NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 250517-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0517 February 19, 2026 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Tazewell County JENNIFER M. HALL, ) No. 23CF49 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Christopher R. Doscotch ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not improperly consider a factor inherent in the offense in aggravation at sentencing, and defendant’s 50-month prison sentence was not excessive.
¶2 Defendant, Jennifer M. Hall, pleaded guilty to permitting the sexual abuse of a child
(720 ILCS 5/11-9.1A(a) (West 2016)) and endangering the life or health of a child (id. § 12C-5(a)).
The trial court sentenced her to 50 months’ imprisonment on the charge of permitting the sexual
abuse of a child.
¶3 On appeal, defendant argues her 50-month sentence was improper because (1) the
trial court improperly considered a factor inherent in the offense in aggravation and (2) the
sentence was excessive. We affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In February 2023, the State charged defendant with permitting the sexual abuse of a child (id. § 11-9.1A(a)), endangering the life or health of a child (id. § 12C-5(a)), and criminal
sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(4) (West 2020)) in connection with the sexual abuse of
defendant’s daughter, O.R. (born in 2007) by Alexander Hackney, defendant’s long-term
boyfriend. Hackney admitted to engaging in sexual acts with O.R. but alleged he did so in his
sleep. In April 2024, defendant entered an open guilty plea to the charges of permitting the sexual
abuse of a child and endangering the life or health of a child. The State dismissed the charge of
criminal sexual assault.
¶6 For the factual basis for the plea, the State advised the trial court that, on December
8, 2022, defendant reported to Officer Danielle Keen of the Pekin Police Department that Hackney
had sexually abused O.R. Defendant told Keen she and Hackney had been in a romantic
relationship for l5 years. Defendant had three children from a previous relationship, including
O.R., and five children with Hackney. Defendant told Keen she knew about O.R.’s allegations of
sexual abuse and assault against Hackney dating back to when O.R. was eight and nine years old.
¶7 Defendant told Keen she had walked into her bedroom one night when O.R. was
between eight and nine years old and witnessed Hackney in bed naked with O.R. When she
entered, Hackney ran out of the room naked, and defendant saw Hackney ejaculating while leaving
the room. Defendant then found O.R. in the bed with no pants or underwear on. O.R. told defendant
that Hackney was poking her private areas with his “ ‘thing.’ ” Defendant confronted Hackney,
and he admitted to the sexual act but said he thought O.R. was defendant and did not realize it was
O.R. until defendant entered the room.
¶8 Defendant also told Keen about an incident when O.R. was approximately 12 years
old. She advised Keen O.R. had woken up from sleeping appearing visibly upset and told defendant
she wanted Hackney to stop touching her. O.R. told defendant that Hackney had licked her and
-2- touched her breasts. Defendant said Hackney confessed he told O.R. to take her bra off but stated
it was for her comfort. Hackney told defendant “he must have fallen asleep again.”
¶9 O.R. was interviewed and disclosed numerous occasions of sexual abuse by
Hackney. She stated the abuse started when she was approximately eight years old. O.R. stated,
when she was around eight years old, she had fallen asleep in defendant and Hackney’s bed and
Hackney got into the bed, took O.R.’s pants and underwear off, began touching her, and tried to
stick his penis into her vagina. However, Hackney was unsuccessful because defendant walked in
on them. O.R. also told the interviewer about an incident that occurred around Christmas of 2020
in which Hackney took off O.R.’s pants and rubbed his penis against her vagina. O.R. said she left
the room and immediately told defendant what had happened to her. O.R. stated defendant gave
Hackney the “benefit of the doubt.” O.R. also explained to the interviewer that Hackney would
“ask her to do stuff with him” when she wanted to play video games.
¶ 10 After O.R.’s interview, Detective Allison Palmer of the Pekin Police Department
had several conversations with defendant about the investigation. Defendant admitted to Palmer
that O.R. had made several disclosures to her about sexual abuse in the home, she had walked in
on Hackney naked in bed with O.R., and she had never reported the abuse to anyone. Defendant
also told Palmer that after one of the disclosures O.R. had made, she confronted Hackney.
Defendant then “decided to remove [sic] O.R.’s bedroom” to see if the sexual abuse continued.
¶ 11 The trial court asked defense counsel if the factual basis was consistent with the
discovery. Counsel stated he anticipated contradicting some of what was stated in the factual basis
at the sentencing hearing but acknowledged, even with the parts he would seek to contradict, there
was still a sufficient basis for defendant to be found guilty. The court accepted the plea.
