Filed 1/14/14 P. v. Harris CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D062783
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD226968)
CURTIS HARRIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, George W.
Clarke, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Robert Booher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Jennifer
B. Truong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Curtis Harris of assault by means of force likely to cause great
bodily injury and battery with serious bodily injury. The trial court sentenced him to 14 years in prison. Harris appeals, contending he received ineffective assistance when
counsel failed to advocate for the court to instruct the jury that emotional trauma does not
constitute "serious bodily injury" in response to a jury note. He also contends the trial
court violated its instructional duty under Penal Code section 1138 and his due process
rights by failing to provide a proper response to the jury's question regarding whether
psychological harm could constitute serious bodily injury. (Undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.) We reject his contentions.
Harris also asserts, the Attorney General concedes, and we agree, that the trial
court orally imposed a section 1202.4 restitution fine in the amount of $3,360, but that the
abstract of judgment incorrectly lists the fine as $33,660. Accordingly, we order the
abstract of judgment modified to reflect the trial court's oral pronouncement. (People v.
Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
While at a party, Harris punched Jodi Tannehill in the face, causing her to fall to
the floor. While Tannehill was unconscious on the floor, Harris poured beer on her,
unzipped his pants and urinated on her. The emergency doctor who treated Tannehill
after the attack testified that she suffered a hematoma (bleeding under the skin) on her
forehead and an abrasion and bruising on the front of her head. He diagnosed her with a
closed-head injury, an abrasion, and possible "GHB" poisoning. The doctor explained
that a "closed-head injury" is commonly referred to as a "concussion."
Tannehill testified that her injuries remained black, blue and painful for several
weeks. As a result, she could not bite or chew and ate only soft foods. The bump on her
2 head lasted for three to five months, and she had to have blood drained from her head
twice after the attack. She suffered daily headaches for several months. Because of her
headaches and the treatment, she had to take time off from school. She also suffered
panic attacks that affected her ability to work as a hairdresser.
During deliberations, the jury sent a note requesting a "clearer definition of
'battery causing serious bodily injury.' Does that include emotional suffering, such as
inability to perform job duties due to the emotional trauma caused by an injury?" Upon
stipulation of the parties, the court responded, "The definition of 'serious bodily injury' is
contained in Instruction 925, the final paragraph." The relevant portion of CALCRIM
No. 925 instructed the jury: "A serious bodily injury means a serious impairment of
physical condition. Such an injury may include, but is not limited to: . . . loss of
consciousness/concussion/bone fracture/protracted loss or impairment of function of any
bodily member or organ." Twenty minutes later, the jury found Harris guilty.
(As an aside, we note that the opening brief contains a myriad of details that are
not helpful as they do not relate to the issues on appeal.)
DISCUSSION
Harris first argues that his convictions must be reversed because he was denied his
Sixth Amendment right to effective representation where his attorney failed to advocate
for the court to instruct the jury that emotional trauma does not constitute "serious bodily
injury." Had the jury been properly instructed, he claims there is a reasonable probability
it would have returned with a more favorable verdict. He next contends that the trial
court violated its instructional duty under section 1138 and his due process rights by
3 failing to provide a proper response to the jury's question. As we shall explain, Harris
forfeited any claim of error by failing to object below to the trial court's response to the
jury's question. Because we conclude the court did not err by referring the jurors back to
the already-given instructions, the failure to object or request a different response did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
"A defendant may forfeit an objection to the court's response to a jury inquiry
through counsel's consent, or invitation or tacit approval of, that response." (People v.
Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1048.) Thus, Harris waived any objection because
his counsel stipulated to the response. Even if we overlook defense counsel's failure to
object or request a different response, Harris's claims have no merit.
Under section 1138, a trial court is required to provide information requested by a
jury concerning any point of law arising in the case. (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53
Cal.3d 68, 97.) "This does not mean the court must always elaborate on the standard
instructions. Where the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court
has discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional explanations are sufficient
to satisfy the jury's request for information. [Citation.] Indeed, comments diverging
from the standard are often risky." (Ibid.) Here, Harris does not argue that the original
instructions were not "full and complete." Accordingly, the abuse of discretion standard
of review applies to the trial court's decision about how to respond to the jury's question.
(See People v. Montero (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1179-1180.)
Here, the jury questioned whether Tannehill's emotional suffering supported the
charge of battery causing serious bodily injury. The trial court did not abuse its
4 discretion by referring the jurors back to the instructions which told the jurors that
"serious bodily injury means a serious impairment of physical condition" and that such an
injury may include loss of consciousness or a concussion. The original instructions were
full and complete and there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to provide further
instruction. (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1212.)
For the same reasons, we reject defendant's alternative ineffective assistance
argument. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Harris must show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that his counsel's representation fell below the standard of
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Filed 1/14/14 P. v. Harris CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D062783
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD226968)
CURTIS HARRIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, George W.
Clarke, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Robert Booher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Jennifer
B. Truong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Curtis Harris of assault by means of force likely to cause great
bodily injury and battery with serious bodily injury. The trial court sentenced him to 14 years in prison. Harris appeals, contending he received ineffective assistance when
counsel failed to advocate for the court to instruct the jury that emotional trauma does not
constitute "serious bodily injury" in response to a jury note. He also contends the trial
court violated its instructional duty under Penal Code section 1138 and his due process
rights by failing to provide a proper response to the jury's question regarding whether
psychological harm could constitute serious bodily injury. (Undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.) We reject his contentions.
