People v. Greer

2021 IL App (5th) 180375-U

Opinion

NOTICE 2021 IL App (5th) 180375-U NOTICE Decision filed 06/16/21. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-18-0375 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE under Rule 23(e)(1). the same.

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Madison County. ) v. ) No. 00-CF-157 ) LARRY D. GREER, ) Honorable ) Ronald R. Slemer, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Boie and Justice Cates concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The second-stage dismissal of the defendant’s pro se postconviction petition is reversed because the record on appeal rebuts the presumption that postconviction counsel substantially complied with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). Because the defendant did not receive a reasonable level of assistance from postconviction counsel, we remand for further second-stage proceedings with new counsel appointed to represent the defendant.

¶2 The defendant, Larry D. Greer, appeals the dismissal, in the circuit court of Madison

County, of his pro se postconviction petition at the second stage of proceedings. He asks this court,

inter alia, to remand this cause for further second-stage proceedings with new counsel, contending

his postconviction counsel failed to provide a reasonable level of assistance to him because counsel

failed to amend his petition to shape his pro se claims into appropriate legal form. For the following

1 reasons, we reverse the order of the circuit court of Madison County that dismissed the defendant’s

pro se postconviction petition, and we remand for further second-stage proceedings with new

counsel.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Following a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted, on a theory of accountability, of

first degree murder for his role in the September 12, 1998, killing of Eugene Brian Warr. The

defendant was sentenced to a term of 40 years in prison. The defendant’s conviction and sentence

were upheld on appeal. See People v. Greer, 2012 IL App (5th) 090257-U. On February 19, 2013,

the defendant filed the pro se postconviction petition (the petition) that is the subject of this appeal.

The petition was 125 handwritten pages long and included extensive quotations from transcripts

in the record on appeal and extensive citation to case law. The petition raised multiple claims of,

inter alia, ineffective assistance of trial counsel and of appellate counsel, as well as prosecutorial

misconduct with regard to the circumstances surrounding a purported granting of immunity to the

defendant. The petition was accompanied by approximately 160 pages of exhibits, comprised of

the transcripts referenced above and other relevant documents, including an affidavit from the

defendant. On approximately February 22, 2013, postconviction counsel—who had previously

served as posttrial counsel for the defendant from approximately 2003 to 2009, prior to the filing

of the petition, including with regard to allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel made

by the defendant shortly after his trial—was appointed to represent the defendant with regard to

the petition.

¶5 On May 30, 2013, an order was entered by the circuit court that noted that the defendant

had met with his postconviction counsel, and that “[t]he [S]tate is to file a [m]otion to [d]ismiss.”

On July 23, 2013, the State filed its first motion to dismiss, alleging a timeliness issue with the

petition. On August 28, 2013, following a hearing, the motion was denied, with the circuit court 2 ruling that the petition was not untimely. At the hearing, the circuit court noted that an earlier filing

which the State had characterized in its motion to dismiss as a previous postconviction petition,

was in fact a “continuation” of the defendant’s earlier posttrial motion. The circuit court

subsequently referred to the earlier filing as “a post-trial motion with supplements rather than a

post-conviction petition.” When asked, counsel for the State agreed with this characterization. The

circuit court then announced that the State would be allowed to file a second motion to dismiss if

it wished to do so, and that if it did not, the case would proceed to a third-stage evidentiary hearing.

When asked, the defendant’s postconviction counsel stated that he agreed with this procedure.

When given the opportunity to question the circuit court about these rulings, neither the State nor

the defendant’s postconviction counsel asked any questions.

¶6 On January 21, 2014, the circuit court granted the request of the State to file a second

motion to dismiss. On June 2, 2014, the State filed its second motion to dismiss, again alleging

timeliness issues (although different ones than previously alleged), but also alleging other reasons

the petition should be dismissed. On July 14, 2014, the defendant, although represented by

postconviction counsel, filed a pro se supplemental memorandum of law in support of the petition.

On July 23, 2014, the circuit court entered an order that noted that the defendant had again met

with his postconviction counsel, and that “[m]ore time is requested to file an amended pleading.”

On August 29, 2014, the defendant, although still represented by postconviction counsel, filed

pro se a 25-page handwritten reply to the State’s motion to dismiss, along with supporting

documentation and a pro se motion for a copy of grand jury proceedings and trial exhibits.

¶7 On September 2, 2014, following the retirement from the bench of the judge who had been

handling it, the case was assigned to another judge for disposition. On September 4, 2014, the new

judge entered an order in which he noted that the defendant had again consulted with

postconviction counsel, this time “in light of” the defendant’s aforementioned August 29, 2014, 3 pro se filings. On October 21, 2014, the circuit court entered an order that gave the defendant “28

days to formally respond to” the State’s motion to dismiss. On February 17, 2015, a hearing was

held on matters unrelated to this appeal. However, of relevance to this appeal, at the hearing, the

defendant’s postconviction counsel noted the defendant’s August 29, 2014, pro se filings, and

stated, “I suppose I will have to file a certificate or make my own amendments as I deem necessary

before we can go much further.” Thereafter, the circuit court stated, “Okay. That’s what we will

do. I will wait to hear from you all.”

¶8 Additional orders were entered by the circuit court continuing or resetting the case, with at

least one of those orders—the order entered on September 15, 2015—specifically noting that the

case was being reset at the request of the defendant’s postconviction counsel. On October 20, 2015,

a hearing was held. The defendant’s postconviction counsel noted that he had spent time with the

defendant discussing the aforementioned matter not relevant to this appeal, and believed it was

resolved. He requested “that given the status of this case at this point,” the court “not proceed to

any kind of a hearing or argument on the State’s motion to dismiss today, but rather a—once we’re

able to move past this issue, I think I can better focus on his request/his petitions.” The circuit

court subsequently asked, “how about if I give you 30 days for you to review the file and see if

you need to make any amendments? Do you think that gives you enough time?” The defendant’s

postconviction counsel responded, “I believe so,” but added, “I think [the defendant] had sent a

request for transcripts in here recently concerning the Grand Jury testimony where he was

indicted.” He added, “I would probably want to be requesting those before we go much further.”