¶ 12 The presentence investigation report (PSI) showed defendant had a criminal history
-3- that included convictions for battery, domestic battery, a “Bad Check” offense, reckless driving,
driving on a suspended license, operating an uninsured vehicle, and other traffic offenses. She had
also previously violated conditions of probation. The PSI reported defendant had various mental
health issues, including generalized anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder with
dissociative symptoms, avoidant personality disorder, and cannabis use disorder. Defendant had
attempted suicide five times in her life, with the most recent attempt in 2022.
¶ 13 Defendant reported she had previously confronted Hackney about sexual abuse of
O.R., but Hackney said he had a sleep disorder and claimed he performed the sexual acts in his
sleep. Defendant said Hackney had previously engaged in sexual behavior with her in his sleep.
Defendant reported she found a disorder that matched the symptoms Hackney described and she
wanted to get him treatment for the disorder. Defendant said she had not been aware there were
multiple incidents of sexual abuse until after O.R. was interviewed.
¶ 14 Defendant stated Hackney had previously put a tracking device on her phone and
had threatened her with guns. Defendant told the investigator she underreacted to knowledge of
Hackney’s offenses against O.R. and she did not know she had enough proof to “lock him away
and keep him gone.” She also reported she was afraid of what Hackney might do if no action was
taken by the State following her report, stating he was violent and used guns for control.
¶ 15 Defendant admitted she chose to plead guilty because she felt responsible for not
acting sooner to protect her family. Defendant had completed domestic violence counseling while
on pretrial release. The investigator reported he had some concerns with defendant’s truthfulness
and level of accountability, noting instances in which defendant made comments minimizing her
past behavior in various circumstances.
¶ 16 The PSI also included a psychological assessment. In the assessment, defendant
-4- discussed a report of sexual abuse against her father as a child. Defendant stated she had accused
her father of sexual assault but then later recanted the allegation and was labeled as a liar by her
family. At the time of the assessment, defendant could not remember what actually occurred, but
she was sure something inappropriate happened with her father when she was a child.
¶ 17 Attached to the PSI was a letter from O.R. stating that she felt guilty because
Hackney had told her she would lose her family if she reported the sexual abuse and if her mother
went to prison, this would occur. O.R. also wrote she had observed Hackney physically abuse
defendant. O.R. expressed love for defendant and asked the trial court to not send defendant to
prison. Also attached to the PSI was a letter from defendant’s mother, alleging Hackney abused
defendant. The PSI stated defendant was an appropriate candidate for community-based
supervision.
¶ 18 At the sentencing hearing, Palmer testified, during several interviews, defendant
disclosed knowledge O.R. was being sexually abused by Hackney for years before filing a police
report. Defendant told Palmer that Hackney had said he performed the acts in his sleep. Defendant
reported to Palmer that, after O.R. told her about a second instance of sexual abuse, she moved
O.R.’s bedroom to another level in the house to see if the abuse would stop. Palmer identified a
video from a security camera inside defendant’s home in which defendant shoved Hackney up
against a wall and head butted him in December 2022. The record indicates this altercation
occurred when O.R. reported the instance of abuse, which led to defendant reporting the abuse to
the police.
¶ 19 Palmer testified, around 1993, defendant reported to police her father would tie her
up and she was sexually assaulted by 50 or 60 men. Those allegations were investigated and no
charges were pursued.
-5- ¶ 20 Defendant’s son, M.R., testified he observed Hackney regularly engage in violent
behavior against defendant. Hackney also was violent toward M.R. on almost a daily basis.
¶ 21 Defendant’s sister testified when she and defendant were children, they were both
drugged and sexually abused by their father. The abuse was investigated, but nothing ever
happened to their father, and they lost contact with family members because of the investigation.
¶ 22 Defendant made a statement in allocution, in which she apologized to O.R. and
expressed remorse. Defendant explained she allowed her childhood traumas to cloud her judgment
and she had wanted to avoid O.R. having to go through the process of an examination similar to
what she had gone through. She said she did not comprehend she had enough evidence “to make
a solid arrest” of Hackney. Defendant described various instances of domestic abuse and also
apologized to her other children and to the trial court. Defendant said she accepted responsibility
and had been engaged in therapy.
