People v. Guerrero

• Court: Superior Court of Guam
• Decided: April 6, 2026
• Docket: CF0119-26
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 7

8 PEOPLE OF GUAM, CRIMINAL CASE NO. CF0l 19-26 9 vs. DECISION AND ORDER 11 DEVON JOEL GUERRERO aka Devin Joel 12 Guerrero, 13 Defendant. 14

15 INTRODUCTION

16 This matter came before the Honorable Vernon P. Perez on March 31, 2026, for hearing

17 on Defendant DEVON JOEL GUERRERO aka Devin Joel Guerrero's ("Defendant") Motion

18 to Sever Charges for Trial. Present were Assistant Attorney General Nicholas Ennis on behalf of

19 the People of Guam ("the Government") and Defendant with counsel, Assistant Alternate Public

20 Defender Brycen J. Breazeale. Having reviewed the pleadings, the arguments presented, and the

21 record, th~ Court now issues the following Decision and Order.

22 - BACKGROUND

23 On February 17, 2026, Defendant was indicted with (1) two counts of Burglary (As a

24 Second Degree Felony; (2) one count of Attempted Theft to a Motor Vehicle (As a Second Degree

25 Felony) with attached Notice: Commission of a Felony While on Felony Release; (3) one count

26 of Criminal Mischief (As a Third Degree Felony) with attached Notice: Commission ofa Felony

27 While on Felony Release; (4) two counts of Criminal Mischief (As a Third Degree Felony); and

28 (5) two counts of Breaking of Window Glass to Gain Access to a Vehicle (As a Third Degree

People v. Guerrero Case No. CF0119-26 Decision and Order

Page 1 of9 Felony). (Indictment, Feb. 17, 2026). These charges stem from events allegedly occurring on or 2 about October 29, 2024, December 23, 2024, and April 30, 2025. Id. 3 On February 26, 2026, Defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial. 4 On March 24, 2026, Defendant filed the instant Motion. On March 27, 2026, the 5 Government filed its Opposition. On March 31, 2026, Defendant filed his Reply. 6 On March 31, 2026, the Court heard brief arguments from the parties and subsequently 7 placed the matter under advisement. 8 DISCUSSION 9 Under Guam law, two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment "if the 1o offenses charged are of the same or similar character or based on the same act or transaction or 11 on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme 12 or plan." 8 G.C.A. § 55.35. 1 To determine whether offenses are properly joined, courts 13 traditionally consider "whether the charges are laid under the same statute, whether they involve 14 similar victims, locations, or modes of operation, and the time frame in which the charged conduct 15 occurred." United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 973 (1st Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Only 16 one of the three prongs must be found for joinder to be proper. United States v. Jawara, 474 F.3d 17 565,578 (9th Cir. 2007). The rule is "construed broadly in favor of initialjoinder." United States 18 v. Walser, 3 F.3d 380, 385 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). See also United States v. 19 Boulanger, 444 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2006) (construing Rule 8(a) generously in favor of joinder). 20 Even if offenses are properly joined, the Court may order separate trials of the offenses if the 21 defendant or Government is prejudiced by suchjoinder. 2 See 8 G.C.A. § 65.35. 22

23 1 Section 55.35 is substantially the same as Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides: 24 (a) Joinder of Offenses. The indictment or information may charge a defendant in separate counts 25 with 2 or more offenses if the offenses charged - whether felonies or misdemeanors or both - are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with 26 or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8. Accordingly, federal law interpreting Rule 8 (and Rule 14) below is persuasive. See Sumitomo 27 Constr. Co. v. Zhang Ye, Inc., 1997 Guam 8 ,r 7. 2 28 Title 8 G.C.A. section 65.35 provides:

