People v. Hancock

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Hancock

71 A.D.3d 566, 896 N.Y.S.2d 680

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 25, 2010

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 71 A.D.3d 566 (People v. Hancock) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Hancock, 71 A.D.3d 566, 896 N.Y.S.2d 680 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010).

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Opinion

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Laura Ward, J., at suppression hearing; Edward J. McLaughlin, J., at jury trial and sentence), rendered on or about March 10, 2009, convicting defendant of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, and sentencing him to a term of 1 to 3 years, unanimously reversed, on the law, defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence granted, and the indictment dismissed.

At the suppression proceedings, the only theory relied upon by the People in their argument, and by the court in its decision, was that a forged driver’s license recovered from defendant’s car after his arrest was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. As the People concede, defendant is entitled to suppression because the inevitable discovery exception does not apply where “the evidence sought to be suppressed is the very evidence obtained in the illegal search” (People v Stith, 69 NY2d 313, 318 [1987]). Concur—Gonzalez, P.J., Moskowitz, Freedman, Richter and Román, JJ.

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Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Laura Ward, J., at suppression hearing; Edward J. McLaughlin, J., at jury trial and sentence), rendered on or about March 10, 2009, convicting defendant of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, and sentencing him to a term of 1 to 3 years, unanimously reversed, on the law, defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence granted, and the indictment dismissed.

At the suppression proceedings, the only theory relied upon by the People in their argument, and by the court in its decision, was that a forged driver’s license recovered from defendant’s car after his arrest was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. As the People concede, defendant is entitled to suppression because the inevitable discovery exception does not apply where “the evidence sought to be suppressed is the very evidence obtained in the illegal search” (People v Stith, 69 NY2d 313, 318 [1987]). Concur—Gonzalez, P.J., Moskowitz, Freedman, Richter and Román, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

71 A.D.3d 566, 896 N.Y.S.2d 680, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-hancock-nyappdiv-2010.

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