The circuit court asked if it would work to have the State “comply with—in providing the record

and making sure that” the defendant’s postconviction counsel had “everything,” and then to give

the defendant’s postconviction counsel “60 days *** to make any needed amendments.” The

defendant’s postconviction counsel agreed to this course of action. He subsequently asked to speak 4 with the defendant, and thereafter stated he would “make a formal written request to [the State]

for the transcripts whereby [the defendant] was indicted before he went to trial.” He added, “I think

there may be one other thing that I would be requesting by way of the police report, but I think we

have covered this for today.” After an additional consultation with the defendant, counsel stated

that he would “follow *** up” on what needed to be requested from the State.

¶9 On October 27, 2015, the circuit court entered an order that stated that the defendant’s

postconviction counsel was “to make any necessary amendments to the [p]etition within 30 days.”

On February 23, 2016, the circuit court entered an order that stated that “[t]he attorneys are

reminded to comply with the amendment deadlines.” On March 15, 2016, the circuit court entered

an order that stated that the defendant’s postconviction counsel had appeared and “report[ed] that

he will be filing a pleading adopting [the defendant’s] arguments as his own within the next

fourteen (14) days.” The order granted the State 45 days in which to file a motion to dismiss.

¶ 10 On August 9, 2016, postconviction counsel filed a motion “for leave to adopt,” in which

counsel stated that he believed “rather than attempt to file an individual pleading on behalf of [the

defendant]—thereby possibly running the risk of omitting certain arguments—it is in the best

interests of justice and judicial economy that counsel be allowed to adopt pleading[s] filed on

behalf of [the defendant] as his own, in advance of any hearing.” In his prayer for relief in the

motion, counsel asked for the circuit court to “enter an [o]rder granting counsel leave to adopt [the

defendant’s] various post-conviction petitions as his own and allow counsel to file no less than one

pleading of his own.” On September 29, 2016, a hearing was held. When asked if he was ready to

proceed, postconviction counsel apologized to the court, then stated, “I have had about 90 minutes

today to confer with [the defendant], and go over some things that in all candor I have a better

understanding of now today after talking with him than I did perhaps before. I respectfully request

a brief period of time to continue or postpone this hearing so that I might add at least one or two 5 other allegations more properly.” He added that this was the defendant’s “first post-conviction

petition, and there are serious waiver doctrines and rules that apply hereafter.” He again apologized

to the court, adding, “I know this was set specially for today, but I think I need a little bit more

time.” He thereafter stated, “I don’t think it will be a new motion. I think it will be a way of more

concisely stating what [the defendant] has attempted to say over probably 15 to 20 pages pro se

filings that I think need to be stated more clearly and concisely and summarize really for the court’s

benefit and for the State’s benefit.” When asked how much time he needed, counsel mentioned an

upcoming murder case he was defending, set for November 7, 2016, then added, “In all candor,

it’s been absorbing a great deal of my time and attention here for the last six weeks, anyway, and

I continue to think about that particular case every day.” When asked about this case,

postconviction counsel stated, “I think I could get the proper amendments on file within 60 days

or less.” The circuit court responded, “I will give you 60 days to amend,” and thereafter added, “I

am going to hold you to that 60 days, though. All right?” Counsel responded, “Yes, sir.” Counsel

thereafter stated, with regard to what he might file, “I don’t think it will be any surprise. It will

simply be a better way of summarizing what needs to be said for more judicial economy, if you

will.”

¶ 11 On October 4, 2016, following the hearing, the circuit court entered a written order in which

it noted that the defendant and the defendant’s postconviction counsel had requested “thirty days

to amend the pleadings.” The circuit court ruled that “[o]ver objection of the State, it is hereby

ordered that the [a]ttorney for [the defendant] is to make any necessary amendments to the

[p]etition within 30 days.”1 The circuit court allowed the State “30 days after that to file any

1 It is not clear from the record on appeal why the circuit court told postconviction counsel orally that he would be given 60 days to amend, but then entered a written order giving counsel only 30 days to do so. A reasonable inference to draw from this action is that the circuit court, in light of the comments that it would hold counsel to the 60-day deadline, was concerned and frustrated by postconviction counsel’s 6 motions.” More than nine months later, on July 18, 2017, the circuit court entered an order which

stated that a “pre-hearing conference” had been held, and that postconviction counsel “report[ed]

that he is awaiting an executed affidavit from [the defendant]” and that counsel needed “to file

certificate.” The order stated that “[b]oth certificate and affidavit shall be on file within forty-five

(45) days.” On October 4, 2017, the defendant’s affidavit was filed, which related to his purported

communication with his appellate counsel during his prior appeal efforts. No certificate was filed.

On March 6, 2018, the circuit court set the case for an April 24, 2018, hearing on the State’s motion

to dismiss.

¶ 12 On April 24, 2018, the hearing was held. The parties presented arguments. The State began

by clarifying that it was the June 2, 2014, motion to dismiss upon which it was proceeding. The

defendant’s postconviction counsel first focused his argument on the defendant’s affidavit about

the defendant’s contact with appellate counsel, arguing that the defendant did not receive the

required level of representation from appellate counsel. He also argued that the defendant did not

receive the required level of representation from trial counsel during the jury trial in this case, and

noted his understanding that the defendant’s trial counsel “later lost his law license over things

such as conflicts and what have you on how he handled those.” He subsequently added, “I think

that there are serious issues that could be looked at in this case with the State,” as well as “I think

that we should be very thorough before we dismiss the case without a third-stage hearing and allow

him to testify and allow us to question him about those matters.” Postconviction counsel concluded

his argument by stating, “I think there are a lot of issues that should have been raised on appeal

that weren’t. I think that the amount of sentence the defendant received, a re-examination of these

issues is very important at this stage, and for those reasons I would urge the court to not dismiss

continuous, and for the most part unexplained, delays in this case. 7 this case at this point.” He then added, “If for some reason the court does elect to do so, I

respectfully request we be given 30 or so days to try to amend to get these allegations more

properly on file.”