People v. Guerrero Case No. CF0l 19-26 Decision and Order

Page 2 of9 The first issue before the Court is whether the charges in the Indictment were properly 2 joined. Defendant argues that "[e]ach date in the Indictment should be tried separately because 3 of the gap in time between the incidents, the independent witnesses necessary to support each 4 allegation, and also because the allegations clearly do not constitute a common scheme or plan." 5 (Mot. Sever at 3, Mar. 24, 2026). The Government sets forth that "joinder is proper because the 6 charged offenses are plainly of the same or similar character." (Opp'n at 2). 7 In considering the Government's basis for joinder, the Court examines "factors such as 8 the elements of the statutory offenses, the temporal proximity of the acts, the likelihood and extent 9 of evidentiary overlap, the physical location of the acts, the modus operandi of the crimes, and 10 the identity of the victims." Jawara, 474 F.3d at 578. "The weight given to a particular factor 11 will depend on the specific context of the case and the allegations in the indictment." Id. The 12 length of time between offenses is not dispositive on its own. See, United States v. Rodgers, 732 13 F.2d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1984) (after examining prior cases where joiner was affirmed for offenses 14 occurring during time periods including eight months, two-years, and five-months, finding "the 15 time-period factor is to be determined on a case-by-case approach; there is no per se rule on when 16 the time period between similar offenses is so great that they may not be joined."). "[T]he use of 17 multicount indictments charging offenses of similar character is a sanctioned practice." Howard 18 v. United States, 372 F.2d 294, 301 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 915 (1967).

19 In this case, Defendant is charged with Burglary, Attempted Theft to a Motor Vehicle, 20 Criminal Mischief, and Breaking of Window Glass to Gain Access to a Vehicle. One count of 21

22 If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order 23 an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other 24 relief justice requires.

8 G.C.A. § 65.35. Section 65.35 is substantially similar to Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 25 provides: 26 If the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of counts, 27 sever the defendants' trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires. 28 Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a).

Page 3 of9 Burglary, Criminal Mischief, and Breaking of a Window Glass to Gain Access to a Vehicle 2 involving victim Cassandra Calvo Santos's 2017 Toyota Camry allegedly occurred on October 3 29, 2024. 3 The second count of Burglary, Criminal Mischief, and Breaking of a Window Glass 4 to Gain Access to a Vehicle involving victim Michelle Borja's Mazda CX-5 allegedly occurred 5 on December 23, 2024. 4 The third set of charges, Attempted Theft to a Motor Vehicle and 6

7 3 The charges involving victim Cassanda Calvo read as follows: 8 FIRST CHARGE 9 Count One

On or about October 29, 2024, in Guam, DEVON JOEL GUERRERO (aka Devin Joel Guerrero) 10 did commit the offense of Burglary (As a 2nd Degree Felony), in that he did enter or surreptitiously II remain in a motor vehicle, that is, a 2017 Toyota Camry belonging to Cassandra Calvo Santos, with intent to commit the crime of Theft therein, in violation of9 GCA § 37.20(a) and (b). 12 CHARGE FOUR 13 Count One

On or about October 29, 2024, in Guam, DEVON JOEL GUERRERO (aka Devin Joel Guerrero) 14 did commit the offense of Criminal Mischief (As a 3rd Degree Felony), in that he did intentionally 15 damage the motor vehicle of another, to wit: Cassandra Calvo Santos, that is, a 20 I 7 Toyota Camry, in violation of9 GCA §§ 34.50(d) and 34.60(a). 16 CHARGE FIVE 17 Count One

