2022 IL App (1st) 200719
FIFTH DIVISION May 27, 2022
No. 1-20-0719
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 17 CR 17697 ) CRAIG HARTFIELD, ) ) Honorable Charles P. Burns, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court with opinion. Justices Hoffman and Cunningham in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a bench trial, defendant Craig Hartfield was convicted of two counts of
predatory criminal sexual assault, one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and two counts
of criminal sexual assault. The circuit court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 76 years’
imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
based upon counsel’s failure to move to dismiss the aggravated criminal sexual assault count as
time-barred. We reverse defendant’s conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault and remand
this cause for sentencing on the lesser-included offense of criminal sexual assault. No. 1-20-0719
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 This case illustrates the importance of precisely drafting criminal indictments. On
December 13, 2017, the State charged defendant with three counts of predatory criminal sexual
assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 2002)), one count of aggravated criminal sexual
assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.30(a)(2) (West 2016)), four counts criminal sexual assault with force
(720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(1) (West 2008); 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(1) (West 2016)), and three counts
of criminal sexual assault of a family member (720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(3) (West 2008)). The charges
stemmed from allegations that defendant committed multiple acts of sexual abuse against his
daughter, T.H., beginning when she was nine years old. In particular, count IV of the indictment,
which charged defendant with aggravated criminal sexual assault, alleged that, on or about July 2,
2007, and “continuing on through” February 25, 2016, defendant:
“knowingly committed an act of sexual penetration upon C.H.,[1] to
wit: contact between Craig Hartfield’s penis and T.H.’s sex organ,
by the use of force or threat of force, and Craig Hartfield caused
bodily harm to T.H., to wit: pregnancy,
and the statute of limitations for this prosecution is extended
*** in that this prosecution has commenced within ten (10) years of
the commission of the offense and T.H. reported the offense to law
enforcement authorities within three (3) years after the commission
of the offense.”
1 Although the indictment erroneously states that defendant committed the act of sexual penetration on “C.H.,” defense counsel at oral argument did not dispute our characterization that this was a mere typographical error. The subsequent references to the specific acts and injuries in the charging instrument only refer to T.H.
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Count VIII of the indictment charged defendant with simple, not aggravated, criminal sexual
assault. Count VIII also charged defendant with contact between his penis and T.H.’s sex organ
by the use of force or threat of force—but it did not contain the additional allegation “and Craig
Hartfield caused bodily harm to T.H., to wit: pregnancy.” Other than the removal of the 11-word
clause referring to pregnancy, counts IV and VIII were textually identical.
¶4 At trial, T.H. testified that she was born on June 2, 1989, that defendant was her father, and
that she had three younger sisters: C.H., A.H., and R.H. T.H. stated that she and her sisters lived
with defendant and her mother Dorothy on South Indiana Avenue in Chicago at the time of the
offenses. T.H. has two children, K.H., who was seven years old at the time of trial, and M.P.
¶5 T.H. stated that, one night when she was nine years old, defendant came into the bedroom
she was sharing with her sisters and began to “fondle” her by touching her vagina under her
underwear with his hands. Later, when she was “nine or ten,” defendant then came into her
bedroom and touched her vagina with his hands and then his mouth. T.H. estimated that defendant
put his mouth on her vagina “maybe once or twice a week.” Then, when T.H. was 11 years old,
defendant went into her room, placed a knife against her throat, ordered her to quietly follow him
out of the room and lie down on a couch in the front room, where he vaginally penetrated her with
his penis. T.H. said that she was initially on her back, and then defendant told her to turn over onto
her hands and knees, at which point he penetrated her again with his penis and then ejaculated onto
her back. T.H. said that defendant said nothing to her during or after the assault.
¶6 Next, when T.H. was “12 or 13,” her mother was going to take T.H. and her sisters to a
Halloween party, but before everyone left, defendant said that T.H. could not go. After everyone
else left, defendant brought T.H. to the front room and told her he wanted to “try something.”
Defendant then took out his erect penis, placed it in T.H.’s mouth, and started “moving back and
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forth” until she turned her head away, gagging. T.H. said that, later that day before everyone
returned from the Halloween party, defendant forced her to try again in the bathroom. Defendant
had T.H. sit on the toilet while he placed his penis in her mouth until he ejaculated. T.H. stated
that, afterward, defendant seemed apologetic and told her that she would not have to do that
anymore. Around that same time, T.H. spoke to her sister C.H. about the abuse. T.H. further stated
that, although she wrote a letter to her school counselor about the abuse when she was in eighth
grade, defendant found the letter, took it, and told her and C.H. that, if T.H. had given the letter to
the counselor, T.H. and her sisters would have been separated and placed in foster care. Defendant
then “home schooled” T.H. after the eighth grade.