¶ 13 Counsel for the State responded that, inter alia, the defendant had “failed to show even a

prima facie case of whether or not the appellate counsel was ineffective in this particular case, and

therefore there is nothing that would require this case to advance to a third stage hearing.” She

added that “[t]he request to further amend their complaint at some point, you know, the Post-

Conviction Petition Act and the subsequent case law shows there has to be an end point to some

of these filings. So in this particular case there is an affidavit, a certificate filed2 that at some point

this just needs to be done. So to further amend the pleadings beyond this date would just drag out

what’s already been a very long 18-year-old case.”

¶ 14 On July 10, 2018, the circuit court entered a written order that granted the State’s motion

to dismiss the petition. The order began with a “timeline” that stated, incorrectly, that the defendant

filed a postconviction petition on January 2, 2008, and that the postconviction petition was

“[d]enied” on April 27, 2009. Later in the order, the circuit court stated that the postconviction

petition was “dismissed” by order of the circuit court following “several evidentiary hearings.”

With regard to the petition filed on February 19, 2013, the circuit court wrote that “the [p]etition

is a collection of facts, opinions, legal citations and argument” which the circuit court had “gone

through *** and searched for cognizable [c]onstitutional claims.” The circuit court added “[t]hat

it appears that the [p]etition is a restatement of the claims already presented in the previous [p]ost-

2 As noted elsewhere in this order, no Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) certificate was filed in this case in the circuit court. As discussed in detail below, on March 18, 2021, the State requested leave of this court to supplement the record with one that was signed by postconviction counsel on February 4, 2021, nearly three years after the April 24, 2018, hearing at which the State erroneously represented to the circuit court that a certificate had been filed. 8 [c]onviction [p]etition and [a]ppeal” and that “[t]hese issues have been fully litigated and rejected.”

The order also stated “[t]hat the broad allegations in the [p]etition are not supported or are

contradicted by the [a]ffidavits, [e]xhibits, [and] the [record].” The circuit court ruled that the

petition did “not make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation,” and “[t]hat any issues

which could have been raised on appeal, but were not, are procedurally defaulted, and any issues

which have previously been decided by a reviewing court are barred by res judicata.”

¶ 15 On July 30, 2018, the defendant filed, pro se, a notice of appeal. The defendant’s

postconviction counsel did not file a notice of appeal. This timely appeal followed.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 On appeal, the defendant asks this court to remand this cause for further second-stage

proceedings, contending his postconviction counsel failed to provide a reasonable level of

assistance to him because counsel failed to amend the petition to shape his pro se claims into

appropriate legal form for presentation to the circuit court. In the alternative, he asks this court to

advance this cause to a third-stage evidentiary hearing in the circuit court. With regard to his first

contention of error, the defendant argued in his opening brief on appeal that postconviction counsel

failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) and provided

unreasonable assistance by merely adopting the defendant’s pro se petition, adding an affidavit

from the defendant, and not shaping the petition into proper legal form. The defendant noted that

no Rule 651(c) certificate was filed in this case, despite counsel’s repeated statements that he

would be filing one, and that counsel never amended the petition at all, despite repeated statements

that he would do so. He also noted, specifically, that his postconviction counsel did not “amend

the petition in order to address the waiver and res judicata issues” raised by the State in its motion

to dismiss. He contended that “[h]ad post-conviction counsel amended the *** petition to allege

that ineffective assistance claims were not waived or barred by res judicata because [the 9 defendant] had argued that appellate counsel had failed to raise these claims on direct appeal, they

would not have been barred.” He posited that to defeat the State’s arguments, his “post-conviction

counsel could have highlighted what was available on the record regarding the immunity issue and

compared it to what actually was raised on direct appeal” by appellate counsel. With regard to his

alternative argument—that he was entitled to a third-stage evidentiary hearing because, the failures

of his postconviction counsel notwithstanding, he had made a substantial showing of a violation

of his constitutional rights—he contended, inter alia, that the issue of the purported granting of

immunity to the defendant “was a complex issue that needs additional evidence where the issue of

immunity affects [the defendant’s] claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsels

and prosecutorial misconduct.” He added that the issue of his purported “immunity was absolutely

material to his case and critical to whether he could even be charged with Warr’s murder, where

there was no doubt that [Robert] Fletcher was the actual shooter” in this case. Finally, the defendant

requested that “due to the significant amount of time that [the defendant’s] petition had been

pending before the trial court,” we, in the disposition of this appeal, “urge the circuit court and the

parties to avoid any further unwarranted or unnecessary protraction of the process, upon remand.”

¶ 18 Subsequent to the defendant’s filing of his opening brief on appeal, and contemporaneously

with the filing of its own brief on appeal, on March 18, 2021, the State filed a motion to supplement

the record on appeal with a Rule 651(c) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017)) certificate signed

by the defendant’s postconviction counsel on February 4, 2021. In its motion, the State argued that

this court should allow the State to supplement the record on appeal with the certificate because

the defendant’s opening brief on appeal “note[d] the omission of the Rule 651(c) certificate and

argue[d] that the present record on appeal does not prove that counsel met his Rule 651(c)

obligations,” and that the certificate “corrects this omission and proves that counsel performed as

required by Rule 651(c).” The certificate, which was included by the State with its motion, states 10 that the defendant’s postconviction counsel certified “pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 651(c)” that

he had (1) “consulted with the [d]efendant in person, by mail, by phone or by electronic means to

ascertain the defendant’s contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights”; (2) “examined the

trial court file, the record of the proceedings at the trial or the plea of guilty and the report of

proceedings at the sentencing hearing”; and (3) “made any amendments to the petition filed pro se

that are necessary for adequate presentation of [the] petitioner’s contentions.”

