because the defendant was standing beside it, and she was scared because she thought that
he was sexually stimulated. Id. She closed her eyes and felt defendant’s tongue near her vagina.
Id. She rose up on her elbows but, at the defendant’s instruction, laid back down and closed her
eyes. Id. She then felt defendant’s penis enter her vagina, at which time she sat up and got dressed.
Id. She testified that she was not restrained on the table, the defendant did not have a weapon or
threaten or use force against her, and she did not call for help or use force against defendant. Id.
¶ 27 The defendant was convicted of rape and deviate sexual assault, both of which required
force as charged. Id. at 816. On appeal, the court recognized that, “due to the nature of the
examination being conducted, defendant was allegedly able to accomplish the acts by surprise,”
as opposed to the traditional understanding of force. Id. at 818. It then considered whether the
surprise employed by the doctor somehow “negated” the necessity for force and explored whether
“some theory of implied or statutory force can be employed.” Id.
¶ 28 In considering the rape statute in effect at the time, the Borak court noted that, “in certain
situations, force can be present where no actual violence was either committed or threatened.” Id.
at 819. Specifically, the rape statute included within the definition of “by force and against her
8 will” the circumstance where the victim was unconscious or had a mental condition that caused
the inability to give effective consent. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 819-20. The court
further noted that a committee comment to the deviate sexual assault statute provided that “the
force required *** is generally the equivalent of the force required in rape.” Id. at 818. The court
ultimately held that, in cases not involving minors,
“ ‘force’ in the statutory sense, is present when the victim is incapable of consenting to the
sexual act involved because she has been given no opportunity to consent. Force is thus
implied when the rape or deviate sexual acts proscribed by statute are accomplished under
the pretext of medical treatment when the victim is surprised, and unaware of the intention
involved.” Id. at 820-21.
¶ 29 Defendant argues that Borak is inapposite because its holding “is limited to circumstances
where a medical professional uses the pretext of medical treatment in order to commit acts of
sexual conduct through surprise.” Defendant argues that an inherent power imbalance exists
between a physician and patient because the patient “often has no way of knowing what is routine
procedure and what is a criminal sexual act until after the fact,” and thus Borak’s holding addresses
circumstances in which a doctor takes advantage of a patient’s limited consent. Here, M.P. and
defendant were not in a professional setting, M.P. was not in an examination room where she
would have felt uncomfortable or unable to leave, and M.P. did not provide any limited consent
for defendant’s touch that was subsequently exceeded. Therefore, defendant concludes, there was
no implied force when she touched M.P.
¶ 30 We agree with defendant that Borak is unavailing to the State. First, as noted by defendant,
the implied force analysis in Borak has never been extended beyond the physician-patient context.
More significantly, however, the analysis in Borak was based upon statutes that are no longer in
9 effect, and the current criminal sexual abuse statute specifically provides for the prosecution of
criminal sexual abuse committed by surprise. By contrast, the former rape statute specifically
included within the definition of force instances where no violence was committed or threatened,
including where the victim was unconscious or incapable of consenting. Id. at 819-20. Moreover,
the committee comments to the deviate sexual assault statute indicated that the force required for
rape and deviate sexual assault was the same, and the Borak court explicitly relied on these
comments in reaching its conclusion. Id. at 820.
¶ 31 Under the current statutory scheme for criminal sexual abuse, however, a person commits
criminal sexual abuse under section 11-1.50(a)(1) of the Code, when the person commits an act of
sexual conduct by the use or threat of force. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.50(a)(1) (West 2024). This is distinct
from section 11-1.50(a)(2), where a person commits criminal sexual abuse when the person
commits an act of sexual conduct and knows that the victim cannot understand the nature of the
act or is unable to give knowing consent. Id. § 11-1.50(a)(2). We note parenthetically that this
conclusion is further supported by the most recent amendment to section 11-0.1 of the Code, which
modified the definition of “unable to give knowing consent” to make clear it included “when the
victim was *** unaware of the nature of the act such that the victim could not give voluntary and
knowing agreement to the sexual act.” Pub. Act 104-245, § 50 (eff. Jan. 1, 2026) (amending 720
ILCS 5/11-0.1).
¶ 32 Simply put, section 11-1.50(a)(1) and (a)(2) consists of different ways to commit Class 4
criminal sexual abuse. While subsection (a)(1) requires the use of force, (a)(2) explicitly
contemplates the situation presented here (and in Borak), where a victim is “unable to give
knowing consent” due to the element of surprise or being unaware of the nature of the act. The
current statutory language no longer supports interpreting a victim’s inability to understand the
10 nature of the act or give knowing consent within the definition of “force” as currently defined in
section 11-0.1. Instead, at least as it relates to criminal sexual abuse, these are alternative theories
for charging criminal sexual abuse. Moreover, interpreting force to include implied force based on
surprise in a section 11-1.50(a)(1) prosecution would render section 11-1.50(a)(2) superfluous,
something we should not do. See Grady, 2016 IL App (1st) 152402, ¶ 25. Accordingly, Borak’s
concept of “implied force” has no relevance to a section (a)(1) prosecution for criminal sexual
abuse.
¶ 33 In electing to charge defendant under section 11-1.50(a)(1), and not section 11-1.50(a)(2),
the State was required to prove “force or threat of force” as defined in section 11-0.1 of the Code.
Section 11-0.1 contemplates some level of physical force, or the threat thereof, to prove criminal
sexual abuse. Here, the State presented no evidence that, beyond the force inherent in the sexual
contact, defendant threatened M.P., physically overcame or restrained her, or otherwise confined
her. While there is no particular standard for the force required to prove criminal sexual abuse, in
this case, there was no evidence of any force used in touching M.P.’s vagina. Although it is
undisputed that defendant did, in fact, commit an act of sexual conduct against M.P., defendant’s
actions in approaching M.P. from behind while M.P. danced and surprising her with the sexual
conduct does not fall within the definition of “force” under section 11-1.50(a)(1). Rather, it is
conduct that arguably falls within the uncharged criminal sexual abuse offense provided for in
section 11-1.50(a)(2).
¶ 34 Recognizing the possibility that the concept of implied force does not apply to criminal
sexual assault as charged under 11-1.50(a)(1), the State alternatively argues that the evidence at
trial was sufficient to satisfy 11-1.50(a)(1)’s force requirement because, in addition to “rubbing”
M.P.’s vagina, defendant engaged in an additional act of digital penetration. Specifically, the State
11 argues that the “rubbing” constituted the “sexual conduct” under section 11-1.50 of the Code, and
the digital penetration established the use of force that was not inherent in the “rubbing” conduct.
However, because defendant was only charged under section 11-1.50(a)(1), which requires a
showing of knowing touching or fondling of the victim’s sex organ by force, we limit our analysis
to the force utilized to accomplish the charged conduct. We therefore reject the State’s argument
on this point.
¶ 35 In sum, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant used force or
the threat of force when committing an act of sexual conduct as charged under section 11-
1.50(a)(1). Given the insufficiency of the evidence, we must reverse defendant’s conviction for
criminal sexual abuse.
¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee
County.
¶ 38 Reversed.
12 People v. Harvey, 2026 IL App (3d) 240690
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kankakee County, No. 24-CF- 317; the Hon. Kathy Bradshaw-Elliott, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Santiago A. Durango, and Vaidehi for Suriyanarayanan, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Appellant: Ottawa, for appellant.
Attorneys James Rowe, State’s Attorney, of Kankakee (Patrick Delfino, for Thomas D. Arado, and Nicholas A. Atwood, of State’s Appellee: Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.