¶7 When T.H. was 14 and 15 years old, defendant would come into her room at night, take
her to the front room and have sexual intercourse with her. T.H. said this typically occurred “about
three, maybe four times a week.” T.H. added that defendant would occasionally also have sexual
intercourse with her in his and her mother’s bedroom if either no one was home during the day or
if everyone else was in the front room, kitchen, or “otherwise occupied.” When T.H. was 18 or 19,
defendant then began penetrating her anus with his penis in the front room at night. T.H. said that
these incidents also took place “a few times over maybe a couple of years.”
¶8 In March 2012, when T.H. was “22 or 23,” T.H. discovered that she was pregnant.
Although defendant told T.H. to keep it a secret, she told C.H. T.H. never saw a doctor during her
pregnancy and did not obtain any prenatal care. T.H. ultimately gave birth to K.H. in October
2012. T.H. said that defendant drove her and C.H. to a secluded spot near his workplace where she
gave birth in the backseat of the car. After she gave birth, T.H. stated that there were “maybe one
or two” additional sexual acts between defendant and her. T.H. believed that defendant did not
want to risk getting T.H. pregnant again.
4 No. 1-20-0719
¶9 On February 25, 2016, T.H., her sisters, K.H., and C.H.’s son (E.H.) left their house and
went to a domestic violence shelter. T.H. did not immediately go to the police, however, because
she and her sisters “just wanted to leave it behind” and start “living our own lives.” Nonetheless,
T.H. went to the police in August 2017 because defendant refused to let their mother leave.
¶ 10 On cross-examination, T.H. admitted that she did not leave the house until after she had
turned 21 years old. T.H. further conceded that she never told anyone at school or in her
neighborhood about defendant assaulting her. On redirect examination, T.H. explained that she
believed defendant when he told her that the family would be separated and her mother would go
to jail. T.H. added that she did not want to leave her sisters behind for fear that defendant would
use them to “replace” her and start assaulting them. T.H. also stated, “we tried leaving a few times
before,” but defendant would block the door and tell them they had nothing and nowhere to go.
¶ 11 Following T.H.’s testimony, the State presented evidence that a DNA test revealed that
there was a 99.999% chance that defendant was the father of K.H. The State then rested its case.
Defendant elected not to testify, and the defense elicited the testimony of defendant’s niece, who
stated that she met T.H. and her sisters, as well as K.H. and E.H., when they were about three years
old. The defense then rested its case.
¶ 12 After the parties presented their closing arguments, the circuit court found defendant guilty
of, inter alia, count IV, alleging aggravated criminal sexual assault with the specified bodily harm
of pregnancy, and count VIII, which alleged criminal sexual assault predicated upon sexual contact
between defendant’s penis and T.H.’s sex organ but did not allege any specific bodily harm such
as pregnancy.
¶ 13 The circuit court subsequently held a sentencing hearing. Following the arguments of the
parties, the court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 76 years’ imprisonment, which
5 No. 1-20-0719
included a consecutive 20-year sentence for the aggravated criminal sexual assault conviction
(count IV), but the court did not impose a sentence for the conviction on count VIII. Instead, the
court merged count VIII into count IV. This appeal follows.
¶ 14 ANALYSIS
¶ 15 Defendant’s sole contention is that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective
assistance for failure to file a pretrial motion seeking dismissal of count IV as time-barred.
Defendant argues that, although the extended statute of limitations allows for the prosecution of
aggravated criminal sexual assault up to 10 years after the offense if the victim reports the offense
to law enforcement within 3 years of the commission of the offense, the victim in this case did not
report her offense within 3 years. Defendant concludes that trial counsel rendered objectively
unreasonable assistance in failing to file the motion and that he was prejudiced by this omission
because the charge would have been dismissed.
¶ 16 Both the federal and state constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to the
effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. To
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both a deficiency in counsel’s
performance and prejudice resulting from that deficiency. People v. Crawford, 2013 IL App (1st)
100310, ¶ 129 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and People v. Albanese,
104 Ill. 2d 504, 526-27 (1984) (adopting Strickland)). In other words, pursuant to Strickland, a
defendant must show the following to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance: (1) counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) the deficient performance
so prejudiced the defense as to deny the defendant a fair trial. Id. (citing People v. Nowicki, 385
Ill. App. 3d 53, 81 (2008), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
6 No. 1-20-0719
¶ 17 To meet the first prong of objectively unreasonable performance, a defendant must
overcome the “ ‘strong presumption that the challenged action or inaction of counsel was the
product of sound trial strategy and not of incompetence.’ ” Id. ¶ 130 (quoting People v. Coleman,
183 Ill. 2d 366, 397 (1998)). To meet the second prong of prejudice, a defendant must show a
reasonable probability, i.e., “ ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,’ ”
that, but for defense counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been
different. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694); see also People v. Houston, 226 Ill. 2d 135,
144 (2007).