¶ 19 In its contemporaneously-filed brief on appeal, the State reiterated the points made in its

motion, and expanded upon them, noting, inter alia, Illinois precedent that stands for the

proposition that “[t]he filing of a facially valid Rule 651(c) certificate creates a rebuttable

presumption that postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance in compliance with the

rule,” and positing that, in light of its proposed supplement to the record on appeal, the defendant

had not rebutted that presumption in this case. The State noted, however, that its argument on

appeal was that the supplemented record demonstrated “counsel’s compliance with the rule, not

that counsel’s compliance is shown elsewhere in the existing record.” In response to the

defendant’s alternative argument, the State provided extensive argument as to why it believed the

defendant was not entitled to a third-stage evidentiary hearing in this case. The State concluded

this portion of its brief by contending that the defendant’s pro se “claims failed to make a

substantial showing of a constitutional violation,” which the State posited meant that this court

“should affirm the dismissal of [the] petition.”

¶ 20 On March 22, 2021, the defendant filed an objection to the State’s motion to supplement,

arguing that the certificate was filed more than two years after the defendant filed his notice of

appeal in this case, and was “contradicted by the record,” which showed that counsel did not in

fact comply with the requirements of Rule 651(c). On March 24, 2021, the State requested leave

to respond to the defendant’s objection to the State’s motion to supplement the record. On March 11 26, 2021, this court entered an order in which we stated that, inter alia, “[t]he State’s motion to

supplement the record, [the] defendant’s objection thereto, and the State’s motion for leave to file

response to [the] defendant’s objection” would be taken with the case and dispensed with in this

order.

¶ 21 On April 29, 2021, the defendant filed his reply brief. He reiterated his objection to the

State’s request to supplement the record on appeal with postconviction counsel’s “belated”

certificate, and argued that even if the record were to be supplemented as requested by the State,

the record would still, as a whole, rebut any presumption that might arise as to postconviction

counsel’s compliance with Rule 651(c) in this case. He also provided extensive argument with

regard to his alternative argument.

¶ 22 On May 19, 2021, we ordered the parties to file additional briefs addressing (1) whether,

pursuant to People v. Yaworski, 2014 IL App (2d) 130327 (as well as other decisions the parties

deemed to be relevant), it was appropriate for postconviction counsel in this case to serve as

postconviction counsel, in light of the fact that he also represented the defendant in the trial court

as posttrial counsel, and in light of the fact that the petition alleged ineffective assistance of trial

counsel and appellate counsel, which required him, as postconviction counsel, to scrutinize his

own performance as posttrial counsel when attempting to determine whether amendments to the

petition were necessary to shape the defendant’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel and

appellate counsel arguments into appropriate legal form; and (2) if error occurred, the proper

remedy in this case. In our order, we noted that in Yaworski, this court held, inter alia, that it was

not proper for the circuit court to appoint, as postconviction counsel on a pro se petition that

included a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the same attorney who served as counsel

at trial. See 2014 IL App (2d) 130327, ¶¶ 1, 4-16. We added that in Yaworski, we specifically

noted that “ ‘[p]recisely what shape [the] defendant’s petition might have taken if an attorney other 12 than [trial counsel] had represented defendant in the post[-]conviction proceedings is a matter of

conjecture,’ ” and “ ‘[w]e decline[d] to speculate whether [post-conviction counsel] failed to

amend the petition because there was no good-faith basis for arguing his own incompetence or,

conversely, because there was a good-faith basis for doing so but [counsel] was inhibited by self-

interest.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) See id. ¶ 14. We noted that the record and briefs on appeal in

this case indicated that the defendant’s postconviction counsel also served as posttrial counsel for

the defendant from approximately 2003 until 2009, prior to the filing of the petition, including

with regard to allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel made by the defendant shortly

after his trial. We further noted that we were aware of nothing in the record on appeal indicating

that the defendant waived or purported to waive his right to conflict-free counsel with regard to

his postconviction counsel.

¶ 23 On May 26, 2021, the defendant filed a supplemental brief in which he contended that, in

light of, inter alia, the supplemental facts identified in his brief with regard to postconviction

counsel’s prior representation of the defendant—for longer than five years—as posttrial counsel,

it was not appropriate for counsel later to serve as postconviction counsel as well. He noted that

the Illinois Supreme Court ruled, in People v. Hardin, 217 Ill. 2d 289, 300 (2005), that, in terms

of a defendant’s right to conflict-free representation, postconviction counsel must be as conflict-

free as trial counsel, notwithstanding the statutory, rather than constitutional, source of the right to

postconviction counsel. He contended that postconviction counsel in this case “should have

recognized that the petition’s allegations calling into question [the defendant’s] trial and appellate

counsels’ performances presented a conflict preventing his continued involvement in th[is] matter”

because he was, in fact, counsel for the defendant for posttrial matters.

¶ 24 The defendant noted that the record on appeal in this case demonstrates that postconviction

counsel’s “entire representation of [the defendant] during the post-trial stage was to assist in [the 13 defendant’s pro se] claims of ineffective assistance of [trial counsel].” He further noted that, as

posttrial counsel, postconviction counsel “was in the unique position to create a record of [trial

counsel’s] ineffectiveness for appellate review,” and that accordingly, postconviction counsel’s

representation of the defendant as his posttrial counsel necessitated “both arguing [trial counsel’s]

ineffectiveness” to the circuit court in furtherance of the defendant’s pro se posttrial motion and

“creating an adequate record for appellate review of [trial counsel’s] ineffectiveness.” According

to the defendant, because the petition alleged ineffective assistance of both trial counsel and

appellate counsel, and because postconviction counsel had previously served, as posttrial counsel,

as a nexus between trial counsel and appellate counsel, essentially charged with both arguing trial

counsel’s ineffectiveness and creating an adequate record for appellate counsel to effectively argue

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on appeal, postconviction counsel was, in his new role, necessarily

required to scrutinize his own prior conduct in the case as posttrial counsel. The defendant

contended that this put postconviction counsel “in the impossible position of arguing his own

ineffectiveness had he amended [the defendant’s] petition and properly alleged [the defendant’s

pro se] claims.”