¶ 23 After defendant’s statement in allocution, the trial court told defendant, “[I]f I
remember correctly now, there’s more things to do than just call the police. You move[d] the
bedroom.” The court then stated, “You can leave. You don’t need the police to leave even if you’re
not gonna report it, you know. Obviously, if you’d taken some efforts like that, rather than the
house, that might mean a little bit—it might have some context for that, you know.”
¶ 24 During argument, defense counsel argued defendant finally had snapped in
December 2022 and confronted Hackney to protect O.R. The trial court interrupted and noted O.R.
forced the issue by telling defendant Hackney had been doing bad things.
¶ 25 The State requested a sentence of at least five years’ imprisonment. Defendant
asked for a sentence of probation.
¶ 26 The trial court stated it had considered the PSI, the evidence presented, defendant’s
-6- statement in allocution, the arguments of counsel, and all of the statutory and nonstatutory factors
in aggravation and mitigation. The court explained it had “due regard for the seriousness of the
offense with the objective of restoring the Defendant to useful citizenship.” The court also noted
there was a presumption of probation but stated that rehabilitative potential was not entitled to
greater weight in mitigation than the seriousness of the offence. The court maintained, “[T]his is
an extremely serious offense obviously.”
¶ 27 The trial court then discussed various mitigating and aggravating factors and noted
three incidents of sexual abuse of O.R. in approximately 2016, 2020, and 2021. The court rejected
the possibility Hackney may have been sleeping during the offenses as an excuse for defendant to
not report the sexual abuse sooner.
¶ 28 During its comments regarding sentencing, the trial court referenced the need to
protect children and noted the failure to protect O.R. caused trauma. Before doing so, the court
identified the statutory aggravating factor that the defendant’s conduct caused or threatened serious
harm. The court stated, “I don’t think it’s inherent in the offense, and that is the case here.” The
court acknowledged the letter from O.R. and stated, “[S]he’s telling me don’t punish you, I didn’t
want this to happen. Well, if you had left or done something a lot earlier, we wouldn’t be where
we’re at, and the risk and damage would have been minimized.” The court also stated, “And these
are the three events that I know of because they talked about abuse generally, and it’s over seven
years, and how that’s gonna turn out for her, I don’t know.” The court further stated, “[I]t’s
extremely a difficult situation because she’s saying don’t punish you, it’s been punishment enough,
but sometimes just like a parent, when your kids are telling you something, you also have to do
what is appropriate also even if that’s not what they want.” The court later stated, “It was seven or
six years. Essentially six, seven years, and moving the bedroom shows that you know something
-7- was not right, and instead of moving the bedroom, sometimes you’ve got to bite the bullet. You’ve
got to move or get out.” The court added, “The police isn’t the only answer, and we have to know
that on a basic human level to know that you cannot stand by while your—that is—while that is
going on.”
¶ 29 The trial court found defendant took some responsibility in her statement in
allocution but still also focused a lot on Hackney’s actions. The court also stated it did not know
how much it could read into defendant’s past history of being a victim of abuse.
¶ 30 Ultimately, the trial court described the case as “extremely, extremely difficult,”
because of the mitigating factors but also because of the seriousness of this offense. The court then
told defendant,
“So the Court’s explained its analysis of the sentencing in this case, the
seriousness of this offense, the comments on your history and character. I also take
into note that Probation has found that you’d be a candidate for high risk probation
as well, and I take that [in]to account as well.
However, considering that, I would find probation would deprecate the
seriousness of the conduct and would be inconsistent with the ends of justice .”
¶ 31 The trial court sentenced defendant to 50 months’ imprisonment and stated, “[T]he
reason it’s not more is for the reasons I stated there argued by [defense counsel] and contained in
the [PSI] and the mitigating factors, considering the seriousness of it.” The court also noted the
sentence was “darn near the minimum for the Department of Corrections.”
¶ 32 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider her sentence, arguing, in part, the trial court
failed to give sufficient weight to factors in mitigation. The court denied the motion. Defendant
appealed, and this court remanded for compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff.
-8- Apr. 15, 2024).
¶ 33 On remand, defense counsel filed an amended motion to reconsider her sentence,
again alleging, in part, the trial court failed to give proper weight to factors in mitigation. Defense
counsel did not allege the court improperly considered a factor inherent in the offense in
aggravation.
