People v. Gotay

38 P.R. 26
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedApril 19, 1928
DocketNo. 3181
StatusPublished

This text of 38 P.R. 26 (People v. Gotay) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Gotay, 38 P.R. 26 (prsupreme 1928).

Opinions

Me. Chief Justice Del- Tobo

delivered the opinion of the court.

The pertinent part of the complaint reads as follows:

“That on or about the first part of the month of April, 1924, and before this complaint was filed the defendants Pedro F. Gotay, Eugenio Pérez Ríos and Ernesto Jiménez, in Comerío, P. R., which is a part of the municipal judicial district of Bayamón, P. R., did unlawfully, wilfully and maliciously, acting jointly and by common agreement, enter into a conspiracy and combination by which Pedro F. Gotay and Eugenio Pérez Ríos were to sell, and did sell, to Ernesto Jiménez, who was to be the purchaser, and did purchase, for the sum of eighty dollars the official examination questions prepared by the Department of Education of Porto Rico, knowing that the said set of questions had been unduly and unlawfully obtained by Pedro F. Gotay and Eugenio Pérez Ríos from persons whose identity is unknown, which questions corresponded to the six subjects of History, Geography, Physiology, Nature, Civil Government and Arithmetic of the examinations that were held for graded teachers by the said Department of Education in Comerío, P. R., on the 14th and 15th of April, 1924, which questions were of a secret nature and could not be given to applicants for examination until examination day. This was done with the understanding that the said Ji-ménez should furnish, as he did furnish, those questions to Juana Jovita Rodríguez and Georgina del Valle, knowing that they were candidates for licenses as graded teachers admitted to the examination and who used the said set of questions in preparing themselves beforehand for the said examination and so obtained in an unlawful, corrupt and malicious manner the licenses as such graded teachers in the Island of Porto Rico, which acts are prejudicial to public morals and disposed to pervert or obstruct the due administration of the laws, thus giving to persons unqualified the means of obtaining licenses to act as graded teachers in the public schools o£ Porto Rico.”

After trial tlie three defendants were found guilty and each of them was sentenced to thirty days in jail.

They appealed to this court. Gotay and Pérez filed a brief represented by attorneys Bubón & Ochoteco and attorney Juan B. Soto filed a brief for Jimenez.

We should refer first to the brief filed by Gotay and Pérez, in which four errors are assigned.

[28]*28It is contended tliat the court erred in overruling' a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants on the ground that more than 60 days had elapsed between the date on which they were arrested and gave bail and the date on which the complaint was filed.

In relation to the motion to dismiss the record shows only the following:

“Tlie three defendants, by their attorneys, filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that 60 days had elapsed between the date of their arrest and the tim,e of the filing of the complaint. The motion-was argued. In opposing the motion the district attorney presented the bail bond given by the defendants and the motion was overruled by the court, counsel for the defendants taking an exception to that ruling. ’ ’

Then, on a motion to correct the record, copies of the motion and of the bail bond were exhibited. The bail was given on May 22, 1924, the day on which the' arrest of the defendants "was ordered. The complaint was filed on July 22, 1924. Between these dates sixty-two days intervened, or two days more than the period prescribed by law.

However, the question raised has not such importance as at first sight it may seem to have. As contended by the fiscal, the motion to dismiss was made in the district court, which was not the court in which the complaint was filed originally.

There is no showing that the defendants asserted their right to dismissal in the Municipal Court of Bayamón which had original jurisdiction of the cause, hence that right must be considered as waived.

In the second assignment of error the appellants contend that perhaps the complaint might charge larceny, but never the crime of conspiracy.

We have quoted this complaint and in our opinion it is sufficient.

The following is copied from Corpus Juris:

[29]*29“In order that a combination may be punishable it must be formed to do either an unlawful act or a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means. If the object to be attained is innocent and the means used are also innocent, there is no conspiracy. It is not essential, however, to criminal liability that the acts contemplated should constitute a criminal offense for which, without the elements of conspiracy, one alone could be indicted. It is an offense independent of the crime or unlawful act which is its purpose; and it will be enough if the acts contemplated are corrupt, dishonest, fraudulent, or immoral, and in that sense illegal. A conspiracy will be indictable if the end proposed or the means to be employed are, by reason of the combination, particularly dangerous to the public interest, or particularly injurious to some individual, although not criminal.” 12 C. J. 547.

And in tlie case of People v. Juliá, 25 P.R.R. 262, this court expressed itself as follows:

“These several acts were strong circumstantial evidence that the defendants were in combination to admit unqualified persons to examination and to issue diplomas to persons ignorant of the profession of pharmacy by furnishing them with answers because they were not familiar with the subjects prescribed by Jaw and that to this end some o£ the conspirators performed certain acts and others other acts, which is sufficient to justify the conclusion that there was a conspiracy among them for the said purpose injurious to the public health and to the due administration of the laws, for it is not necessary to prove the conspiracy itself because generally it would be impossible to produce such proof by direct evidence in view of the secrecy with which such plans are adopted. The evidence generally consists of inferences or presumptions arising from the commission of certain acts and it is sufficient when one conspirator performs a part of the plan of the conspiracy and the other another part thereof in order to complete it, although they never got together to concert the methods or to put in practice the common purpose. People v. Donnelly, 143 Cal. 398; United States v. Sacia, 2 Fed. 754. In People v. Bentley, 75 Cal. 409, the following is quoted from 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 93:
“ ‘If it be proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the same object, often by the same means, one performing one part and another another part of the same so as to complete, it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, the jury will be justified in [30]*30the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that ■ object.’ ”

In assignments three and four it is alleged that the evidence was insufficient.

In the brief filed by the fiscal the evidence is summed up as follows:

“On or about the 14th and 15th of April, 1924, certain examinations for graded teachers were to be held at Comerio.

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Related

People v. Donnolly
77 P. 177 (California Supreme Court, 1904)
People v. Ley
75 Cal. 407 (California Supreme Court, 1888)
United States v. Sacia
2 F. 754 (D. New Jersey, 1880)

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Bluebook (online)
38 P.R. 26, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-gotay-prsupreme-1928.