¶ 25 With regard to the appropriate remedy in this case, the defendant’s supplemental brief

pointed to the language from Yaworski that we quoted in our order requiring supplemental briefing,

described above, and asked this court to do as the Yaworski court did: vacate the dismissal of the

petition and remand for further second-stage proceedings with new, conflict-free counsel. After

noting the Yaworski court’s concern that self-interest might prevent an attorney who labored under

a conflict of interest from making necessary and appropriate amendments to a petition (see

Yaworski, 2014 IL App (2d) 130327, ¶ 14), the defendant reiterated many of the irregularities of

postconviction counsel’s representation of the defendant in this case—both as posttrial counsel

and as postconviction counsel—many of which are analyzed by this court in detail below. The 14 defendant also pointed out that at the April 24, 2018, hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss the

petition, postconviction counsel, when discussing the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

claims raised by the defendant in the petition, made reference to his own prior representation of

the defendant as posttrial counsel, stating to the circuit court, “we had a fairly thorough hearing on

the effective assistance of [trial] counsel issue. [The defendant] testified, and again, Your Honor,

for those matters to have been glossed over the way they were on appeal, in my opinion, I don’t

think this is what the Sixth Amendment contemplates.” In his supplemental brief, the defendant

thereafter contended that another failing of postconviction counsel, in his earlier role as posttrial

counsel, was that “the immunity issue *** was ‘glossed’ over during the post-trial motion hearings

*** because the focus was on [trial counsel’s] representation.”

¶ 26 On June 2, 2021, the State filed its supplemental brief, in which it contended that in this

case, postconviction counsel had neither a per se conflict of interest nor an actual conflict of

interest. With regard to the latter, the State contended that the defendant had not met the “burden

of identifying a specific defect in [counsel’s] post-conviction strategy that is attributable to the

alleged conflict” of interest in this case. According to the State, pursuant to the recent decision of

the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, the “[d]efendant’s remedy for

this alleged failing remains his claim of counsel’s noncompliance with Rule 651(c).” Thus, the

State posited, if this court were to accept the proposed Rule 651(c) certificate, any conflict of

interest problems would be resolved by that certificate. For this contention, the State relied upon

its earlier assertion, in its first brief on appeal, that the defendant had not rebutted the presumption

of reasonable assistance raised by the proposed filing of the certificate. The State noted, however,

that if this court were to find that it was not permissible for postconviction counsel to serve in that

role in this case, the appropriate remedy would be to remand for further second-stage proceedings

with new counsel. 15 ¶ 27 On June 7, 2021, the defendant filed his supplemental reply brief, in which he contended

that (1) the State, in its supplemental brief, was overly dismissive of the Yaworski court’s holding,

as well as the reasoning upon which the holding was based, and inaccurately posited that recent

Illinois Supreme Court precedent called into question the reasoning underpinning Yaworski;

(2) pursuant to Yaworski, postconviction counsel in this case labored under an impermissible

“inherent” conflict of interest; (3) because postconviction counsel labored under an impermissible

inherent conflict of interest, he also labored under a per se conflict of interest; and

(4) postconviction counsel also labored under an actual conflict of interest, because counsel “as

post-trial counsel for over five years, was tasked with creating a record of [the defendant’s] pro se

claims of ineffective assistance against his trial attorney,” but failed to do so either as posttrial

counsel or as postconviction counsel. The defendant also, inter alia, reiterated his arguments as to

the ways in which he believed postconviction counsel failed to provide the defendant with

reasonable assistance, notwithstanding any conflict of interest, and notwithstanding counsel’s

belated filing of a Rule 651(c) certificate.

¶ 28 In addition to the briefs and supplemental briefs, described extensively above, we have

considered thoroughly the three filings—the State’s motion to supplement the record, the

defendant’s objection thereto, and the State’s motion for leave to file a response to the defendant’s

objection—that were taken with this case. In light of the protracted proceedings in the circuit

court—both on the defendant’s posttrial motion and on the petition—we agree with the parties that

at the heart of this case is the question of whether the defendant received the reasonable assistance

of postconviction counsel. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that even if we assume,

arguendo, that the State is correct that postconviction counsel’s representation of the defendant in

this case was conflict-free, and therefore was permissible, and even if we further assume,

arguendo, that it was proper for the State to seek to supplement the record with a Rule 651(c) 16 certificate that was filed nearly three years after postconviction counsel’s last on-the-record

representation of the defendant in the circuit court, and that therefore the certificate is properly

before us, the defendant nevertheless is correct that the record on appeal rebuts the belated

contention from postconviction counsel that he substantially complied with Rule 651(c).

Accordingly, we hereby deny, as moot, the State’s motion to supplement the record.

¶ 29 As the defendant points out, at the first stage of postconviction proceedings, the circuit

court reviews the petition independently and determines whether the petition is frivolous or

patently without merit. People v. Wallace, 2018 IL App (5th) 140385, ¶ 27. If the petition clears

that hurdle, it advances to the second stage, at which point the defendant has the right to counsel.

Id. Counsel may file an amended petition, and the State may file a motion to dismiss or an answer.

Id. If the petition makes a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, it will be advanced to

the third stage, which ordinarily involves an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s claims. Id.

¶ 30 The source of the defendant’s right to counsel at the second stage of proceedings is

statutory rather than constitutional, and as a result, the level of assistance guaranteed is not the

same as the level of assistance constitutionally mandated at trial or on direct appeal; instead, the

level of assistance required is reasonable assistance. Id. ¶ 29. To provide reasonable assistance,

postconviction counsel is required to perform the three duties set forth in Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). Id. ¶ 30. Counsel must (1) consult with the defendant to determine

the claims the defendant wants to raise, (2) examine the appropriate portions of the record, and

(3) make any amendments to the petition that are necessary in order to adequately present the

defendant’s claims to the circuit court. Id. Counsel is not required to file an amended petition in

every case—only in those in which amendments are necessary to adequately present the

defendant’s claims. Id. Counsel may choose to stand on the defendant’s unamended petition if it

17 adequately presents the defendant’s claims. Id. Moreover, counsel is under no obligation to amend

a petition to advance claims that lack merit. Id.

