People v. Haramura

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Haramura

186 A.D.2d 676, 588 N.Y.S.2d 637, 1992 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11264

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 13, 1992

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 186 A.D.2d 676 (People v. Haramura) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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People v. Haramura, 186 A.D.2d 676, 588 N.Y.S.2d 637, 1992 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11264 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1992).

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Opinion

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Pitaro, J.), rendered October 11, 1990, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention, that the prosecutor’s cross-examination of him regarding his ability to understand and speak English improperly appealed to racial prejudice, is not preserved for appellate review. The defense counsel never specifically raised such a claim either in her objections, motion for a trial order of dismissal, or motion for a mistrial (see, CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Bynum, 70 NY2d 858; People v Colavito, 70 NY2d 996; People v Harrison, 167 AD2d 353). However, we note that a witness may not be contradicted by the introduction of extrinsic evidence regarding collateral matters for the sole purpose of impeaching his credibility (see, People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288; People v Saporita, 132 AD2d 713, 716). Here, despite requesting a court-appointed interpreter, the defendant never injected his inability to speak or understand English into the trial; nor did he deny that he spoke English to the complainant and the arresting officer. Therefore, the prosecutor’s persistent cross-examination of the defendant on this point was improper. However, the proof of [677]*677the defendant’s guilt in this case was overwhelming. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s cross-examination must be assessed for its prejudicial effect under a standard which " 'requires [a] greater impropriety to produce that effect in a stronger case’ ” (People v Roopchand, 107 AD2d 35, 36, affd 65 NY2d 837). On this record it cannot be said that the misconduct "substantially prejudiced” the defendant’s trial (People v Galloway, 54 NY2d 396, 401; People v Roopchand, supra). Thus, we find that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242; People v Melendez, 158 AD2d 720, 721).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Thompson, J. P., Rosenblatt, Lawrence and Ritter, JJ., concur.

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— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Pitaro, J.), rendered October 11, 1990, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention, that the prosecutor’s cross-examination of him regarding his ability to understand and speak English improperly appealed to racial prejudice, is not preserved for appellate review. The defense counsel never specifically raised such a claim either in her objections, motion for a trial order of dismissal, or motion for a mistrial (see, CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Bynum, 70 NY2d 858; People v Colavito, 70 NY2d 996; People v Harrison, 167 AD2d 353). However, we note that a witness may not be contradicted by the introduction of extrinsic evidence regarding collateral matters for the sole purpose of impeaching his credibility (see, People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288; People v Saporita, 132 AD2d 713, 716). Here, despite requesting a court-appointed interpreter, the defendant never injected his inability to speak or understand English into the trial; nor did he deny that he spoke English to the complainant and the arresting officer. Therefore, the prosecutor’s persistent cross-examination of the defendant on this point was improper. However, the proof of [677]*677the defendant’s guilt in this case was overwhelming. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s cross-examination must be assessed for its prejudicial effect under a standard which " 'requires [a] greater impropriety to produce that effect in a stronger case’ ” (People v Roopchand, 107 AD2d 35, 36, affd 65 NY2d 837). On this record it cannot be said that the misconduct "substantially prejudiced” the defendant’s trial (People v Galloway, 54 NY2d 396, 401; People v Roopchand, supra). Thus, we find that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242; People v Melendez, 158 AD2d 720, 721).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Thompson, J. P., Rosenblatt, Lawrence and Ritter, JJ., concur.

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186 A.D.2d 676, 588 N.Y.S.2d 637, 1992 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11264, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-haramura-nyappdiv-1992.

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