Harris also asserts, the Attorney General concedes, and we agree, that the trial
court orally imposed a section 1202.4 restitution fine in the amount of $3,360, but that the
abstract of judgment incorrectly lists the fine as $33,660. Accordingly, we order the
abstract of judgment modified to reflect the trial court's oral pronouncement. (People v.
Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
While at a party, Harris punched Jodi Tannehill in the face, causing her to fall to
the floor. While Tannehill was unconscious on the floor, Harris poured beer on her,
unzipped his pants and urinated on her. The emergency doctor who treated Tannehill
after the attack testified that she suffered a hematoma (bleeding under the skin) on her
forehead and an abrasion and bruising on the front of her head. He diagnosed her with a
closed-head injury, an abrasion, and possible "GHB" poisoning. The doctor explained
that a "closed-head injury" is commonly referred to as a "concussion."
Tannehill testified that her injuries remained black, blue and painful for several
weeks. As a result, she could not bite or chew and ate only soft foods. The bump on her
2 head lasted for three to five months, and she had to have blood drained from her head
twice after the attack. She suffered daily headaches for several months. Because of her
headaches and the treatment, she had to take time off from school. She also suffered
panic attacks that affected her ability to work as a hairdresser.
During deliberations, the jury sent a note requesting a "clearer definition of
'battery causing serious bodily injury.' Does that include emotional suffering, such as
inability to perform job duties due to the emotional trauma caused by an injury?" Upon
stipulation of the parties, the court responded, "The definition of 'serious bodily injury' is
contained in Instruction 925, the final paragraph." The relevant portion of CALCRIM
No. 925 instructed the jury: "A serious bodily injury means a serious impairment of
physical condition. Such an injury may include, but is not limited to: . . . loss of
consciousness/concussion/bone fracture/protracted loss or impairment of function of any
bodily member or organ." Twenty minutes later, the jury found Harris guilty.
(As an aside, we note that the opening brief contains a myriad of details that are
not helpful as they do not relate to the issues on appeal.)
DISCUSSION
Harris first argues that his convictions must be reversed because he was denied his
Sixth Amendment right to effective representation where his attorney failed to advocate
for the court to instruct the jury that emotional trauma does not constitute "serious bodily
injury." Had the jury been properly instructed, he claims there is a reasonable probability
it would have returned with a more favorable verdict. He next contends that the trial
court violated its instructional duty under section 1138 and his due process rights by
3 failing to provide a proper response to the jury's question. As we shall explain, Harris
forfeited any claim of error by failing to object below to the trial court's response to the
jury's question. Because we conclude the court did not err by referring the jurors back to
the already-given instructions, the failure to object or request a different response did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
"A defendant may forfeit an objection to the court's response to a jury inquiry
through counsel's consent, or invitation or tacit approval of, that response." (People v.
Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1048.) Thus, Harris waived any objection because
his counsel stipulated to the response. Even if we overlook defense counsel's failure to
object or request a different response, Harris's claims have no merit.
Under section 1138, a trial court is required to provide information requested by a
jury concerning any point of law arising in the case. (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53
Cal.3d 68, 97.) "This does not mean the court must always elaborate on the standard
instructions. Where the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court
has discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional explanations are sufficient
to satisfy the jury's request for information. [Citation.] Indeed, comments diverging
from the standard are often risky." (Ibid.) Here, Harris does not argue that the original
instructions were not "full and complete." Accordingly, the abuse of discretion standard
of review applies to the trial court's decision about how to respond to the jury's question.
(See People v. Montero (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1179-1180.)
Here, the jury questioned whether Tannehill's emotional suffering supported the
charge of battery causing serious bodily injury. The trial court did not abuse its
4 discretion by referring the jurors back to the instructions which told the jurors that
"serious bodily injury means a serious impairment of physical condition" and that such an
injury may include loss of consciousness or a concussion. The original instructions were
full and complete and there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to provide further
instruction. (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1212.)
For the same reasons, we reject defendant's alternative ineffective assistance
argument. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Harris must show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that his counsel's representation fell below the standard of
a competent advocate and a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's errors, the
result would have been different. (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218.) A
"reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 333.)
The record suggests defense counsel may not have objected to the court's proposed
response to the jury's question because the court properly referred the jury to the correct
instruction. (People v. Ochoa (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 664, 674, fn. 8 ["Defense counsel
does not render ineffective assistance by declining to raise meritless objections."].) Even
assuming, without deciding, that counsel was ineffective for not proposing an alternative
response, Harris failed to establish that, absent counsel's assumed error, it was reasonably
probable that the verdict would have been more favorable to him. Tannehill suffered a
loss of consciousness after the attack and was diagnosed with a "closed-head injury"
which is the same as a "concussion." Thus, even if the court had explicitly told the jury
5 that emotional suffering is not a serious bodily injury, it is not reasonably probable the
jury would have acquitted Harris.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified by reducing the section 1202.4, subdivision (b)
restitution fine imposed by the trial court from $33,660 to $3,360 and, as modified, the
judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to forward to the Department of
Corrections an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the above modification.
McINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
HUFFMAN, J.