18 On or about October 29, 2024, in Guam, DEVON JOEL GUERRERO (aka Devin Joel Guerrero) did commit the offense of Breaking of Window Glass to Gain Access to Vehicles (As a 3rd Degree 19 Felony), in that he did break a glass window of a vehicle in the process of committing or attempting to commit burglary or criminal trespass, in violation of9 GCA §§ 37.l0(d) and 37.40(a). 20 (Indictment, Feb. 17, 2026). 21 4 The charges involving victim Michelle Borja read as follows: 22 CHARGE ONE Count Two 23 On or about December 23, 2024, in Guam, DEVON JOEL GUERRERO (aka Devin Joel Guerrero) 24 did commit the offense of Burglary (As a 2nd Degree Felony), in that he did enter or surreptitiously remain in a motor vehicle, that is, a Mazda CX-5 belonging to Michelle Borja, with intent to commit 25 the crime of Theft therein, in violation of9 GCA § 37.20(a) and (b). 26 CHARGE FOUR Count Two 27 On or about December 23, 2024, in Guam, DEVON JOEL GUERRERO (aka Devin Joel Guerrero) 28 did commit the offense of Criminal Mischief (As a 3rd Degree Felony), in that he did intentionally

Page 4 of9 Criminal Mischief, involving victim Carson Riley Bigelow's 2024 Kawasaki Z500 motorcycle 2 allegedly occurred on April 30, 2025. 5 Both Santos and Borja's vehicles had passenger side 3 windows shattered, and GPD Forensic Science Officers recovered fingerprints from both scenes. 4 (Deel. of Curtis C. Van de veld, Magistrate's Compl., Feb. 6, 2026). The incidents involving 5 these two vehicles also occurred roughly two months apart (October 29, 2024 to December 23, 6 2024). As to the third incident, Defendant allegedly attempted to steal Bigelow's motorcycle and 7 damaged the handlebars four months later (April 30, 2025). Id. The attempted theft was caught 8 on surveillance video and GPD was able to identify Defendant as the individual involved, once 9 the face covering was removed on camera. Id. 10 In light of the above, the Court finds that the two sets of charges involving Burglary to a 11 Motor Vehicle, Criminal Mischief, and Breaking of a Glass Window to Gain Access to Vehicle 12

13 damage the motor vehicle of another, to wit: Michelle Borja, that is, a Mazda CX-5, in violation of 14 9 GCA §§ 34.50(d) and 34.60(a).

15 CHARGE FIVE Count Two 16 On or about December 23, 2024, in Guam, DEVON JOEL GUERRERO (aka Devin Joel Guerrero) 17 did commit the offense of Breaking of Window Glass to Gain Access to Vehicles (As a 3rd Degree Felony), in that he did break a glass window of a vehicle in the process of committing or attempting 18 to commit burglary or criminal trespass, in violation of9 GCA §§ 37.l0(d) and 37.40(a).

19 Id. 5 The charges involving victim Carson Riley Bigelow read as follows: 20 CHARGE TWO 21 On or about April 30, 2025, in Guam, DEVON JOEL GUERRERO (aka Devin Joel Guerrero) did 22 commit the offense of Attempted Thef of a Motor Vehicle (As a 2 nd Degree Felony), in that he did attempt to unlawfully take, obtain, or exercise unlawful control over the motor vehicle of another, 23 to wit: Carson Riley Bigelow, that is, a 2024 Kawasaki ZS00, with intent to deprive Carson Riley 24 Bigelow thereof, in violation of9 GCA §§ 43.20(a), 43.15, 43.l0(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e), and 13.10.

CHARGE THREE 25 On or about April 30, 2025, in Guam, DEVON JOEL GUERRERO (aka Devin Joel Guerrero) did 26 commit the offense of Criminal Mischief (As a 3rd Degree Felony), in that he did intentionally damage the motor vehicle of another, to wit: Carson Riley Bigelow, that is, a 2024 Kawasaki ZS00, 27 in violation of9 GCA §§ 34.50(d) and 34.60(a). 28 Id.

