People v. Griffin

2026 IL App (5th) 250933-U

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250933-U NOTICE Decision filed 01/28/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0933 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jefferson County. ) v. ) No. 25-CF-262 ) ERNEST L. GRIFFIN, ) Honorable ) Jerry E. Crisel, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Sholar and Bollinger concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court’s orders granting the State’s verified petition to deny pretrial release and denying the defendant’s motion for relief are affirmed.

¶2 Defendant Ernest Griffin appeals pursuant to the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act) (725 ILCS

5/110-1 et seq. (West 2024)) from the Jefferson County trial court’s November 4, 2025, order

granting the State’s petition to deny pretrial release, as well as the court’s November 6, 2025, order

denying his motion for relief and immediate release. The defendant did not file a memorandum in

support of his appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On November 3, 2025, the defendant was charged by information with one count of

domestic battery, a Class 4 felony, and one count of resisting or obstructing a peace officer, a Class

1 A misdemeanor. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2); 720 ILCS 5/31-1 (West 2024). The State filed a verified

petition to deny pretrial release the same day, alleging that the defendant was charged with

domestic battery, that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or

the community, and that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate that threat. 725

ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(4) (West 2024). The trial court held a hearing on the State’s petition on

November 4, 2025.

¶5 A. Hearing on Petition to Deny Pretrial Release

¶6 The State presented its evidence by proffer. According to the State, Officers Hawkins and

Gray, of the Mount Vernon Police Department, would testify about responding to a call involving

a physical domestic incident. Misty Redmond reported that her husband, the defendant, had

punched her in the jaw while he was heavily intoxicated. When Officer Hawkins arrived, he

observed that Redman’s jaw appeared swollen.

¶7 Redman told Officer Hawkins that a juvenile witness had seen the defendant punch her.

Officer Hawkins spoke with nine-year-old B.R., who said he saw Redman get mad at the defendant

for his drinking. The defendant then punched Redmond when she tried to call someone, knocking

the phone from her hand. Officer Hawkins also spoke with the defendant, who told him that

Redman was lying, that she hit him first, and that he reacted and slapped her.

¶8 After determining that he had probable cause, Officer Hawkins informed the defendant that

he was under arrest for domestic battery. Officer Hawkins told the defendant to stand up and place

his hands behind his back. The defendant stood up, but resisted arrest by flexing his arms and

pulling away. Officer Gray was also expected to testify that the defendant resisted arrest by pulling

his arms away from the officers and ignoring their commands that he stop.

2 ¶9 Eventually, Officer Gray was able to wrap his arms around the defendant’s legs, causing

him to fall, and the officers were able to gain control over the defendant and handcuff him. The

defendant continued to resist by refusing to walk forward, began to fall down, and became dead

weight, forcing the officers to drag him to the patrol car.

¶ 10 The defense proffered that the defendant was 51 years old, had lived in Jefferson County

for approximately 12 years, had many family members who also lived in the county, and was

employed at McDonald’s at the time of his arrest. He also reported not having any record of failure

to appear in court, and he was not on parole or work release at the time of his arrest. The defendant

provided “some support” for his four children, and he claimed that Redman was lying about the

incident. Counsel also stated that the defendant would submit to any conditions of release,

including electronic monitoring, home confinement, and a stay-away order from Redman, and he

would attend rehabilitation services if released. The defendant also identified someone with whom

he could stay under home confinement. Counsel argued that the defendant wanted to get back to

work to support his children, and that he was not a danger to anyone.

¶ 11 The State argued that the defendant was charged with domestic battery, and that Redman’s

claim was corroborated by Officer Hawkins’s observation of her swollen jaw and the child’s

eyewitness statement. The State further argued that the defendant posed a real and present threat

to the victim and others. He had a criminal history of six felonies and nine misdemeanors, and the

Ontario Domestic Assault Risk Assessment (ODARA) predicted that 74% of individuals who

scored at the defendant’s level would commit an act of domestic violence within five years. He

also committed the crime in the presence of a child.

¶ 12 The State also contended that no less restrictive means of preventing the defendant from

further criminal conduct existed. At the time of the offense, the defendant was subject to court

3 supervision in Jefferson County, probation in Cook County for aggravated battery, and conditional

discharge in Jefferson County for domestic battery. Therefore, the State argued, he had proven that

no conditions of pretrial release would suffice. Furthermore, when he was given orders by police

officers, he still was not willing to abide by lawful commands. The State concluded that detention

was the only way to protect Redman and others.

¶ 13 The trial court found the following factors in defendant’s favor: his community ties and the

fact that he had a history of being employed, despite not finishing high school. The trial court then

addressed the negative factors, which it described as “pretty lengthy.” First, the defendant had a

“lengthy” and “bad criminal history” spanning two counties across the state, including terms of

imprisonment. His previous charges included battery and domestic battery cases, home invasion,

possession of a weapon by a felon, drug offenses, and failure to return from a furlough. The trial

court noted that this last offense did not “give [the court] a lot of confidence” about the defendant’s

likelihood of obeying court orders. The defendant was also on three different kinds of court

oversight, all for different offenses, at the time of his arrest, which indicated to the court that he

was unable to follow court orders. One of the aforementioned oversights was court supervision for

a DUI, to which the trial court added that the defendant’s record indicated a serious and ongoing

problem with alcohol abuse.