¶ 34 At the hearing on the motion, the trial court stated it considered the factors in
mitigation and noted defendant had gotten counseling. The court stated, “That’s why the sentence
wasn’t worse to be honest with you.” The court then stated, “If it was a one-time only deal, might
be a different situation,” but it noted “this went on over seven years where there’s opportunity, and
sometimes you have to be a parent.” The court also noted the PSI reported a belief defendant
minimalized culpability. The court rejected an argument defendant’s past as a victim of abuse
justified a sentence of probation. Accordingly, the court denied the motion.
¶ 35 This appeal followed.
¶ 36 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 37 On appeal, defendant argues her 50-month sentence for permitting the sexual abuse
of child was improper because (1) the trial court improperly considered a factor inherent in the
offense in aggravation and (2) the sentence was excessive.
¶ 38 A. Consideration of a Factor Inherent in the Offense
¶ 39 Defendant contends the trial court improperly considered her failure to protect O.R.
or intervene sooner to stop the abuse as a factor in aggravation that was inherent in the offense of
permitting the sexual abuse of a child. She argues doing so was an improper double enhancement
of the sentence.
¶ 40 Defendant recognizes her counsel failed to raise the matter in a posttrial motion but
-9- argues counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to do so. “It is well settled that, to preserve
a claim of sentencing error, both a contemporaneous objection and a written postsentencing motion
raising the issue are required.” People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544 (2010). Thus, here, counsel
forfeited the issue by failing to raise it.
¶ 41 “Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the standard set forth
in [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)].” People v. Cathey, 2012 IL 111746, ¶ 23. “To
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel’s
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” People
v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490, 496 (2010). A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland
standard, and the failure to satisfy either prong precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of
counsel. People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 317-18 (2010). When addressing a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, appellate courts first consider whether the defendant has
established a clear or obvious error. Absent a clear or obvious error, a theory of ineffective
assistance does not afford the defendant any relief. People v. Gilker, 2023 IL App (4th) 220914,
¶ 78.
¶ 42 Generally, the trial court has broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate sentence
in criminal cases. People v. Hibbler, 2019 IL App (4th) 160897, ¶ 64. However, the question of
whether a court relied on an improper factor at sentencing is a question of law that we review
de novo. Id. at ¶ 65. “[A] trial judge may not consider an improper factor in aggravation when
sentencing a defendant because such consideration clearly affects that defendant’s fundamental
right to liberty.” People v. Brown, 2019 IL App (5th) 160329, ¶ 18.
¶ 43 “ ‘A double enhancement occurs when (1) a single factor is used both as an element
of an offense and as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence *** or (2) the same factor is used
- 10 - twice to elevate the severity of the offense itself.’ ” Hibbler, 2019 IL App (4th) 160897, ¶ 66.
“There is a strong presumption that the trial court based its sentencing determination on proper
legal reasoning, and a court of review should consider the record as a whole, rather than focusing
on a few words or statements by the trial court.” People v. Canizalez-Cardena, 2012 IL App (4th)
110720, ¶ 22. The defendant bears the burden to affirmatively establish the sentence imposed was
based on an improper factor. People v. Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 103. A sentence
will not be reversed unless it is evident the trial court relied upon an improper factor. Id.
¶ 44 “A person responsible for a child’s welfare commits permitting sexual abuse of a
child if the person has actual knowledge of and permits an act of sexual abuse upon the child.” 720
ILCS 5/11-9.1A(a) (West 2016). Here, defendant points to various statements by the trial court
referring to her failure to protect O.R. or her failure to remove O.R. from the situation earlier to
argue the court was using her charged act of permitting the sexual abuse of O.R. as a factor in
aggravation. We disagree.
¶ 45 When announcing its sentencing decision, the trial court is not required to refrain
from any mention of the factors that constitute elements of an offense, and the mere reference to
the existence of such a factor is not reversible error. People v. Brown, 2018 IL App (1st) 160924,
¶ 22. “Sentencing hearings do not occur in a vacuum, and the duty to impose a fair sentence entails
an explanation of the court’s reasoning in the context of the offenses of which a defendant has
been convicted.” People v. Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st) 140134, ¶ 15. Although elements inherent
in the offense are off-limits as aggravating factors, the sentencing judge cannot be expected to
ignore factors relevant to a sentencing decision. See People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 268 (1986).