¶ 31 The filing, by postconviction counsel, of a certificate of compliance with Rule 651(c)

creates a rebuttable presumption that counsel has provided the statutorily-required reasonable level

of assistance. Id. ¶ 31. We review de novo the question of whether counsel provided the reasonable

level of assistance required. Id. If we determine that postconviction counsel failed to provide

reasonable assistance, we will remand for further proceedings on the petition, with new counsel to

be appointed to represent the defendant on remand. Id. ¶ 53. If new counsel investigates the claims

raised by the defendant and concludes that they are frivolous and patently without merit, despite

the circuit court’s initial finding to the contrary, new counsel must file a motion to withdraw that

comports with the requirements spelled out by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Kuehner,

2015 IL 117695. Id.

¶ 32 As we undertake our de novo review of whether postconviction counsel provided

reasonable assistance, we are mindful of the fact that substantial compliance with Rule 651(c) is

sufficient. See, e.g., People v. Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307, ¶ 18. We also are mindful of the

fact that the presumption of reasonable assistance that arises with the filing of a Rule 651(c)

certificate may be rebutted by the record. People v. Russell, 2016 IL App (3d) 140386, ¶ 10. The

failure to make a routine amendment, such as an amendment adding a claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel in order to prevent the dismissal of a petition on the basis of waiver,

is an example of conduct on the part of postconviction counsel that rebuts the presumption of

reasonable assistance. Id. ¶ 11. Moreover, there is no requirement that a defendant make a positive

showing that counsel’s failure to comply with Rule 651(c) caused prejudice, because if

postconviction counsel failed to fulfill the duties of Rule 651(c), remand is required, regardless of

whether the claims raised by the defendant in the petition had merit. Id. ¶ 12. Likewise, counsel’s 18 failure to comply with the rule will not be excused on the basis of harmless error, because a

reviewing court will not engage in speculation as to whether the circuit court would have dismissed

the petition at the second stage had counsel complied with the rule. Id.

¶ 33 As we consider whether postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance, we also

are mindful of the fact that the purpose of Rule 651(c) is to ensure that postconviction counsel

shapes the defendant’s pro se claims into appropriate legal form and thereafter presents those

claims to the circuit court. People v. Jones, 2016 IL App (3d) 140094, ¶ 28. To effectuate that

purpose, Rule 651(c) requires a showing that postconviction counsel took whatever steps were

necessary to secure the adequate representation of the defendant’s claims. Id. We are guided by

the proposition that if postconviction counsel does not adequately complete the duties mandated

by Rule 651(c), the statutory right to reasonable assistance cannot be fully realized. Id. With regard

to the duty to amend, the failure to provide reasonable assistance as to this duty may, under certain

circumstances, rise to the level of an impermissible “total failure of representation” that amounts

to postconviction counsel representing a defendant “in name only.” People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d

406, 415 (1999). With regard to harmless error, in Turner, the Illinois Supreme Court reiterated

that if a reviewing court determines that “counsel essentially did nothing to shape the [pro se]

claims into the appropriate legal form,” the defendant “must be given an opportunity to replead

[the defendant’s] post-conviction petition with the benefit of reasonable assistance of counsel.” Id.

at 416-17. To not afford the defendant this opportunity on remand with new counsel is essentially

to “render the appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings nothing but ‘an empty

formality.’ ” Id. at 417 (quoting People v. Garrison, 43 Ill. 2d 121, 123 (1969)).

¶ 34 As we turn to this case, we are mindful as well of the holding of our colleagues in the First

District, in Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307, ¶¶ 19, 29-30, that one of the ways by which a

defendant may meet the defendant’s burden to rebut the presumption created by the filing of a 19 Rule 651(c) certificate—and therefore may show that the defendant did not receive reasonable

assistance of counsel because counsel failed to substantially comply with the rule, by failing to

make necessary amendments to the pro se petition—is to identify the amendments that should

have been made to the petition by counsel, but were not made. However, we do not believe that

Profit stands for the proposition—as the State insinuates in its briefs on appeal—that this is the

only way by which a defendant may rebut the aforementioned presumption. See, e.g., People v.

Kirk, 2012 IL App (1st) 101606, ¶¶ 33-36 (noting that Profit was factually distinguishable, and

did not preclude a finding for other reasons—including on the basis of postconviction counsel’s

on-the-record conduct—that the defendant had met his burden to rebut the presumption of

compliance with Rule 651(c)).

¶ 35 In this case, following a thorough de novo review of the record on appeal, we conclude, for

the following reasons, that notwithstanding postconviction counsel’s belated Rule 651(c)

certificate of compliance, his on-the-record conduct clearly rebuts the presumption created by that

certificate that he substantially complied with the rule and provided the statutorily-required

reasonable level of assistance. We reiterate that the petition was 125 handwritten pages long and

included extensive quotations from transcripts in the record on appeal and extensive citation to

case law, and that it raised multiple claims of, inter alia, ineffective assistance of trial counsel and

of appellate counsel, as well as prosecutorial misconduct with regard to the circumstances

surrounding a purported granting of immunity to the defendant. Moreover, the petition was

accompanied by approximately 160 pages of exhibits, comprised of the transcripts referenced

above and other relevant documents, including an affidavit from the defendant.

¶ 36 As described in extensive detail above, postconviction counsel repeatedly—over a period

of years—requested additional time to attempt to determine whether amendment of the petition

was required. However, even when the circuit court provided generous extensions of time for 20 postconviction counsel to “focus” himself so that he could better understand the petition and how

it should be handled, counsel repeatedly failed to act within the deadlines created by the court. The

State asks us to overlook counsel’s pattern of conduct, contending that, ultimately, counsel made

the studied decision that no amendments to the petition were required, and that he could

substantially comply with the rule and provide reasonable assistance to the defendant by resting

on what the defendant filed pro se. The State’s argument would be more persuasive if there was

evidence in the record to support it. There is not. Instead of evidence that after much

contemplation—years of contemplation, in fact—postconviction counsel came to the reasoned

conclusion that the petition was in appropriate legal form just as it was and required no amendment,

the record shows that no such reasoned decision was made by counsel.