People v. Guerrero Case No. CFOl 19-26 Decision and Order

Page 5 of9 are properly joined. The allegations on October 29, 2024 and December 23, 2024, although 2 involving different victims, all involve the same charges and are based on the breaking of the 3 passenger window of the victims' vehicle. See United States v. Chambers, 964 F.2d 1250, 1250- 4 51 (1st Cir. 1992) (affirming joinder of six robberies involving similar victims over a period of 5 two and a half months); United States v. Sanders, 463 F. 2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1972) (affirming 6 joinder of counts where offenses were of the same or similar character and occurred eight months 7 apart). The Court, however, does not find that the third set of charges involving the Kawasaki 8 Motorcycle are properly joined with them, and orders that the Second Charge of Attempted Theft 9 of a Motor Vehicle (As a Second Degree Felony) and the Third Charge of Criminal Mischief (As 10 a Third Degree Felony) proceed to trial separately from the remaining charges. 6 11 The Court next turns to Defendant's argument that the charges should be severed for trial 12 because he will be prejudiced. Defendant sets forth that the charges "inappropriately paint Mr. 13 Guerrero as a serial offender," the jury will be "unable to compartmentalize evidence concerning 14 allegations on each alleged date from the others," and that his Fifth Amendment rights will be 15 jeopardized. (Mot. Sever at 4-5). As the Court has already determined that the third set of charges 16 involving the Kawasaki motorcycle should be severed for trial, the issue at this time is whether 17 Defendant will be prejudiced if the two sets of charges involving Burglary (to a motor vehicle), 18 Criminal Mischief, and Breaking of Window Glass to Gain Access to a Vehicle are tried before 19 a jury together. 20 The Court is not persuaded by Defendant's first two arguments regarding prejudice. 21 "Weighing the danger of confusion and undue cumulative inference is a matter for the trial judge 22 within his sound discretion." Johnson v. United States, 356 F.2d 680, 682 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. 23 denied, 385 U.S. 857 (1966). "It is not enough simply to show that such joinder makes it more 24

25 6 The Second and Third Charges in the Indictment also have an attached Notice: Commission of a Felony While on 26 Felony Release. Defendant states that "[a]t either a joint or severed trial, [he] will move to bifurcate the Notice from the factual presentation a trial." (Mot. Sever fn. 1). The Court will bifurcate the Notice from the underlying charges 27 at trial. See People v. Muritok, 2003 Guam 21 1 47 n.8 (adopting Supreme Court Justice Thomas's approach in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 521 n.10 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring), advocating the bifurcation of trials 28 to keep juries from learning of aggravating facts until after a conviction on the underlying offense.).

Page 6 of9 difficult to defend." Id. (citations omitted). Severance under Rule 14 requires a serious risk of 2 prejudice. See Jawara, 474 F.3d at 579. "The test is whether joinder is so manifestly prejudicial 3 that it outweighs the dominant concern with judicial economy and compels the exercise of the 4 court's discretion to sever." United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1976) 5 ( citation omitted) (emphasis added). "Even where there may be some risk of prejudice, if the 6 possibility of prejudice may be cured by a cautionary instruction severance is not required." 7 United States v. Walser, 3 F.3d 380,385 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

8 See also United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 974 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that defendant's "bare 9 allegation that, if the jury were to believe that he was involved in one bank robbery, then it might 10 also (improperly) be led to believe from the fact alone that he was involved in the other, is simply 11 not enough. This type of spillover is standard fare whenever counts involving discrete incidents 12 are linked in a single indictment. We have repeatedly held that such a garden variety side effect, 13 without more, is insufficient to require severance."). "Juries are presumed to follow their 14 instructions." Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993) (citation omitted). 15 The Court is also not persuaded by Defendant's third argument thatjoinder will prejudice 16 his Fifth Amendment rights. Defendant asserts that he "is prejudiced if he wishes to testify 17 concerning one set of Charges, but maybe not others," and that he will be forced to choose 18 between testifying on one allegation, thereby exposing himself to cross-examination on all 19 charges, or not testifying altogether. (Mot. Sever at 5). A defendant seeking severance on this 20 basis must demonstrate "that he has important testimony to give on some counts and a strong need 21 to refrain from testifying on those he wants severed." United States v. DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890, 22 898 (9th Cir.), amended,. 777 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 23 479,483 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1123, (1983)). See also United States v. Kelly, 99 F.4th 24 1018, 1026 (7th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S.Ct. 276 (2024); People v. Washington, 517 P.3d 25 706, 714 (Wash. 2022); People v. Walker, 542 P.2d 1283, 1286 (Colo. 1975); State v. Martin, 926 26 P.2d 1380, 1388 (Mont. 1996). To satisfy this standard, a defendant must provide sufficient detail 27 regarding "the nature of the testimony he wishes to give on one count and his reasons for not 28 wishing to testify on the other," so that the court can determine whether the claimed prejudice is

