People v. Gutierrez

180 Cal. App. 3d 1076, 225 Cal. Rptr. 885, 1986 Cal. App. LEXIS 1575
California Court of Appeal·Decided May 13, 1986·No. E002239·Published·Cited by 20 cases

Opinion

*1079 Opinion

RICKLES, Acting P. J.

Defendant Mary Helen Gutierrez was convicted by jury of three counts of inflicting cruel or inhuman injury upon a child (Pen. Code, § 273d). Defendant was sentenced to state prison for a term of five years but execution of sentence was suspended and probation was granted on various conditions. Defendant has appealed from the judgment.

Two related issues are raised on appeal: whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of defendant’s mental illness at the time of the offenses and whether the court erred in imposing on defendant the burden of proving the cause of her mental condition.

Facts

Defendant (age eighteen years) was living with her three children: Crystal (age three years), Daniel (age two years), and Steven (age two months). On July 21, 1984, defendant was staying at her parents’ house while they took a trip to Las Vegas. During the afternoon, defendant began beating her children and the police were summoned. When the officers arrived, about 5 p.m., defendant was being physically restrained by neighbors and relatives. Crystal, her daughter, had swollen lips and was swollen around the eyes. Daniel had bruises, bumps and dried blood on his face and neck. Steven, the infant, also had bruises and drying blood on his face; he appeared to be unconscious.

Defendant was arrested and taken to a hospital for a blood test, after which she was taken to the police department where she waived her Miranda rights and gave a tape-recorded interview. Defendant admitted hitting, slapping, squeezing, and kicking her children. Her explanation for this conduct was bizarre and inconsistent. She referred to hearing voices, to thinking there was a bird inside her children, or a tire tube, or an older person. At times she said she did not know why she had beaten her children, at other times she said she was trying to force the things inside of them to come out. 1

Defendant was found to be incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the custody of the State Department of Health. She was placed in Patton State Hospital on October 2, 1984. On January 24, 1985, defendant was found to be mentally competent to stand trial and criminal proceedings were reinstated.

*1080 Following her arraignment on the information, defendant entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. On the date set for trial, defendant elected, against the advice of her attorney, to withdraw her plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. A hearing was held at which testimony was received from Dr. Harvey Oshrin, a psychiatrist. In his opinion, any mental illness which defendant may have had was a consequence of intoxication with a variety of illicit substances. After she was taken into custody, her system had cleared and her mental condition likewise had cleared. She was competent to make a rational judgment to withdraw her plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.

Following this hearing the trial court approved the change of plea. During voir dire of the jury, the prosecutor objected to questions posed by defense counsel regarding state-of-mind evidence. Argument on this question continued during voir dire and during presentation of the prosecution’s casein-chief. The trial court ruled that defendant would not be permitted to introduce evidence of mental illness or voluntary intoxication but she would be permitted to introduce evidence of a reasonable mistake. More specifically, defendant would not be permitted to call expert witnesses to testify regarding her mental condition or to introduce evidence from any source regarding her history of mental illness. She would not be permitted to introduce evidence of her appearance, statements or conduct before or after the offenses to prove the existence of a mental illness at the time of the offenses. She would not be permitted to introduce evidence of her voluntary ingestion of drugs or other intoxicating substances. Defendant would be permitted to testify regarding her mental state at the time she was beating her children.

The only defense witness was defendant herself and her testimony was brief. She said she started seeing her children as birds on the day in question and “didn’t know they were children at that time.” She had just wanted to kill the birds because she felt they were an evil force.

Discussion

Before considering defendant’s contentions, a brief review of the distinction between general and specific intent crimes will be helpful. Defendant concedes she was charged with and convicted of general intent crimes.

“When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the definition refers to defendant’s intent to do some further act or achieve *1081 some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent. There is no real difference, however, only a linguistic one, between an intent to do an act already performed and an intent to do that same act in the future.” (People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 456-457 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370].)

“The distinction between specific and general intent crimes evolved as a judicial response to the problem of the intoxicated offender. That problem is to reconcile two competing theories of what is just in the treatment of those who commit crimes while intoxicated. On the one hand, the moral culpability of a drunken criminal is frequently less than that of a sober person effecting a like injury. On the other hand, it is commonly felt that a person who voluntarily gets drunk and while in that state commits a crime should not escape the consequences. [Citation.]

“Before the nineteenth century, the common law refused to give any effect to the fact that an accused committed a crime while intoxicated. The judges were apparently troubled by this rigid traditional rule, however, for there were a number of attempts during the early part of the nineteenth century to arrive at a more humane, yet workable, doctrine. ... To limit the operation of the doctrine and achieve a compromise between the conflicting feelings of sympathy and reprobation for the intoxicated offender, later courts both in England and this country drew a distinction between so-called specific and general intent crimes.” (People v. Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 455-456.)

Evidence of voluntary intoxication may be introduced to show the absence of specific intent but not to show the absence of general intent. (See Pen. Code, § 22.) Because specific intent crimes are usually more serious than general intent crimes and because there is usually, though not invariably, a general intent crime available as an alternative to each specific intent crime (see People v. Wetmore (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318, 327-330 [149 Cal.Rptr. 265, 583 P.2d 1308

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People v. Gutierrez, 180 Cal. App. 3d 1076, 225 Cal. Rptr. 885, 1986 Cal. App. LEXIS 1575 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).

180 Cal. App. 3d 1076 (People v. Gutierrez) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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