¶ 37 As explained above, at the April 24, 2018, hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss—which

was held more than five years after he was appointed to represent the defendant as counsel on the

defendant’s February 19, 2013, pro se postconviction claims—counsel made his final

pronouncement in the circuit court as to whether he believed amendment was required: he stated

that if, after hearing counsel’s argument, the circuit court believed the petition should be dismissed,

rather than advanced to third-stage proceedings, he would like to “be given 30 or so days to try to

amend to get these allegations more properly on file.” 3 We see no reasonable way to interpret this

request other than as a concession by postconviction counsel that—his belated Rule 651(c)

certificate, filed with this court nearly three years later, notwithstanding—he could not state with

3 The State suggests that moments later, postconviction counsel stated that he would stand on the defendant’s pro se petition. The State asks us to interpret this as counsel’s realization that no amendments were necessary. However, what counsel actually stated was, “I think I would stand on the things that I have said a few moments ago, along with [the defendant’s] filings, I’ll ask the matter proceed to a third stage.” We decline to ignore the fact that one of the things he stated “a few moments ago” was that he desired more time to amend the petition to “properly” get it on file, and that counsel did not state, at any point thereafter, that he now believed amendments were not necessary. 21 the quantum of confidence required by Rule 651(c) that he had made all required amendments to

the petition. The fact that he did not file a certificate in the circuit court supports this interpretation.

¶ 38 Moreover, although the State attempts to minimize counsel’s conduct by contending that

counsel earlier stated he did not think he would file an amended petition, but would instead file

some kind of summary simply for the sake of judicial economy, when we look at the language

actually used by postconviction counsel at the September 29, 2016, hearing—“I don’t think it will

be a new motion. I think it will be a way of more concisely stating what [the defendant] has

attempted to say over probably 15 to 20 pages pro se filings that I think need to be stated more

clearly and concisely and summarize really for the court’s benefit and for the State’s benefit”

(emphasis added)—we see no reasonable way to interpret this statement other than as a concession

by postconviction counsel that he did not believe that the petition, in its present pro se form (which,

we note, is the same form the petition remains in, more than 4½ years later), was in appropriate

legal form and was ready for presentation to the court for disposition. In fact, the comments pointed

to by the State are part of a consistent—indeed, near-constant—pattern by postconviction counsel,

throughout the proceedings in the circuit court, including up to and through the April 24, 2018,

hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss, of asserting that additional time, and subsequent work on

the petition, was required before the petition would be in appropriate legal form for presentation

to the circuit court.

¶ 39 Furthermore, although counsel repeatedly asked for additional time to try to understand the

nature and scope of the petition, and how the petition should be handled by him in his role as

appointed counsel who owed a duty of reasonable assistance to the defendant, we cannot, on the

record before us, conclude that he ever achieved such an understanding. We note, for example,

that prior to the September 29, 2016, hearing just discussed, on August 9, 2016, the defendant’s

postconviction counsel filed a motion “for leave to adopt,” in which counsel stated that he believed 22 “rather than attempt to file an individual pleading on behalf of [the defendant]—thereby possibly

running the risk of omitting certain arguments—it is in the best interests of justice and judicial

economy that counsel be allowed to adopt pleading[s] filed on behalf of [the defendant] as his

own, in advance of any hearing.” (Emphasis added.) In his prayer for relief in the motion, counsel

asked for the circuit court to “enter an [o]rder granting counsel leave to adopt [the defendant’s]

various post-conviction petitions as his own and allow counsel to file no less than one pleading of

his own.”

¶ 40 We see no reasonable way to interpret these statements other than as concessions by

postconviction counsel that his understanding of the contents of the petition and the other

documents filed by the defendant was so poor that he believed that if he amended the defendant’s

pro se pleadings, rather than adopting them as-is, he might inadvertently omit “certain arguments.”

As explained above, counsel is under no obligation to amend a petition to advance claims that lack

merit. See, e.g., Wallace, 2018 IL App (5th) 140385, ¶ 30. Accordingly, the only reasonable way

to interpret postconviction counsel’s statement that he was afraid he would leave out “certain

arguments” if he filed an amended petition is to presume that either (1) postconviction counsel

believed all of the defendant’s arguments were meritorious (because, of course, he would have no

reason to fear omitting nonmeritorious claims) but nevertheless believed that, for unspecified

reasons, he lacked the ability to amend the petition without leaving out things that needed to be

included, or (2) he did not understand the defendant’s pleadings well enough to ascertain which

claims, if any, were meritorious, and which therefore must not be omitted for fear of rendering his

assistance to the defendant unreasonable. Neither reading of postconviction counsel’s statement

inspires confidence in this court that postconviction counsel understood the defendant’s

contentions. We believe it is self-evident, in light of the requirements of Rule 651(c), that

substantial compliance with the rule, and reasonable assistance to a defendant, require, at the very 23 least, that postconviction counsel understand the nature and scope of the defendant’s claims,

because such an understanding is clearly a prerequisite to a reasoned assessment of whether the

pro se petition requires amendment.

¶ 41 We also note that at the September 29, 2016, hearing, prior to making the statements

pointed to by the State and discussed above, postconviction counsel apologized to the court, then

stated, “I have had about 90 minutes today to confer with [the defendant], and go over some things

that in all candor I have a better understanding of now today after talking with him than I did

perhaps before. I respectfully request a brief period of time to continue or postpone this hearing so

that I might add at least one or two other allegations more properly.” (Emphasis added.)

Postconviction counsel’s statement that based upon his new understanding of the defendant’s

pro se contentions, he might need to add allegations contradicts his subsequent statement, made

just minutes later, that rather than filing “a new motion,” he would probably just summarize for

clarity and judicial economy, and only adds to our conclusion, based upon the record before us,

that postconviction counsel never understood the nature and scope of the defendant’s pro se claims

well enough to assess whether the petition required amendment. Thus, we agree with the defendant

that the record on appeal rebuts the belated contention from the defendant’s postconviction counsel

that he substantially complied with Rule 651(c).