¶ 14 The trial court also found that the charged offense was very serious and was made a felony

due to the defendant’s criminal history. Furthermore, the State’s case, based on its proffer, was

very strong and the likelihood of conviction was high. The evidence against the defendant included

the victim’s statement, police officer observations, and the child eyewitness’s account. The court

was also troubled by the defendant’s failure to follow police orders and added that his striking

4 Redman in the face in front of a child “doesn’t speak very highly” of his conduct. Thus, the trial

court granted the State’s petition to deny pretrial release.

¶ 15 The trial court determined that the defendant would be a threat to Redman and to the public,

given his criminal history, his fighting with the police to resist arrest, and his high probability of

committing further acts of domestic violence according to the ODARA. The trial court further

found that no condition or combination of conditions would assure the court that he could follow

any terms set out in a pretrial release order. The trial court granted the State’s petition, ruling that

the State had met its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant should

be denied pretrial release.

¶ 16 The court entered an order to that effect on November 4, 2025, making a finding under the

dangerousness standard (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1)-(6) (West 2024)) that the defendant posed a

real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and no condition or

combination of conditions could mitigate that threat. The trial court found that no less-restrictive

conditions could assure the safety of the individuals or community because the defendant was not

deterred from committing the alleged conduct by the three different types of less-restrictive

conditions he was already obligated to follow.

¶ 17 B. Motion for Relief

¶ 18 The defense filed a motion for relief on November 5, 2025, arguing that the State had not

met its burden by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions could mitigate any threat

defendant posed. The defense contended that the trial court failed to fully consider the defendant’s

ties to the community, his willingness to abide by any terms of pretrial release, his employment

opportunities, and the fact that no weapon was used in the commission of the alleged offense.

5 ¶ 19 The trial court held a probable cause hearing and a hearing on defendant’s motion for relief

on November 6, 2025. At the hearing, defense counsel repeated the points he made at the detention

hearing, and further emphasized that the defendant denied the charges and would submit to any

conditions of pretrial release. The State argued that domestic battery is a detainable offense,

regardless of whether the defendant used a weapon. The State also summarized its previous proffer

and emphasized the strength of the evidence against the defendant, his resisting arrest, his criminal

history, and his three active court supervision statuses.

¶ 20 The trial court stated that the defendant was accused of the qualifying detainable offense

of domestic battery and agreed with the State that no additional showing—such as the use of a

weapon—was required for this finding. The court then acknowledged the points defense counsel

raised that went in the defendant’s favor—residence in and ties to Jefferson County, not being on

mandatory supervised release or work release at the time, and the lack of a weapon in the alleged

offense. The trial court also recognized that the defendant had four children for whom he was

attempting to provide support and that he wished to attend rehab to address his alcohol use, which

the court described as “a central figure in [his] misbehavior.”

¶ 21 However, the trial court maintained its finding that the negative points against the

defendant were “pretty severe.” The court reiterated that the State’s case against the defendant was

strong. Additionally, Redman’s accusation was corroborated by the responding officer’s

observations and the statement of the child witness, whom the officers considered to be credible.

The trial court was also concerned by the fact that the alleged offense occurred in front of at least

one of the four children residing with the defendant.

¶ 22 Next, the trial court summarized the defendant’s extensive criminal history, which covered

“a wide gamut of different types of offenses” in both Jefferson and Cook Counties—six felony

6 and nine misdemeanor convictions, including at least two offenses the trial court considered to be

violent. The trial court also noted that the defendant spent a lot of time in Cook County, far from

Jefferson County, possibly indicating ties to that community as well. The trial court concluded that

his criminal history “speaks for itself. It’s terrible.”

¶ 23 The defendant was also on three different kinds of court supervision at the time of his

arrest, which the trial court repeated were for a DUI, aggravated battery, and domestic battery. The

trial court explained that the main provision of each form of supervision was that the defendant

follow the law—and his violation of those orders indicated that he would not abide by any pretrial

release conditions. Specifically, the trial court indicated it did not have “a lot of faith in [the

defendant’s] ability to continue or to even successfully abide by a court order.” Additionally, the

defendant’s criminal history included the failure to return from a furlough in 2019, which was yet

another instance of the defendant violating a court order. The trial court also found that the

defendant’s resisting arrest strongly suggested that he would not abide by the law and would pose

a danger to Redman, her children, and the community.

¶ 24 The trial court thus denied the defendant’s motion for relief on November 6, 2025, finding

that there was no condition or set of conditions that would assure that he would abide by the terms

of pretrial release or mitigate the threat he posed to the safety of Redman or the general public.

Defendant filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h), which conferred

jurisdiction on this court. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(3) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024).

¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 26 Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

(Code), as amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), sometimes referred to as the Pretrial

7 Fairness Act. Under article 110 of the Code, a defendant’s pretrial release may only be denied in

certain limited situations. See 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2024).

