People v. Gomez

56 Misc. 3d 883, 56 N.Y.S.3d 854
CourtCriminal Court of the City of New York
DecidedJuly 18, 2017
StatusPublished

This text of 56 Misc. 3d 883 (People v. Gomez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Criminal Court of the City of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Gomez, 56 Misc. 3d 883, 56 N.Y.S.3d 854 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2017).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

David J. Kirschner, J.

By an accusatory instrument filed August 25, 2014, defendant was charged with three counts of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (two counts as intoxicated, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3], [4], both misdemeanors; one count as impaired, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [1], a violation).

In a motion dated January 20, 2017, defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the grounds that his equal protection rights were violated. In papers dated April 12, 2017, the People opposed. On June 19, 2017, this court denied the motion. This expands that decision.

I. Background and Procedural History

The charges against defendant stem from his arrest on August 24, 2014, at approximately 5:00 a.m. in front of 1447 Gleason Avenue in Bronx County. It is alleged that police officers observed defendant drive his SUV through a steady red light at the intersection of St. Lawrence and Gleason Avenues. Upon stopping and approaching him, the arresting officer detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from his breath, and observed him to have bloodshot and watery eyes and slurred speech, and to be unsteady on his feet. Defendant admitted he had been in a bar and consumed about nine beers. He submitted to a chemical breath analysis test, the result of which was that he had a blood alcohol content of .14 of one per centum by weight.

On August 25, 2014, defendant was arraigned on the charges, entered a plea of not guilty, and was released on his own recognizance. His driving privilege in New York was suspended. He was also ordered to undergo screening and assessment for substance abuse.

[885]*885By motion dated October 27, 2014, defendant moved to suppress the statements he made to the police and the result of the chemical breath test claiming, among other things, that they were the fruit of an improper and unlawful arrest. On November 18, 2015, a hearing was held on that motion. On December 22, 2015, defendant’s motion to suppress was denied in all respects.

Then, as noted, defendant moved to dismiss the charges in the information claiming that his equal protection rights were abrogated in violation of Criminal Procedure Law § 170.30 (1) (f), US Constitution, 14th Amendment, § 1 and article I, § 11 of the NY Constitution. Defendant maintains that the policy of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) is to offer English-speaking people under suspicion of driving while impaired or intoxicated the opportunity to perform physical coordination tests. He alleges that as an English-speaking person, the police, based on his Hispanic ethnicity, engaged in a discriminatory practice by depriving him of the same opportunity afforded to other English-speaking people.

The People, however, argue that after interacting and communicating with defendant, the arresting officers had a reasonable basis to believe that defendant was not fluent in English. Consequently, their decision to not offer him the physical coordination test was not based on his Hispanic ethnicity, but rather on his inability to correctly understand the instructions.

II. Discussion

The United States Constitution mandates that the states afford the same rights, privileges, and protections to all within its jurisdiction (US Const, 14th Amend, § 1). Likewise, the New York State Constitution provides a similar protection (NY Const, art I, § 11). In addressing claims alleging equal protection violations, a court first must determine whether to apply a strict scrutiny analysis or the less stringent rational basis analysis (Heller v Doe, 509 US 312, 319 [1993]; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v Bakke, 438 US 265 [1978]; Soberal-Perez v Heckler, 717 F2d 36, 41 [2d Cir 1983]; Alevy v Downstate Med. Ctr. of State of N.Y., 39 NY2d 326, 332 [1976]; People v Salazar, 112 AD3d 5, 9 [1st Dept 2013]).

When a practice by the government creates a burden on a fundamental right or disadvantage for a suspect class, the strict scrutiny test must be applied (id.). Strict scrutiny requires the government to provide a credible justification for [886]*886the practice. Otherwise, it will be struck down (id.). But absent an infringement on a vital right or demonstration of discrimination, the government practice will be struck down only if there is no rational basis for it (id.).

In this case, defendant challenges the practice of the NYPD of offering physical coordination tests only to English-speaking people. He claims he is English-speaking and the police declined to offer him the tests based on his Hispanic ethnicity. Defendant contends that this ethnicity determination was discriminatory. The People argue that the police did not offer the tests based upon their reasonable perception of defendant’s inability to fully comprehend and speak English, not his ethnicity.

The record of the suppression hearing demonstrates that the police had a sound belief that defendant was not fluent in English, and certainly that English was not his primary language. The arresting officer, who was fluent in Spanish and English, introduced himself to defendant in English but throughout their interaction, spoke to defendant in both languages (Per-alta at 17).1 Additionally, as depicted in the videotape presented at the suppression hearing, when defendant spoke English at the precinct, he did so with a distinct Spanish accent (id. at 24-25; People’s exhibit 2). Perhaps most saliently, though, is that the chemical breath test instructions were administered in Spanish through the use of a Spanish language videotape recording (Peralta at 24). Thus, there is credible evidence that the police had a reasonable perception that defendant was not fluent in English.

Moreover, a refusal to offer a physical coordination test based on a person’s language is facially neutral (People v Salazar, 112 AD3d at 9). If a practice is facially neutral, intentional discrimination must be established to apply a strict scrutiny analysis. Given that the NYPD’s facially neutral practice of determining whether to offer the tests is wholly rooted in language, and not race or ethnicity, no suspect class is burdened. While Hispanics, as an ethnic group, are generally a recognized suspect class for equal protection analysis, there is no indication here that defendant’s language was a substitute for his ethnicity or a pretext for discrimination. Since no suspect class was burdened, and defendant failed to demon[887]*887strate the existence of intentional discrimination, strict scrutiny analysis is not warranted (Hernandez v New York, 500 US 352, 371-372 [1991]; People v Aviles, 28 NY3d 497 [2016]).

Instead, a rational basis analysis is appropriate in analyzing the practice here. Under this analysis, the government must demonstrate that the practice is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose (Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v Garrett, 531 US 356, 367 [2001]). Here, it is.

The practice of not offering the coordination test to non-English speakers is rationally related to the government’s interest in the reliability of coordination tests. Conducting it through a Spanish-speaking police officer, rather than a certified translator, may substantially compromise the results if instructions are improperly translated, which could be incorrectly perceived as evidence of intoxication.

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Related

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
438 U.S. 265 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Hernandez v. New York
500 U.S. 352 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Heller v. Doe Ex Rel. Doe
509 U.S. 312 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett
531 U.S. 356 (Supreme Court, 2001)
People v. Finnegan
647 N.E.2d 758 (New York Court of Appeals, 1995)
The People v. Jose Aviles
68 N.E.3d 1208 (New York Court of Appeals, 2016)
Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center
348 N.E.2d 537 (New York Court of Appeals, 1976)
People v. Salazar
112 A.D.3d 5 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2013)
People v. Perez
27 Misc. 3d 880 (New York Supreme Court, 2010)

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Bluebook (online)
56 Misc. 3d 883, 56 N.Y.S.3d 854, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-gomez-nycrimct-2017.