¶ 42 The confusion sown by postconviction counsel’s failure to provide reasonable assistance

to the defendant is also evidenced in the order on appeal, in which the circuit court stated,

inter alia, that after it had “gone through” the petition in an effort to find “cognizable

[c]onstitutional claims,” the court’s conclusion was that “it appears that the [p]etition is a

restatement of the claims already presented” that had “been fully litigated and rejected.” (Emphasis

added.) The fact that the circuit court could not state with certainty what the claims in the petition

were, but could state only what they appeared to be, further supports our conclusion that, despite 24 the appointment of counsel to assist the defendant—and despite counsel having more than five

years to provide that assistance—absolutely no effort was made by counsel to shape the

defendant’s contentions into appropriate legal form for presentation to the circuit court, despite

postconviction counsel’s repeated statements, as late as the April 24, 2018, hearing, that the

petition required further scrutiny and should advance to a third-stage evidentiary hearing.

¶ 43 On a related note, we find it necessary to briefly address the State’s suggestion, in its briefs

on appeal, that perhaps postconviction counsel chose not to amend the petition because—

notwithstanding the circuit court’s initial finding that the petition was not frivolous and patently

without merit, and that therefore counsel must be appointed to represent the defendant—

postconviction counsel nevertheless later independently determined that the petition was frivolous

and lacked merit. There is no support in the record on appeal for this suggestion. To the contrary,

as noted immediately above, as late as the April 24, 2018, hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss,

postconviction counsel—his failure to provide reasonable assistance to the defendant

notwithstanding—continued to argue that the petition required further scrutiny and should advance

to a third-stage evidentiary hearing. His statements in support of that position at the hearing

included the following: “I think that there are serious issues that could be looked at in this case

with the State,” as well as “I think that we should be very thorough before we dismiss the case

without a third-stage hearing and allow him to testify and allow us to question him about those

matters.” Moreover, he concluded his argument by stating, “I think there are a lot of issues that

should have been raised on appeal that weren’t. I think that the amount of sentence the defendant

received, a re-examination of these issues is very important at this stage, and for those reasons I

would urge the court to not dismiss this case at this point.” We therefore find patently unpersuasive

the State’s suggestion that postconviction counsel at some point decided that the petition lacked

merit, and for that reason chose not to amend it. The State also suggests that postconviction 25 counsel’s subjective belief as to whether amendments were required should be irrelevant to our

analysis of whether the presumption created by counsel’s Rule 651(c) certificate is rebutted by the

record. However, we believe such a rule would be inherently illogical. We are aware of no

precedent, or pattern of practice among postconviction attorneys, that suggests that prior to signing

a Rule 651(c) certificate, counsel must seek objective verification, from outside sources, of

counsel’s belief that the certificate can be executed in good faith. To the contrary, the presumption

of compliance created by a Rule 651(c) certificate necessarily must be derived from postconviction

counsel’s good faith, subjective belief, at the time counsel signs the certificate, that no amendments

are necessary; to take into consideration postconviction counsel’s subjective beliefs for purposes

of creating a presumption of compliance, but then to disregard counsel’s subjective beliefs for

purposes of determining whether the presumption is rebutted, would be fundamentally unfair to

defendants, and contrary to logic. If counsel’s subjective beliefs are sufficiently reliable to form

the basis for a presumption of compliance with Rule 651(c), they also must be deemed reliable

enough to provide the means, in cases such as this one, to rebut that presumption.

¶ 44 We turn next to the question of the appropriate remedy in this case. The State urges this

court—without regard to any shortcomings we might find in the performance of postconviction

counsel that are so severe as to render his assistance unreasonable—to find other grounds to affirm

the dismissal of the petition. However, as explained above, if postconviction counsel fails to fulfill

the duties of Rule 651(c), remand is required, regardless of whether the claims raised by the

defendant in the petition had merit. See, e.g., Russell, 2016 IL App (3d) 140386, ¶ 12. Likewise,

counsel’s failure to comply with the rule will not be excused on the basis of harmless error, because

a reviewing court will not engage in speculation as to whether the circuit court would have

dismissed the petition at the second stage had counsel complied with the rule. Id. Moreover, also

as explained above, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that if a reviewing court determines that 26 “counsel essentially did nothing to shape the [pro se] claims into the appropriate legal form,” the

defendant “must be given an opportunity to replead [the defendant’s] post-conviction petition with

the benefit of reasonable assistance of counsel.” Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 416-17. To not afford the

defendant this opportunity on remand with new counsel is essentially to “render the appointment

of counsel in post-conviction proceedings nothing but ‘an empty formality.’ ” Id. at 417 (quoting

Garrison, 43 Ill. 2d at 123). We note as well that to allow the State to attack the petition on other

grounds on appeal would be, in essence, to allow the State to attack a petition that has not had the

benefit of the reasonable assistance of counsel at the circuit court level, despite the fact that the

circuit court found that the petition was not frivolous and patently without merit, and therefore

appointed counsel to represent the defendant, rather than dismissing the petition at the first stage

of proceedings without affording the defendant the benefit of counsel. Accordingly, we do not

agree with the State that under circumstances such as those presented in this case, it would be

appropriate to search for other grounds upon which to affirm the dismissal of the petition.

¶ 45 We find the defendant’s request that “due to the significant amount of time” the petition

has been pending, this court “urge the circuit court and the parties to avoid any further unwarranted

or unnecessary protraction of the process, upon remand” to be well-taken. To date, the

representation of the defendant by postconviction counsel has been riddled with inadequacies and

irregularities. Although we take no position on the merits of the petition, we urge the circuit court

and the parties to remain mindful of the defendant’s right to reasonable assistance of counsel on

the petition as this matter moves forward on remand.

¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 47 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the circuit court of Madison County that

dismissed the defendant’s pro se postconviction petition, and we remand for further second-stage

proceedings with new counsel. 27 ¶ 48 Reversed; cause remanded for further second-stage proceedings with new counsel.