People v. Guerrero Case No. CFO! 19-26 Decision and Order

Page 7 of9 genume and intelligently weigh such prejudice against the interests of judicial economy. 2 Workman v. United States, 15 A.3d 264,268 (D.C. 2011).

3 Here, Defendant sets forth that his "decision to testify is based, in part, on the 4 incriminating nature of his out-of-court statements the People would likely introduce at his trial." 5 (Reply at 5). This generalized assertion does not identify what specific testimony Defendant 6 would offer on any particular charge, nor why he must refrain from testifying on others. 7 Defendant also states that he "provided varying levels of culpability as to each date alleged[] 8 [t]herefore he has valid reason to testify concerning some of the dates in question, but not all of 9 them." Id. However, without more specific details, the Court cannot meaningfully evaluate any 10 prejudice against the interests of judicial economy. Workman, 15 A.3d at 268. See also Martin, 11 926 P.2d at 1388 (a "one sentence assertion that [Defendant's] privilege against self-incrimination 12 would be compromised is insufficient to prove the.existence of this type of prejudice."). Lastly, 13 Defendant contends that his defenses may differ across the charged dates, but he does not identify 14 which defenses apply to which charges or explain how joinder would impair his ability to present 15 any specific defense. His references to a possible identity defense on some counts, legal defenses 16 as to elements on others, or simply holding the Government to its burden of proof7 are too 17 generalized to establish prejudice. Variations in defense strategy, without a concrete showing that 18 joinder would actually hinder the presentation of a particular defense, do not warrant severance. 19 Accordingly, the Court will not grant severance of the remaining charges on this ground. 20 CONCLUSION 21 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 22 Defendant's Motion to Sever Charges for Trial. The charges set forth in the Indictment will be 23 split into two trials: the First Charge of Burglary (As a Second Degree Felony)-Two Counts, the 24 Fourth Charge of Criminal Mischief (As a Third Degree Felony) - Two Counts, and the Fifth 25

7 26 Defendant sets forth in his reply that "[t]he inconsistent nature of defense as to each alleged date requires severance not because the evidence and defenses may differ across counts, but instead, because Mr. Guerrero cannot adequately 27 raise a defense at trial if as to some Charges he has a true identity defense, and to others he has a legal defense as to the elements of the crime, or ifhe simply wishes to force the People to prove their case to a jury beyond a reasonable 28 doubt." (Reply at 5).

Page 8 of9 Charge of Breaking of Window Glass to Gain Access to a Vehicle (As a Third Degree Felony) 2 Two Counts shall be joined together for trial; and the Second Charge of Attempted Theft of a 3 Motor Vehicle (As a Second Degree Felony) and the Third Charge of Criminal Mischief (As a 4 Third Degree Felony), both with attached Notice: Commission of a Felony While on Felony 5 Release, shall be joined together for trial. 6 A Status Hearing remains set for April 6, 2026 at 3 :00 p.m. As this matter remains in an 7 asserted status, parties should be prepared to discuss trial dates. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED this ~ y of April, 2026. 9

12 HONORABLE VERNON P. PEREZ Judge, Superior Court of Guam l3

SEIR.VICIE V!A EM.IU!l. 24 I acknowledge ttiat an electronic copy o1 the original was e-mailed to:' 25

Page 9 of9