¶ 27 If the State files a petition requesting denial of pretrial release,

“[T]he State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that a defendant has committed a qualifying offense, that the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community or a flight risk, and that less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.” People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 7; 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e), (f) (West 2022).

Our supreme court has instructed that “[e]vidence is clear and convincing if it leaves no reasonable

doubt in the mind of the trier of fact as to the truth of the proposition in question.” Chaudhary v.

Department of Human Services, 2023 IL 127712, ¶ 74; see also People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st)

231753, ¶ 12 (“Clear and convincing evidence is that quantum of proof that leaves no reasonable

doubt in the mind of the fact finder about the truth of the proposition in question.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.)).

¶ 28 The trial court may order a defendant detained pending trial if the defendant is charged

with a qualifying offense and the court concludes the defendant “poses a real and present threat to

the safety of any person” or the community. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2024). The statute

provides a non-exclusive list of “[f]actors to be considered in making a determination of

dangerousness” that the trial court may consider in assessing whether the defendant poses such a

threat. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2024). These include the nature and circumstances of any

offense charged, the defendant’s history and characteristics, the identity of any person whose

safety the defendant is believed to threaten, and “[a]ny other factors, including those listed in

Section 110-5 of this Article deemed by the court to have a reasonable bearing upon the

8 defendant’s propensity or reputation for violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior, or lack of such

behavior.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2024).

¶ 29 If the trial court finds the State proved a threat to the safety of any person or the community,

the court must determine which pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the

appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and the

likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” 725 ILCS

5/110-5(a) (West 2024). In making this determination, the court must consider (1) the nature and

circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the

history and characteristics of the defendant; (4) the nature and seriousness of the real and present

threat to the safety of any person or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the

case, that would be posed by the defendant’s release; and (5) the nature and seriousness of the risk

of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West

2024).

¶ 30 Our standard of review of pretrial release determinations is dependent on whether the trial

court heard live witness testimony or whether the parties proceeded solely by proffer or submission

of documentary evidence. In the latter case, as here, this court stands in the same position as the

trial court and may conduct its own independent review of the proffered evidence, thus reviewing

the record de novo. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54.

¶ 31 The defendant did not include any additional argument on appeal. In his motion for relief,

he contended that the trial court failed to fully consider his ties to the community, his employment

opportunities, the lack of a weapon used in the alleged offense, and the defendant’s willingness to

abide by any terms of pretrial release. He has never challenged the trial court’s determination that

he was charged with a qualifying detainable offense. To the extent that his contention regarding

9 the lack of a weapon goes to this determination, we agree with the trial court that the use of a

weapon is not required under the Act. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(4) (West 2024) (identifying

domestic battery under section 12-3.2 of the Code as a qualifying offense).

¶ 32 The record shows that the trial court thoroughly reviewed the evidence presented and

considered all of the statutory factors in denying pretrial release based upon the dangerousness

standard and the lack of conditions that could reasonably ensure the safety of the threatened

individuals or the community. Based on the allegations that he committed an act of domestic

violence against Redman, in the presence of a child, the trial court found that the defendant posed

a threat to Redman’s safety, specifically. In the hearing on the defendant’s motion for relief, the

trial court added that the four children in the home could also be at risk.

¶ 33 The trial court was also concerned by the defendant’s lengthy criminal history, finding that

his several felonies and misdemeanors, his history of committing violent offenses, and his past

disregard for the law, peace officers, and court orders made him a safety risk to the general public.

The trial court additionally noted the high likelihood of his committing further acts of domestic

violence based on his ODARA score.

¶ 34 Furthermore, the defendant was on three different court supervision orders at the time of

his arrest, including one for domestic battery, another for aggravated battery, and one for an

alcohol-related offense. Notably, in the present case, the defendant was charged with domestic

battery and was allegedly intoxicated while committing the offense. He further demonstrated his

continued disregard for following lawful orders when he resisted arrest. There was also strong

evidence against him, as Redman’s accusation was corroborated by law enforcement and a credible

eyewitness. The trial court determined that, based on his demonstrated unwillingness to abide by

the terms of court supervision and the likelihood of his committing further offenses, there was no

10 pretrial condition or combination of conditions that would mitigate the risk he posed to Redman

or the general public. We agree with the trial court’s findings and conclusions regarding the risk

posed to Redman, her children, and the general public and that there were no factors that would

mitigate these risks.

¶ 35 Lastly, we find that the record contradicts the defendant’s contentions that the trial court

overlooked his community ties, employment opportunities, or any other factors in his favor.

Rather, the trial court determined that these were insufficient to overcome the weight of the factors

against allowing pretrial release. Regarding the defendant’s expressed willingness to abide by any

terms of pretrial release, the trial court found ample evidence that it was clear the defendant would

not abide by any such terms, in light of the circumstances set forth above. We thus conclude that

the trial court did not err in both granting the State’s petition and denying the defendant’s motion

for relief.

¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orders of the trial court of Jefferson County

granting the State’s verified petition to deny pretrial release and denying the defendant’s motion

¶ 38 Affirmed.