People v. Hansen

2025 IL App (4th) 250248-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 11, 2025
• Docket: 4-25-0248
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 250248-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0248 June 11, 2025 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed th 4 District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) McLean County NATHAN HANSEN, ) No. 25CF20 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) William A. Yoder, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE VANCIL delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lannerd and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court’s conclusions that (1) defendant committed a qualifying offense, (2) defendant posed a real and present threat to the community, and (3) no condition or conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the threat defendant posed were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2 Defendant, Nathan Hansen, appeals the trial court’s order granting the State’s

motion for relief pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). For the

reasons stated below, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On January 9, 2025, defendant was charged by information with the following six

counts: (1) traveling to meet a child, a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS 5/11-26(a) (West 2024));

(2) indecent solicitation of a child, a Class 4 felony (id. § 11-6(a-5)); (3) indecent solicitation of a

child, a Class 3 felony (id. § 11-6(a)); (4) solicitation to meet a child, a Class 4 felony (id. § 11- 6.6(a)); (5) grooming, a Class 4 felony (id. § 11-25(a)); and (6) unlawful possession of a controlled

substance, a Class 4 felony (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2024)). The State filed a petition to deny

defendant pretrial release.

¶5 At a probable cause hearing held the same day, the State proffered the following

factual basis. On the morning of January 8, 2025, defendant, who was 45 years old, initiated

contact with an Illinois State Police undercover special agent. The agent had posted an online

advertisement for sexual services featuring images of a “young looking” female who was

displaying herself in a sexual manner. The advertisement listed the female’s age as 20 and included

a phone number. At 11:28 a.m., defendant allegedly sent a text message to the number in the

advertisement, inquiring as to whether the female was still available. Defendant texted he was

looking for “HH,” which the State proffered was “a shorthand term in prostitution and describe[d]

a half-hour of sexual services.” The officer responded to defendant, texting him that the half-hour

rate was $170. The officer also texted defendant that she was 16, so defendant would need to wear

a condom. After being told the female was 16, defendant arranged a meeting in a hotel room. At

approximately 11:48 a.m., defendant arrived and provided the undercover officer with the agreed-

upon $170. The officer again told defendant she was 16. At this point, officers entered the room

and took defendant into custody. Upon searching defendant, officers found a small plastic

container in his shirt pocket containing nine pills. Through markings on the pills, the officers

identified them as oxycodone, a controlled substance.

¶6 From the proffered facts, the trial court found probable cause. It then proceeded to

a hearing on the State’s petition to deny defendant pretrial release. In addition to its previous

proffer, the State asked the court to take judicial notice of defendant’s pretrial investigation report.

The report provided that defendant lived with Laura Moritz, his girlfriend of 15 years; worked full

-2- time; and owned multiple rental properties. His criminal history included a 1998 conviction for

driving under the influence of alcohol; multiple convictions for possession of cannabis, with the

last being in 2000; and his most recent conviction for speeding in 2011. He scored 7 out of 14 on

the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument-Revised (VPRAI-R), placing him at a risk level

of 4 out of 6.

¶7 The State presented testimony from Nate Kessinger, a field supervisor with the

Office of Statewide Pretrial Services (OSPS). Kessinger testified to the services OSPS offers

defendants who are placed on pretrial supervision. OSPS provides text message reminders to

defendants, checks in with them, attends their court dates, and helps connect them with the proper

treatment providers to ensure they remain compliant with their conditions of release. OSPS also

provides electronic monitoring via GPS ankle devices. When an individual is ordered to be on

home monitoring, an “inclusion zone” is created around the individual’s home address, and he is

remotely monitored by an electronic monitoring unit. Kessinger testified that if an individual left

the inclusion zone, the electronic monitoring unit would be notified. He confirmed that the

electronic monitoring unit is not alerted if someone comes to the defendant’s home and that OSPS

cannot monitor a defendant’s social media or browsing history and does not conduct home visits.

¶8 The State noted that the first five of defendant’s charges were detainable offenses

for which he could be denied pretrial release. It argued that defendant was dangerous, emphasizing

that within approximately 20 minutes of first contacting someone whom he believed to be a minor

female, he arrived at a hotel room to engage in intercourse with her. He also brought drugs, which,

the State argued, indicated a possible intent to engage in drug use with the minor. The State further

argued that the testimony of Kessinger showed that in this particular case, OSPS did not have the

capability to monitor defendant effectively and, therefore, no conditions of pretrial release could

-3- mitigate the threat defendant presented to members of the community.

¶9 Defense counsel argued that, although defendant scored 7 out of 14 on the

VPRAI-R, 2 of those points came from his criminal history and his most recent criminal offense

was nearly 25 years old. Counsel also argued that, because section 110-6.1(e) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2024)) presumes that all criminal

defendants are eligible for release, the State’s argument that no conditions of release could mitigate

the threat defendant posed based on the type of crime he committed was inappropriate. Counsel

further noted that defendant was employed and had “a lot of people kind of relying on him to be

out for their livelihood, for their home and shelter.”

¶ 10 The trial court found the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that

defendant committed an offense that qualified for detention and that he posed a real and present

threat to the safety of the community. However, it found the State did not prove that no conditions

of pretrial release would mitigate the threat defendant posed. It noted that defendant’s criminal

history was old and largely composed of drug offenses, that he was not on probation at the time of

the offense, and that no evidence was presented that he had a history of violating court orders. It

ordered him released on the condition that, among other things, he would not have any contact

with anyone under the age of 18 and would not use the Internet for any purpose.