¶ 18 Failure to show either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an
ineffectiveness claim. Crawford, 2013 IL App (1st) 100310, ¶ 130 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687). Whether defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and
law. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698). Therefore, although we must defer to the circuit
court’s factual findings, we review de novo the ultimate legal issue of whether counsel’s omission
supports an ineffective assistance claim. Id.
¶ 19 Section 11-1.20 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) defines criminal sexual assault as an
act of sexual penetration through the use or threat of force. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(1) (West 2016).
Section 11-1.30 of the Code provides in relevant part that an accused commits aggravated criminal
sexual assault if he commits criminal sexual assault and causes bodily harm to the victim. Id. § 11-
1.30(a)(2). Bodily harm is defined as “physical harm, and includes, but is not limited to, sexually
transmitted disease, pregnancy, and impotence.” Id. § 11-0.1. The term “bodily harm” in the
context of an aggravated criminal sexual assault case has the same meaning as under the battery
statute. People v. Johnson, 2015 IL App (1st) 123249, ¶ 31 (citing People v. Bishop, 218 Ill. 2d
232, 249-50 (2006)). Bodily harm, while “difficult to pinpoint exactly,” requires “some sort of
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physical pain or damage to the body, like lacerations, bruises[,] or abrasions, whether temporary
or permanent.” People v. Mays, 91 Ill. 2d 251, 256 (1982); accord Bishop, 218 Ill. 2d at 250. To
determine whether an accused’s actions caused bodily harm, the trier of fact may both consider
direct evidence of injury and also infer an injury based upon circumstantial evidence “in light of
common experience.” Bishop, 218 Ill. 2d at 250.
¶ 20 Ordinarily, the State must commence prosecution for aggravated criminal sexual assault
“within 3 years after the commission of the offense.” 720 ILCS 5/3-5(b) (West 2016). Section 3-
6 of the Code, however, provides that the State may commence prosecution for aggravated
criminal sexual assault within 10 years of the commission of the offense “if the victim reported
the offense to law enforcement authorities within 3 years after the commission of the offense.” Id.
§ 3-6(i). It is well established that the precise allegation and proof of time or date are not necessary;
instead, the charging document must allege that “the crime was committed at some time prior to
the return of the indictment *** and within the period fixed by the statute of limitations.” People
v. Strait, 72 Ill. 2d 503, 505-06 (1978). Where, as here, however, the State proceeds on a theory
that the accused had engaged in a continuous course of aggravated criminal sexual assault, the
offense is not complete “until the last act was accomplished.” People v. McDade, 345 Ill. App. 3d
912, 915 (2004).
¶ 21 In this case, the State charged defendant by indictment with aggravated criminal sexual
assault based upon the infliction of bodily harm, “to wit: pregnancy.” In People v. Wilson, 24 Ill.
2d 598 (1962), our supreme court observed that, “Where an alleged fact is preceded by ‘to-wit,’ it
is said to be laid under a videlicet.” Id. at 601 (citing People v. Rivas, 5 Ill. 2d 556 (1955)). The
court further explained that the use of a videlicet in “ ‘every species of pleading’ ” allows the
pleader to “ ‘fix with certainty that, which before, was general, and which, without such
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explanation, might with equal propriety have been applied to different objects.’ ” Id. (quoting
People v. Shaver, 367 Ill. 339 (1937)).
¶ 22 Rivas provides guidance on the issue presented here. There, the State indicted the defendant
for “the sale on June 28, 1952, of ‘a large amount, to-wit: six capsulefuls of a certain narcotic
drug.’ ” Rivas, 5 Ill. 2d at 562. The court noted that based upon the record, the defendant was
convicted of the sale of six capsulefuls of heroin on June 28, but the only evidence sufficient to
sustain a conviction related to two sales of heroin on June 27, neither of which involved the sale
of six capsules or any other specific number of capsules. Id. at 563. Accordingly, the court held
that the State failed to prove the offense as charged in the indictment and reversed the defendant’s
conviction. Id. at 564.
¶ 23 Here, although the State alleged a continuing course of conduct in the preface of the
indictment, the charge itself alleges “an act” of sexual penetration resulting in a specific type of
bodily harm, pregnancy. This “last act” was “accomplished” in October 2012, when K.H. was
born. See McDade, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 915. To stay within the extended statute of limitations, the
offense had to be reported to law enforcement within three years of that date, or October 2015.