“While a trial court may not consider a factor inherent in the offense in aggravation, it is
appropriate to consider the degree and gravity of the defendant’s conduct.” People v. Jeffers, 2022
- 11 - IL App (2d) 210236, ¶ 25. Indeed, the seriousness of the offense is the most important factor in
determining an appropriate sentence. People v. Harmon, 2015 IL App (1st) 122345, ¶ 123. It is
also appropriate for a court to consider in aggravation that the defendant’s conduct caused or
threatened serious harm. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(1) (West 2024).
¶ 46 Here, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of permitting sexual abuse of a child,
and the trial court referenced three specific instances of abuse. But in commenting on defendant’s
failure to protect O.R. or to stop the acts from occurring, the court referenced the broader time
period of abuse occurring over seven years and specifically stated it was considering that
defendant’s conduct caused or threatened serious harm. The court further specifically noted that
was not a factor inherent in the offense. In the full context of the sentencing hearing, the court’s
comments addressed the evidence showing a long-term pattern of behavior in which defendant
allowed O.R. to be harmed, aside from the specific acts alleged in the offense, which in turn
illustrated the extent of the harm and the seriousness of the offense. The court could properly
consider those factors. Thus, defendant has not shown a clear error to support a finding of
ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting at the sentencing hearing or otherwise failing to
raise the issue.
¶ 47 B. Excessive Sentence
¶ 48 Defendant also contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the
50-month sentence by failing to consider or properly weigh factors in mitigation, resulting in a
sentence that was disproportionate to the nature and circumstances of the offense.
¶ 49 “The legislature sets forth by statute the range of permissible sentences for each
class of criminal offense.” People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999). A reviewing court affords
great deference to a trial court’s sentencing judgment because, “having observed the defendant and
- 12 - the proceedings, [it] is in a far better position to consider such factors as the defendant’s credibility,
demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, and habits than a reviewing
court, which must rely on a ‘cold’ record.” People v. Little, 2011 IL App (4th) 090787, ¶ 24. A
sentence that falls within the applicable statutory limits is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
People v. Price, 2011 IL App (4th) 100311, ¶ 36. “A sentence within statutory limits will not be
deemed excessive and an abuse of the court’s discretion unless it is ‘greatly at variance with the
spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.’ ” People
v. Pina, 2019 IL App (4th) 170614, ¶ 20 (quoting Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 54).
¶ 50 Here, defendant challenges her sentence for permitting the sexual abuse of a child,
a Class 1 felony. 720 ILCS 5/11-9.1A(a), (g) (West 2016). On that charge, defendant was subject
to a term of not less than 4 years and not more than 15 years in prison. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30 (West
2022). Because defendant’s sentence was within the permissible range, we presume the sentence
was proper and we review it for an abuse of discretion. See Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035,
¶ 104.
¶ 51 Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 50-month term of
imprisonment. While defendant contends the sentence is disproportionate to the circumstances
underlying the offense and points to various statements by the court to argue it failed to consider
or give appropriate weight to various mitigating factors, the court expressly discussed the
mitigating factors and weighed them against the seriousness of the offense. As the court itself
noted, it was not required to afford greater weight to mitigating factors than to the severity of the
offense. See People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 214 (2010). Nor does the presence of mitigating
factors require a minimum sentence. People v. Jones, 2014 IL App (1st) 120927, ¶ 55. “Where
mitigating evidence is presented to the trial court, it is presumed, absent some indication to the
- 13 - contrary, other than the sentence itself, that the court considered it.” Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st)
140134, ¶ 19.
¶ 52 As previously discussed, the seriousness of the offense is the most important factor
in determining an appropriate sentence. Harmon, 2015 IL App (1st) 122345, ¶ 123. The trial court
specifically found the offense was particularly serious and noted the events underlying it had taken
place over a long period of time, causing serious harm. Despite that, the court sentenced defendant
to just two months over the minimum prison term. In doing so, the court specifically stated the
sentence would have been greater but for the presence of mitigating factors.
¶ 53 Our review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Although defendant insists the court abused its discretion, her argument is essentially nothing more
than a request for us to reweigh the sentencing factors, which we will not do. “A reviewing court
does not reweigh the factors involved in a trial court’s sentencing decision.” People v. Pippen, 324
Ill. App. 3d 649, 653 (2001).
¶ 54 On this record, we cannot say defendant’s sentence was greatly at variance with the
spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 50 months’
imprisonment.
¶ 55 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 56 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
¶ 57 Affirmed.
- 14 -