¶ 11 On January 30, 2024, the State filed a motion for relief, asking the trial court to

reconsider its denial of the State’s petition. On February 28, 2025, the State’s motion came for

hearing before a new judge. The State asked the court to take notice of the report of proceedings

from the prior hearing, as well as defendant’s pretrial investigation report. Defendant presented

testimony from Moritz. She testified that she and defendant had been in a relationship for more

than 15 years and that they considered each other husband and wife. They did not have any children

-4- together, and no children lived in the home. She stated that she had epilepsy and experienced

seizures that could be life-threatening. Her health insurance was provided through defendant’s job,

and if he were to be detained, she would lose her insurance. She testified that defendant assisted

her with her condition and she had no one else nearby who could help her. She stated that she

would be home to verify that defendant was complying with his release conditions and that if he

did not, she would report it.

¶ 12 Following argument from both parties, the trial court granted the State’s motion for

relief. In finding that defendant posed a threat to the community, the court discussed the nature of

the crime; defendant’s apparent readiness to commit it, as shown by the short amount of time that

elapsed between defendant initiating contact with the undercover officer and appearing at her hotel

room; defendant’s familiarity with the prostitution term “HH”; and the large amount of oxycodone

defendant had on him for a meeting at which he expected only two people to be present. The court

further found that Moritz “ha[d] a significant vested interest in the outcome” of the hearing and

concluded that, because of her dependence on defendant, her assertions that she would supervise

him and report any violations were not credible. It also noted the previous testimony of Kessinger

that OSPS could not adequately supervise defendant’s criminal activity or any in-person contact

he might have with a minor. The court therefore found there was a high likelihood that defendant

would commit new criminal offenses if granted release and that the safety of the community could

not be meaningfully achieved with the available conditions of pretrial release.

¶ 13 The trial court then immediately heard defense counsel’s motion to reconsider. The

court found it had made all the appropriate rulings and findings and denied the motion.

¶ 14 This appeal followed.

-5- ¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 Defendant did not file a memorandum accompanying his appeal. As a result, we

will consider the arguments made in his motion for relief. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15,

2024). His motion for relief states that, since being granted pretrial release, he has followed all

court orders. This is followed by the single-sentence assertion that the trial court erred in granting

the State’s petition for relief. Defendant does not provide any argument beyond this single

sentence. Indeed, he does not even state which of the court’s findings or conclusions he believes

were made in error, for example, if the court erred in finding he was dangerous or that no conditions

of release could mitigate his dangerousness, or both or neither. Because of this, the State argues

that he has waived any arguments on appeal.

¶ 17 We agree with the State. Rule 604(h)(7) provides that an appellant’s arguments,

“[w]hether made in the motion for relief alone or as supplemented by the memorandum *** must

contain sufficient detail to enable meaningful appellate review, including the contentions of the

appellant and the reasons therefore and citations of the record and any relevant authorities.” Id.

Although defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion for relief and

denying him pretrial release, he offers no explanation as to why. He does not provide any specific

arguments and makes only one factual assertion, which is not cited to the record. For appeals under

Rule 604(h), “some form of argument is required, along with justification for claiming entitlement

to relief—like references to the record, the evidence presented, or, if possible, legal authority.”

People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 12. Defendant here has merely presented us with a

conclusion, not an argument. We will not construct one for him. See id. ¶ 13 (“[W]e cannot be

expected to formulate an argument for defendant out of whole cloth, and we decline to do so.”).

¶ 18 We acknowledge that other districts have dismissed defendants’ appeals under Rule

-6- 604(h) for failing to present arguments to support their contentions. See People v. Lyons, 2024 IL

App (5th) 231180, ¶ 26; People v. Duckworth, 2024 IL App (5th) 230911, ¶ 8. When presented

with this situation in the past, we have proceeded by reviewing the record on appeal and affirming

if nothing in the record suggests the trial court abused its discretion. See Inman, 2023 IL App (4th)

230864, ¶ 14. Although our standard of review regarding decisions to grant or deny pretrial release

has changed to a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard (see People v. Morgan, 2025 IL

130626, ¶ 38), we will employ the same approach here.

¶ 19 All defendants are presumed eligible for pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)

(West 2024). To deny a defendant pretrial release, the State must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed a

qualifying offense, (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons or the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case, and (3) no condition

or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat defendant poses. Id. “[W]hen

live witness testimony is presented at a pretrial detention hearing, a circuit court’s ultimate

detention decision ***, in addition to any underlying factual findings supporting the decision, will

not be disturbed on review unless found to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.”

Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 38.

¶ 20 Here, the trial court found that defendant had committed a qualifying offense, that

he posed a danger to the community, and that no conditions of release could mitigate the threat he

posed. We find nothing in the record to suggest that these findings were against the manifest weight

of the evidence. Significant evidence was proffered that defendant committed multiple offenses

that qualified him for pretrial detention. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(5) (West 2024). With respect

to his dangerousness, the court noted that within approximately 20 minutes of contacting the

-7- undercover officer, whom he believed to be a minor female, he appeared at her hotel room with

drugs and money to facilitate a sexual act. The court also stated its particular concern over the

amount of oxycodone pills defendant had, noting that amount of oxycodone would be sufficient to

incapacitate the victim. The court further found that any possible conditions of pretrial release,

such as electronic monitoring, home confinement, and a ban on Internet access, were not sufficient

to address the specific concerns of this case, as they would not prevent defendant from continuing

to use the Internet to contact minors or potentially meet with them at his home. In reaching this

conclusion, the court credited the testimony of Kessinger and found Moritz to lack credibility. We

do not find any of these conclusions to be against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 22 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 23 Affirmed.

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