Since the victim did not report this offense until August 2017 and the State failed to allege and
prove bodily harm that took place within the three-year statute of limitations, the State was time-
barred from prosecuting this particular offense. On these facts, defendant has overcome the strong
presumption that trial counsel’s failure to seek discharge of count IV was the product of a sound
trial strategy and not incompetence. See Crawford, 2013 IL App (1st) 100310, ¶ 130. Therefore,
trial counsel rendered objectively unreasonable assistance, and defendant’s claim satisfies the first
prong of Strickland.
9 No. 1-20-0719
¶ 24 In addition, defendant has met the prejudice prong. Defendant suffered prejudice from trial
counsel’s failure to move to discharge this count when he was convicted and subsequently
sentenced to a consecutive 20-year prison term. Although the victim in this case testified that
defendant raped her at least “one or two times” after the birth of her son, the State indicted
defendant for “an act” of aggravated criminal sexual assault predicated upon bodily harm, “to wit:
pregnancy.” Therefore, even if those one or two additional acts took place within three years of
the victim’s outcry to law enforcement, that would not preserve a valid conviction on count IV,
which specifically alleged pregnancy and nothing else as the bodily harm.
¶ 25 Notably, there is no evidence that, following the birth of K.H. in October 2012, the victim
again became pregnant by defendant within the three years prior to her outcry on August 29, 2017.
In addition, the State elicited no additional evidence regarding the one or two additional attacks,
which stands in stark contrast to the detailed testimony the State elicited for the time period
preceding the victim’s pregnancy. Faced with a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on count
IV as time-barred, it is highly unlikely the State would have been able to amend or otherwise revive
this charge. As stated above, to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland, defendant must show a
reasonable probability, i.e., “ ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,’ ”
that, but for this error, the result of his trial would have been different. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694). Under the facts presented, defendant has shown prejudice as required by Strickland.
¶ 26 Finally, we are not persuaded by the State’s reliance upon People v. Stone, 374 Ill. App.
3d 980 (2007), McDade, 345 Ill. App. 3d 912, People v. Griffith, 249 Ill. App. 3d 1046 (1993),
and Strait, 72 Ill. 2d 503. The first three cases are factually distinct because they all allege multiple
acts occurring during the time frames alleged in the charging instruments. See Stone, 374 Ill. App.
3d at 982 (describing various “incidents” of abuse); McDade, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 913 (noting the
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defendant abused the victim “numerous times”); Griffith, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 1047-48
(uninterrupted child abduction from 1981 until 1989). Here, although the State alleged the
aggravated criminal sexual assault of the victim took place over a lengthy span of time, the bodily
harm, i.e., pregnancy, was a single instance that took place in 2012, well before the filing of the
indictment in 2017 and well beyond the statute of limitations. In Strait, the supreme court affirmed
the appellate court’s reversal of the defendant’s conviction for indecent liberties with a child.
Strait, 72 Ill. 2d at 504, 507. There, as here, the State alleged a single instance of abuse taking
place on March 3, 1972, but the State did not file the charging instrument until May 13, 1976,
which was beyond the applicable three-year statute of limitations. Id. at 504. Therefore, Stone,
McDade, Griffith, and Strait do not support the State’s claim.
¶ 27 At sentencing, the circuit court found that count VIII, which alleged criminal sexual assault
based upon forcible penis to vagina contact, was a lesser-included offense of count IV, which
alleged aggravated criminal sexual assault based upon the same forcible act but adding in the
bodily harm of pregnancy. Consequently, the court then merged count VIII into count IV and
imposed a consecutive 20-year sentence on the conviction on count IV. Defendant does not contest
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting these convictions in his brief, and thus the conviction
on the lesser included offense, count VIII, should stand, based upon the victim’s testimony that
the defendant assaulted her during the time frame in question but within the applicable statute of
limitations. See supra ¶ 24.
¶ 28 The circuit court did not impose a sentence upon count VIII before the merger, resulting in
a nonfinal conviction on that particular count. Since we are compelled to reverse defendant’s
conviction on count IV due to the State’s carelessly drafted indictment, our jurisdiction is limited
to remanding this cause for the court to impose a sentence upon count VIII. See People v.
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Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 75 (holding that the appellate court’s jurisdiction over nonfinal
convictions is “limited to ordering a remand for imposition of sentences on the lesser
convictions”). Defendant’s remaining aggregate sentence of 56 years’ imprisonment is unaffected
by this disposition.
¶ 29 CONCLUSION
¶ 30 We reverse defendant’s conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault (count IV), enter
a conviction on criminal sexual assault (count VIII), and remand for sentencing on the single,
lesser-included offense, count VIII.
¶ 31 Reversed and remanded with directions.
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Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 17-CR-17697; the Hon. Charles P. Burns, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Jennifer L. Bontrager, of for State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique for Abraham, Tyler J. Cox, and Christine Danielson, Assistant State’s Appellee: Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.