People v. Griest

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Griest

131 A.D.3d 736, 13 N.Y.S.3d 920, 2015 NY Slip Op 06452, 2015 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6315

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedAugust 6, 2015

Docket519408

StatusPublished

This text of 131 A.D.3d 736 (People v. Griest) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Griest, 131 A.D.3d 736, 13 N.Y.S.3d 920, 2015 NY Slip Op 06452, 2015 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6315 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

Pincite

Opinion

Appeal from an order of the County Court of Cortland County (Ames, J.), rendered March 20, 2014, which classified defendant as a risk level three sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.

In 2008, defendant was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree and, following his release from prison, he was required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C). He was presumptively classified as a risk level three sex offender based upon the score on the risk assessment instrument, and the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders recommended that he be classified as such. Thereafter, a hearing was conducted before County Court to determine the appropriate risk level classification. Following a continuation of the hearing, the court ultimately classified defendant as a risk level three sex offender based upon the risk assessment instrument score. Defendant now appeals.

*737 Appellate counsel seeks to be relieved of his assignment of representing defendant on the ground that there are no nonfrivolous issues to be raised on appeal. The record discloses, however, that defendant argued to County Court that he had been erroneously assessed too many points in specific risk assessment categories and, as a result, he should have been presumptively scored as a risk level two sex offender (see People v Irizarry, 89 AD3d 1246, 1247 [2011]; People v Meyer, 52 AD3d 921, 921-922 [2008]). Without expressing any opinion on the ultimate merit of these or any other potential issues, counsel’s request to be relieved of assignment is granted and new counsel shall be assigned to address any nonfrivolous issues that the record may disclose (see People v Stokes, 95 NY2d 633 [2001]; People v Cruwys, 113 AD2d 979, 980 [1985], lv denied 67 NY2d 650 [1986]).

Peters, P.J., McCarthy, Rose and Devine, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the decision is withheld, application to be relieved of assignment granted and new counsel to be assigned.

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Appeal from an order of the County Court of Cortland County (Ames, J.), rendered March 20, 2014, which classified defendant as a risk level three sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.

In 2008, defendant was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree and, following his release from prison, he was required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C). He was presumptively classified as a risk level three sex offender based upon the score on the risk assessment instrument, and the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders recommended that he be classified as such. Thereafter, a hearing was conducted before County Court to determine the appropriate risk level classification. Following a continuation of the hearing, the court ultimately classified defendant as a risk level three sex offender based upon the risk assessment instrument score. Defendant now appeals.

*737 Appellate counsel seeks to be relieved of his assignment of representing defendant on the ground that there are no nonfrivolous issues to be raised on appeal. The record discloses, however, that defendant argued to County Court that he had been erroneously assessed too many points in specific risk assessment categories and, as a result, he should have been presumptively scored as a risk level two sex offender (see People v Irizarry, 89 AD3d 1246, 1247 [2011]; People v Meyer, 52 AD3d 921, 921-922 [2008]). Without expressing any opinion on the ultimate merit of these or any other potential issues, counsel’s request to be relieved of assignment is granted and new counsel shall be assigned to address any nonfrivolous issues that the record may disclose (see People v Stokes, 95 NY2d 633 [2001]; People v Cruwys, 113 AD2d 979, 980 [1985], lv denied 67 NY2d 650 [1986]).

Peters, P.J., McCarthy, Rose and Devine, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the decision is withheld, application to be relieved of assignment granted and new counsel to be assigned.

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Bluebook (online)

131 A.D.3d 736, 13 N.Y.S.3d 920, 2015 NY Slip Op 06452, 2015 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6315, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-griest-nyappdiv-2015.

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